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CII APTEK 11

discussed in this house iii a tonę which might have its uscs in election rallics [good! left] but which is not customary for a parliament aware of its rcsponsibility [applausc, left]. When I—conscious of my responsibiiity—rcfer in guardcd terms to the speeches of forcign statesmen, this is supposcd to and intended to lcad to an improvcmcnt in our forcign relations. Passionate and excessive languagc such as that of Herr von Heydebrand [correct; hcar! henr! on the left] may serve the interests of politicai par-ties—but to the German Reich they do nothing but damage [lively applausc and hear!

hcar! on the left and among the Social Democrats]----If newspapers and the press

present things as if our fatherland was in distress, as if we were faced with the coilapse of the nation, then this does not squarc with the facts. Hut to bring national passions to the boiling point for the sake of utopian plans of conquest or for the sake of party interests—now that compromises patriotism and sejuanders a y.iluable asset [lively applausc left and center, scattercd applausc among the Frcc Conservatives].

—Keiditlag, 26(1:7755-56

J)

Journal of Yiscount Esher,⁶¹ 24 November 1911

A Gabinet cabal against the entente with France and the Defence Conimittec. The original fault la)' with that imprudent summoning of a packed Defence C.ommiltec in August to settle the immodiate form of action if war had to be declared war against Germany.''² . . . There has been a serious crisis. Fifteen members of the Gabinet against five. The entente is decidedly impcrilled. The Gabinet so far is intact. . . .

—Oliver Viscount Esher (ed.), Joumnls .md Lelters of Reginald Viscount Esher (London, 1931!), 3:74

11.15 THE HALDANE MISSION, FEBRUARY-APRIL 1912

Mettcrnich to Wilhelm II, 10 January 1912 • British Memorandum, Presented to the German Gouerntnenl by Sir Ernest Cassel, 29 January 1912 • German Memorandum Jor the British Gouernment, 29 January 1912 • "Obscrralions " by Churchill. Ji January 1912 • Niailson lo llcrlle, fi Eebrttary 1912 • Churchill in Glasgow. 9 Eebrttary 1912 • Uethmann s and UaldancsiSketcb oj a Conceiiiable [Anglo-German] Eormula," 10 Eebrttary 1912 • Minutę by Crowe, 12 Eebrttary 1912 • German Memorandum, 6 March 1912 • lirilish Pro/tosal Jor a British Declaration on Anglo-German Relations, id March 1912 • Churchill in the Home oj Commons, IS March 1912 • Betesjord in the House oJCommons, 18 March 1912 • ilelhntann to Metiernich, 21 March 1912 • British Countermemorandum to the German Gouernment, 25 March 1912, with Annotations by Wilhelm II, 31 March • Churchill, Attend/ng Sea Trials, to Clementlne Churchill, 25 March 1912 • Bertie to Nicotson, 28 March 1912 • Minuto by Nicoison, 4 A/tri! 1912 • Minutę by Grey, 6(?) A/iril 1912 • Goschen to Nicoison, 20 April 1912 • Grey to Goschen, 27June 1912

"'Repin.ild, Visrounl Esher (1052-1930). Consl.iblr of Windsor Cosile, 1901-19211; cdilor of the Letlers of Queen Victori,r, niember of the Conimiltee of Imperial Defensc, 1905-1910. Dcclincd appoint-ments as under-secrelary for colonies (1099) and war (1900), |;overnor of the Cape Colony (1900), and

THE NARHOWING MARGIK, 1905^9:14.'

•⁵ ■ ⁵# %

The opportunity to repair the Anglo-German relationship, so heavily damagediOYjlhe seco Moroccan crisis, presentecl ilsclf in early 1912 when two businessmen—tlrc|jIrector;(if i Hamburg-America linę, Albert Ballin, and the German-born British financierySir Edwa Cassel—paved the way tor Lord Haldane, the British secretary7or.war_/-iqvVisig8erl'in.Trę the point of view of the British Foreign Office, Haldane was in Berlin to.talkjaboor hayi, lalks. But his extensive political conversations with the German cHanceniprSThedbald w Bethmann Hollweg, and the Kaiser (as well as Tirpitz) gave the talksan asymmetrical puali The German government was now committed on a higher pianejlran{thVBrfCsftand,’'in t. event the lalks went awry, would have c o r r e s po ndingiygrea tec-d i f fi cu I li e s; ijnt>sarving;- fa ce a i extricaling ilsclf.    !|||§|§i    1

Haldane returned to London with a "sketch" for a political and ■a colorriatfundersta-ndir Bethmann and Haldane agreed that this accord should includfcno'explióij/CTmCbii'ibf^!rte naval amendment to the existing German naval program/proyided-that;the/Cerman gover mcnt would ultimalely build only Iwo of the Ihree dreadnoughtó.enyisagedil^ilhinbill,

The proposcd German naval amendment hardly secmcd to-'fitJheispi^Wl^^iÓ-Gerni. detente or the premises for an Anglo-German accord initially communicafed.td-the-Germ, government by Cassel. But the question of whether or not to    legisl

t.e

out a middle ground. But above all, Bethmann needed to play for tiniet to cornrpeLthe Kaisi to again postpone publicalion of the naval amendment, he submitted his resignation. THrt days latcr, Tirpitz Ihrcalenerl to resign if publicalion was in facl poslponed,' and, willi tli threat, carrietl the day.''¹

No matler how melodramatic the contest between Bethmann and Tirpitz, the Germ; negotiators collectively blundered when they gave Haldane a copy of the prpposetl legisljtic to take back to England.'-' The very fact that there would be an amertdmenijplayed into tf hands of those in England who had opposed the Haldane mission in prinćiple. Stftwilh an.ai vance copy in band, the Biilish Admiralty now had the opportuniiy to d1scOverirr..iTs fine |jri

tion also caused a crisis within the German government. Bethmann'hóped.tF^t6e;prospect an Anglo-German political accord would make the amendment unnecessaiy/whęreas Tirpit with the backing of the Kaiser, considered the amendment, in the tórm:-in';Wfe^fchadibft discussed with Haldane, to be nonnegotiable. After the momentum of the Anglo-Cerman tal hnd slowed to a crawl, Bethmann rcalized that they could not bo revived unlessahe nay amendment werc to be further reduced in scope. But British approval of thepofiTical.formu willi wliicli Haldane had returned to London constituted the only rhance—andVa;rerneilc or at that—that the Kaiser would agree to a further scaling back of the nayalfanrendment. Pe haps Bethmann was oblivious to the fundamental incompatibifity of theroptlmurp^British pos tion (neithera German naval amendment nora political formula, i.e.,.the;;dcfcrÓTOipf the-stnti quo) with the optimum German posilion (both a naval amendment,^hdSa^^^nf|formul , a redefinition of the Anglo-German relationship), perhaps hebęlieyedS(ra^^bbl^.Sta|

^l-lText of Ueihmann's letlcr of resignalion in Ernst Jtickh (ed.), Kiderlcn-WSchtcr. ;Der'.StXTtsnTMrn w Mcnsch (Stuttgart, 1924), 2:159-61. and Alfred von Tirpitz, Politische Dukumcnie Gtungari, 191-1:31 H-20. For Tirpitz'* threat, sec ibid., 323.    ritK-tr ■

"The official announcement on 8 February, the eve of Haldane’s visit, that a rrava; amendme would be presented to tlić Reichslag was a |xilitical viclory for Tirpitz. Bcthniarrn, howver. rlelayc publicalion of the texl of the amendment unlil 22 March. But giving a foreign cabirtcf .rcopy uf draft lei islation before it was published was a proceduro hardly consonant willi constitutiort.il,prattice. Funhi

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