Adrian A. Selin

Appearing of the Borderland: Delimitation in Ingermanland in 1617-1618

North-Western border of Novgorod Land was one of the most ancient delimitated borders in Northern Europe. Appeared in the 1^st half of 14^th c. as a division of Finnish-speaking tribes it started to be phenomena of two Early Modern states in 16^th c. Close interactions between Sweden and Muscovy during the Baltic wars, delimitations in 1583 and in 1590s, had prepared the territory to be a kind of diffusion space with transparent limits. Meanwhile the character of Muscovite power being spread on any territory appeared to be of an occupational type: all lands or newly conquered either wined back had been regarded as former enemy space.

Through the political crises in Swedish kingdom in late 1590s the Ingria fortresses - Ivangorod, Jam and Koporje, Notheborg to less extent - were regarded by Swedes as a necessary corridor between Finland and Livonian estates. That is why the De la Gardie's army both in 1609 and in 1611 tried to take just these lands. However the servicemen of the small fortresses in 1611-1612 were the supporters of Pskov Thief - False Dmitry III. But in 1612-1616 North West of Novgorod land preserved to be a constituent part of Novgorod.

Stolbovo Treaty signed on February 27, 1617 was the final point of long confrontation between Moscow and Sweden, full of different political ideas and conversations, sometimes shut with military events and local battles. The peace been achieved was expected by both sides and the conversations in 1615-1617 were only about money, territories and souls of Novgorod servicemen, peasants and priests. However the result was the appearing on the Baltic coast new specific territory better to be named borderland. Sweden received territory been inhabited with Orthodox population. For more than 80 years a specific new Swedish province had existed.

During negotiations in Stolbovo only names of fortresses (and its districts) were mentioned. Genuine borders between them were very badly known (if existed). Thus the delimitation was too complicated task. But in early January 1617 it looked easy. Russian and Swedish ambassadors decided at that time that just on March 1 the first meeting of delimitation commissions could be held (that depended from roads: in February - March the winter ways were still used before the spring slush. Then in January the ambassadors talked about the further limit “on the original border between Ladoga and Oreshek on Kobona river on the bridge”. Both sides did not know the “genuine border” - Lavuja river - at that time. The name of the river appeared in the negotiations only in mid-January preliminary Treaty texts. The time of further meeting was also changed to more realistic May, 1 and then to June 1

Only on May 31, 1617 head of Moscow deputation Semen Zherebtsov received the order from Posolskij prikaz (Foreign Chancellery). He and his assistants, gentleman Ivan Domozhirov and Secretary (Diak) Ivan Lgovskij had to go to the mouth of Lavuja river and have a meeting with Swedish representatives. The delimitation commissions depended also from the meeting of two ratification embassies which also were to meet on new borderline: Prince Fedor Boryatinskij went to Stockholm and Gustav Steinbeck went to Moscow.

Moscow commissars were specially ordered to insist on the delivery of seven pogosts of Koporje district to Muscovite state. That was the space which after the war of 1590s was taken by Russians from Swedes; after that the land was transferred to Novgorod gentry. Zherebtsov was allowed to refuse of that delivering only on the most extreme extent. According to the Chancellery order the commissars had to take as much space as it would be possible to the czar's side and to describe the taken places and lands secretly.

On September 18 Zherebtsov reached Novgorod. The governor Prince Ivan Khovanskij reached the city just some days before. He just started his active duty; his orders were slowly executed. The appointed 20 Novgorod servicemen did not come to the service. Zherebtsov waited for them for 5 days but only 5 gentlemen had come to him. At last on September 25 Russian commissars started to Ladoga.

The commissions even did not have a translator, no any translator found in Novgorod. Only Prince Boryatinskij after their meeting near Lavuja gave the translator Timofej Fannemin to Zherebtsov's commission. Since the very first days of the negotiations the Swedes showed displeasure of the way how did Fannemin translated the speeches. Swedes had an expert in Russian and Swedish and also Finnish, German and Tartar languages - that was Erik Trana). In the same time Fannemin spoke only German and very badly Russian.

Prince Boryatinskij and his team was the first been sent from Moscow in summer 1617. They were also the first who faced with Swedish ambassadors and delimitation commissars had been bored in Notheborg (Oreshek). They had conversations: Prince Boryatinskij wrote to Foreign Chancellery that it was high time to start the delimitation before the slush started and the snow appeared. On November 5 Boryatinskij's report appeared in Moscow and the secretaries of the Foreign Chancellery sent an order to Zherebtsov directing to start the negotiations as soon as it was possible. But in November 5 the negotiations had already finished and even the delimitation had been started.

The point of the conference with Swedish commissar Johan Berends till Strömsberg ought to be the bridge across Lavuja river: it had been to be build by Russians. Zherebtsov was ordered to start the negotiations from the proposal to have a meeting in the tents on Russian side of the river and if the Swedish commissars refuse, to make the conference just on the bridge. After long way from Moscow to Novgorod and then long argues with local Russian administration Zherebtsov came to the Lavuja river in early October. The bridge was made by his musketeers.

First two weeks of the negotiations were spent in conversations about the titles of czar Mikhail and king Gustav Adolf and, as a result of this, in about the appropriation of the credentials. Swedes, aspiring to make the negotiations faster, offered to postpone the issues for the time when the both sides receive the new credentials and start the delimitation. The important impulse to that start was the coming of Ambassador Gustav Steinbeck to Swedish commissars' camp on October, 18. He went to Moscow for the Stolbovo Treaty ratification. On October 23 Zherebtsov and Berends started the delimitation process.

The first dispute between the sides was on the small island Zelenets in Ladoga Lake. According to the text of Stolbovo Treaty both sides suddenly understood that there was no any word about the delimitation of the Lake. The dispute about the island made also the precedent of the opposition of the old residents' evidences: Russian witnesses sworn that the island belonged to Ladoga district, Swedish ones that it belonged to Notheborg district. Swedes offered that in future in such cases the sides could better resort to oath of the old residents. The supposed oath was of two manners: one was the kissing of a cross and the other - bearing a piece of sod on a head. The issue of the island and ways of oath was of special discussion in the Chancellery. The Secretaries in Moscow allowed the both ways and ordered Russian commissars to struggle for the island or, in extreme case - to propose the division of it.

It was really impossible to make a normal communication between Moscow Foreign Chancellery and Zherebtsov's commission. Orders and reports were coming to Moscow and to the commissars with great delays. In one of his first reports Zherebtsov wrote that he started the delimitation on October 25 and limited Terebuzh pogost, Malaja Loptsa and Soltsy pogost from the Lop' pogost and Jarvosol' pogost with “genuine border”. I suppose Zherebtsov intended the genuine border between the pogosts. But on the point Velikij Kamen' (Great Stone) where the Tigoda pogost from the Russian side and the Koporje district from the Swedish side had started, Russians offered to talk about the seven pogosts of Koporje district that had been allegedly transferred to Novgorod district after the war of 1590s. Swedes refused flatly using simple arguments: in late 16^th century all Novgorod land, including Koporje and other North-Western districts were the part of Muscovite State; the pogosts Muscovites were taking about were the genuine pogosts of Koporje district. Novgorod landowners who had estates in the area after 1617 were free to return to the Muscovite side, so Russian commissars had had n arguments to pretend for those seven pogosts.

But that was not so simple - according to Muscovite practice. The episode when Russian commissars tried to reconsider the Stolbovo agreements was based on the sequence of arguments. According to Plussa Treaty 1583 Koporje, Jam and Ivangorod were kept in Swedes' hands. After taking these fortresses back by Muscovites in 1590-1591 the estates in the districts were distributed to Novgorod servicemen like any newly conquered lands. These estates were governed by Novgorod Chancellery (not by Koporje or other governors). That system was described in 1614 when nobody knew the conditions of further Stolbovo treaty. Thus, according to unprejudiced opinion of Novgorod servicemen after 1590-1593 the seven Koporje pogosts were transferred to Novgorod district.

The other dispute happened in that point: the old residents from both sides started to argue about the abandoned village Konduja: Swedish witnesses maintained it belonged to Jarvosol pogost and the Muscovite old residents affirmed that the “genuine” border was “higher” than Konduja village and the village belonged to Tigoda pogost. The Muscovite witness had even quoted the old record books (see map).

After passing by the disputable village the commissars moved further following “old borderline, passing by Lezje swamp about 6 verstas up to the Orechov road and then, - as Russian commissars had proudly written to Moscow, - following the new borderline through Notheborg and Koporje districts”. The commissions moved through these districts for 204 verstas up to the waste village Lipovo taking, according to Zherebtsov's report, from Orechov and Koporje districts space about 17 and somewhere about 10 or 8 or less verstas in width. “Russian” old residents told the commissars that “Swedish” old residents do not know this part of “the genuine border” so both commissions followed the Russian side.

The next stop was at Posestrina Gora site where Swedish old residents tried to go aside the villages Bezhany and Muravejno (leaving them on the Swedish side) but that was recognized by Russian “connoisseurs” and both villages were left as disputable ones. After next 50 verstas along Luga river both commissions reached borderline Storonje village; then Zherebtsov and his team went to the camp in Lozhgolovo and the Swedish commissars - to Jam fortress (see map). That happened in mid-December (just the time when new Russian credentials started to move from Moscow). On December 15 Erik Trana came to Muscovite camp and offered to have new meeting on Luga. During that conference the Russian commissars described the last part of the borderline according to the Stolbovo Treaty:: by Krutoj brook from Luga river to Pjata river, by Pjata rive to Plussa river, by Plussa river to Narova river. But Trana made a secret proposal: to make the borderline along Dolgaja river, making Swedish Ivangorod district large. He referred also to the Swedish witnesses. Then the sides came to making confrontation between the witnesses using also the borderline description and some draught. But it failed: the old residents from both sides did not achieve common decision, after that the commissars continued the negotiations without them. At last Erik Trana offered a combination: if Zherebtsov agreed to sign the borderline covenant just immediately the Swedes would agreed with the Russian verse; if Russians proposed to wait for the credentials from Moscow, Swedes would continued to persist on their verse. Immediately one of Swedes' witness Fedor Aminev (considered in Muscovy as a deserter) testified to the Russian verse that was a surprise for Swedes.

It is noticeable that Swedes also started to ловчить and to propose the revision of Stolbovo agreements. Zherebtsov who could not agree to such proposals had apply to earlier delimitations in 1583 and 1590s. But Trana noted that Swedish commissars did not remember former negotiations and delimitations but in Stolbovo Treaty that had been clearly written: to уточнять the borderline according to the old reminders'; meanwhile “Swedish” old residents noted that the “genuine” border passed the line along Dolgaja river and further - to Issad. Once again the sides used identification parade between the old residents using also the limitation list and some чертеж.

The intrigue of that day was not over: Erik Trana used the political arguments. He applied to the danger to Moscow that came from “Lithuanian” troops; he knew that Prince Wladyslaw Wasa had conquered Vjazma and Dorogobuzh and started o siege Moscow. He told: “I heard he (the prince} is going to Moscow by one road; but I would be happy to know he ran away by thousands of roads”. That was subtly done: both menace and benevolence were explicated immediately. Zherebtsov meanwhile refused the reliability if the events about such a great menace to Moscow (and Trana did not know about the terrible march of Sagajdachnyj) . He answered that only few “Lithuanians ” had came up to Moscow; they were defeated by Czar's army.

In January 1618 the Zherebtsov's commission having no contact with the Foreign Chancellery appeared to be in very hard conditions. They had no possibility to send couriers to Moscow and Novgorod as often as necessary; he had lack of wagons and food, all the space near the future borderline was abandoned and the commissars moved by their own horses. The commissars were very afraid to stay in Lozhgolovo, in a camp without any fortifications. The January reports to Moscow were going for more than a month. And the political situation in January had become very serious: the Lithuanian detachments appeared very close to Narva. Both Swedes and Russians supposed that the enemies knew about their mission and had the aim to attack them. During meetings in January 21-22 the sides discussed the problem of such assault

New stage of the negotiations started. All the trace of the borderline had been already passed. The aim was to decide all the disputable questions and to sign the agreement. The task was to make that in the conditions of military danger: the raid of a big Lithuanian detachment to Novgorod or Pskov was very possible. The Swedish commissars interrupted the negotiations and moved to Jam fortress. Erik Trana came to Russian camp and offered to finish the conference on Osinovaja Gorka, the place where the Big Ivangorod road crossed the further borderline.

Later on it was known that the паники has a basis: local peasants told Zherebtsov (after his separation with Swedes) that there had been Polish-Cossack detachment been specially sent to sudden attack the commissars. Only when Zherebtsov went from Luga closer to Novgorod and he Swedes moved to Jam that detachment turned back. In the same time Swedes had prisoned the spy in Gdov who had also told about that detachment

While moving through territory that was out of Muscovite power for more than 6 years Zherebtsov needed to search for any information. The searching was mostly the analysis of different talks of local peasants and also of special spies. The spies were ordered to collect information about Swedes' intentions and “Lithuanians” movements.

On November 18, 1617 Zherebtsov sent two local landowners, brothers Faddey and Foma Grigorjevs to their native town Jam. 5 days later Faddey returned to Russian camp, been visited Narva and Ivangorod. He told the commissars that lived in Ivangorod for three days and had noted that the Narva fortress had been fortified. In the same time significant fortification works were in Ivangorod. In 1616 the Ivangorod wooden fortress was burnt down; in late 1617 Swedes made the new one and cleared the ditch around it. Also Jam fortress was repaired in that time. Faddey's relatives told him that soon after the Pokrov day (October 1) there was scare in 20 verstas near Narva. People were talking that “Lithuanians had taken the Livonian fortresses back. After numerous damages Jacob De la Gardie, according to the talks, signed the armistice with “Lithuania” and promised Revel and Narva to the enemy. Then he had gone to Stockholm. Meanwhile Revel inhabitants were waiting for King Gustav Adolf. 1500 Lithuanian cavalry and infantry had come to Dorpat and nobody knew where they prepared to go.

Two days later Foma Grigorjev also returned to Russian camp. He confirmed the most of events been told by his brother and added some talks about the king. That time, according to his information, Gustav Adolf was in Stockholm and on Christmas the king was prepared to the coronation. After the coronation Gustav Adolf ought to be in Revel. When in Narva Foma had heard that Swedes in Stockholm did not want Gustav Adolf to be a king and there had been even talks about Prince Carl Philipp as a candidate. Such talks about confusion in Sweden and about the confrontation between Gustav Adolf and his brother (who had not long ago been a candidate for Moscow throne) seemed to be very significant to Russian commissars and of course influenced on them greatly. Bu all the “Swedish” talks appeared to be false; in the same time the “Lithuanian” danger was very close reality. The armistice between Swedish Narva and “Lithuanian” Dorpat was reality and numerous enemy troops in Dorpat was very important menace for the delimitation mission.

But Foma Grigorjev also told about confusion in Lithuania: when in Jam he had heard about “German Prince who had asked Lithuanian king for some fortresses in Lithuania and the king wanted to execute him; after that the Prince had deserted and gone to the Swedish king with his 1000 soldiers”. Then, n November 1617 that Prince, according to the talks was sieged in Pernau.

The commissars also tried to take any information just from their opponents during the negotiations (sometimes of the same extent of true). On December 15 Erik Trana told Russian commissars that Swedish and Danish king had achieved peace and the fortress of Kalmar had been ransomed from the Danes; but there had been no peace between Sweden and Lithuania, only temporal armistice before June. Trana also denied the talk about further coronation of King Gustav Adolf; according to him, the king had been crowned in Uppsala on October 12.

Other talks were obtained from Commissar Gert von Ungern on December 29 or 30. He confirmed the talks about the armistice in Livonia until June. He also minutely described the struggle of Swedish stockholders for the supremacy in Southern Baltic. Carl Gyllenhelm had left Narva to check the armistice with Lithuania and Jacob De la Gardie had been going to be a governor over Revel, Narva and also Vyborg (that was also false: Gyllenhelm kept to be governor over further Ingermanland). Zherebtsov also retold the Foreign Chancellery von Ungern's talks that King Gustav Adolf had hired 8000 soldiers in the Netherlands given the towns “where honey burns” as deposit.

The brightest talks were taken to the Russian commissars from priest Larion from Staropolje near Lozhgolovo, In late December Zherebtsov sent him to Gdov district to local fishermen. The priest returned back on January 2. In one of fisher's village (Kunest') he met with a peasant Ivan Borovikov, former from Gdov district and at that time - the settler of Dorpat district. Borovikov told the priest about 8000 of Lithuanian army been hold in Polotsk. The reason for the military concentration was the started peaceful negotiations between Swedes and Lithuanians.. According to Borovikov Lithuanians pretend for 15 Livonian fortresses, including Narva, Revel and even Vyborg. If the Treaty would be signed the Lithuanian army attack Novgorod, if not - the war between Swedes and Lithuanian restart.

The clatters gathered in other fisher's villages were less anxious. The fishers told the priests that Marshall Gyllenhelm with the army had gone to the Lithuanian frontier and Gdov inhabitants had supplied him with food and forage. In Gdov people talked that Gyllenhelm went to negotiate with Lithuanians.

It is significant that the most actual theme of the talks was the negotiations and the armistice between Swedes and Lithuanians; the most important hero appears to be Marshal Gyllenhelm who had sieged Pskov some months before and at that time appointed to Baltic Swedish provinces.

After negotiations interrupted Berends and his team had gone to Jam. They notified Zherebtsov that after spending one night in the fortress they moved to Zarechje and then to Osinovaja Gorka. There Swedes offered Russians to sign the delimitation agreement and finish everything in a week. But Zherebtsov and his team went to Beloe being afraid of Lithuanian troops in the area (see map). On January 30 Erik Trana came to Beloe and told Russians that Swedes were waiting them prepared dwellings in Osinovaja Gorka. Zherebtsov showed he was ready to join. But on January 31 Novgorod governor Prince Khovanskij informed the commissars that Lithuanians detachments were seen some 40 verstas from Novgorod. The Swedes also were afraid of Lithuanian troops: Swedish commissars got harry and agreed with Russian preliminary proposals of the borderline warning them about the Polish attacks near Narva

In early February the military danger became too serious. Local peasants told Zherebtsov that separate Lithuanian detachments were asking them where the commissars were staying. Greatly frightened Zherebtsov started running to Novgorod. Near the Vjazhitskij monastery he recognized that Prince Khovanskij had defeated Lithuanian detachments. On February 8 Swedes invited Zherebtsov to Osinovaja Gorka. On February 13 Zherebtsov started to move back to the point. Two days later the last round of negotiations started. Swedes prepared fortifications in the Osinovaja Gorka and guarded it with about 300 soldiers with canons.

In Osinovaja Gorka Swedes refused from the Zelenets island and also the disputable villages Konduja, Bezhany, Muravejno. Even the old residents did not swear an oath. The Russian commissars succeeded to make a border of Somro and Gdov district with Jam and Ivangorod districts according to the “old” borders. On the whole the negotiations finished on February 19. Then the credentials were translated by Fannemin and Trana.

On March 28 1618 the borderline agreement in Ingria was signed. Long and complicated negotiations about the other part of new Russian - Swedish border continued in Karelia for long next almost three years and Erik Trana was very active participant of them. But Ingermanland since March 1618 became an existing Swedish territory, first - as a number of fortresses and countryside districts, all governed from Narva, then, since 1630s -as a new province. The borderland appeared: as a diffusion space with transparent limits and similar population. The new challenges of repatriation and also of returning the deserters appeared in the borderland discourse.

It is important to stress that the persons took part in the delimitation were veterans of 1611-1617 military events. Sometimes they had an experience of common service (like Novgorod serviceman Nikita Tyrkov, participant of the commission and Swedish commissar Berends) sometimes they had changed the side during the previous events (like Erik Trana). The fleur of the Time of Troubles heritage followed the history of borderland for more than twenty next years.

The more than eighty years of the borderline between Sweden and Muscovite State in 17^th century was the very specific cultural experience. Extremely closed Orthodox space of Muscovite culture was suddenly divided. But in the same time the borderline was not so closed like, for example in 19^th or in 20^th century. People who had been lived along both sides of the line were more the people of their time nor of the closed cultures: they kept contacts in the borderland that started to shape just in 1617-1618.

Adrian A. Selin. Professor, Higher School of Economics, St. Petersburg Brunch, Faculty of History

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Appearing of the Borderland: Delimitation in Ingermanland in 1617-1618

Annotation

Stolbovo Treaty 1617 was the first step in making peace in Russian North-West. Delimitation process started after half a year ended only in August 1621. The article describes the circumstances of the delimitation first stage in Ingria in 1617-1618 provided in the atmosphere of “Lithuanian” menace. Old residents - local peasants supported both Swedish and Russian delimitation commissions. The result of the delimitation was making very transparent borderline existed for more than 80 years

Keywords: Delimitation, Stolbovo Treaty, Novgorod Land, Sweden, Borderland

Dunning Chester “The precondition of Modern Russia's First Civil War”, Russian History/Histoire Russe 25, no 1-2 (1998): 119-31.

Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts (далее, RGADA), Relations between Russia and Sweden fond 96, 1617, number 3, folio. 65.

RGADA, fond 96. 1617, no. 3, fol. 139-40.

RGADA, fond 96. 1617, no. 3, fol. 72-3.

RGADA, fond 96. 1617, no. 9, fol. 100-22.

RGADA, fond 96. 1617, no. 9, fol. 9-77.

RGADA, fond 96. 1617, no. 9, fol. 149-50.

A. Korhonen, Eerikki Antinpoika. Porvoo, W. Soderstrom ed., 1953.

RGADA, fond 96. 1617, no. 9, fol. 164-5.

RGADA, fond 96. 1617, no. 9, fols. 223-30.

RGADA, fond 96. 1617, no. 9, fols 166-94.

RGADA, fond 96. 1617, no. 9, fols 223-230.

RGADA, fond 96. 1617, no. 9, fols 238.

RGADA, fond 96. 1616, no. 3, fols 181-4.

Юхан Видекинд, История шведско-московской войны XVII века (Москва: Издательство Памятники исторической мысли, 2000), 481-2.

RGADA, fond 96. 1617, no. 9, fol. 239-49.

RGADA, fond 96. 1617, no. 9, fol. 291-3.

RGADA, fond 96. 1617, no. 9, fol. 294-312, 314, 318-20, 317, 315, 321-34, 336.

А. А. Селин, Новгородское общество эпохи Смуты (Санкт-Петербург: Издательство Российско-американский издательский центр «БЛИЦ», 2008), 600-6.

В. А. Аракчеев, А. А. Селин, Русско-польские отношения на северо-западной границе России на исходе Смуты и перемирие 1617 г., Россия, Польша, Германия: история и современность европейского единства в идеологии, политике и культуре, Москва, Издательство «Индрик», 2009: 70-81.

RGADA, fond 96. 1617, no 9, fol. 266-72.

RGADA, fond 96. 1617, no 9, fol. 291-3.

RGADA, fond 96. 1617, no 9, fol. 294-312, 314, 318-20, 317, 315, 321-34, 336.

Ibid.

Ibid.

RGADA, fond 96. 1617, no 9, fol. 337, 335, 338-42; RGADA, fond 96. 1617, no 9, fol. 343-8.

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