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My War Mcmoriea, 1014-1918

Th© order to retreat from the Mani© wus Issucul, whntluir on good grounds or not I hav© never henn able to cieci cle.

3t was obvtaus Unit tho war would now be a, long one and vcqmre cnormous ancritices of tho Fafhtrland. The hour had como when evcrylhing, li li© rally ovorything, would have to bo staked on tho war, and tho work of ©nlightoning nur peonle would have to be undertnJken on a larg© scalę. 1 was astonithsd liii tho optimism 1 found prevailing in Berlin towarda tho ©nd of October, 1914. There Boomod to be no roalizritlon ol tho troniendous gravity of our situation.

It was notliing less than a fatality, in view of the numerlcal inferiority of the Dual Alliance and the fact that Germany was suiTounded by enemies, that she didjrtot win the war, wliich had been forced 011 her, by sorne overwhelming lightning strolce, and 90 lay Iow an enemy superior in numbers but inferior in training' We now had to face the prospect that, in the course of the war, the training of the armies would becotne equalized to a cortain extent, although it was reasonable to hope that the German Anny would long maintain some advantage over the others in virtue of its great traditions. Tho heavy losses in ofhcers might be a serious mattcr. At all events, it was es9ential that we should do all in our power to maintain our superiority i,n training, so that the enemy*9 superiority in men might not be felt so much.

In particular, we had to face the prospect that England would make use of the tknę to increase her annaments and raise a powerful army in addition to her fleet. She had quite enough men.

In view of this we could not neglect any means that might still cnable us to win the war. Germany had to become an armed camp. That was the burden of the New Year’s message I sent to a newspaper on January ist, 19^5*

In the autumn of 1914 and the winter of 1914-15 General Headquarters had raised from eigliteen to twenty new diviaioii9. We formed new divisions out of the Landwehr and Landsturm formations. We began by reducing the number of battalions in a division from twelve to nine, and forming fresh division9 out

Tu n n en hor

fefes lmHnlion* Ihii« libera ted, allottlng to osich te coraplemenfc of nrI itlnry and uporlnl finnH- We did n grnai defll, though In mmiy di rur. Hond we did not do enongh.

Ilvc 8 tli Ar my at tliifl lilii® conld r|uj|<< ly have sent ?łoi r ic Oorpf to thn WiltOttt broni:. i do not know whnthf*r th© idea wii,h nvnr conitdered by General H codo tiar ters, or wheth® the •tfclMtlon of the Auatro-1 ftingarian Army marle it oni: of the rpicstion. The lat ter, 1 now rnalized, was unfortunately rntrenting, completely dcfeafud, acroff the San with terrible lossea. The RiisHuins were following it up. A Riuwlan falYUllon of Moravia nnrl then Upper Silesia seemed possible. Hiei AuBtro-Iiuugarlan Army would have to be eupported i£ it wor® not to be annihilated. An advnnce of the 8th Army acrosg tho Narew, the operation which harl been pl&nned at the hegia-ning of September, would now have been useless. Help musi be flnnL immediately and conld not be too powerful. We were not able to reinforce the Western Front.

In the iustructions which I received at fnsterburg on the cvciilng of the i4th it was stated that two corps of the 8th Army were to form the Southern Army in Upper Silesia. Tliia looked like notliing morę than a defensive meaeure ; at any ratę, it would be nuite Lnadequate to restore the aituation in Galicia. We -had nbt morały to hołd the enemy in checlc; we had to act.

Accordingly, in a coiweimtion over the telephone, i suggested, botli to General Headąuartera and General von Moltke himself, that the whole of the 8th Army should be sent to Upper Silesia and Poscn¹ under General von Hindenburg, who had just been put in command. In spite of the danger that Russia would bringiup fresh forces in a further attempt to invade the un-fortunate province of East Pnissia, oniy weak forces should be left for its protection. E certamly hoped that sucli an invasion was a long way off. Even during the operations nrrangements had been madę to.strengthen and extend the defences of LÓtzen and the Lakes. We not only insisted that a scheme should be drawn up, but that the work should be put in hand at once. The Angerapp linę was also to be fortified. These measures

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