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242 NEC.UGENCE: CAUSATION AND CONTR1BUTORY NECLIGENCE

it must be shown that there is something which I will cali ultroneous¹ something unwarrantable, a new cause which disturbs the sequence of events, something which can be described as either unreasonable _or extraneous or extrinsic."‘'

In The Oropesa, the action of the master was not itself tortious: he was not guilty of a breach of duty to the deceased in ordering him into the boat, but that fact is not itself decisive one way or another. A wholly unpredictable but non-tortious intervention may break the chain of caii-sation in one case while in another even deliberate tortious conduct mav not do so, though as a generał proposition it is probably correct to say that the further along the scalę from innocent mistake to wilful wrongdoing the third party's conduct moves the morę likely it is to terminate the defendant's liability¹⁰ The matter is what in former times would have been regarded as a jury questionⁿ (though according to modem practice on appeal from trial by judge alone it is a question which the appellate court considers itself in as good a position to answer as the trial judge) and there have been calls for "common sense rather than logie"¹² and a "robust and sensible approach".¹³ The student is only likely to get a "feel" for the current application of the law by reading cases, but some multiple collision cases, on each side of the linę, may be used for illustration. In Rouse v. Squires'⁴ Dl, driving negligently, jack-knifed his lorry across a motorway; a following car collided with the lorry, and some minutes later D2's lorry, also being driven negligently, collided with the other vehicles, killing C, who was assisting at the scene. The Court of Appeal, reversing the trial judge, held that Dl 's negligence was an operative cause of Cs death,¹⁵ for if:

"a driver so negligently manages his vehicles as to cause it to obstruct the highway and constitute a danger to other road users, including those who are driving too fast or not keeping a proper lookout, but not those who deliberately or recklessly drive into the obstruction, then the first driver's negligence may be held to have contributed to the causation of an accident of which the immediate cause was the negligent driving of the vehicle which because of the presence of the obstruction collides with it."¹⁶

In contrast, in Wright v. Lodgc¹⁷ Dl's vehide broke down and she 6.34 pegligently failed to take steps to remove it from the highway. Dl was jiable to her passenger Cl, who was injured when D2's lorry struck the gar, but not to C2 and C3, who were injured by colliding with the lorry in the opposite carriageway, where it had come to rest after the collision. The _effective cause of the lorry being in the other carriageway was the reckless manner in which D2 had been driving when he collided with the car.¹⁸ The chain of causation was broken by intervening events though there no recklessness in Knightley v. lotnis.'* DTs negligent driving caused the blocking of a busy tunnel. After a good deal of confusion as to the location of the accident, D2, a police inspector, took charge but did not ńnmediately close the tunnel as he should have done. He then ordered C, a constable, to drive back against the traffic for that purpose. While doing so C was struck and injured by D3, who was driving too fast into the tunnel. The Court of Appeal set aside a judgment for C against Dl.²”

While it might be natural, probable and foreseeable that the police would come to deal with the accident in the tunnel and that there might be risk-taking²¹ and even errors on their part, there had in fact been so many errors before the claimant was ordered to ride back down the tunnel²² that the subsequent collision with D3 was too remote a consequence of Dl's original negligence.

It is not too difficult to say that if C is knocked down and injured by Dl and a few moments later is struck and further injured by D2, also driving negligently, Dl may bear some responsibility for the further injury. It is perhaps less intuitive to conclude that Dl might be liable for the conse-quences of negligent medical treatment of the injury directly inflicted by him, but he will be unless the treatment is completely inappropriate.²¹ Generally, of course, the matter will be one of contribution between the two defendants in respect of the second injury.²⁴

Most difficulty arises in the case of acts of a third party which are 6.35 wilfully wrong towards the claimant, for it is especially here that the

” 119931 4 Ali E.R. 299. Weir. Casrbook on Tort (9th ed.l. p. 232. t>2 was of course liable to C2 and C3 (and to Cl). The issue was whether D2 could daim contribution from Dl. Di s share in the liability to Cl was only 10'3. It will be obser\ed that both of these cases could equally well be analysed in terms of Juty of care to the particular claimant, indeed Wright r. Lodgc bas some affinities with Palsgraf v. Lang halami Railroad (para. 5.17, above).

^ 11982) 1 W.L.R. 349.

However, D2 and D3 were liable to C. In many cases, provided all defendants are claim-worthy, these issues will essentiallv be related to contribution among defendants and will be or no direct concem to the claimant.

²¹ Taking risks to save others from danger does not normally break the chain of causation: see para. 25.16, below.

^See in particular 119821 I W.L.R. 349 at 365-366.

- Wtbb v. Barclays Bank pic 120011 EWCA Civ 1141, (20021 P.I.Q.R. TO, following Mahony v. Kruschich (Demolitians) Pty (1985) 59 A.LR. 722. In Pmidergast v. Sam & Dcc Ud, The Times, March 14, 1989, Dl. a doctor, wrote an unclear prescripłion D2, a pharmacist misread it, though he should have been put on inquiry. D2's act did not break the chain of causation and the relatiee responsibility was assessed as 25 per cent to D2.

* cf. the difficult case ot Rahmnn v. Arcawsc Ud 120011 Q.B. 351, where it was conceded that the medical treatment was the sole cause of the loss of the eve.

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   "5o Lord Wright found it necessary to go outside the dictionary, or at least to e\plore its fnrthest comers, in order to identify the kind of rircumstances in which the defendant might cease to be liable for what could otherwise be regarded as the consequences of his a et": The Sivand 11998) 2 Lloyd's Rep 97 at 102. per Hvans LJ.

*    ibid., at 39. per Lord Wright.

¹ Knightley v. John? 119821 1 W.L.R. 349 at 365 *» Wright v. iodge (1993) 4 AU E.R. 299 at 307.

^?3 Knightley v. Johns, above, at 367.

¹' Lamb v. Camden Lindan Borough (1981) Q.B. 625 at 647 and sec Sir Robin Cook, "Remoteness of Damages and judidal Discretion" (1978) C.L.J. 288.

¹⁴ [1973J Q.B. 889; Uoyds Bank Ud v. Budd (1982) K.T.R. 80. For an t¹xample in a wholly different conte\t see Ciarko v. C C. Ńorłluwiptonshire, The Times, June 14, 1999.

¹³ For which Dl was held 25^ to blame under the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935.

119731 Q.B. at 898, ;vr Caims LJ