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Ernst Mach

the lattcrs influence in tum on Bertrand Russell.²⁰ We will ignorc our mystics pastorał cxistcnce after World War I in an Austrian village and conccntratc first on his principlc and then on his contact with Schlick's group. The “yerifiability principlc” in its most widcly rccog-nized form asserted that only rhosc statements which were in principlc cmpirically vcrifiablc or falsifiablc had meaning.²¹ The problem. cvcn apart from clarifying the cxprc$sions “cmpirical” and “vcrifiablc,” was that it arbitrarily limited the scopc of understandability, cncouragcd premature dismissal as “mcaningless" or "nonsense” of much that in fact could be understood, cspecially in terms of other theories of mcan-ing and reference, and it tended to glorify ignorancc as if the less one understood the better.

Its ovcrt purposc was to provide a mcthodological instrument to help remove “metaphysics” from scicntific invcstigation. In practicc, it denied “intclligiblc” reference to what most represcntational realists mcant by physical rcality and all practical pcoplc understood by causcs, namcly, particular mcntal or physical forccs locatcd at particular placcs and times. It was not truć, howcver, that cvcry time a bclievcr in Wittgcnstein’s principle used the term ‘‘metaphysics” or “nonsense” he was specifically attacking wh3t Galileo, Descartes, and practical pcoplc considercd common sense, but it was truć that when such presentationalists were consistcnt they had to rcjcct traditional common sense as Weil as all representationalist philosophy as “mcaningless.”

To allow rules, any rules, to determine meaning restriets communi-cation by condemning all violations of the rules to nonunderstanda-bility. To avoid unncccssary ignorancc and misunderstanding most pcoplc in practical lifc havc tried to kcep communication open by subordinating expresscd words and rules to what other pcople arc most likely driving at, that is, they focus on intentions. In this way all philosophics and points of vicw, presentationalist and representationalist, havc rcmained at least conccivably capablc of bcing understood by cvcryone. indeed, cvcn when other pcoplc speak in a foreign language or usc no cxprcsscd words or symbols at all, it is still fre-(jucntly possiblc to understand them by focusing on what pcoplc in their situation or with their beliefs and background most likely intend to communicatc and plan to achievc by communication. To be surę, the common sense approach lacks “ccrtainty" and what is morę vaguc or noncrnpirical than the notion of an "intention”? Nonethelcss, intention-oriented communication works, avoids the arrogancc of rulc* determined meaning, and is so practical that the likelihood of it ever bcing abandoncd by pcoplc who want rcliable communication and who insist on corrcctly understanding the vicw$ of other pcoplc is ncxt to noncxistcnt.

Presentationalist tlicorics of reference as wcll as the “verifiability principlc” oscillate betwcen "strong" and “weak" versions or inter-pretations. The “strong” vcrsion identifics both the process or relation of reference and the referent in presentationalist terms; reference must be consciously immediatc and the referent cannoi havc other than eon* sciously experienccablc characteristics. The “weak" vcrsion. which sińce the 1930S has been the dominant one, rciaxes the presentationalist strictures on reference but not on the referent. Reference may now be representationalist and extcnd beyond what is immediatcly conscious, but the referent is still shackled and may not possess characteristics other than what in principlc could be consciously expcricnced. Needless to say, this referential bondage still makes it impossible to understand representationalist epistemologics in a reliable way, and equaliy seri-ous, means either that the history of philosophy (and much scicncc as wcll) will not be understood at all or will be misunderstoód in presentationalist terms as if such were merely a different “linguistic ap-proach.”

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Ludwig Wittgenstcin first published his Trać tatuś Logico-Philosophicus in Wilhelm Ostwalds journal, Annalen der Naturphilo sophie, in 1921. A rcviscd vcrsion was published in book form the following ycar in London with an introduction by Bertrand Russell. Also during 1922 Hans Hahn conductcd a seminar in Vienna on the Tractatus which aroused Schlick's interest, so that by 1926 the circle was rcading the book aloud scntcnce by sentcnce and analyzing it in detail.²" Both Schlick and Carnap were especially impressed by it. 1 ho lattcr has dcscribed how the circle lirst caine into direct contact with Wittgenstcin himself:

In 1937 Schlick became personally acquainted with Wittgenstcin. Schlick convcycd to him the interest of our circle in his book and his philosophy and also our urgent wish that he mcci with us and cxplain certain peints in his book which puzzlcd us. But Wittgenstcin was not willing to do this. . . . Wittgenstcin łinally agreed to meet Waismann and n\c. 1 hus the