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Ernst Mach

scnsations, ihcn Mach was faccd, if not with an unwantcd ontological dualism, nt least with having to shift from a “scnsation" to a morc in-clusivc “cxpcriencc” form of phenomenalism.

Mach was frcqucntly if not normally a ref tren tiul phcnomenalist, that is, unlikc Kant and John Stuart Mili who werc also cpistcmologl-cal phenomenalists. Mach often assinncd that it was only possiblc to refer “mcaningfully" cithcr to what was being consciously expcricnccd or to what could be consciously expcrienccd. In short, rcfcrcnce im-plicd cxistcncc, at least sensntional or phcnomcnal cxistence. This point of vicw was in vcry sharp contrast with the cvcryday opinion that we could refer to anything real or unreal, expericnceablc or not cxperiencc-able, past, present, or futurę, and so on, that rcfcrcnce in no way im-plicd existence.

In practicc Mach alternated so often bctwcen rcfcrcntial phcnomcnal-ism and a common sense approach to rcfcrence that most of the kcy terms in his philosophy werc defined in at least two different ways, making sense only when the proper theory of rcfcrcnce was usccl. For cxample, critical terms likc “fact," “mctaphysics," and “atom” all had double definitions depending upon the theory of refcrencc uscd at the time.

A fact for Mach was normally a conscious scnsation, that is, when he was following his rcfcrcntial phenomenalism, but a fact was simply a historical happening, not ncccssarily conscious or cvcn expcricnce-able, when using an cvcryday or common sense theory of rcfcrcnce. The most rcgrettablc feature of this particular double definition was that hc applied it in a mislcading way with respcct to how other peoplc used the term. For example, Mach frcquently criticizcd Newton for not living up to his intention to dcal only with the “facts.” But clcarly, Mach, presupposing his rcfcrcntial phenomenalism, not only himsclf meant facts as conscious sensations, but falsely supposed that Newton intended the word in that sense too, whercas, it seems rcasonably cvi-dent that Newton meant it in the ordinary sense of a mcntal or physical happening or a reliablc statement about that happening, without any-rhing ncccssarily being cxpcricnceablc, a “scnsation”, or in any way connccted with cpistemology.¹⁰ In other words, Mach’s referential phenomenalism tended to make him foreshorten his understanding of what other pcople werc talki ng about to conscious scnsations, regard-le5S of what thosc peoplc werc under the impression they werc talkmg about.

Mach usually dcfined mctaphysics" in what hc snpposcd was a Kanuan sense, that ts as the study of what eaisted ouuide„perien” » I Hu, Mach a so dcfined u, when using his referenda! phenomenalism as ,he study of those tdcas whose source or history we could no, dearTy trące. If an .dca could „o, be intelligibly related ,o the lustory of 1 odter tdcas, then „ was "metaphysical." And in generał, the fcwer i relations a referent had with other objects or idcas the morę “meta phystcal • it was. from this definition one could easily understand whv Mach constdercd htmsclf a "relativist" and opposcd "absolutes" or what he thought werc completely “metaphysical" sińce they prcsumably lackcd nil relations to anything clsc.

M;my scicntists, then and now, bclicvcd that it was both possiblc and dcsirablc to eliminatc “mctaphysics^M from science. By •‘mctaphysics” they normally meant speculntive, imverifiable theorizing. The morę philosophical scicntists also tended to usc the word as a justification for rcjccting the Galilean or common sense purposc of science (ie.. “to understand reality") in favor of Machs goal of “dcscribing and rclat-ing the appcaranccs.” We may add herc, however, that it was Mach’s i second definition of “mctaphysics” which providcd a major justification for his interest in the history of science. That is, if we could make idcas less “metaphysical” by tracing down their historical conncctions to other idcas, then by all means wc should bccome morę historically mindcd oursclvcs and should cncourage other scicntists to bccome interested in the history of science.¹⁰

Mach’s double definition of the word “atom” has resultcd in a great dcal of confusion and controvcrsy. It has sometimes been allcgcd that Mach acceptcd the atomie theory during the period of his early scien-tific cxperiments, that is, betwcen 1860 and 1863, but whilc thcrc was a sense in which this was true, noncthelcss, the assertion has been quitc misleading. Mach ncvcr belicvcd in the reality of atoms or in the indisj)ensjible valuc of the atomie theory in any norma! sense

In terms of Mach’s rcferential phenomenalism hc meant by an atom an idea, that is, a theorctical construct. Hc foreshortcned refcrencc to what could be cxpcrienced, and sińce no one had cvcr pcrccived an atom, it must bc a mere thought or idca.“° In other words, when follow-ing a phenomenalistic theory of refcrencc, hc fclt compcllcd to identify everything talked about with those conscious impressions or sensauons which for most peoplc have mcrely symbolized or impcrfcctly repre-sented what was being refer red to. For most peoplc our idea ot an atom

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