885096446

J PRS-EER-91 -053 25 April 1991

POLITICAL

13

[Text] According to Bela Glattfelder, the National Assembly representative at a FIDESZ [Association of Young Democrats] press conference yestcrday, FIDESZ does not plan to become involved in the parliamentary debate over the details of the Indemnification Law, and has not introduced amendments either. Glattfelder noted that “FIDESZ has no position to support because it did not offer any amendments. At the same time, however, one cannot rule out the possibility that FIDESZ representatives will comment, because they must respond to possible attacks madę against them.” In Glattfeldefs view, the debate conceming details may be regarded as a matter of formality because committees decide the fate of amendments. Nevertheless the debate promises to be quitc lengthy because the Smallholdcrs will try to “keep their irons in the fire” as long as possible.

Viktor Orban, the FIDESZ faction leader, joined the discussion and said that indemnification was not a national issue, i.e., one that is supported by a majority of the people. Orban said that the charged atmosphere that surrounded the indemnification may be attributed pri-marily to the Smallholders Party. Public opinion polis by far do not suggcst that people attributed such great significance to this matter. Orban also reported the results of a survey conductcd by Szonda Ipsos Ltd. on a 1,000-person representative sample. Given a choice regarding methods of privatization, only 20 percent of the respondents said that the former property should be retumed to the owners. Responding to whether they approved of indemnification, only 27 percent answered in the affirmative, while 67 percent gave a clearly nega-tive reply. The latter was justified by the country’s present economic situation. Other public opinion sur-veys produced similar results. Orban was told that these will be madę public within a few days.

The FIDESZ sponsored yet another survey by Szonda Ipsos Ltd. In this survey respondents were asked for whom they would vote if the elections were held today. The FIDESZ would receive 31 percent of the vote, 22 percent of the vote would go to the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], 14 percent to the Hungarian Dem-ocratic Forum [MDF], 10 percent to the Smallholders Party [FKgP], 6 percent each to the Christian Demo-cratic People’s Party [KDNP] and the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], and 4 percent to the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP]. In his further remarks, Orban found yet another finding of the public opinion survey as surprising: Contrary to common belief, the inclination of people to take part in elections has not diminished sińce last spring. Forty-nine percent of the persons asked said that they would certainly cast their votes, while 24 percent would probably go to the polis if parliamentary elections were held.

Zoltan Rockenbauer reported on a FIDESZ trip to France: The increased foreign policy activities of FIDESZ were related to the fact that FIDESZ has become a leading party, and this status demands that the party’s extemal relations be elevated to a higher level.

FIDESZ does not want to conduct foreign policy instead of the govemment, it tries to contribute by using its own means to the evolution of a consensual Hungarian foreign policy, even if this is difficult for FIDESZ to do, as it was at the time of the weapons scandal.

Local RMDSZ Head Views Political Landscape

91BA0427A Budapest ROMAN1AIMAGYAR SZO in Hungarian 7 Mar 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Gabor Kolumban, Udvarhelyszek RMDSZ [Democratic Federation of Hungarians in Romania] head by Istvan Olah; place and datę not given: “Politics and Civil Society; Thoughts on RMDSZ’s Spring Congress”—first two paragraphs are ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO introduction]

[Text] An unusual interview? When the political organi-zation of Hungarians in Romania is the subject, RMDSZ [Democratic Federation of Hungarians in Romania] head Gabor Kolumban is concemed with at least four questions. The questions, just like the answers, manifest the balance of political power of our times, or the moment. Let us view this tactical interview as a critical interpretation of the RMDSZ’s short but significant period of development, drawing a few lessons from it that may also be projected into the coming period. However, what Gabor Kolumban tells is not a morał story. He reflects and doubts, assesses and makes prog-noses, painting civil society’s distant reality (rather than its ideał) on the wali and, being a politician, or morę modestly, engaged in politics, he does this with the abstractness of politics. Which is, after all, not realpoli-tik. It is too clean and idealistic for that.

Here, then, are the qucstions:

1.    Why has the RMDSZ a populist accent?

2.    What form of organization or activity is most appro-priate for the populist demand?

3.    Where do these practical forms clash with the change of system?

4.    What does this organization expect from its leaders, in other words: what can a Magyar intellectual do in Romania?

[Olah] Let us, then, begin with the possible questions, i.e., with those that cannot be formulated as absolute truths....

[Kolumban] It seems essential for organizations and political structures, which can assume leadership roles in societies freed from totalitarianism, to be organizations that usually require and rally broad popular support; mass demands are also manifest in their idcologies, and this makes them nationally inclined. Their role in repre-senting social interests is also evident. This is what the front is like which represcnted an all-national consensus in the beginning, being able to preserve this until it began its struggle for power; and this is what the RMDSZ is