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© Nokia Siemens Networks

Bernhard Spalt / Sep. 2008

Bernhard Spalt

Chair 3GPP SA 3 LI

Nokia Siemens Networks
Vienna, Austria

3GPP SA 3 LI handling US and European needs

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Content

!

Structure of 3GPP

!

General Concept

!

Common IMS

!

Dynamic triggering

"

Questions

"

Conclusion

!

Back Up

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3rd Generation Partnership Project

ATIS (USA)

ARIB

(Japan)

TTA

(Korea)

TTC

(Japan)

CCSA

(China)

Organizational Partners:

ARIB, CCSA, ETSI, ATIS, TTA, and TTC

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Definition of the Third Generation Partnership
Project

3GPP will provide globally applicable Technical Specifications

for a 3rd Generation Mobile System based on the evolved GSM

core network, and the Universal Terrestrial Radio Access

(UTRA), to be transposed by relevant standardization bodies

(Organizational Partners) into appropriate deliverables (e.g.,

standards).

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Project Co­ordination Group

2PCG3

TSG RAN

Radio Access Networks

RAN WG1

Radio Layer 1

specification

RAN WG2

Radio Layer2 spec &

Radio Layer3 RR spec

RAN WG3

lub spec lur spec lu spec &

UTRAN O&M requirements

RAN WG4

Radio Performance &

Protocol Aspects

RAN WGL

Mobile Terminal

Conformance Testing

TSG SA

Services &

System Aspects

SA WG1

Services

SA WG2

Architecture

SA WG3

Security

SA WG4

Codec

SA WGL

Telecom Management

TSG CT

Core Network

& Terminals

CT WG1

MM/CC/SM 2lu3

CT WG3

Interworking with

External Networks

CT WG4

MAP/GTP/BCH/SS

CT WGV

Smart Card

Application Aspects

TSG GERAN

GSM EDGE

Radio Access Network

GERAN WG1

Radio Aspects

GERAN WG2

Protocol Aspects

GERAN WG3

Terminal Testing

GERAN WG3

Terminal Testing

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! 2?<=*5

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General Concept

!

One document set as LI solution for 3GPP

!

National LI regulation could be done via one reference

"

Clear structure of necessary functions

!

Include the common requirements of all 3GPP members

!

Detailed stage 2 definitions

!

Mainly based on access interception, but service

interception is already fixed for specific services

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Specifications

!

TS 33.106 Lawful Interception requirements

"

Stage 1

!

TS 33.107 Lawful Interception architecture and functions

"

Stage 2

!

TS 33.108 Handover interface for Lawful Interception

"

Stage 3

"

Based on / coordinated with ES 201 671 / TS 101 671

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Common IMS LI

According to the agreement between TISPAN & 3GPP the IMS

definitions out of 3GPP will also be used by TISPAN.

IMS LI definitions have to be drafted in a way that also TISPAN

could use them.

Update of current specification is suffizient

Main question for LEAs: Who will fix the details for CC??

!

dynamic triggering seems to be the solution

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Dynamic triggering
General questions

1.

LI could be activated within one domain within one country

2.

LI could be activated within one domain
#on&' care abou' na'ional bor#ers

3.

LI could be activated within one country,
domain / operator borders doesn't matter

4.

LI could be activated at 'any' access server
no domain or border restriction

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1. LI could be activated within one domain within
one country

Current assumption within all LI concepts and standards.

Usual LEA behavior:

!

2ne 3arran' for 5o3n6 cus'omers

!

Several warrants for all operators for roamers

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2. LI could be activated within one domain

!"#$%&'()*&(+",%&#(%-"#(.&+")!*)/

Operators still hope to get centralized services

Main problem:
"

is it legal to send the target list out of the country ?

Solution within EU could be expected

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3.LI could be activated within one country,
domain / operator borders doesn't matter

Legal question:
Could Operator 1 activate LI in the Operator 2 network?

"

In this way quite dangerous!

German regulations already include this requirement, but no

technical details exist!!

"

Get a solution involving the regulators

"

trusted government organization

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4. LI could be activated at 'any' access server
no domain or border restriction

Practical question:
Could a SIP service provider (e.g. in India) offering this service

in Germany activate interception for CC within Germany??

Problems:

!

Sending target info out of the intercepting country

!

8o 9rela'ion5 be'3een IRI an# << =rovi#ing o=era'ors

!

@ui'e #angerous for misuse by 5anybo#y6

"

No technical solution seen,

"

too many legal restrictions / problems

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Dynamic triggering
Conclusion

If standardization fixes LI dynamic triggering solutions for

question 3, but no concepts for question 4!

Might / Will bring market / marketing advantages for operators

working based on question 4.

Expect statements (explicit or implicit):
Choose our service, you will not be intercepted !!

Worst case:
Operator will go out of the country to prevent LI

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Contact

Bernhard Spalt

mailto:[e-mail]

mailto:[e-mail]

Tel.: [phone]

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Access Interception

My usual s'a'emen'C 9De' i' a' 'Ee access or forge' i'5

Background:

!

All information has to go via the access nodes

!

No discussion where the service is executed and if the access

is possible at all

!

If an UE is able to handle this, a Monitoring Center (MC) has to

support the same functionality

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Service Interception

!

Additional requirements for each service

"

No clear situation where these services are created/executed

!

Additional LI functions for each service

!

Always detailed functions " no national regulation for

services

!

Access to service might be out of the national jurisdiction
"

restriction for services usually not possible and also

not recommended

!

Cost consideration

"

Seems to provide for a cheaper MC; but this is not true

"

Expensive at the TSP side

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LI for conferencing

Whole chapter will become a national option, as the details

might conflict with national regulations.

Currently no CS LI requirements for conference server exists

All these details are fixed for SIP specific conferencing

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LI for conferencing (Fig)

Draft common architecture

HI1

HI3

HI2

X3

X1_3

X1_2

X2

LEMF

Delivery

Function 3

ADMF

Delivery

Function 2

Mediation
Function

Mediation
Function

Mediation
Function

MRFP

AS/MRFC

X1_1

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History

Alrea#y for DSM 'Ee Hsame‘ bo#y eJis's" SMG 10 WP D

Specifications:

GSM 1.33 (old GSM 10.20)
GSM 2.33
GSM 3.33
Currently maintained by SA3 LI as
41.033"1.33
42.033"2.33
43.033"3.33

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Abbreviations I

AAA

Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting

ADMF

Administration Function

BM-SC Broadcast-Multicast Service Centre
CC

Content of Communication

CS

Circuit Switched

ASN.1 Abstract Syntax Notation, Version 1
CC

Content of Communication

CSCF

Call Session Control Function

DF

Delivery Function

GGSN Gateway GPRS Support Node
GPRS

General Packet Radio Service

GSM

Global System for Mobile communications

GSN

GPRS Support Node (SGSN or GGSN)

HI

Handover Interface

HI1

Handover Interface Port 1 (for Administrative Information)

HI2

Handover Interface Port 2 (for Intercept Related Information)

HI3

Handover Interface Port 3 (for Content of Communication)

IMEI

International Mobile station Equipment Identity

IMS

IP Multimedia Core Network Subsystem

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Abbreviations II

IMSI

International Mobile Subscriber Identity

IP

Internet Protocol

IRI

Intercept Related Information

LEA

Law Enforcement Agency

LEMF

Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility

LI

Lawful Interception

MF

Mediation Function

MME

Mobility Management Entity

MSISDN

Mobile Subscriber ISDN Number

P-CSCF

Proxy Call Session Control Function

P-GW

PDN Gateway

PDP

Packet Data Protocol

S-CSCF

Serving Call Session Control Function

S-GW

Serving Gateway

SGSN

Serving GPRS Support Node

SIP

Session Initiation Protocol

SMS

Short Message Service

URI

Universal Resource Identifier

URL

Universal Resource Locator