The University of Vienna. "The New Building" (1897) (Courtcsy of the Austrian National Library)
Left:
Ludwig Boltzmann. Prime developer of the kinetic theory of gases which hclpcd make the revolutionary work of Planck and F.instein possible. His tenaciuus defense of the atomie theory earncd him the labcl "The Last Pillar" from Math's followcrs.
(Courtcsy of the Ernst Mach Institutc)
Rigbt:
Joseph Petzoldt. Philosopłiical follower of Richard Avenarius and Ernst Mach whosc attempt to conncct Ernst Machs cpistemological theory with Albert Einstein’s physical theory of relativity has helped lead to so much contemporary controvcrsy and confusion. (Courtcsy of ihe Library Archivc of the Tcchnical LTnivęrsiry of Berlin)
Ernst Mach at Vaterstetten. The last ycars (191 3*1916) (Courtcsy of Frau Anna Karma Mach)
sations (phenomenalism), senscd objeets (naivc rcalisni), nor with any immcdiately cxperienceablc or conscious referents, but with materiał forccs in a space and timc outsidc all possiblc or actual conscious im-mcdiacy.
This disputc bctwcen “New" and "Critical" Rcalism shifted the battlc away from “na£vcM vs. "causal rcalism" to one simply bctwcen presentationalist and representationalist realism. The for mer is somc-times understood as naive rcalism with “functional” instead of “causal" cxplanation and minus somc of the traditionally objectionable fcatures of naivc rcalism. Another identification of presentationalist “rcalism" is indistinguishable from phenomenalism cxccpt for its language.91
The tragedy is that when most contemporary philosophcrs opposc “realism" to cither “positivism" or “phenomenalism," they normally mcan presentationalist rcalism, when in fact, most practical pcoplc arc representationalist in their cpistcmology (which they also cali “realism") and oppose presentationalist “rcalism" just as strongly as they opposc other presentationalist views such as “positivism" and "phenomenalism." No aspect of modern philosophical usage is morę mis-leading and regrettablc than identifying the word “rcalism" with vie\vs based on a presentationalist or idealistic (in cightecnth-ccntury terms) cpistcmology.
The sccond wave of Machs influence in the new world camc with the emigration of the “Vienna Circlc" during the 1930S. All "logical positivists" as members of this movcmcnt werc soon callcd, hcld a number of Machs idcas. Undcr the influence of the linguistic idcas of Wittgenstein and Carnap they came to believc that they had shifted from Machs "phenomenalism" to "realism." by which they mcant a “physical object” language. During the 1940S and 1950$ some of the older members of this movcmcnt genuinely tried to shift from Mach s cpistemology and not rnercly from a “phenomenalistie language," but again, to the extcnt they succcedcd it was rnercly to another form of presentationalist realism, usually one closer to "New' Realism/'4 Thcre is no csidence that members of the “Vienna Circle" any morc than their American counterparts of the 1910 mamfesto ever comprchcnded wliat rcpresentationalists mcant by "rcalism," much less evcr camc elose to adopting such a position. Only in the last decadc, in a move rcsembling Bertrand Russclls last philosophical metamorphosis, havc a few cldcrly survtvors of the “Vicnna Circle" begun to appreciatc representationalist, that is, “common sense" rcalism.®'
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