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ly to confine itself to political processes, at the same time it ought to constitu-te the whole of society. The political organisation of the State apparatus is supposed to represent the constitution for the nation. This oscillation betwe-en the political and the societal is transferred to world society today. If one can only manage to constitutionalise the interaction of state-political institu-tions in intemational relations, then that ought to be enough to produce a constitution appropriate to world society. If this distinction was already problcmatic in the nation-state, then in world society it has once and for all been overtaken. But what is there in the blind-spot of the distinction? An all-embracing constitution for global society? A network of national and transna-tional constitutions? An autonomous legał constitution? Or what?

If in seeking to illuminate the blind-spot one abandons the State ccntring of the constitution, then the real possibilitics of constitutionalisation without the State become visible. For constitutional thcorists this amounts to brcaking a taboo. A constitution without a State is for thcm at bcst a utopia, but a poor one into the bargain. But this formula is dcfinitcly not an abstract normativc demand for remote, uncertain futurcs, but an asscrtion of a real trend that can today be observed on a world-widc scalę. The thcsis is: cmcrgcncc of a multi-plicity of civil constitutions. The constitution of world society comcs about not exclusively in the represcntativc institutions of intemational politics, nor can it take place in a unitary global constitution ovcrlying all arcas of society, but emcrges incremcntally in the constitutionalisation of a multiplicity of autonomous subsystcms of world society.

The raging battlcs in the internet about cyberanarchy, govcrnmcnta! rcgu-lation and commcrcialisation front-rank constitutional policy conflicts, the cha-otic coursc of which is gradualty showing us the shape of nothing other than the organisational law of a digital constitution. It is no coincidcncc that the famous/notorious Dcclaration of the Independence of Cyberspace uscs the constitutional rhctoric of the founding fathers, telling the

„govcmmcnts of the Industrial World, you wcary giants of flcsh and Steel..., the global social space we arc building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You havc no morał right to rule us nor do you possess any mcthods of cnforcement we have true reason to fcar."

One of the fundamcntal rights problems of the digital constitution prc-scnts itself in our legał case. Whether a right to access vis-a-vis a host provi-dcr for the internet cxists or not is to be decided on the basis of the inclusion principlcs of digital communication. It is not the principlcs of an extemal political constitution (which one? The US-constitution? Other national constitution? A transnational constitution?), aimed at powcr accumulation and policy formulation for the internet, but the principles of an internet constitution pro-per, aiming at freedom of communication and clectronic threats to it, that is the adequate sedes materiae of the digital constitutional norms. But these princi-ples have still to be worked out and validatcd in the coursc of constitutionali-sing the internet. The open ąucstion in our case is whether business opera-tors, even stimulated by economic stimulation in privatc-public co-rcgulation, should be entrusted with deciding on the limits of human rights.

Extending the combat area, from Seattle to Gcnoa, what is taking place in the conference halls and on the Street is fights over a constitution of the global economy, the outcome of which will givc constitutional impctus to the World Bank, IMF and WTO. A constitution of the global hcalth scctor i taking shape in the fiery debates inside and outsidc science on embryo rcsc arch and reproductive medicine, and on the hunt for mcdically adcquatc equ ivalents for traditional statc-related fundaincntal rights. And sińce 11 Scptcm ber 2001, attempts to institutionalise debates among world religions morę stron gly in legally constituted institutions of inter-religious dialoguc have bccn multiplying.

IV. THREE TRENDS OF DEVELOPMENT

To shift the focus from the one political constitution of the nation-statc to the many civil constitutions of world society, immcdiatcly raises the qucstion what circumstances justify ovcrthrowing the model of an cxclusivcly political constitution that seems to have provcn itself through the centuries. Very sche-matically and in much abbreviatcd fashion, I wish to sketch out three secular trends subverting state-centred constitutional thought and making societal constitutionalism on a global level cmpirically and normatively plausible.

DIAGNOSIS I: DILEMMAOF RATIONALISATION

Herc the theory of societal constitutionalism developed by the American sociologist David Sciulli supplies initial starting points. Starting from the di-lemma of the rationalisation process of modemity analysed by Max Weber, hc raises the question what counter-forces may exist to a massivc cvolutionary drift manifested in four thrusts: (I) fragmentation of logics of action, with conscquences of highly ads anced differentiation, pluralisation, and rcgional compartmentalisation of separate social spheres; (2) dominancc of instrumen-tal calculation as the sole rationality meeting with rccognition across the do-mains; (3) comprehensive replacement of informal co-ordination by burcaucra-tic organisation; (4) inereasing conftnement in the "iron cagc of scrvitudc to the futurę," especially in social spheres. This drift would incvitably end socic-ty-wide in a situation of intensive competition for positions of power and social influence, highly formalised social control and political and social au-

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