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Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
Jonathan Abdalla
Even a casual reader of Saul Kripke’s monograph on the later Wittgenstein will
recognize immediately the vast amount of sustained engagement with Wittgenstein’s
texts on the part of Kripke. In addition to forceful analysis of Wittgenstein’s principal
theses, Kripke gives the reader a synopsis of the structure of the Philosophical
Investigations and an explicit reconstruction of the so-called “private language”
argument. For those more historically minded, Kripke addresses at least somewhat the
relations between Wittgenstein’s work and the work of Quine and Goodman among
others. Quite admirably, Kripke stays true to his title and concentrates on those
portions of the Philosophical Investigations that are relevant to his thesis; he also
covers certain parts of the Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics.
The central thesis of Kripke’s monograph is that Wittgenstein in his later
philosophy of language recognizes a powerful skeptical argument against the coherence
of the notion of meaning and consequently offers a solution to it consonant with his
dictum that meaning is use. The two areas in which such a skeptical thesis seems most
damaging are mathematics and inner experience. Kripke sees the formative statement
of the paradox in §201 of the Philosophical Investigations: “no course of action could be
determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the
rule.” To make the claim as clear as possible, he begins with a mathematical example;
the case of inner experience would proceed analogously.
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It seems quite commonsensical that in grasping the rule of addition one has
determined one’s answer for any novel future sum. The skeptic, as all good skeptics do,
questions the certainty implicit in the claim of a rule being grasped. Let us say that
Bertrand has grasped the rule of addition. When pressed by the skeptic as to his
certainty in saying that the sum of 68 and 57 is 125, Bertrand replies that he is following
the rule for addition that he has previously grasped. The skeptic responds by defining
the function ‘quus’ as follows:
x ⊕ y = x + y, if x, y < 57;
= 5, otherwise.
He then asks how it is that Bertrand knows that in the past he has not always meant
‘quus’ by ‘plus’ and consequently should answer 5 instead of 125. This point is crucial.
The skeptic is not asking how Bertrand knows that 68 + 57 is 125, but rather how
Bertrand knows that 68 +57 should denote 125 as a consequence of Bertrand’s meaning
‘plus’ in the past. If Bertrand’s past usage of ‘plus’ denoted ‘quus’, then Bertrand’s past
intention was such that he ought to compute the sum as 5 rather than as 125.
Now, if Bertrand attempts to give an account of the facts about his mental states
that constitute his meaning ‘plus’, not ‘quus’, he seems to find himself in a dilemma.
The skeptic claims that there exist no facts about Bertrand’s past mental history, even
Bertrand’s past observable behavior, that establish Bertrand meant ‘plus’ rather than
‘quus’.
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Thus, the skeptical paradox is not epistemological; even an omniscient observer
would not know which of the two Bertrand meant. Furthermore, argues the skeptic, if
there exist no facts about which function Bertrand meant then, then there existed no
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Kripke acknowledges the close similarities between this skeptical argument and Quine’s thesis of the
indeterminacy of translation. He points out though that Wittgenstein’s allowance of introspective
evidence distinguishes him from Quine and his behavioristic limitations.
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facts then about which function Bertrand presently meant. If there exist no facts about
which function Bertrand presently meant in the past, then there exist no facts about
which function Bertrand means in the present. Hence, there exist no facts about what
one means by any word at any time. For Kripke, this is Wittgenstein’s skeptical
paradox.
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More systematically, the paradox rejects the notion of meaning as truth
conditions. The skeptic concludes that there exist no facts corresponding to sentences
such as “Bertrand meant addition by ‘plus’.” Consequently, any assertion involving a
meaning claim is meaningless.
Having dismissed a number of objections on behalf of Wittgenstein or on behalf
of himself, Kripke turns to the solution that Wittgenstein offers. Wittgenstein accepts
the skeptic’s rejection of meaning as truth conditions; this amounts to rejecting the
views of both Frege and the Tractatus. In its place, he offers a two-faceted theory of
language. In a move reminiscent of the positivists’ emphasis on provability conditions
in their verificationist theory of meaning, Wittgenstein partially characterizes meaning
in terms of assertability conditions. He completes this characterization by incorporating
the notion of the practical utility of such assertions. In application to the mathematics
example above, Kripke explains it this way: “Do not look for ‘entities’ and ‘facts’
corresponding to numerical assertions, but look at the circumstances under which
utterances involving numerals are made, and the utility of making them under these
circumstances” (77). This postulation of a new conception of meaning allows
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Footnote 43 on page 58 is fascinating. Kripke intimates that his idea of ‘quus’ quite possibly might have
arisen from reading Goodman on ‘grue’. In fact, if one considers not a mathematics problem but the
language of color impressions, it seems that ‘grue’ would play the role that ‘quus’ now plays. Of course,
the problem would not be Goodman’s new riddle of induction, but rather if one knows whether one ought
to call the sky green given that in the past one might have meant ‘grue’ by ‘green’.
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Wittgenstein to accept the skeptical premise without being forced to accept that all
meaning assertions are therefore meaningless.
Kripke roughly characterizes the assertion conditions for a sentence such as
“Bertrand means addition by ‘plus’” as follows:
[Bertrand] is entitled, subject to correction by others, provisionally to
say, “I mean addition by ‘plus’,” whenever he has the feeling of
confidence – “now I can go on!” – that he can give ‘correct’ responses
in new cases; and he is entitled, again provisionally and subject to
correction by others, to judge a new response to be ‘correct’ simply
because it is the response he is inclined to give.
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If Bertrand claims to be following a rule, then the community can check his claim.
Others in the community can see whether Bertrand as a putative rule follower is or is
not giving responses that agree with the ones that they themselves endorse. If they
perceive such agreement, then they judge that Bertrand has grasped the rule. Now, if
Bertrand were ever to begin to deviate substantially from how the community behaved,
then the community would conclude that Bertrand no longer grasped the rule.
Kripke is thus claiming that Wittgenstein offers a social theory of meaning. That
theory claims that there does exist a useful role in the life of the community for a
language game that allows people to assert meaning claims. Furthermore, within that
language game, one is allowed to assert that one’s present usage of a given word does
agree with how one used it in the past. It is here that the so-called “private language”
argument becomes relevant. Many think incorrectly that a private language is a
language that is impossible for anyone else besides its bearer to understand. Kripke
claims instead that by it Wittgenstein means that there can be no private way in which
to follow a rule. If one were to follow a rule privately, then one would be proceeding
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Kripke, 90.
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randomly or blindly, since there is no fact of the matter as to whether one rule or
another applies. One’s authority would be unconditional, and no one could say that any
behavior was correct or incorrect. However, when one steps up to the level of the
community, others then have the authority to assess that behavior as correct or
incorrect. As such, a private language is incoherent, properly understood.
Now, even given a social theory of meaning, it seems that membership in a
community is irrelevant to one’s characterization of one’s inner experience. As noted
before, Kripke sees Wittgenstein’s approach here as analogous to the mathematics case.
Here, instead of grasping a rule for addition, one would grasp a name for a sensation.
But, that naming is clearly conventional. Any normative force regarding the
conceptualization of a particular sensation and its continued usage arises from the
community. The community observes the behavior of a putative member together with
attendant circumstances and judges whether that person is using the word pertaining to
that sensation and state of affairs properly. For the record, Kripke also takes
Wittgenstein to have viewed the philosophical problem of the existence of other minds
as a narrow case quite close to the issues already addressed and to have constructed an
analogous skeptical problem and an analogous solution.
Interestingly, the centrality of the notion of community in Wittgenstein’s social
theory of meaning bears a striking resemblance to the work of Goodman and of Putnam.
Specifically, it seems that Wittgenstein would agree with Putnam that meanings are not
in the head. Where Putnam differs is in the complexity of the causal-historical theory of
reference that he gives to characterize meaning. Of course, both of these are positive
improvements over Quine’s rejection of meaning.
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In summary, let me say that Kripke’s monograph is an impressive model of
careful philosophical argumentation. Though he declaims it at times, it is clear that
Kripke is both offering an interpretation of Wittgenstein and asserting that Wittgenstein
does hold certain claims as true. Thus, it is legitimate to ask whether Kripke’s
interpretation is a plausible one. My suspicion from the portions of the Philosophical
Investigations that I have read is that Kripke’s reconstruction is just that. More
specifically, it is a reconstruction of what might be an argument in Wittgenstein and a
recasting of it in strict analytic terms. In other words, it seems to me that Kripke has
successfully rehabilitated the later Wittgenstein into the ranks of analytic philosophers.
But, that seems to be in great tension with the persona and attitude that Wittgenstein
portrays in the Philosophical Investigations. To say it another way, if Kripke’s reading
of Wittgenstein is correct, then I now understand what Wittgenstein was attempting to
accomplish in the Philosophical Investigations. My reading of Wittgenstein’s text does
not convince me in the least that I understand all of Wittgenstein’s thought. As such, it
seems the Kripke’s Wittgenstein is not the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical
Investigations. Nevertheless, I must say again that Kripke’s accomplishment is very
commendable. He has fashioned from a difficult text a quite plausible theory and
argued vigorously for it. I would that all interpretive work in philosophy met that same
standard.