SOUTH EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES PROGRAMME
European Studies Centre
St Antony s College, Oxford
OPINION PIECE
EU and the Balkans:
The Long and Winding Road to Membership
by Dimitar Bechev
SEESP Research Associate
It is nowadays common to say that the EU is the only game in town for the Balkans.
Joining Europe is, time and again, declared the strategic objective for the region. It is
as salient in states as it is in quasi-state entities like Montenegro and Kosovo. Levels
of public support for EU accession are exceptionally high, rarely falling below 70
percent of the electorate. Astonishingly, even die-hard nationalists like Vojislav
`
ea
elj and Tomislav Nikolić s Serb Radicals or the Greater Romania Party led by the
flamboyant Corneliu Vadim Tudor, figuring for a long time on the West s blacklist,
are eager to jump on the European bandwagon. At the other end of the spectrum,
mainstream political leaders flag up the prospect of membership to push for hard
decisions: redrawing municipal borders in Macedonia, extraditing top-ranking Serbian
generals to The Hague-based International Criminal Court for Yugoslavia, and
changing the Bulgarian constitution to allow foreigners to own land.
This overwhelming pro-EU sentiment is in part bolstered by the advancement
of integration. In 1999 when the Kosovo conflict raged, the idea of Balkan
enlargement was beyond the pale of one s wildest imagination. Even the likes of
Bulgaria and Romania who enjoyed a privileged status due to their Europe
Agreements of 1993 were trailing far behind the frontrunner countries of central
Europe. When the EU launched the Stability Pact to help post-Kosovo reconstruction,
it foresaw a gradual inclusion of the Balkans into its ambit but took extra care to
dilute its language and avoid strong membership commitments. Five years down the
road, Bulgaria and Romania are almost certain to join the EU on 1 January 2007,
while Croatia is poised to follow suit two years afterwards. Next in line are
Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro. At the
Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003, the EU made it clear that the Stabilisation and
Association Process (SAP) for the Western Balkans was essentially an enlargement
platform. It is structured around the same political, economic and institutional
conditions as applied to the new members joining in 2004 and backed up by identical
policy instruments (e.g. EU funded institution-building programmes). The incoming
European Commission headed by José Manuel Barroso has now transferred the
Western Balkans from the External Relations to the Enlargement directorate, a
symbolic move testifying to the Union s strong commitment to the countries in
question.
The optimistic mood, however, is offset by South East European countries
slow progress in meeting the EU conditions and benchmarks. Coupled with the
region s relative underdevelopment in comparison with the new member states of the
Union, the legacy of conflicts and delayed reforms has stymied the process of EU
integration. If the whole EU project aims, at least in part, at transcending state
sovereignty, it is still dependent on the capacities of national level bodies and
structures to implement policies and governance standards, as well as effectively
safeguard the rights and interests of individual citizens. All post-communist countries
in South East Europe have experienced difficulties in critical sectors such as the
reform of public administration and the judiciary, privatisation, and border
management among other arenas. Ultimately, state weakness has done more harm to
the EU prospects of Balkan countries than ethnic divisions or lingering status issues.
Weakness leads to illegitimacy, which tends to reproduce itself through the
democratic process. Across South East Europe, public distrust in political and
bureaucratic institutions feeds into voter apathy. A record low 55 per cent of those
entitled voted in Macedonia s presidential polls in May 2004. The Serbian Parliament
had to strike the 50 percent turnout requirement from electoral laws in order to avoid
a third debacle at the vote for president in June 2004. The rise of the Serbian Radical
Party, fuelled by its populist rhetoric appealing to those experiencing the heavy social
burden of reforms, suggests that the image of a liberal, market-friendly and pro-EU
consensus is somewhat flawed.
What is the state of play in the individual Balkan countries integration into
the EU, the opportunities and obstacles they face along the way?
If one needs success stories, Croatia has, no doubt, been one. Since 2000, it
has embarked on an ambitious programme to set aside President Tudjman s
authoritarian legacy, boost growth, and harmonise its legislation with the EU acquis
communautaire. In 2001, Zagreb signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement
(SAA) with the EU and submitted a membership application two years later.
Following the European Commission s positive assessment, the December 2004
Brussels Council decided to open membership negotiations with Croatia. The
Croatian application was served by the commitment to political and economic
liberalisation by the moderately nationalist HDZ of Ivo Sanader, which replaced the
social democrat cabinet of Ivica Ra%0Å„an in 2004. However, the country s EU bid is
threatened by its events from its recent past. Brussels has put the extradition of
General Ante Gotovina, hailed by many as a hero of the  liberation campaign of
1995, to The Hague as a key condition for Croatia.
Croatia s success in graduating to full EU candidacy has certainly inspired
Macedonia, the first Western Balkan country to sign an association treaty with the
Union. Still coping with the fallout of the 2001 conflict between the central
government and the ethnic Albanian guerrillas of the KLA, Macedonia submitted a
membership application in March 2004. It was supported by the coalition
government s pro-reform policy. In February 2005, Skopje completed a 14,000-page
long questionnaire needed to assess progress in adopting EU standards. Still,
persistent political instability raises questions as to the country s EU prospects. The
uneasy implementation of the 2001 Ohrid framework agreement that promotes ethnic
power-sharing at the national and local levels has unsettled Macedonian society. In
the summer of 2004, a coalition of opposition forces successfully initiated a
referendum hoping to vote down two laws redrawing the borders of several
municipalities, including Skopje, in favour or ethnic Albanians. The EU staunchly
opposed the plebiscite threatening that a blockage of the Ohrid process would halt the
Macedonia s integration. Held on 7 November 2004, the referendum ended in failure
after only one quarter of the electorate turned out. Meanwhile, stability remains a
distant goal judging from developments such as the death of President Trajkovski in
an airplane accident, Albanian paramilitary incursions in the vicinity of Skopje, civil
unrest at the grass-root level spurred by the redistricting initiatives, the sudden
resignation of the country s prime minister Hari Kostov in late 2004, as well as
sluggish economic growth.
Yet Macedonia s mixed record contrasted with the difficulties experienced by
its northern neighbour Serbia and Montenegro. The loose federation, sometimes
referred to as  Solania after one of its founding fathers, has failed to receive a
feasibility study from the European Commission that would pave the way to a SAA.
This is partly due to the reluctance of the two constituent republics to harmonise their
foreign trade regimes foreseen under the 2002 Belgrade Agreement. Faced with that
problem, the EU introduced in 2004 the so-called twin-track approach which
effectively ditched the principle of economic integration between Serbia and
Montenegro but facilitated technical negotiations. It is not unlikely that a Montenegrin
independence referendum in 2006 would seal the fate of the federation. Cooperation
with The Hague has emerged as an even greater stumbling block. The EU has
consistently criticised the broad coalition government of Vojislav Koa
tunica for
failing to surrender high-level military figures indicted for war crimes during the
Kosovo war. International pressure as well as violence against the Kosovo Serbs,
culminating in the March 2004 riots, boosted the profile of nationalist forces. The
Serbian Radical Party gained the largest chunk of the popular vote at the December
2003 parliamentary elections and even came close to winning the presidential polls in
June 2004. The new president Boris Tadić, leader of the pro-Western opposition
Democratic Party once chaired by the late Zoran Djindjić, has pledged to improve
cooperation with The Hague and move Serbia closer to EU membership but his
narrow constitutional powers give him few levers. Positive signals from the EU as the
long-awaited feasibility study could strengthen the position of the Belgrade
reformists.
Assessed by its institutional links with the EU, Serbia and Montenegro is now
behind the other two Western Balkan laggards Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Since early 2003, Albania has been negotiating a SAA with the European
Commission. Yet progress has been very slow as Albania has problems in meeting
both the technical and political conditions set by the EU. The country has been
plagued by confrontation between the ruling socialists and the opposition, at times
leading to outbursts of political violence. The EU has repeatedly pointed out that a
key test will be the parliamentary polls in mid-2005, warning the Fatos Nano cabinet
that it will not tolerate electoral fraud. While Bosnia-Herzegovina was the subject of a
positive feasibility study in November 2003, the latter outlined 16 additional
conditions before opening SAA talks, including the reintegration of Mostar and the
strengthening of the central-level institutions policymaking authority. During a
meeting with the Bosnian Prime Minister Adnan Terzić in February 2005, Jose
Manuel Barroso pointed out that negotiations could start in May if there was better
cooperation with ICTY, alluding to the arrest of General Ratko Mladić and the former
Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karad~
ić. Bosnia-Herzegovina also figured high on the
EU security agenda. In December 2004, NATO transferred peacekeeping
responsibilities to the Union-led ALTHEA operation.
The Western Balkan states difficult and slow-paced EU integration has
widened the gap with their eastern neighbours Bulgaria and Romania. Bulgaria
wrapped up its membership negotiations with the EU in June 2004. Despite the
elections for president and parliament on 28 November, Romania managed to catch
up in early December, days before the regular EU Council. In Brussels, Sofia and
Bucharest received a green light to sign an accession treaty in April 2005 and join the
EU in 2007. However, the accession treaty will also contain safeguard clauses
providing for a one-year delay in case obligations undertaken during the negotiations
are not implemented. Meanwhile, the second round of the Romanian presidential
elections ended in a victory by the opposition candidate Traian B
sescu, who then
engineered a centre-right coalition. The new government has vowed to combat
corruption and clientelism, which had tarnished Romania s external image during the
social democrat administration of Adrian N
stase, through measures like the
introduction of a flat-rate income tax and restrictions on international adoptions.
Though perceived as more advanced on the reform front, Bulgaria, ruled since 2001
by Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, has similarly been a target of EU criticism over the
lack of progress in the judicial sector. What accounts for this failure is the cabinet s
weakness as well as its dependency on a shaky coalition of parties and political
groups. However, politics in Bulgaria -- as well as in Romania -- is characterised by a
powerful pro-EU consensus. Although the outcome of the upcoming parliamentary
elections in June 2005 is unclear, the future government is more likely than not to
pursue similar policies as its predecessor.
The EU is now facing its first expansion towards South East Europe, apart
from the accession of Greece in 1981. Though this gives additional momentum to the
Balkans integration into the Union, the process will clearly be rather bumpy and
protracted. Much depends on the power of the EU membership perspective to catalyse
long overdue economic and institutional reforms in the individual South East
European countries. The EU has significantly strengthened its commitments, now it is
time for the region s political elites to take up the opportunity.