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r.rnst Mach

with thc usc of propcr equipmcnt could not only rcliably noticc his own sensations, but also in many cascs could rcliably measurc thcm To bc surc this took training. And Wundt gradually bccamc knou„ for his “traincd introspcctionists" who could canccl out cnough indj. vidual difTcrcnccs to gct a reliable picturc of normal human sensations

Brcnuno, on thc other hand, denied thc applicability of psychology to sensory contcnt altogcthcr. For him, psychology studied thc acts of sensing and expericncing and physics studied thc contcnt or obj?ć(_S sensed. Brentano hclpcd to lead psychology in two oppositc dircctions. First, his emphasis on acts was a step in thc dircction of bchaviorism and away from so-callcd introspcctionism. But sccond, hc retained such a conccrn with sensations and obscrvation as to help influence many of his numerous followers into “superintrospectionist” psychologićs likc Gcstalt psychology and Edmund I IusscrBs phcnomcnology/"

Brentano published comparatively little after his 1874 book, es-peciaily in psychology, but lic casily madc up for this with his lccturcs and personal influence over a host of talentcd students including: Ehrenfcls, Freud, Husscrl, Lipps, Marty, Masaryk, Mcinong, and Stumpf. Noncthelcss, in spite of Brcntano’s undoubted influence, most expcrimcntal psychologists remained closer to Wundt’s approach than to that of Brentano. According to Professor Boring: “The historical fact is that contcnt has lent itsclf pcrsistcntly to cxperimcntation, whereas act has not.”⁴⁵

Brcntano’s personal lifc was dominated by an cxtrcme and uncom-promising scrupulousncss, combincd with gradually shifting view$ about thc Roman Catholic Church. Hc bccamc an ordaincd priest in 1864 and entered a Dominican monastery. Five ycars latcr, hc wrote an articlc 3gainst thc proposcd doctrinc of papai infallibility. In 1872 papai infallibility bccamc dogma. The ncxt ycar Brentano resigned his univcrsity post at Wurzburg and also quit thc priesthood, insofar as this was allowcd in Germany in those days. He fcll in lovc in 1880, but as a former priest was not allowcd to marry. He resigned his Vienna professorship, married, and returned to Vienna to tcach as a privat-dozent. His wifc died in 1894, ^an^ his eyesight began to fail. Hc resigned for thc bst time in 1895, explaincd his action in a book My luist Wishes for Austria (1895), ^a,,Łl ^lhen retired to Florcncc, Italy, whcrc hc remained intcllectually activc for somc time. Scvcral of these cvcnts influeneed Mach’s life; in particular, it was thc availability of "Bren ta nos Chair" in Vicnna in 1895 which allowcd Mach to make

riumphant return to thc Habsburg Capital. Brentano died in 1917

influence in psychology and philosophy was still great. and ^t of his students was still largcly ahead of them.

III. HIS PHENOMENAL1SM AS A I)ESCR1PTIVE PSYCHOLOGY Katu" oj Psychology

Many basie aspects of Mach’s philosophy, his Darwinian “biological nceds" approach, his theory of "economy," and thc yarious senses in which hc was a phenomenalist, havc alrcady becn covcred, but therc werc a number of descriptivc detailsof his phenomenalism I havc not dealt with yet which as aspects of a "descripm-e psychology” would probably be of interest morę to psychologists than to cither philosophers _or physicists. Hence, I considcr thcsc dctails in this chaptcr.

Mach wrotc most of thcsc dctails for thc first time in his Fcchncr-influcnccd manuscript of 1866 (sce chap. 2). Unfortunatcly, we havc no way of knowing what was in thc manuscript for its location is un-known. Prcsumably, hc madc a number of changcs when hc resumed work on it almost twenty ycars latcr. Mach published his Contribntions to thc Analysisjsf Sensations in 1886. 'I his book is normally considercd tfc molTrcadablc and popular presentation of his philosophy, but, in fact, as much of it conccrncd psychology as philosophy, and it has long scrved as a primary sourcc for his opinions on psychology.

First, what did Mach mean by "psychology"? Until at least 1872 hc scems to havc followcd Fechncr’s distinction as this quotation from his Conseruation of Energy shows:

1.    The determinntion of thc connc.\ion of presentations. This is psychology.

2.    The discovery of the laws of thc connexion of sensations (pcrccptions). This is physics.

3.    The elear establishment of thc laws of sensations and presentations. This is psychophysics.⁴⁸

Apparcntly, at this time hc still distinguished betwecn sensations and presentations, with thc latter presumahly mcaning “ideas” and perhaps '‘rclations." In other words, he still viewed psychology as the study of a particular kind of data. But this 1872 opinion was radically

different from his 1886 understanding which appeared in his Contri-butions.