Effects of the GreatŢpression on the U S and the World


Effects of the Great Depression

The introduction of the discussion will focus on the origins of

the Great Depression and the escalating events that led to it. This

will provide adequate foundations to bring up questions and attempt to

answer them in an objective fashion as to why and how the Depression

affected different industrialized countries in different ways.

The core of the debate will consist of detailed comparable

analyses of the consequences of the Depression with an emphasis on

the economic aspects. The conclusion will provide a brief overview of

the ways used by the different governments to get out of that dark

episode of world economic history.

When studying the Great Depression and it's effects, it is not

unusual for historians to choose World War I as a starting point for

their investigation. The reason for that is the importance of the

repercussions the conflict had on the economies of all the countries

that were involved in it.

First of all, the War made it impossible for Europe to

maintain previous levels of production. For example, before the War,

France, the U.K. and Germany accounted for about 60 percent1 of the

world's exports of manufactured goods, a share of the market which

they could not sustain during the conflict. Consequently, Europe took

many of its markets to the U.S. and Japan. The stunted growth of the

European economies meant a lower demand for raw materials, which in

turn lowered the demand for European exports.

In agriculture, things didn't look any better, as it was the

sector which employed the most people. At the end of World War I,

Europe was forced to import food from the U.S.. Moreover, these

transactions were conducted on a credit basis since Europe could not

afford to pay for its purchase at that time.

Clearly, the U.S. was going from being a traditional debtor of

Europe before World War I to becoming its creditor: America had

financed the war and it was issuing loans for its reconstruction.

However, the attitudes in the U.S. were evolving in an unusual

direction: an increasing number of American financiers were starting

to literally seek ut potential borrowers which led to competition

among U.S. banks and the spreading of unsound lending.2 The main

object was to "do the most business", even at the expense of essential

caution.

What seemed like a beginning of recovery from the Great War,

was in fact an immense accumulation of debts, which made the

international economic order vulnerable to depression. Analyzing these

events with the insight we have today, they seem even more

unbelievably audacious given the high instability of the borrowing

nation. (i.e., Europe)

The triggering event was the crash of the Wall Street stock

market in October of 1929. The stock market collapsed after steady

declines in production, prices and incomes over three previous months

which forced the speculators to revise their expectations. Anxiety

soon gave place to panic which led to the crash. However, the

depression affected the different industrialized countries in various

ways and degrees of intensity.

The depression was of especially great magnitude in the U.S.

because there were not any welfare benefits for laid off workers. In

the period between 1929 and 1933, money income fell by 53 percent

(real income fell by 36 percent.)3 As a consequence, demand fell

significantly, which in turn led to lower production and more

layoffs-- up to a high of 25 percent rate of unemployment in 1933.

Despite the severity of the situation, the Federal Reserve did

not pursue a monetary expansion on policy which would have stimulated

the economy through lower interest rates and increased the stock of

money in circulation. This inaction is often attributed to the fact

that market interest rates in 1930-1931 fell to very low levels, much

lower than in the earlier recessions (of 1924 and 1927), and

therefore, the Federal Reserve Board wrongfully saw no need to pursue

an expansionary monetary policy.4 An indicator of that inaction is

that open market operations did not provide sufficient money reserves

for a banking system faced with depositors anxious for liquidity

(monetary expansion would have filled that need). If the Federal

Reserve had provided additional funds to the banking sector after

1930, bank failure would not have been so numerous and the decrease in

the attack of ???? would have been (at least) slowed down.

Still, it would not be accurate to make the Federal Reserve

responsible for all these problems. Other factors contributed to the

precipitation of what began as a cyclical recession into what we now

know as the Great Depression. One of those is the Hawley Smoot tariff

of 1930 which in essence made America more protectionist than ever,

sending import duties to record highs. Evidently, retaliation from

other countries was quick to come. The new tariff act accelerated the

downfall of American trade volume, which was probably the last thing

the U.S. needed at that stage. President Hoover had always been in

favor of protective tariffs which he considered a strictly domestic

issue and he supported the Howley Smoot Act. Therefore, he clearly

failed to see the implications of such a move.

Soon, the Depression was spreading to the rest of the world,

especially to Europe. There, the single country that was most affected

was Germany whose very weak economy could not cope with the slow

disappearance of American capital. Let us mention that Germany was

still paying reparations (for World War I), which made its situation

even more delicate. Germany was forced to borrow from Great Britain

and France which could not compensate for the decline in U.S.

lending.5 The trap in which Germany found itself was quite

disconcerting: she had to pursue deficienary policies to gain the

confidence of investors in order to attract foreign funds. At the same

time, devaluaton posed a major problem. It increased the burden of the

external debt (through the exchange rate mechanism) which was payable

in foreign currencies.

The United Kingdom represented another major force on the

global economic scene. The British economy was not hit immediately as

violently as Germany's. However, as the repercussions of the world

crisis became increasingly clear, Great Britain experienced a notable

decline in its exports which was even greater than the decrease in its

imports. Those two factors contributed to generate a deficit in its

balance of payments.

Still, compared to most other industrialized countries, the

U.K. got through the Depression in better economic health.6 In the

case of France, things went a significantly different way. First of

all, out of the four biggest industrialized countries of the time

(U.S., Germany, U.K. and France), France was the last to be hit by the

Depression. Many possible reasons are hypothesized to explain that

fact, but the one that is most often heard is the undervaluation of

the French franc.

The French economy began to feel the effects of the world

crisis in 1932. Around that time the Depression caught up with the

French economy through an important decrease in its exports (due

impart to the shear downsizing trend in the volume of world trade),

combined to an increase in imports. The problems faced by France were

also worsened by the fact that it still was maintaining the gold

standard long after all of the other industrialized countries-starting

with Great Britain in 1931--had switched to fleeting exchange rates.

As for Japan, we can safely say that it is the one country

among today's industrialized nations that got through the Great

Depression with the least damage to its economy.7 Now that we have

illustrated how the world crisis affected various nations in different

ways, it seems only logical that they would put together solutions

that were adapted to their individual problems.

In the United States, Hoover had failed to bring a solution to

the Depression, and he was replaced by Roosevelt in 1932. The new

president brought with him the New Deal, which can be qualified as a

collection of programs aimed at stimulating different sectors of the

economy (like the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the National

Industrial Recovery Act). As it turned out, the New Deal was not a

particularly successful economic initiative, but it was definitely a

political success, probably because its goal was to help the American

people (even though the means used to accomplish that were never very

clear). What proved more effective at bringing economic solutions to

what was really an economic problem was the "Keynesian theory". In

1938, Roosevelt, facing the semi-failure of his New Deal, finally gave

in to an increasing number of his close advisors who were confident

that Keynes' ideas would be more successful.8 The underlying theory to

Keynes' ideas was that recovery could only come through fiscal

expansion--in other words, running a bigger budgetary deficit. The

additional expenditures were pumped into the economy through a variety

of government actions--like major public works--in order to stimulate

demand by providing people with income.

In Germany, the Nazis' victory at the 1933 elections was a

major accelerating factor on the road to recovery. The Nazi program

aimed first and foremost at the reduction of unemployment and it did

accomplish at least that. However, the realization of the plans was

conditioned by an omnipotent government which was best described by

Peter Hayes' analogy (1987): "It is perhaps accurate to say that, to

German industry, the emergent economic system was stiff capitalism,

but only in the same sense that for a professional gambler poker

remains poker, even when the house shuffles, deals, determines the

suite and the wild cards, and can change them at will, even when there

is a ceiling on winnings, which may be spent only as the census

permits and for the most part only on the promises."9

One other essential vector that Nazis used toward recovery was

rearmament, starting in 1936. Hitler used the defense industry to

satisfy two of his im???: recreate a strong Germany while giving

people work.

The case of Great Britain is different. We have mentioned

earlier how well (relatively to other nations) the U.K. got through

the Depression years. Let us now attempt to explain why. Three

elements are often mentioned in the British recovery: the abandoning

of the gold standard in 1931, the adoption of higher tariffs and the

devaluation of the pound. When the U.K. abandoned the gold standard,

it gave itself a competitive advantage via-a-vis those countries which

did not. The new tariff laws helped by protecting domestic industries

and the 30 percent devaluation of the pound added to the competitive

edge of the U.K by making British products cheaper to the rest of the

world.

In the face of Depression, France reacted quite differently

from the other industrialized countries. Confident in its strong

economy until 1932, France did not abandon the gold standard until

June 1937 and did not devalue the franc until October 1936. Those two

factors made France rather uncompetitive for most of the 1930's, given

the actions taken by the U.S., the U.K., and Germany. Those measures,

in time, helped lift France out of the Depression but the recovery

there might have occurred a few years earlier if the French had only

signed their policies to that of the United States and Great Britain

in particular.10

When it comes to Japan, two reasons are proposed to explain

its good economic performance through the Depression: the fact that it

had a planned economy, and the early understanding of the advantages

of devaluating the yen. Japan improved its competitive position that

way and it reacted very soon after the Depression hit. As a result,

the effects of the crisis were greatly reduced from the start.

---

Footnotes

1"The origins and nature of the Great Slump," Fearn.

2"The origins and nature of the Great Slump," Fearn.

3"Capitalism in Crisis,"edited by Garside.

4"La Crise economique dans le monde el en France," Nogaro.

5"The origins and nature of the Great Slump," Fearn.

6"The Great Depression, 1929-1938," Saint Etienna.

7"The Origins and Nature of the Great Slump," Fearn.

8"Capitalism in Crisis,"edited by Garside.

9"Capitalism in Crisis,"edited by Garside.

10"Capitalism in Crisis,"edited by Garside.



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