Relationship between mind and brain
The work is aimed at considering the relationship between the mind and the brain. An attempt will be made to prove the thesis that the brain, being the centre of human neurological system, creates and is the source of the mind as a complex of various cognitive activities, which are realised by it ( such as perception, thinking, remembering, feelings and emotions, learning, various levels of attention). In other words, the mind is a function of the brain. To prove the thesis, I will present some points to confirm it along with some counterarguments, which I will attempt at refuting, such as theories of dualism, identity theory and logical behaviorism. I will also remain slightly sceptical against radical functionalism.
One of the bases of my thesis is the assumption that the human mind is not a separate intangible substance. Dualists argue that the brain is a physical object, and therefore it can not directly affect mental states. They also add that it is possible that there might be a causal interaction between them. But here an important question arises: how can the mind which belongs to the immaterial sphere and the brain (a material thing) - would affect each other? How can causality happen between the mental and the physical? Would it not be more sensible to assume that the mind is not a separate substance, but rather the result of the brain activity?
The next argument for my thesis is the fact that there is no credible proof for existence of a mind without a brain. It could be claimed that the lack of proof for existence of a mind without a brain is not enough proof that the former is the creation of the latter. In my opinion though it is proven by the fact that brain damages lead usually to certain mental aberrations (cognitive, affective or personality disorders). If the mind were not a consequence of brain activity then brain damages should not have any influence on the functioning of human mind. Dualists' counterargument here is that there exists a possibility that for various cases damaging the same part of a brain might lead to different mental disorder, and vice versa - damaging of different parts of brain may cause the same disorder. Nevertheless, for me it signifies only that various mental functions are not located in one definite part of human brain.
The above argument is logically connected to another: the state of relations between various parts of brain is responsible for its mental functioning. There are people who believe that it is possible to construct a computer which will be able to function as a human brain does. Adducing John Searle's argument, called `Chinese room'argument' I can prove that executing extremely complicated tasks by a computer is not identical with understanding those tasks. You can have a conversation in Chinese with a computer but it does not signify that the machine can understand Chinese. Denying non-humans the right to have a mind I can be accused of `philosophical chauvinism' though, so I need to add here that even assuming that one day it will be possible to construct an object, not identical with a human being but able to perform all human brain functions, it is still not contradictory to my thesis. Such machines or devices, although constructed of different elements to human brain, will have similar functions, together with the function which we call the mind. It seems to me though that creating such a machine is equally unlikely as creating a human with their brain.
Nevertheless, the claim about the theoretical posibility to construct a machine which would have a function of mind leads us to a further argument proving my point. Mental states are not dependent on any subjective properties of the human experiences and they do not have much in common with the material of which humans are built. What matters is the arrangement, not substance. Mind is only a function which can be realized in different ways. Identity theorists do not agree with this assumption, arguing that the mind is just another name for the processes occurring in the brain. Behaviorists add that if the brain can automatically regulate breathing or blood pressure, it can also be responsible for feelings, emotional states and images without the mediation of the "mind" and thus "mind" does not exist. However, if we agree with any of these claims, how to explain the fact that differences between brains did not result in differences in their functions? A brain of Aborigine and a brain of New Yorker are not identical but their functions are actually the same. Behavioristic assumption leads to false conclusion that all brains should be identical.
My thesis, which in its premises resembles moderate funtionalism, holds that mental states are defined by their functional roles and any state that performs the specific functional role may be counted as a mental state. I have presented only a few arguments proving this claim but they should be sufficient to make my point of view convincing and to reject possible criticism.
Katarzyna Dobrowolska
DSL2