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REY1EWS 289

On p.76_f linę 24, the author makes a conclusive statement - “Really an absence conceived as an independent real is a highly untenable concept.^M Here we should keep in mind that the Prflana as well as Navya - Nyfiya works have adduced a number of arguments in favour of AbhSva. And hence I think, it is better to leave this issue as controversial.

On p.86, Dr. Nagin Shah has very systematically presented Jayanta’s discussion about the qualifier and qualillcand relation, and has righlly pointed out the ad hoc characler of the NySya which admils this relation. The author ’s view is quite in consonance with the views held by modem logicians, łike Daniel H.H. lngalls (Materials for the Study of Navya - NySya Logic, pp. 58, 75) and B.K. Matilal ( The Navya NySya Doctrine of Negation, pp. 42-44).

In the Appendix, Dr. Nagin Shah has vsry interestingly discussed the naturę of knowledge citing a number of definitions of various darśanas like Vaiśesika, NySya, MlmamsS, Bauddha, Jaina, etc. A similar discussion we find in the “Advanced Studies in Indian Logic And Mctaphysics " by Sukhlalji Sanghavi (pp. 32-33).

On p. 116 (Appendix) the author has distinctly shown the difference between the views regarding validily and non-validity of knowledge held by ŚSntaraksita and that held by Stcherbatsky and Chatterjee who “seem to have before them the Sarvadarśanasańgraha. " Then the author remarks - “May be this view held by a section of the Buddhist philosophers. Or maybe it is a misrepresentation of the Buddhist view on the part of the author of the Sarwdarśanasańgraha. ” I think the first altemative is morę plausible than the second. In this context we find the statement “ tasmSdaprSmSnyaih, svatah prSmanyam tu sariivadajhanSdibhir.... ” The author of the Yuktisneha -prapurani - siddhSnta - ćandrikS, relcrs to this as the Buddha view. (AvidyS - A Problem of Truth and Reality, Fn.3, p. 464, by E.A. Solomon, Gujarat University, Ahmedabad).

The printing and get-up of the book under review are very nice and attractive. There are some errors in printing e g. plimarily (= primarily, p.l, linę 14), thmes theem (= thcmes them p.7, linę 20), Jayanta that (= ‘says’ missing, p. 10, 1.7), Jayanta (- letters in disorder, p. 21, linę last bul one), worp ( = word, p. 27, 1. last), comesin (= comes in p.29, 1.20), to arelte (= to relate p.30, I. last), senory (= sensory, p. 47, 1.2), trun (= tum, p. 47, last linę of the para. 1), the ( = he, linę 4^,h from the last), smhoe (= smoke, p. 58 middle), complcd (= coupled, p. 59, .10), a cog-tion (= cognition, p.l 14, 1. last), 43 (= 45 Fn. No. p. 115, 1.5), Bracked (= Bracketed, p. 121, Fn.13), Pramanata iti (= pramSnala iti, p.l25, Fn.79, linę 3).

This book under review is a valuable contribution to the sphere of Indian Philosophy in generał and that of Indian Logic in particular. And I am confident