57574 kryzysy marokańskie (9)

31K

CHAPTEH ] J

Wolfgang Momnisen, “Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy,” Central Buropean Hislury 6 (1073), 3M3: Zara Sleiner, Britain and the Origins of Ihc First World War (New York, 1977); idem. The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy. 11198-1!) 14 (1968; reprint: London, 1986); Samuel K. Williamson, |r„ Austria-Hungary and the Origins uf the First World War (New York, 1991); idem, The Polilit s of Grand Stratogy (1969; reprint: Atlantic Higlilands, 1991)

GERMANY AND THE FIRST MOROCCAN CRISIS

Directiuu by Bulów, 24 Meircb I'JO 5 • Schoen to Ibe German 1'orelgu Minislry, i i Mtircb 1905 • liiilow lt> Slenibitrft.A/tr/l l‘J05 « Holstein to Ufiloir,

5 A/tril 1905 * liflloir to Stemburg. JO May 1905

As already noted,. fear of being dragged into the Russo-Japanese war inereased the desire of France (Russia's ally) and Britain ()npan's ally) (o settle their outstanding differences by con-duding tlie enienle cordiale(Documenl 10.30). But any gnins (hal France might have realized under (his agreement had to bc wcighed againsl the fact ihat the East Asian conflicl severely damaged the Franco-Russian nlliance: Russia's preoccupation willi the war preeluded ii from exerting any military or diplomalic pressure on Germany, Temporarily freed from the specter of having to prepare for a two-fronl war. Germany had considcrable room to maneuvcr and could even hope to reverse its deteriorating position among the powers.

l3ijlow's vehicle for doing so was to target the cenlerpiece of Delcassć's diplomacy. Delcasse regarded the French conquest of Morocco as an end in itself, but, bcyond this, he apprecialed that his agreements on Morocco witli llaly, Britain, and Spain brought with tliem tlić additional benefit of underscoring the isolation of Germany. By challenging Delcassć's Moroccan policy, Bulów could therefore strike at the Frencli stnlosman's European diplomacy. BUlow's objeclive was to prove that France would require German assent lo realize its ambi-tions in Morocco; that, coiwcrsely, German obstructionism could undo all of Delcasse'* ef-forts; and, hence, that Delcassć policy of ignoring Germany was misguirJed.

Cerlairily the defects in Delcasse's Moroccan diplomacy played into Biilow's liands: Delcasse had neglected to nolify the German govcrnment of the Franco-Spanish accord of Oclober 1904 (an omission, that, thougli not illegal, was discourteous); French representa-lives, in their dealings with the sułtan of Morocco, were giving the erroneous impression that France was acting on belialf of all powers; most important, Delcasse was seetningly obliviot:s lo the legał fact that any alleration in the status of Morocco had to be sanctioned by all signa-tories of the 1880 Convention of Madrid, including Germany.

Billów and Holstein could not have devised a morę visible chailenge to France's arnbi-lions in Morocco tlian by inducing the Kaiser, en roule to a Meditorranean cruise, lo go asliore in Tangier. On his visil to this Moroccan port, Wilhelm was supposcd lo slress Germany's desire for equal commcrcial opportunity in Morocco, to refer to the sultan's independence only in Ihe context of free trade, and to ignore the French charge. But when the latler seemed to welcome Wilhelm to Tangier in (he name of the French foreign minister, the Kaiser went con-sirlerably further.

By stressing the International character of the Moroccan cjuandary, the Kaiser seemed to suggesl lliat it reegtired an inlernational solution. The queslion was how Germany could com-pel or persuade the other signatories of the Madrid convenlion lo lakę the same view. In Holstein': opinion, the other powers would lollow Germany's lead if an appro|)riale Irame-work for resolving the Moroccan queslion could be found, wliile Bulow's prcscription was lo keep ihe other powers guessing to wh.it lenglhs Germany would be prepared lo go to gel its

THE NAKKOWING MARCIN, 1905-1914

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way. Bul inis kincj ol sibyllinc appronch suffered from a drawback: il was now easy for others lo allribulc lo Germany Ihc mosl t.inislcr intenlions and lo suspecl i! of wanling lo launcli o Franco-Gcrnian war.

n)    Directiue by Biilow, 24 March 1905

Slioulcl forcign diplomats inąuire aboutTangier and Morocco, plca.se give no answer but pin on a scrious and impassivc face. Our demeanor should rcscmblc that of the sphinx which, whcn bclcagucred by curiou.s tourisis, also refuscs lo give anything a way.

- CR, 20i:657't

b) Schoen" lo the German Forcign Ministry, 31 March 1905

...Witli French cliargć at first also indiffercnt [conversation]. Wlicn charge con-veyed Delcassefs respects and grcelings and scemed to welcome His Majesty to Morocco in [tlić minister's] name, [H.M.| rcplicd: His visit mcant that His Majesty de-nianded for Germany free trade and complete eijuality with other nations: when Count Cherisey wanted to concede tliis,Ilis Majesty remarked that he woukl rrcat tlie Sułtan as an equal, as a free rulerofan independent country; that he would know how to have his legitimate deniands respected; and that lic expected that these would be respected by Enince also. Count Cherisey turncd pale, wanted to rcply, but w;ts pre-vented from so doing by being asked to takc leave. . . .

—GP. 20i:G)8*)

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c)    Biilow to Sternburg,¹¹3 April 1905

... Piease point out to President |RooseveIt] the conncction between rhe Chincse and the Moroccan qucstions. Germany acts on behalf of the Open Door in Morocco. that is, it defends the interest of all peoplcs carrying on commerce against the special interests of France.. . .

- Cl‘. !'i:i:(..!u2

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d)    Holstein to Biilow, 5 April 1005

... Coniraeuial collectivity is a principle on which we can takc a firm stand without oursehes appearing to iiarbor aggrcssiee intentions. Moreorcr this idea lias tlie

"Wilhelm von Schoen (1851* 1913). German foroiKn ministry lioison m the Kaiser’s entf»ur<i^e; stale secret.iry in the German foreign ministry. 1907-1 ^łJ 10.

‘ Heimami Spc*c!< von Sternburg tlHSy-l^OM). Geimnn amhassarlor to Washington, 1901-1908.