IMG04

Ernst Mach

The aim of rescarch is the discovcry of the cquations which subsist be tween the element s of phrnomcnn.¹⁷

li. Mach's "Intermediate" Purpose of Science

The goal of scicntific cconomy is the most complctc, consistcnt, cohcsiv_c . . . world picturc, a wcrld picturc of the greatest possiblc stability. The closer science comes to this goal, the morę capablc it becomcs~oTirrnitinw the disturbanccs of practital lifc. . . .¹⁰

C. Mac/i's "External" Purpose oj Science

The biologiuil t3sk of science is to providc the fully dcvclopcd human individual with as jx*rfcct a mcans of orienting himself as possiblc.¹⁰

Ali this abundantly shows that the scicntist and scholar havc also the battlc of existcncc to fight, that the ways cvcn of science itself lead to the mouth. . . .²⁰

Ernst Machs "intermediatc" purpose of science with its stress on a slabie “worki picturc” anticipatcd and probably influenced the similar view of Max Planck, and Machs “extcrnal” purpose of science fitted in wcll with pragniatic theories of the timc, but it was Mach’s “intcrnal” purpose that helped reyolutionize twcnticth-ccntury philosophy of science.

Describing the appcarances in the simplest way possible as a method was overtakcn and superseded by Ludwig Boltzmanns emphasis on the indispensability of theories. but as an end goal, understood in log-ical as opposcd to psychological terms, Machs “intcrnal” putpose of science, his theory of economy, bas bccome popular to the point of being taken so for granted that it hus swallowcd up and subordinated to it the notorious hypothesis-dcduction-verification methodology so often referred to by contemporary philosphers of science.

Machs greatest success as a philosopher was to persuade several gen-erations of pliilosophically inclincd scientists tu abandpji Galilco’s undcrstand-rcality science for an updated version of Bellarminc^łs de-scribe-ajid-rclate-thc-appcaranccs science. This triumph has becn iden-tified by many rcccnt positivjsts with the spcctacular scicntific advances manifested in relativity and cjuantum physics, as if the philosophical revolution (or morę accurately, “counterrevolution,” if one may pla*

giarize from F. A. von Hayck) madę the scicntific rcvolution possiblc, and indced, on a logical basis was presupposed within the scientific theories themseWcs, as if the theories werc intrinsically phenomenalistie or at least presentationalist in cpistcmology."¹

Historically, Mach’s philosophical ideas did influence the thinking of Albert Einstein and Max Planck, the founders of relativity and cjuantum theory, but in light of the fact that both men latcr repudiated Machs phenomenalism and returned to Galilco’s understind-reality science, and the abundant cvidencc that both the relativity and quan-tum theories werc morc compatible with epistemologies other than Mach’s phenomenalism, then in all fairness one must challenge this still popular positivistic thesis."

Mach’s philosophy of science was and remains influential, but the' extent to which it was presupposed or necessary in rccent scientific i advances was considcrably less than phcnomcnalists and positivistsj havc bccn inclined to belicve. Or to put the matter another way, all basie scientific advanccs have bccn compatible with Gaiilco’s under-stand-reality philosophy of science, but they have not all bcen compatible with the approach of Berkeley, Humc, and Mach, that is, with the most rccent revival of Cardinal Bellarmine’s “dcscrifce-and-rclate-the*appcaranccs” rcductionism."³ Kant spoke of his own “Copernican Rcvolution” in philosophy, but in fact, he and his presentationalist cohorts havc bccn chiefly responsible for reviving Bellarmtne’s anti-Copernican approach, in both science and philosophy.

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Mach deepened the wedge between common sense and presentationalist philosophy of science by de\eloping a justification for the abstract naturę of science. I le argued that all men werc ir.ortal creaiures with overriding biological needs, who had to “economizc" their eiforts if they werc to survive and prosper. He felt that human bemgs could not afford the luxury of a curiosity-oriented, learning for mere pleasure, particularistic science. In light of the need to be as “economical" as possiblc, it was his conclusion that this required the utmost in abstract understanding, which he believed only mathematical functions could provide. Most scientists did not believe that the abstract naturę of science nceded a defense, but Mach provided one should the occasion