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bluffing m thcir hints of possiblc rccourse to fcrcc and that thcir bluff was succcssfully c lled. (The ed^;!ots of the documents quotcd are of this opinion.) Hut an cxaminatien of the documents rather supports the view, not that they wcrc bluffing, but that they would havc becn prepared to go to war in the last rerort if they lud been ablc to find allics. Neither Austria nor France was willing to put her military resources into the balance, and without one or other of thesc powcrful military nations it was not practicablc to givc effective aid to Poland. That fact did not deter Palmcrston and Russell, and indeed the great mass of the British peoplc, from frankiy showing wherc thcir sympathies lay.

The British public in generał have never allowed thcir attitude to be dictatcd by purcly materiał considerations. It is only a morał issue which will stir the British public to its depths ; and the British public and the most outstanding British statesnjcn havc always bccn prepared to take risks to uphold the principles of public morality. There has, of course, always becn an element in British public łifc whose policy bas been dictated by rcspect for power. At the time of Munich this element was in control of British forcign policy ; and Mr. Hogg is running truć to form, for hc was clcctcd to Parliament in 1938 as a supporter of Mr. Chamberlain and his opponents plastcred the strects of Oxford with the legend, “ A Vote for Hogg is a Vote for Hitler.” Thcn Germany was a mighty nation whose power had to be respeered at all costs and Czccho$lovakia was a “ smali far-off country about which we know nothing.” Now Poland is the “ smali far-off country about wffiich we know nothing.” But w^rhcn the British people realize the morał issues involved iheywvill not dismiss the Polish causc so lightly.

After 1863, Poland was submerged in the Tsarist Empire and it was only with the Great War of 1914-18 that the Polish causc could again become a subjcct of diplomatic representations. | The restoration of an independent Poland bccame one of the "Allicd war aims and was achieved, thanks not least to the lighting spirit of the Allics thcmschrcs. But unfommately the divcrgcncc of view which developed between Great Britain and France almost as soon as victory was won was rcflected in a serious diffcrcncc of policy towards Poland. For France support of Poland was a Cardinal item of policy, but Mr. Lloyd George developcd considerable hostility towards the Polcs—“ the Irishmen of Europę.” Ii was really only part of his swing away from France but it had most unfortunate conseąuences for Poland. In thosc days Lord Curzon was at the Forcign Office but the real Foreign Office was across the road at No. 10 Downing Street, and his advi.ee was generally disregarded.

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