I
ing cm as i!' in the grip of a hypnotie. circam throiigfa jmhearci-of sacriiićcs. dragging othn-s with thein to a ćoiiflict of ćxhaustion, wbose spiritual and social e.onse.-quences threaten to beepme thc curse of the futurę. ”
Kvcry responsible person in t-his country and America is deeply perturbed by thc suffering this war has inflicted on Ku ropę, by the ravages wrought by bnngęr, deportation, bom bing. laek of wędieal supplics* heating, etc. (Jenerał Smuts’ ncautiful pbrase “Europę is the hearl of the cause of mmi,” Sir Samuel Honre*s plea for help to Contineiitnls t.rnsting in Britnin. ono oould <iliote many inorc aiiithoritative spokesmen to prore that the futurę of Europę is yci-y much present in the ni ind of the British- <ioveniinent.
But the menns of »chieving vic-tory are of a military naturę, and have to be left to tliose who are ręsponsiblo for tlie figliting. The British public is eonymeed that. the {Jennans are dangerous pcople, and have Iheir Knglish \ariant for “Oettcs fois il fant en ttnir.” łlence, the Hojy Fatln-Cs advice for moderation has to he erpiated with the deinand fór security f.elt in tbe British Isles, but infinitely morę alive and morę Imuntihg in Franco, Polami, Russin, and thc resf of Europę.
Ir his 1 hird stateiuęnt His lloli-ness refers to a .i ust peace. Few pcople will disngree with him— and aga i n sueh are nol. in the British (Jovernment—tliat “lumest Solutions iii ust be lYmmł—Solutions whieh are not merely parily su«-eessful but truć and enduring . . . a just poliey musi leave the vnnquishęd a hope. or ratber a faitłi, that its vital necessities will be safeguarded.” This was the basis of Albed poliey as expressed inthe Atlantic Charter. Althongh in view of the still unsolved eon troversy regnrding the Fourteon Point* and tlieir applieation fo the Herman Surremler in 1918. Mr. Churchill has <*xpressly stated that the Charter does not by right apply to Germany, yot hc has stressed that its principles are the signposts «vi Albed ix>bey. Thesc do guaran teo rohabilitation and hope to Herman indmduals. Couplc this with the e.onditiońs of surrender riow drafied by the Euro pean Adeisory i'ouinuttee, and we cmi sce that tlie Albed poliey can lic co-ordinated with the attitude ndeocated by His Holiness.
The fourth point, the definition of war guiłt put forward by the Pojic, excmplifios thc rcal differ-ence <:xistiilg betwecn Albed StatcsuMMi and His Holiness. Ile says. ‘ wite jiist expiHtion for acts of viqjenee against persona or things does not depend on the eonduet of war. bili is a neeessary guarantee against armeH nl-tcnipts.” In other words. violence against “persons or things” have to he expiatcd re gard less o i' con-ditions-—war or peace, Europę or Asia. sumrner or win.ter, ete.—pre-vaiiing. It also limits war gnili to persons personally indieted, and caimot he used as nn excuse for puttiag millions into bondage without snporeision or .timc limit.
The Poptds peace appcal of Junc 2ml, 1944, hrings to mind the agoni.sed appcal of tlie Erench bighops and the Belgian Cardinal ahout tlie sufferings of their flock owing t.ó hombipg—as the common pcople in Western Europę can poił ber “movc out.” nor ‘‘protect themselvcs” at their plćasurc. With the present ratę of destruc-tion and suffering, there is dnngcr of destroying the cmlisntion of Europę, with its faith, its tradi-tion, its <liversit.v, ils lieauty. The Holy Eather advoeatod modera-tion hecause ol: liis conecni for tlie pcople of Europę But by prefue-ing his eo lid it loiis of a just and lasting peace by “a elear and un-questioned vietory,” he proved that he was under no iLLusion as to thc prior nce<l to dcstrov thc Evfl Thing.
Beeently, after prolonged nego-tiati<ms. a nuniber of t reaties liave been signed betwecn the (iovcrn-ments of Occupied Countries and thc tlirec Chief Allied H^wers whieh rcgulatc thc methods of udmimstrating the liheratcd arcas. It wbuld be an error to suppose, howevcr, tliat these treaties hare been madę exelusively bet wecn all three Albed Powera and the (ioveniments of the Occupied Countries; for. :n almost every ertŚC, łbfferent parties are signa-tories to theni, and in eertnin cases there is a differenee in the eon-tents.
Thus the treaties with Belguim and Holland werc only signetl by Creat Britnin and' The* United States. Origjtinlly thc treaties with Norway wore to have been betwecn the same parties, but.
Kussia announced her desire to partieipate. and cpnaęąuently three separate treaties wore. signed. Uinally. the treaty with C/.eeho.slovakia has been signed by Czechoslovakia and Russia silone. In this way thc European Advis-ory (jommittee, whose tsisk was to eo-ordinate all undertakings by the A Hi es in relation to Europę, has been passod over.
The Russo-(.!y.eehoslovak treaty deserves speeisd ipeution. It <loes not proeide, likc* the. other treaties, for a transition period duaing whieh the r.uthórity will be in the hands of a 'military oceupying power. According to t.ho treaty, CzceliosloYrk administrat ion will bo set up when the territory bas been likcrntęd from thc enemy, but the e.\ae.t linie will be deter-mined by the Kussian military iiuthorities. (.'zeehoslpvak eirelcs reganl this as moro advaritageousr though only tirnc will show whieh .of the two amingements will prove thc l>ottcr in praetioc.
In e.onneetion with this treaty, CzeehosloYak cirole-s have worked out a plan for tlie futurę adminis-rnition of the liberated territories. According to this, the administra-tion is to he e.utrusted to' loeal eomniittees set up, ad hoe, hy menns of eleetions. One of their tasks will hc to rcinove froai their posts all pei-sons who have shown disloyally towards the O.eeho-slovak Rcpublic.
There are still considerable gaps in the system uf treaties eonccrn-ing the administration of Europę. First and foremoat, there is no treaty betwecn any of the Allied CoYernmentR with France. There is ceident .oppositiou to wider po wers heing vested. iu de Caulle’s provisional government. although it has been recogniscd hy Kussia^
Nor is there yet any treaty* with Polarni, the only Allied country already partially liber-atod from German oecupution. The reasons for the delay are not far to seelt, hut it is the very want of t-his treaty whieh shows what ditlleulties the present IftC.k of Russo-Polish diplomatic rclations is ereating. ' ^
The problem* of thc present in-Yosion niuat, of coursc. receiYO pnority, hur there is a widespread desire atnongst the Allied eoun-tries that treaties of agreernents shoukl. despite the difticitlties, be negotiated with all speed for tlie administration of the liiierated territories betwecn as many of tlie United NatioitS as possihle.
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