kryzysy marokańskie (12)

>28 CHAPTER U

Art. 4: Thcse officcrs and noncommissioned officcrs Jor a period of five years, to Jatę from the ratification of the act of the conference, shall give their scrvice. .. .

Art. 30: In the region bordering on Algeria, the enforcement of the reguiation on he contraband of arms shall be the exclusive concern of France and Morocco. Simi-arly, the enforcement of the reguiation on the contraband of arms in the Rif and in 'eneral in the regions bordering on the Spanish possessions shall be the exclusive ronccrn of Spain and Morocco. . . .

Art. 33: Tire bank shall, to the exclusion of everv other bank or establishment of rredit, discharge the duty of the treasury-paymaster of the (Moroccan] Empire ....

Art. 51: Each of the following institutions, the Bank of the German Empire, the Bank of England, the Bank of Spain, and the Bank of France, shall, with their govern-:ncnts’approva!,appoint an auditorfor the State Bank of Morocco. . . .

—FRUS 1006, 2:1495-1511; Hurst, 2:772-805

HOLSTEIN ON THE LESSONS OF ALGECIRAS

llolslcin to li ranili, l()A/>rll 1006

The renl importance of the Algeciras conference lay not in the specifics of its Finał Act, but in the fact that on all substantive issues Germany was supporied only by Austria-Hungary and Morocco. Oulvoted and isolated, Germany noncthelcss preferred retreat to deliance. Neither the Kaiscr nor Helów had the stornach for the fall-back slrategy recommendetl by Holstein, bricfly summarizod below. His policy undercut by his superiors' lack of nerw, Holstein re-signed from the German foreign ministry—a tactical error that allowed others to cast him as the scapegoat for the Moroccan debacie. This letter analyzes the "lessons" of Algeciras for Germany and castigales the German response to the conference: the introduction in the Reichstag of nnother naval appropriations bill. This supplementary bill provided for the con-struction of several cruisers; morę important, it was designed to cowr the heavy expcndiiures entailed by the German decision to upgrade futurę battleship construction to malch the new British Dreadnought class.

Holstein to Brandt,²⁸ 10 April 1906

... In che Morocco qucsti»n, the chancellor, the State secretary, the uiulersecretary, and 1 all took the point of vie\v that we should wait calmly until the neutrals in necd of moncy and peace—Russia, Italy, etc.—camc up with mediation proposals. It would not have taken. much longer. However, His Majesty ordered the retreat and thereby justified the prediction of King Edward and LuzzattP' that Germany would losc her ncrve.Out of this retreat there arises an indefinitc danger ofwar, because the pressure method which succecded in Morocco, may be applied against us at the next oppor-tunity.

^J"Maximilian von Brandt (1835-1920). German minister to Pekiny,, 1875-1893.

i    nrimp minister.

Among the ąuestions of the futurę, the most interesting is that of the licet; I refer to the International limitations on armaments. . .

What will our position be if ihc tjuestion shoukl one day be firnily pushed into the foreground? What can we aehicve by conlinuing our naval armaments? Could we evcr challenge botb Hngland and France at sea? Can we expcct that England will ever separate herself from France as long as therc is the danger of a German invasion? ls a German lleet that is unable to cope with an Anglo-French flcct an asset in war or a li-ability? Would the fear of a German land army, no matter how strong, but without a lleet, be great enough to cause England to take parł in a Franco-German or a Franco-Russian-German war?

—HF, 4:959

11.7    THE CROWE MEMORANDUM

Memorandum by Crowe, I January 11)07 • Countermcmorandum by Siwderson, 21 1'ubruary 1907

The "Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany" cre-nted an uproar among German historions when it was first publisherl in the British Docomcnls on the Origins of the War in 1920. Here was tangible evidence of the hostility of the prewar British Foreign Office toward Germany—the "smoking gun," so to speak, that British diplo-macy hnd taken such great pains to conceal.

The memorandum came from the pen of Eyre Crowe, senior clerk in the Foreign Office— an expert on Germany, flucnl in its Inngunge, married lo a German-born wite, son of n German-born mother. Taking the Moroccan crisis as his point of deparlurc, Crowe Iraced the transformation of the entente cordinle from a pureiy colonial agreement into an enduring, if vaguc, instrument for Anglo-French diplomatic cooperation. Crowe then moved on to his main purposc: a review of Anglo-Gcrman relations sińce the Bismarck era, Long on Britart-nia's henevolence to others, Crowe's arguments echoed the classic Whig sentiment that the interests of England and humanity coincicled. At the same time, he left no doubt whom he considered the culprit of the piece: German actions and motives, by and large, were cast in lurid colors. Although Crowe seasoned the narrative with sonie grudging praise for German achievemonts, his references to German industry and efficiency only heightened the effect by making the German threat appear ever morę menacing.

Of inlerest here is not Crowe's skill as a historian or his acuity as a therapist, but his pre-scription for the futurę of Anglo-German relations. Crowe ruled out an Anglo-German entente on the curious grounds that the differences between Britain and Germany were not suffi-ciently concrete or serious to warrant an understanding pallerned on the Anglo-French agreement. But neither were these differences superficial, nor could they easily be settled. Germany should be resisted, except in the exercise of its legitimate aspirations—though Crowe evi-dently felt it unnecessary to specify whose standards should apply in delermining what was legitimate and what was not. Surprisingly, Crowe did not regard the German navy as the primary threat to Britain, an assessment that most of his counlrymen would not have shared.

Crowe's memorandum elicited meager but approving comments from his superiors in the Foreign Office. A morę crilical rejoinder came from Lord Sanderson, who had scrved as per-manent under-seerotary in the Foreign Office from 1094 to 1905 and had been a direct par-licipant in some of the evenls rccounled by the memorandum. Working from memory and