Jacques
I SOpinion
Rupnik*
S
May 2009
ThE EU and ThE WESTERn BalkanS
Photo session after session of the EU-Western Balkan Summit in Porto Carras, Greece, 21 June 2003. European Union leaders welcomed the Western Balkan countries to
talks on forging closer economic and political ties.
1. EU approach
Both during and in the immediate aftermath of the
wars that accompanied the break-up of Yugoslavia,
the European Union has been working on the coher- The EU has simultaneously applied the widest pos-
ence of its approach towards the Western Balkans to sible range of different instruments to stabilizing the
move from an agenda dominated by security issues Western Balkans and bringing the region close to the
related to the dissolution of Yugoslavia to an agenda EU: from Community funding to its military and civilian
focused on the Western Balkans EU accession pros- ESDP missions, from the presence of the EU Special
pects. Representatives (EUSRs) to the SAP framework and
annual Regular Progress Reports (by Commission)
The political commitment of all EU Member States to on the respective countries. However, drawing on
the accession of the countries of the Western Balkans the experience of the Central and Eastern European
was affirmed at the European Summit in Thessaloniki Countries, the region of Western Balkans shows
in 2003. The framework was set, the commitments of some important specific elements that the current EU
the political elites in the region seemed clear enough, enlargement approach may not take fully into account.
and the policy tools were supposedly familiar to all The difficulty (and this is where consistency is most
since the previous wave of Eastern enlargement. stringently tested) is that the EU is for the first time in
However, for a number of reasons this reassuring sce- its history directly involved in assisting in the creation
nario (as well as the coherence of EU enlargement of its future Member States. Some questions spring to
policies) is open to question. mind in this respect:
* Jacques Rupnik, Director of Research at CERI-
Sciences Po, Paris, is also Associate Researcher
European Union
with the EUISS. He is the author of Les Banlieues
Union européenne
de l Europe (Paris, Presses Sciences Po: 2007).
European Union Institute for Security Studies
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© Meigneux/SIPA
f& How far have we moved from security-driven con- condition for successful integration to the EU? Does
tainment towards politically driven integration? Have this contribute to or does it rather detract from EU s
we calibrated our instruments accordingly? coherence?
f& Do EU policy instruments meet the real needs in real f& The US has recently shown signs of re-engagement
time? For example, does the two year cycle of the in the Western Balkans which is seen as crucial by a
Instrument of Pre-Accession (IPA) planning allow for number of actors in the region. How does this reflect
sufficient flexibility to react to political and economic on EU engagement? Should the EU encourage the
developments on the ground? continued engagement of the US in the Balkans or,
on the contrary, should it take the view that the scal-
f& Are we making the optimal use of our EUSRs? Do ing down of the US presence should accompany the
their functions need to be readjusted as the Western process of European integration seen as  the only
Balkans countries move closer to the EU? Do their game in town ?
mandates need changing?
f& Russia plays a decisive role in the Balkans, be it
f& What benefits in terms of internal and external co- as member of the Contact Group and the PIC, be it
ordination and coherence could we expect from through its stance on the Kosovo issue. Russia has
double-hatting the EUSRs? How could their lever- means to assert influence, not least in relation to en-
age in their host-countries increase? What is our ergy supply. To what extent does Russia influence
experience with the one case of  EU-double-hatting the EU s policy coherence ?
we have in the region (the EUSR for FYROM)?
f& Turkey is an important political player in the Western
f& How does cooperation and coordination on the Balkans and the fact that Turkey has opened en-
ground between all instruments work? Where do largement negotiations with the EU has been noted
practical challenges lie? Why are we still perceived by the countries of the Western Balkans. Turkey is
as a host of actors on the EU side and fall short of especially relevant as a PIC member in BiH and as
presenting a unified  EU face not only vis Ä… vis the our partner in ESDP missions on the ground (e.g.
countries in the region but also towards our interna- EUPM in BiH, EULEX Kosovo). What is our future
tional partners? strategy on its role? Is the question of the Western
Balkans EU future linked to that of Turkey?
f& Can the current principles of enlargement ( re-
gatta principle , healthy competition,  pull carrots f& Regional cooperation is a sign of coherence as well
rather than  push sticks) ensure deliverables in the as a confidence building measure. Experience has
Western Balkans? shown that regional cooperation can help achieve
sustainable political and economic development and
f& How to better coordinate and finetune the EU mes- it should be promoted in all aspects. What more can
sages and those from Member States? Is there room we do? Does RCC (Regional Cooperation Council,
for a strategy on public diplomacy in the Western successor of Stability Pact) really work? How does
Balkans beyond master messages agreed on spe- it link with EU efforts? Are there synergies or over-
cific missions? lap?
2. The role of external factors and actors 3. Case studies
Since the EU does not function in a political vacuum, There are  unfinished states in the Western Balkans:
the role of external factors and actors must be taken Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo and - in certain
into account. There are certain elements that do influ- aspects also - Serbia. Olli Rehn, the EU Commissioner
ence EU s policies and their coherence, such as: for Enlargement, has rightly pointed out that  protec-
torates cannot be integrated in the EU. Nor can unfin-
f& NATO enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe ished states.
preceded EU enlargement and there seems to be a
similar pattern in the Balkans with the recent NATO The two European  protectorates could be examined
accession of Croatia and Albania. Is the transatlan- as test cases for consistency of policy and coherence
tic bond and the emphasis on security really a pre- of EU action:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
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Bosnia and Herzegovina: Kosovo:
From  protectorate to integration through Dealing with the question of Kosovo, its status
nation-state building. The EU as well as the and future has shown political differences be-
larger international community have invested tween Member States as well as their firm com-
much in the reconstruction and stabilization mitment to finding a common position and a
of BiH, financially, politically and in human re- coordinated approach to the tasks ahead of the
sources. How do the results measure up against EU in theatre. Differences aside it was possible
the input? Has it been possible to create a sta- to agree on EULEX Kosovo, the largest civilian
ble, multiethnic state? The answer very much mission ever launched under ESDP. Assistance in
varies, even among EU Special Representatives/ building the institutions of Kosovo accompanies
High Representatives. Former HR Ashdown the progressive shift from the  protectorate -
feared disintegration whereas, more recently, stage to (long-term) pre-accession strategy.
HR Lajcak felt that both the Bonn powers and
the HR office had become irrelevant. Certainly However, on the ground the EU still coexists with
BiH is not a fully functional state yet left on UNMIK and the International Civilian Office (ICO).
its own. The international presence has en- EULEX is supposed to support the consolidation
sured stability but also fed tendencies to duck of the rule of law of the new state, but it offi-
responsibility and full ownership. Can an exit cially remains  status-neutral while it remains
from the  protectorate -stage and a shift to a unclear which law applies when in Kosovo. Dif-
pre-accession agenda be a powerful enough ferent courts apply different legislation. Which
leverage to push through the institutional and state, which international agency, which law?
constitutional reform necessary to develop This surely is the most formidable  consistency
the sense of ownership and make BiH a viable challenge for EU Special Representative Peter
polity? Feith, and more generally for the EU mission in
Kosovo. It also requires long-term commitment
In BiH the EU is present with a civilian (EUPM) for which the EU needs public support.
as well as a military ESDP mission (EUFOR Al-
thea). Did taking over from SFOR increase EU KFOR ensures security in Kosovo. Is it desirable
coherence on the ground? Have EUFOR and EUPM for the sake of coherence to follow KFOR with a
jointly been able to achieve more than the sum military ESDP mission? What lessons learned can
of their individual efforts? we draw in this respect from BiH as a model?
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the EUISS
European Union Institute for Security Studies
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