R

OZA

N

URULLINA

The Revival of Muslim Communities in
Russia’s Regions

Based on Sociological Research Materials in the
Republic of Tatarstan

In the Federation of Russia’s regions, revival of Islam has been
accompanied by formation of the primary cells of Muslim communities—
mahallah. However, many Islamic researchers and Muslims recognize
that these communities do not play a substantial role in the life of
believers. The article is based on results of a sociological study involving
the mosque personnel, sponsored by the Islamic Studies Center of
the Academy of Sciences of Tatarstan. Expert interviews and other
documents are also reviewed. Research revealed basic problems
impeding the proper functioning of reviving Muslim communities in the
region. These include financial problems hindering economic indepen-
dence, personnel problems despite numerous religious educational
institutions, lack of library resources including high quality religious
literature, lack of unity among Russia’s Muslims, and the need to

3

English translation

q 2014, 2015 Taylor & Francis, from the Russian text,

“Vozrozhdenie musul’manskikh obshchin v rossiiskikh regionakh (po materialam
sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia v Respublike Tatarstan).”

Roza Nurullina is a candidate of sociology, and a senior research associate at the

Center of Islamic Research, in the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of
Tatarstan. She is also a docent (assistant professor) at the Kazan (Volga region)
Federal University.

Translated by Stephan Lang. Translation reprinted from Anthropology and

Archeology of Eurasia, vol. 53, no. 2. doi:

10.1080/10611959.2014.1022427

.

Russian Social Science Review, vol. 56, no. 6,
November – December 2015, pp. 3–23.

q 2015 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1061-1428 (print)/ISSN 1557-7848 (online)
DOI:

10.1080/10611428.2015.1119535

overcome ideological discrepancies within the larger community of
Muslim believers, the ummah.

The Muslim community in Russia: Past and present

Muslim regions of Russia, such as the Republic of Tatarstan, are creating
the first building blocks of Islamic communities—mahallah [makhallia ]—
in the context of a religious revival, a process taking place as a rule, around
mosques. However, in the consensus opinion of Islamic-studies specialists
and Muslims themselves, they still do not play a noticeable role in the life of
believers. “What is being spoken of is the creation (or the revival) of the
institution of Muslim communities and the formation on their base of a full-
fledged spiritual-social space that allows believers to satisfy all their needs.
We often hear that there are 20 million Muslims living in Russia. The
number is impressive. But the majority of Russia’s Muslims are such only
nominally, given that they are not members of any Muslim community.”

1

The degree of consolidation for members of a given congregation depends

on many factors—including ensuring financial self-sufficiency for the
mahallah. “A community, being the primary building block and foundation
of the Muslim ummah, must be based on healthy economic relations and
moral principles. Otherwise it cannot be called a Muslim community. There
are very few of them among the registered 1,000 religious organizations.”

2

One strategic direction of activity by the Spiritual Administration of the

Muslims of the Republic of Tatarstan has been declared to be “formation of
a Muslim community that:

—understands the whole depth of the problems facing it;
—determines its place in a polyconfessional and multinational secular
state and the optimal forms of peaceful coexistence;
—is in a constant search for material and financial self-reliance;
—possesses a sense of responsibility in the struggle against dangerous
phenomena that negatively affect public life, especially given the
spiritual state of society searching to eradicate negative phenomena and
to use its centuries-old traditions in the resolution of social problems;
—realizes that Islam is not simply the fulfillment of rites, but also
the forming of a corresponding way of life and worldview.”

3

The religious community is considered to be an important, independent,

and relevant institution in the majority of confessions, albeit not to the same

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RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW

degree. In Protestantism, as a rule, it comprises a highly consolidated
community of coreligionists, who maintain constant informal ties among
one another. A high degree of intracommunity integration is likewise
characteristic of adherents of Judaism and Catholicism. At the same time, it
is customary to consider that in Orthodoxy and Islam—the religions of the
majority of Russia’s population—despite a canonic obligation (in Islam, a
desirability) to participate in public divine services, religious communities
are much more amorphous and have a shifting membership, especially in
large cities.

4

Along with that, researchers note the rather high consolidation of Islamic

communities in prerevolutionary Russia. Researchers describe the
prerevolutionary Tatar mahallah as a localized self-administered Muslim
community that organized its internal life according to sets of principles
based on religious [shari’ah ] law, providing its members with opportunities
for the free execution of moral-religious duties in conditions where other
confessions were dominant in the state.

5

The Tatar localized Muslim community possessed a significant financial

base and independence, had the capability to create congregational
trusteeships, received consistent offerings from believers, and controlled
and distributed charitable funds. The absence of a tax burden on
congregations and systematic support from the entrepreneurial elite
allowed the mahallah to function successfully without direct support from
the state.

6

At present, a multitude of unresolved problems complicate the full-

fledged functioning of revitalizing Muslim communities.

There are many mosques, but they are 80 percent empty. They have lost
the global role they used to fulfil. This is not only a place for performing
prayers [namaz ], sermons, this was a center that united the community
[mahallah ]. People used to come here for a cup of tea, to socialize, to
hear the latest news. We need to change the very role of the mosques.

7

(From an expert interview)

It is customary to associate the problems of congregations with

insufficient training of skilled cadres of clergymen, difficulties in achieving
the economic independence of the communities, the need to work out a
legal-normative base that meets contemporary requirements, and a whole
series of other reasons.

One such important reason is the lack of unity among Russia’s

Muslims, manifested at the scale of the entire ummah and within individual
congregations.

NOVEMBER – DECEMBER 2015

5

This is connected with disagreements among Muslims themselves

. . . .

Muslims have got to be united, but what happens in the mosque? There is
radical Islam, there is traditional Islam, Hanafis. (From an expert
interview)

In relation to the Republic of Tatarstan a well-established point of view is

expressed among politicians and scholars that this is one of the most successful
regions of Russia in the context of interethnic and interconfessional
interaction. “Inherent in Tatar Islam, which belongs to the Hanafi doctrinal
persuasion (madhhab), is a high degree of tolerance.”

8

Religious figures have

likewise underscored on many an occasion that Hanafi Islam, traditionally
widespread in the Volga region, is distinguished by relative flexibility,
lenience, and peacefulness, confirmed by a centuries-old history of the
interaction of Muslims with representatives of other confessions on the given
territory. However, the events of recent years show that the problem of
religious extremism in the region is urgent. “The most negative aspect is that
the ‘tolerant Tatarstan model,’ which many regions and states took as a model,
may be destroyed.”

9

Resolution of all these tasks depends in large part on the success of the

activity of the ministers of the mosques (imams) and their ability to provide
for people’s spiritual needs. “The mosque must once again become the
center of Muslims’ life.”

10

While a specific and important intermediary mission is officially

entrusted to the clergy in Christianity (especially in Catholicism and
Orthodoxy) and some other religions, the privilege of a Muslim, according
to tradition, is the opportunity to address God directly, without
intermediaries. In Islam formally no priesthood intervenes to be a mediator
between humans and God. However, it is noted by researchers that a
distinctive feature of the contemporary period of Islamic development in
Russia is the forming of a professional clergy: “A certain semblance of a
‘Muslim clergy’ has formed, which actively separates itself from the rest of
the members of the community.”

11

The scholarly treatment of this phenomenon is not straightforward. One

group considers this to be a manifestation of the modernization of Islam: “It
is obvious that this is the influence of the Christian tradition, more
broadly—of the worldview that developed based on the Christian one.”

12

Researchers note that the professionalization of Muslim scholars and imams
began at the very dawn of Islam: “This allowed Muslim learning to be
preserved, since cultivating it is beyond the strength of mere amateurs and
dilettantes, as opposed to salaried professionals.”

13

The process has

6

RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW

developed actively: “The Muslim clergy in Tatarstan is gradually acquiring
the features of a social group, which in recent times has turned to the
formation of its own worldview.”

14

The training of religious cadres, the nurturing of a clergy, is a priority

direction for active religious educational establishments. At present, ten
professional educational establishments in the Republic of Tatarstan are
under the jurisdiction of the regional Spiritual Administration of Muslims.
In the capital of the Republic: The Kazan Islamic University, two higher
Muslim medreses (“Mukhammadia,” and the medrese named after the
1000th anniversary of the adoption of Islam), the Kazan Islamic College,
and another six secondary-level medreses in various raion centers.

A particular place in the system of Muslim education in Tatarstan

is played by the Islamic Institute of Russia (RII), the first higher
professional Islamic educational establishment in the Federation of Russia
(founded in 1998).

a

The main objective of the institute is not to train

ministers and prayer leaders [imam-khatibs ] for mosques but to nurture a
contemporary Muslim intelligentsia, who feel called on to serve the Muslim
ummah of Russia. It is to enable highly skilled specialists in Islamic
theology, history, law, language, and Islamic economics. The Institute
implements educational activity on the basis of state educational standards
for higher professional education in bachelor’s and master’s programs, and
conducts scholarly research in the field of Islamic theology.

15

But despite sufficient Islamic educational establishments in the region,

the mosques continue to be in need of highly skilled clergymen. According
to data from the official website of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims
of the Republic of Tatarstan [DUM RT], as of today only 15 percent of
village imams have a higher spiritual education, and some imams have no
religious education whatsoever.

16

There is a contradiction between the

objective need to provide the Muslim congregations of Tatarstan with
highly skilled cadres of clergymen and lack of precise knowledge about the
real level of training of ministers at the mosques, as well as their value
orientations, ethnoconfessional frameworks, and ideological predilections.

To resolve this cadre problem, and with the support of the Center for

Skills Improvement of the Workers of Religious Organizations and
Instructors of Educational Establishments of the Russian Islamic Institute,
the Center of Islamic-Studies Research of the Republic of Tatarstan
(Academy of Sciences) is conducting sociological research among clergy at
the republic’s mosques. According to official data, more than 1,200
mahallah communities are under the jurisdiction of the Spiritual
Administration. These are joined into forty-five urban and rural middle-tier

NOVEMBER – DECEMBER 2015

7

administrators [muhtasibats ] and nine territorial subdivisions of a muftiate
[kazyiats ]. About 400 imams training at two-week courses in the Center for
Skills Improvement of the Workers of Religious Organizations and
Instructors of Educational Establishments under the Russian Islamic
Institute were surveyed using questionnaire methodology during the 2011 –
12, 2012 – 13, and 2013 – 14 school years. They represent 36 of the republic’s
45 muhtasibats. Clergy from the Republic’s two largest cities—Kazan and
Nabererzhnye Chelny—did not participate much in the survey.

The research was organized to answer the following questions: To what

degree are the Muslim congregations of Tatarstan provided with skilled
cadres of clergy? Does the training of ministers in the mosques meet the
expectations of believers and the demands made by them? Do their views
and ideological predilections correspond to the fundamental tenets of the
Hanafi religious-law school? What additional professional retraining and
skills improvement educational programs can ensure that Muslim
clergymen can maintain the necessary skill level?

Imams of Tatarstan: Social and demographic characteristics

The central question in the questionnaire became: “What, in your opinion,
do believers expect from Muslim clergy, and what demands do they make
of you?” The diversity of responses offered by respondents can be reduced
to a few. The leader of a mahallah must have mastery of the basic minimum
of religious knowledge (19 percent), be able to perform the necessary rituals
(19 percent), be active and energetic (16 percent), possess high moral
qualities (14 percent), attract new members (9 percent), be an example for
others (7 percent), unite people (4.5 percent), and more (10.5 percent).

For comparison, we cite the results of a questionnaire-style survey of

students at Tatarstan’s Muslim educational establishments, conducted in
2008 jointly by the Tatar State University of Humanities and Education and
the Islamic University of Russia, in which 439 students in 8 medreses were
surveyed. The Muslim students [shakird ] responded to an analogous
question extensively. Congregation members expect above all from
contemporary Muslim clergy knowledge and skills in the religious sphere
(34.5 percent). [Typical answers include]:

A healthy, correct understanding of the creed of Islam and a concise
knowledge of fiqh (law), including in the performance of the prayer
services since an understanding of religion and religious action in Islam
are inseparable. Unfortunately, the imams of the Tatarstan, especially in

8

RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW

villages, do not know the subject of fiqh (the laws of Islam), leading to
odd incidents. Constant work on oneself, on expanding knowledge.
Believers are subdivided into practicing and not, so the requirements are
correspondingly different. The former must have a high literacy in
questions that arise (family, everyday life, connected with religious
practice and the main point—the interrelation between the new
conditions of life and the requirements of shari’ah), the latter must
correspond to canonic actions. Society is waiting for professionals
specifically in the spiritual sphere, and not socially versed secular people.
What is important for them is religion, and not a knowledge of
philosophy and other secular disciplines.

Only a few respondents (6.4 percent) considered it imperative for a

contemporary imam to have an all-around education:

An imam has to be ideal from all sides, both from the religious and from
the secular; in our time imams must have knowledge in pedagogy and
psychology.

In second place among requirements (24 percent) was the ability to

render spiritual and psychological support to people:

[People are waiting] for spiritual support and understanding of problems;
spiritual support is one of the reasons for going to a mosque; the imam
has to be an educated psychologist, to be able to talk and work with
people; provide life advice; provide a more subtle and flexible approach
in the resolution of personal problems.

Third (18 percent) in significance concerned the clergy’s high moral

qualities:

[Clergy should] be attentive, polite, righteous; have oratorical abilities, a
good disposition; be polite and fulfill imposed duties regardless of
whether he’s busy doing something of his own. Everybody thinks imams
never sin and are greatly disappointed when they see the opposite. Many
engage in intermediation between people and the Most High (praying for
the forgiveness of the sins of others), which is categorically prohibited in
Islam—that is, they earn money for this. I think clergy don’t have enough
spirituality; they are engaged in admonitions, moral teaching, and
condemnation.

A few respondents (2 percent) considered that an imam must above all be

an example of a true Muslim, by whom the rest orient themselves: (People
are waiting) for an example to emulate. Also mentioned were: an ability to
attract people, an aspiration to find an approach to people:

NOVEMBER – DECEMBER 2015

9

[An imam should have a] literate approach to people; an imam has to get
congregation members interested; the ideal imam literately and wisely
calls [people to come] to Islam, without imposing his opinion; [he
exemplifies] active civic work; in a call to faith, he must be a shield; [he
should have] patience, all-around help to those in need, especially sick
children; [he should be] strong spiritually, responsible, capable of
fighting for the rights of Muslims, striving for the development of Islam.

As young Muslims see it, a professional clergyman must have diverse

knowledge, skills, and personal characteristics; he must not be limited to
cult practice: ritual cults (alone) is in the past.

More than half the imams we surveyed are pension-aged men, with 64

percent being over sixty years old. Elderly people tend to be more religious;
and serving in a mosque is usually a low-paying occupation, especially in a
rural locale. It therefore attracts people who already have a stable income in
the form of a pension (see

Table 1

). Even so, a fifth of pensioner-imams

have an additional job—18 percent are engaged in agriculture on their own
farm, 3 percent still have a secular job.

One-third of the clergy surveyed are young, up to thirty-five years of age (11

percent) and middle aged, from thirty-five to sixty years old (25 percent).
Higher and secondary Muslim educational establishments annually graduate
young specialists in the field of Islamic theology, enabling them to receive the
professional classification of a prayer-leader and sermon-giver at mosque
services [imam-khatib ]. However, research conducted earlier in Tatar medreses
has shown that only 8.5 percent of shakirds plan to become an imam in a
mosque immediately after completing their education. Among the most

Table 1

Age of Imams and Where Mosques are Located (%)

Age of imam

Place where mosque is located

In a large

city

In a town or

medium-sized

city

In a raion center

or urban-type

settlement

In a

rural locale

All

Up to 35

1.5

2.0

1.0

6.5

11.0

From 36 to 60

1.0

1.0

2.0

20.0

24.0

Older than 60

0.0

2.0

5.0

57.0

64.0

Total

2.5

5.0

8.0

83.5

99.0

10

RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW

widespread problems that medrese graduates encounter, 58 percent of
instructors note the low remuneration for their labor. In second place is the
problem of job placement (38.5 percent), although what is usually meant is
specifically a shortage of work that pays well: They can’t find work as imams

. . .

because there aren’t enough guaranteed secure places (from a medrese
instructor’s questionnaire).

This is confirmed by other researchers’ conclusions: “in the Volga

[Privolzhskom ] Federal District the low prestige of a local Islamic
professional education stems to some degree from the [low] prestige of the
work of an imam.”

17

“Graduates do not want to work for a paltry salary.”

18

However, specialists see the reason for the problem not only in the lack of
secure jobs and the inability of a mahallah to provide their imams with
acceptable compensation for labor. Noted as well is the weak coordination
of actions between the Islamic educational establishments and the Spiritual
Administration of Muslims.

19

The situation can have far-reaching

consequences: “some of them, not having managed to find a “place under
the sun” by themselves

. . . can subsequently create new educational or

religious structures, which will start to compete with those that already exist
in the region and will create the preconditions for splits in the Muslim
population. Radically disposed young people often nurture such plans.”

20

Given that most of Tatarstan’s mosques were built in the post-Soviet

period, Muslim clergy’s service and experience in them is not long. More
than half the respondents have been serving as imams less than five years
(56.5 percent), 23.5 percent from five to ten years, 18 percent have more
than ten years of service, and a mere seven people surveyed (2 percent) have
been working in the sphere more than twenty years. The term of service
does not correlate with age, since most elderly clergy became imams only
after becoming pensioners. Moreover, only 8.5 percent had been employed
in another religious post, as instructors or call-to-prayer assistants
[muezzins ], before this.

The overwhelming majority of the mosques in Tatarstan are rural and are

predominantly in Tatar villages. Therefore, the nationality composition of
Muslim clergy in the republic is extremely homogeneous. Thus, 98.5
percent of respondents identify themselves with the Tatar ethnos, the rest
with other ethnic groups traditionally confessing Islam, for example
Uzbeks, or Bashkirs. Just one imam indicated his ethnic-Russian origin.
Correspondingly, they communicate with members of the congregation
predominantly in the Tatar language: 12.5 percent indicated that they
use Russian and Tatar equally. Only the ethnic-Russian imam uses his

NOVEMBER – DECEMBER 2015

11

mother-tongue Russian exclusively in communicating with members of the
congregation.

The educational and professional characteristics of the respondents are to

a large extent correlated with demographic-social composition: 23.5
percent of the imams surveyed, with various age categories represented in
nearly equal proportions, have a higher secular education, half of those
surveyed had received a secondary (including secondary professional)
education, and less than a quarter (23.5 percent) do not have a secondary
education. No one is younger than thirty-five.

In contemporary conditions, in the context of a tolerant consciousness,

an imperative aspect of a classical theological education is considered to be
the study of general humanities disciplines. According to the data of
research in medreses, the administrators and instructors recognize the
importance of this:

They [the secular disciplines] are very important for understanding and
making sense of Islam. We [the Islamic clergy] live in a secular state
and we’ve got to know

. . . and be broadly educated, in order to think

objectively, to objectively analyze a given situation. This [studying
general-education disciplines] is a must, religious knowledge is not the
only thing needed in life; a [religious] person has got to know what is
going on around him

. . . history . . . mathematics . . . he must know and

be abreast of contemporary achievements of science and culture. (From
questionnaires and interviews)

It is not by chance that an overwhelming portion of the imams surveyed,

nearly 90 percent, had earlier worked or are now working in a nonreligious
sphere in addition [to their jobs as imams]. More than half, 56 percent, are
employed or were employed in the past in agriculture, 12 percent have
working-class occupations, and 20.5 percent put themselves in the category
of “intelligentsia, managers, businessmen.”

As concerns religious education, the picture is less favorable, since only

half the respondents indicated that they have any kind of religious education:
elementary—20 percent, secondary—18.5 percent, and higher—11 percent,
comparable with the data from official sources (see above). The rest achieve
the necessary minimum of religious knowledge on their own. They actively
engage in self-education, read religious literature, and more. To some degree,
the level of knowledge of the Arabic language is revealing as well: a third of
the surveyed imams (33.5 percent) practically do not know it at all, another
third (32 percent) know the basics and can read what is written, nearly a
quarter (24 percent) understand a little of what is written and know simple

12

RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW

phrases, and only 10 percent consider that they know the Arabic language
sufficiently well.

In second place among practical problems that clergy encounter in their

service activity is insufficient knowledge—their own (34 percent), and that
of colleagues (10.5 percent). Among the variants of resolving problems, in
third place is the need to increase religious knowledge. More than half the
respondents, 56 percent, indicated that they would like to increase their
religious education in a higher educational establishment, although for
many this would be difficult in view of their advanced age. Among the
preferred religious educational establishments, mentioned most often is
the Islamic Institute of Russia, the Mukhammadia higher medrese, and the
higher medrese named after the 1000th anniversary of the adoption of Islam
(all in the city of Kazan).

Even more, 88 percent, are interested in taking retraining and skills

improvement courses. Of these, 75 percent in religious disciplines,
featuring: the Arabic language, the Koran, the hadiths, fiqh, tajweed [Koran
recitation diction], ’aqı¯dah [tenets of belief], tafsir [exegesis], shari’ah, the
history of Islam, obligations of an imam, methodology of conducting
sermons, and more. Thirteen percent of imams would also like to study
secular disciplines: psychology, pedagogy, rhetoric, linguistics, philosophy,
Tatarstan history, inter-confessional relations, and others. Preferred faculty
at these courses is predominantly Islamic theologian-scholars (71.5 percent
of those who responded); secular specialist-scholars’ knowledge of Islamic
studies is called for to a lesser degree (23 percent).

Preliminary data obtained in our research permit us to assert that the level

of education of most Muslim clergy for the region as a whole is insufficient.
Many imams require educational services, including professional retraining
and skills improvement. Opportunities for this are being created in the
republic: evening and correspondence sections have been opened in all
higher and secondary Muslim educational establishments, where one can
increase one’s religious education without interrupting one’s main duties.
Short-term courses for professional development for imams likewise operate
periodically in most medreses. In the city of Naberezhnye Chelny an Institute
for Skills Improvement of Imams and Preachers is functioning, where around
250 imams from different corners of Tatarstan are trained annually. At the
initiative of the Interagency Working Group on Realizing a Targeted
Program for Prophylaxis of Terrorism and Extremism in the Republic of
Tatarstan, a Center for Skills Improvement of the Workers of Religious
Organizations and Instructors of Muslim Educational Establishments was
founded in 2011 on the base of the Islamic Institute of Russia.

NOVEMBER – DECEMBER 2015

13

Problems concerning the functioning of Muslim communities in
Tatarstan and possible resolutions: Opinions and assessments of
Muslim clergy

Discovering Muslim clergy’s opinions and assessments of practical
problems associated with the functioning of a mahallah, as well as possible
resolutions of these problems, were among the basic tasks of our research.
It was also important to discern ideological views and predilections of
mosque personnel, including whether they correlated with fundamental
tenets of the Hanafi religious-law school, considered traditional in
numerous regions of Russia. Many researchers deem that not only the
degree of consolidation of Muslims in communities, but also the character
of inter-confession relations in the country in the next few years will largely
depend on this.

A mere 6 percent of the imams surveyed consider that there are no

“apparent, serious” problems in the mahallah. The rest hold the opposite
view: “the mosques have very many problems” (from a questionnaire).
Most prevalent (62 percent) are material and financial complications.
A sample of these are:

—Complications concerning mosque upkeep; payment of public
utilities; payment for lighting and heating.
—There are no funds for everyday needs; construction-repair costs;
European-style [thermal] windows are needed so that it would be warmer
in the mosque.
—Money is needed to insulate the walls; to replace the doors and
windows; to landscape mosque territory.
—We need material assistance so that the mosque will be clean,
beautiful, and attract people.
—Offerings are not sufficient; we need to provide for the financing of
mosques and remuneration of the imam’s labor; for the imam—a good
wage; if the imams have an adequate salary, they will be able to broaden
[their] religious knowledge, spend more time working with the people,
and actively call [people] into the religion.

In second place in significance (44.5 percent) is the problem of cadres:

—The lack of highly skilled imams; we need imams who would know
how to answer any questions that may come up.

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RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW

—We have a shortage of cadres and [we need] young imams who read
Arabic [muhallim-imams ].
—[Imams] have weak religious education.

The fact that 34 percent of clergy encounter the need to make up for a

lack of religious knowledge among the congregation confirms the
importance of this problem:

The people do not have an elementary education in religion; they cannot
remember the prayers and ayahs of the Koran.

From us [is needed]—clarifications, [while] from the members of the
congregation— [we have] an aspiration to understand the fundamentals
of the religion.

The overwhelming majority (84 percent) of respondents considers that

mosque personnel need to improve their skills regularly; about 80 percent
deem that this needs to occur at least once every four years.

Most of the imams surveyed (84 percent) serve in village mosques,

which corresponds to the ratio of rural congregations, according to official
data of the Republic of Tatarstan Spiritual Administration. Since the late
1980s, the construction of such mosques in Tatarstan has acquired a vast
scale, though experts admit that the forming of full-fledged communities
around them has been hampered. “This was indeed a utopia—to place our
bets on strengthening Tatar rural Islam

. . . money has been pulled into the

village, money that has not gone for the development of city communities.
All these village mosques built in honor of deceased parents, or of fathers
and mothers living out their final years—all this, to my view, is a grandiose
black hole.”

21

Only 15 percent of the respondents include insufficient provision of

religious literature to congregations among the most important problems.
More than half the mosques (64.5 percent) nevertheless need replenishment
of library stock. Among the necessary literature, mentioned most often is
religious literature in the Tatar language, including quality translations into
Tatar of the Koran, fiqh, ’aqı¯dah, tafsir, and so on:

—Providing for literature in an accessible language; we would like to
have all the necessary religious books in the Tatar language.
—Books in the Tatar language written by Tatar scholars are needed; the
works of modern-day theologians, books on shari’ah, all in Tatar.
—There are few books in Tatar.

NOVEMBER – DECEMBER 2015

15

As concerns the content, books of the Hanafi madhhab (the books of

Abu¯ H

˙

anı¯fah; Abu¯ H

˙

anı¯fah’s fiqh; the canons of shari’ah according to

the madhhab of Abu¯ H

˙

anı¯fah) are in demand, as well as the Tatar

theological classics (R. Fakhretdin, A. Maksudi, and others) and the
works of modern-day authors (G. Samatov, R. Iunusov, Dzh. Fazyev, and
others). It ought to be noted that the scholarly community and the
Spiritual Administration leadership are attempting to revive the national
theological heritage: the works of Tatar thinkers and theologian-scholars
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are being published,
translated, and researched.

Despite the urgency of the topic, only a few respondents (7 percent of the

imams surveyed) included ideological contradictions among the practical
problems that they encounter in their activity. For example, some did assert:
“there is no unity; [we have] disagreements in worship approach [ibad ];
[we have] problems with Wahhabi followers.” This circumstance can be
explained in several ways. The opinion exists that the scale of the spread of
radical currents in the republic are exaggerated. A respondent in an “expert
interview” explained:

The selection of the facts [in Russia’s mass information media] is
tendentious; this is factually an information war against Islam.

In Tatarstan [radicals are present] to a lesser degree, but everything
[accused elsewhere] is likewise duplicated.

In April 2013, the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Federation

of Russia organized the conference “Islam-online” for journalists. At this
forum, a decision was adopted to enable elaboration of a code of rules for
“dissemination of the values of Islam” and a “methodology for the
submission of information in the Muslim mass information media.” Their
objective was to promulgate “a positive attitude” toward the Muslim
ummah and weed out “Islamophobic sentiments” in society.

22

On the other hand, in rural communities, a predominant focus of this

stage of research, the problem of radicalism may be not as acute as in large
cities. The insufficient theological education of rural imams may also play a
role. It does not allow them to recognize potentially dangerous views
among congregation members. One expert respondent explained:

It may be that his religious range of vision is not so big, he only came to
Islam ten years ago. But he says that apparently it’s not the Hanafi
madhhab that’s prevalent in that place where he’s living now, but that
there’s more Wahhabism. He’s trying not to have anything to do with this.

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RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Besides, some respondents may consciously ignore the existence of

ideological contradictions in the ummah:

We say—there is one Islam, with which the Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him)
came; another does not exist. Whatever you may call yourself—Shi’ite,
Sufi, or someone else, the “Hizb ut-tahrir,” which has styled itself a party,
no matter who you are, I recognize only one Islam, with which the prophet
came, another one does not exist for me. (From an expert interview)

According to a sociological survey conducted on the initiative of the

sociological group “Sreda” in 2012, only 34% of the republic’s residents
consider themselves Muslims. Among them, 31% of respondents, while
defining their religious identification, chose the following option: “I am a
Muslim, but neither a Sunni, nor a Shia.” Only 1% of respondents
positioned themselves specifically as Sunni.

23

It is also probable that

respondents are avoiding giving a positive response to a direct question
[about ideological tensions] through unwillingness to touch on a sensitive
topic or because of personal adherence to radical currents.

In any case, the research toolkit potentially permits work [on issues of

ideology] to be continued. For example, the question of the language of
sermons in mosques can serve as a significant marker reflecting the
ideological state of the ummah in Russia. S[ergei] Gradirovskii initiated a
project called “Russian Islam.” He noted the mass transition in mosques to
the Russian language, connected with the point that “the majority of urban
mosques today are being filled by Muslims of different nationalities.”

24

This process, the author asserts, is taking place by itself, through objective
causes, and cannot have negative consequences. In reality, many view the
situation not so unambiguously.

One of Gradirovskii’s opponents, V[ailulla] Iakupov, had expressed

concern that “in the majority of urban Russian mosques, besides Tatarstan
and Bashkortostan, the language of the sermons is changing to Russian

. . . .

And if nothing is done, it may soon happen that Islam in Russia will stop
being Tatar, that is, in the Tatar language.” What is most unfortunate, as
Iakupov asserts, is that “this process is being facilitated by, among other
things, the point that in many ways Tatar youth is Russian-speaking and has
been infected with Salafi and Wahhabi ideas, with their complete rejection of
the nationality component.”

25

This view is supported by the first deputy chairman of the Spiritual

Administration of Muslims of European Russia, D. Mukhetdinov, who
writes on his blog: “If you teach Muslim children entirely in the Russian
language, then, probably, they will move away from the Islamic traditions

NOVEMBER – DECEMBER 2015

17

of their people and will most likely come to the traditions of the radicals.”
He considers that such a tendency “only spawns Wahhabi-mankurts and
Hizbuts, who say that they need an extra-nationality caliphate.”

26

,a

The positions of respondents on the use of Russian in mosques is as

follows:

—65 percent of the imams surveyed consider that the sermon in Tatarstan’s
mosques must be read in the Tatar language, since the Muslim religion is a
cultural-based formational factor for the Tatar nation;
—9.5 percent consider it more convenient to use Russian and Tatar
concurrently in mosques attended by Muslims of different nationalities;
—12 percent adhere to the extreme view that Islam is above all a world
religion, which from the outset has not been connected with a specific
national tradition and language; even if it is connected, then it is more likely
with Arabic than Tatar;
—4.5 percent do not have a specific point of view.

In the opinion of some researchers, the ethno-confessional views of

Muslims, as with linguistic-cultural orientations, can indirectly reflect the
presence or absence in their consciousness of radical views. “Ethnic
membership is not a constraining factor for the spread of the ideas of
Wahhabism. Islam offers broad opportunities for this. One of its
fundamental tenets came over from the Middle Ages—religion is above
ethnic membership. Wahhabism, like no other persuasion of Islam, adheres
to this dogma.”

27

On the other hand, it is considered that multiple generations of Hanafi, as

a rule, have recognized the role and significance of ethnic traditions in the
formation of distinctive regional features of Islam.

That Islam being propagandized today, it’s just a tiny bit incorrect, since it
belittles and annihilates the culture of the people. All people are not
obligated to be Arabs, all people should not have to adhere to Arab culture.
Islam—this is monotheism, the essence of Islam is in this, but our culture
has to remain our own. Therefore we can have a Tatar Islam, while a
Kazakh and a Caucasian Islam [may be] different. Islam is enriched by
another culture, and there is nothing wrong about this. (From an expert
interview)

Among the imams surveyed, the overwhelming majority considers that

for the further development of Islam in the republic, the revival and
development of Tatar national culture is either important or very important

18

RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW

(90.5 percent). A mere 3.5 percent of respondents deny this interconnection;
6 percent had difficulty answering.

The study’s tasks included discovering imams’ opinions and assessments

on possible ways of resolving the issue of the functioning of Muslim
mahallah. According to the survey data, further development of religious
education and enlightenment is the universal method for overcoming
practically all the difficulties indicated by the respondents. Questionnaire
responses included:

[It is important] to instruct in Islam from childhood; to instruct every
Tatar youth and maiden who have attained the age of majority in religion;
to organize instruction under the auspices of the mosque; to perfect the
work of Sunday schools; to organize the liquidation of illiteracy
[likbezes ] on religious questions.

b

[We should] instruct everybody according to a single methodology (Abu¯
Ḥanı¯fah’s madhhab), to live according to the laws of the Most High, to
expand knowledge.

It would be good if the students and instructors of Muslim higher
educational establishments interacted with congregation members, read a
sermon, at least once a year; the most important thing is that Tatars know
the mother tongue well, provide a moral upbringing in the family and
preschool daycare centers, publish books of good quality; to organize
moral upbringing and instruction; to open courses under the auspices of
mosques, in order to give knowledge to fellow villagers.

Among other popular responses, most prevalent is an opinion concerning

the necessity for more active participation of state organs in the affairs of
the ummah:

[We need] to prohibit Wahhabist currents; strictly limit various currents
with government assistance, using the state material support; material
assistance from the state [would help].

It would be better to work together with the government, since a big state
consists of small organisms (organizations, communities).

Help at the state level [is needed for] young scholars, to give a wage to
those who don’t get a pension.

The state should rule the people without separating itself from religion; to
fight unemployment in the village, to provide people with jobs, to raise
the level of the minimum pension; government officials can solve it; this
is a state, all-Russian problem.

NOVEMBER – DECEMBER 2015

19

The state has permitted spreading and developing religion, but the
material and financial problem hasn’t been resolved.

In those situations when the imams consider the idea of the relative

independence of religious communities from state structures to be a
priority, the further mobilization of the efforts of the Muslim community as
a whole and of religious organizations in particular is assumed:

To discuss problems at meetings of imams together with the muhtasib.

First, [we need] to increase our own level of religious knowledge, second,
to attract fellow villagers to the faith and to prayer [namaz ].

[We should] find sponsors for the capital repair of the mosque; to attract
people into the mosque, to secure the help of local entrepreneurs; to reach
agreement with fellow villagers and resolve problems;

[We should] raise the issue of charitable donations for religious purposes
[waqf ], and of increasing alms-giving [zakiat ] to provide imams with a
worthy remuneration of labor.

So that the people should act decisively in favor of religion,
entrepreneurs should render assistance.

[We should] provide a wage for the imams through the efforts of the
muftiate; organize instruction under the auspices of the mosque,
involving the muhtasibat in social affairs; we [should] resolve problems
together collectively.

In sum, the main problems that complicate full-fledged functioning of the

reviving Muslim communities in Tatarstan have been identified at this stage of
our research. Among these are financial problems, whose resolution would
allow specific Muslim communities, mahallah, to achieve economic
independence. In addition, serious problems include generating more and
better educated cadres, providing libraries at mosques with quality religious
literature, as well as the task of overcoming ideological differences and
consolidating the Muslims of Russia. Resolution of all these problems is
possible via the further development of religious education and enlightenment
within the framework of the Hanafi madhhab that is traditional for the given
region, with the active participation of state structures, religious organizations,
and the ummah as a whole.

Finally, the ethnoconfessional frameworks, worldviews, and linguistic-

cultural orientations of the imams who participated in the sociological
research correspond on the whole to traditions of the Hanafi madhhab.

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RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW

However, their responses have provided only an indirect set of insights into
their true ideological predilections. More indicative could be the
respondents’ views in interpreting certain specific tenets of the actual
Islamic creed. Eliciting such interpretation represents a complex
methodological problem whose resolution still lies ahead for the authors
of the research.

Notes

1. From A.F. Sadriev’s interview with the magazine Zvezda Povolzh’ia, March

15 – 21, 2012, p. 3.

2. R.M.

Mukhametshin

, “Sistema musul’manskogo obrazovaniia v post-

sovetsom Tatarstane,” Russkii arkhipelag, January 8, 2008,

www.archipelag.ru›ht/

authors/muhametchin/?library

¼1228

.

3. Cited in ibid.
4.

Iu.A. Gavrilov, E.N. Kofanova, M.P. Mchedlov, and A.G. Shevchenko

,

“Konfessional’nye osobennosti religioznoi very i predstavlenii o ee sotsial’nyk
funktsiiakh,” Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, no. 6, 2005, p. 47.

5.

A.A. Mukhametzianov

, “Transformatsiia institutov musul’manskoi

obshchiny Tatarstana (1920 – 1930-e gg.),” Dissertation abstract, candidate of
legal sciences, Kazan, II AN RT, 2007.

6.

A.A. Mukhametzianov

, “Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie musul’manskoi

obshchiny v Rossii (vtoraia polovina XIX – nachalo XX v.),” Izvestiia Ural’skogo
gosudarstvennogo universiteta, no. 49, 2007, pp. 133 – 37.

7. Fragments of expert interviews, as well as the most typical examples of

responses from the questionnaires, here and below.

8. A.V. Malashenko, “Foreword,” in R.M. Muchametshin,

Islam v Tatarstane

(Moscow: Logos, 2006), p. 7.

9.

A.N. Iusupov

, “Svoi sredi chuzhikh, chuzhoi sredi svoikh,” in

Konfessional’nyi faktor v razvitii tatar: Kontseptual’nye issledovaniia (Kazan:
Institut istorii im. Sh. Mardzhani AN RT, 2009), pp. 242 – 45.

10.

Auda Dzhassir

, “Rol’ mecheti v Islame,” Imam.ru, September 12, 2012,

www.imam.ru/articles/mecheti.html

.

11.

R. Shukurov

, “Musul’manstvo i modernizatsiia,” in Religiia i identichnost’ v

Rossii, ed. M.T. Stepaniants (Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura, 2003), p. 202.

12. Ibid.
13.

V.M. Iakupov

, “Sootnoshenie religii i obshchestva v dukhovnom

obrazovanii,” in Sistema musul’manskogo religioznogo obrazovaniia u tatar:
ISTORIIA, problemy, perspektivy. Sb. materialov odnoimennoi nauchno-prakti-
cheskoi konferentsii. Kazan, 13 Oktiabria 2004 g. (Kazan: Institut istorii im. Sh.
Mardzhani AN RT, 2005), p. 15.

14.

V.M. Iakupov

, “Problemy musul’manskogo obrazovaniia v sovremennoi

Rossii. Vystuplenie na zasedanii islamskoi sektsii rabochei gruppy po
confessional’noi politike, okhraneniiu istoricheskogo i dukhovnogo naslediia
Obshchestvennogo soveta po razvitiiu institutov grazhdanskogo obshchestva v

NOVEMBER – DECEMBER 2015

21

PFO. 15 iulia 2007 g. Kazan,” Musul’mane Povolzh’ia, July 13, 2008,

http://www.

muslims-volga.ru/?id

¼385

.

15. Ofitsial’nyi sait RII, March 25, 2014,

http://kazanriu.ru/ob-institute/

.

16. E-islam, February 12, 2008,

http://e-islam.ru/newsall/news/?ID

¼1569

.

17.

A. Shapovalov

, “Problemy institutsionalizatsii islamskogo obrazovaniia v

sovremennoi Rossii,” Vlast’, no. 3, 2011, p. 4.

18.

K. Ainutdinova

, “Problematika razvitiia rossiiskogo obrazovaniia v Rossii i

Srednei Azii,” Minbar, vol. 2, no. 4, 2009, p. 9.

19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., pp. 9 – 10.
21. Sadriev, Zvezda Povolzh’ia interview, p. 3.
22. Ofitsial’nyi sait DUM RT,

http://dumrt.ru/node/8046

.

23.

Atlas religii i national’nostei Rossii

, p. 218. Issledovatel’skaia sluzhba

“Sreda,” January 2, 2014,

www.sreda.org/arena

.

24. S.

Gradirovskii

, “Russkii islam,” Russkii arkhipelag, November 23, 2010,

www.archipelag.ru

.

25.

V.M. Iakupov

, Mera Islama (K problem adekvatnogo konretno-

istoricheskogo ponimaniia vechnykh shariatskikh istin) (Kazan: Iman, 2004), p. 24.

26. Damir-khazrat Mukhetdinov official blog, September 15, 2013,

www.damir-

hazrat.livejournal.com

.

27.

Kh.V. Dzutsev

, “Vakhkhabizm v respublikakh Severnogo Kavkaza

Rossiiskoi Federatsii: realii i posledstviia,” Sotsis, no. 8, 2011, p. 107.

Editor’s note

a. The reference to mankurts has come into everyday conversation in Russia

through the famous novel of Kirghiz writer Chingiz Aitmatov, available in many
editions in English as A Day Lasts Longer Than A Century. It chillingly narrates the
legend of a warrior tribe that turned captured slaves into zombie-like, memory-less
workers through the tightening of a skin cap on their heads. It has become a
metaphor for those who have lost their traditions, and hence their souls. For an
intriguing use of the term applied to Russians, see Paul Goble, “Russians Said
Becoming Mankurts in Their Own Land,” November 2, 2014.

http://wi

ndowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/11/window-on-eurasia-russians-said.html

.

The reference to “Hizbuts” is slang for followers of the outlawed Muslim group
Hizb ut-Tahrir.

www.hizbuttahrir.org

.

b. Intriguingly, the phrase used here evokes early Soviet era campaigns against

illiteracy.

References

Ainutdinova, K. “Problematika razvitiia rossiiskogo obrazovaniia v Rossii i Srednei

Azii.” Minbar, vol. 2, no. 4, 2009, pp. 5 – 14.

Atlas religii i national’nostei Rossii. Issledovatel’skaia sluzhba “Sreda.” January 2,

2014.

www.sreda.org/arena

22

RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Auda, Dzh. “Rol’ mecheti v Islame.” Imam.ru. September 12, 2012.

www.imam.ru/

articles/mecheti.html

.

Dzutsev, Kh.V. “Vakhkhabizm v respublikakh Severnogo Kavkaza Rossiiskoi

Federatsii: realii i posledstviia.” Sotsis. no. 8, 2011, pp. 107 – 114.

Gavrilov, Iu. A., E.N. Kofanova, M.P. Mchedlov, and A.G. Shevchenko.

“Konfessional’nye osobennosti religioznoi very: Predstavlenii o ee sotsial’nykh
funktsiiakh.” Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, no. 6, 2005, pp. 56 – 69.

Gradirovskii, S. “Russkii islam.” Russkii arkhipelag. November 23, 2010.

www.

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Iakupov, V.M. Mera Islama (K probleme adekvatnogo konkretno-istoricheskogo

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NOVEMBER – DECEMBER 2015

23

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