068

GERMANYS PANTHER TANK

STATUS OF OPERATIONAL PANTHERS

Oparallon ZHadada from 5 to 17 Juty 1043

ICO

100    184

180 "

170    ^X,®^#

180 150 140 130 •

120 •

110

100

90

80

70

80

	40		43	38 20 ■	43 44
	■ llnknown 18 ■ 10	•o ■s
6 Juty	7 July 9 July	11 Juty	13 July	18 Juty	17 Juty

6 Juty 8 Juty lOJuly 12 Juty 14 Juty 18 Juty Opa/allonal ■talu* wat f apo/lad by tha oparatlont ofllcar batwaan 1700 and 1800 houra on tha awantno ot aach day.

Report on the Operationa ot Paruer-Realment (Panttier) von Lauchert

Tactical Experience The tactical employment ot a new type ot Panzer does not release the commander from usmg the proven prmciptes ot Panzer tactics. This especially applies to cooperation with other weapons and employment ot concen-trated Panzer units.

The Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen created a Panzer-Brigade headąuarlers to ensure control over the 300 Panzers in the remforced “Grossdeutschland” Divi$ion. Be-cause ot friction between personnel this Brigade headquar-ters did not function at the start. Persona/ considerations should not be allowed to play a roli when the futurę ot the Reich is bemg gambled.

It is false to puli out other heavy weapons where Pan-thers were employed. only because Panthers are there. It is correct to create a Schwerpunkt. concentrating the other weapons (Artillerie, Pioniere, Luftwaffe, Panzer Grenadiera) with the Panthers m order to quickly succeed with minimal losses

The attack is to quickly penetrate into the depth ot the opponents defensive system, take out the enemy artillery and ensure that armored infantry and infantry are accompanied forward.

Following the high losses during the first few days, fur-ther losses were relatively higher. The number ot Panthers that started into battle each day was very smali (at times only 10 Panthers). Therefore, the defenders could easily repulse the attacks

The enemy defence consisting ot 7.62 cm anti-tank and tank guns succeeded in knocking out Panthers only with flank shots. Penetration ot the frontal armor was never achieved

Close attention must be paid to guarding the flanks ot the Panther attack! Ali the other available weapons must be employed in this effort. Panthers need to attack utilizing an

especially wide formation to prezent the enemy from flanking the core ot the attacking unit.    ^y

When finng, mdividual Panthers should be brought into position with their front facing the enemy fire.

For breakmg through a strongly defended and mmed mam battle zonę, a Panzer-Funklenk-Kompame (radio-controlled mme clearing company) should be attached in the futurę.

In all cases, cooperation with combat engineers should be assured. Materials needed for Crossing bogland should be prepared in advance and carried along to prevent delays during an attack.

Organlzatlon The organization ot the combat elements of the Panther Regiment was proven successful. In no case should the platoons, companies or battalion be weakened. The number of wheeled vehicles could be somewhat reduced. Especially, because due to steady losses. supplymg all of the Panthers is practically never necessary.

Training: The time allotted for training was too short. Therefore, the drivers did not achieve the necessary proficiency. The mamtenance personnel were not sufficiently trained. The gunners and commanders did not receive necessary tactical training.

Because ofthe necessary rebuild work at Grafenwoehr. training exercises were onlyaccomplishedat the platoon level'. The missing training was very noticeable indeed. A large part ofthe technical and tactical losses are traceable to this cause.

Situation of the Regiment after Seven Days in Action: Due

to enemy action and mechamcal breakdowns the combat strength sank rapidly during the first few days. By the evening of 10 July there were only 10 operational Panthers in the front hne. 25 Panthers had been lost as total writeoffs (23 were hit and burnt and two had caught fire during the ap-proach march.) 100 Panthers were in need ofrepair (56 were damaged by hits and mmes and 44 by mechamcal break-down). 60 percent of the mechanical breakdowns could be easily repaired. Approximately 40 Panthers had already been repaired and were on the way to the front. About 25 still had not been recovered by the repair sernice.

On the evening of 11 July. 38 Panthers were operational, 31 were total writeoffs and 131 were in need ofrepair. A slow increase in the combat strength is obsen/able. The large number of losses by hits (81 Panthers up to 10 July) attests to the heavy fighting.

The deep, heavily mined, main battle field of the Rus-sians must result in above average losses of materiał through hits and mmes. The fact that the Panther appeared for the first time on the battlefield, focused generał interest. Com-parison against losses of other Panzer units were not madę. Therefore the high command and troops quickly jumped to the conclusion: The Panther is worthless!

In closing, it should be remarked that the Panther has been proven successful in combat. The high number of mechanical breakdowns that occurred should have been ex-pected sińce lengthy troop trials have still not been accom-plished. The curve of operational Panthers is on the rise. After correcting deficiencies in the fuelpumps and the motors, the mechanical breakdowns should remain within normaI lim-its. Without consideration of our own mistakes, the

CHAPTEf) 10: OPERATIONAL HISTORY

10 July 12 July

70^1	38
23	25
19	31
15	5
12	10
4	3
0	4
131	116

^spropOfUonally high number of losses through enemy ac _tl0n attests to especially heavy combat    ^{y c}

An attachment to the report contamed detailed remark^{2 1} _on tne adequacy of components as exper.enced on Panthers

i n action

_Mam Gun The accuracy and penetrating ability is good As ₀t W July. 1^0 enemy tanks had been shot up. Theaueranl tange was 1500 to 2000 meters. Also. one T 34 was killedat a rango of3000 meters Atter the thirdshot, the commande¹ _y,$,on was hmdered by burnt propellant fumes causino thl eyes ,o war Tne Sehstab (obsen.al.on per,sco?e) w£ sM not available>

Several weapons became unserviceable as a result of anti-tank rifle hits on the gun tubes (bulges on the inside) Replacement of damaged gun tubes with gun mantlets can not be covered by cannibahzmg other total writeoffs

Machineguns In generał, the machmeguns fired very well Stoppages sometimes occurred due to the cables stretchino Possibly. the cable materiał is poor quality The belt feed madę trom sheet metal bent itself.

Smokecandle dischargers turned out to be unusable, sińce tney were very quickly destroyed by enemy fire. Develop-ment of a usable self enveloping smoke device must be has-

tened.

Armor Enemy weapons did not penetrate through the Iron-tal armor of the Panther. Even direct hits from straight on fired from 76 mm anti-tank and tank guns did not penetrate tnrough the gun mantlet. However, the sides of the Panther were penetrated at ranges exceedmg 1000 meters The 76 mm anti-tank and tank rounds broke cleanly through the tur-ret sides and both the sloped and vertical hull sides In most cases. the Panther immediately caught on fire. This was pos-sibly due to the large amount ofpropellent in the ammumtton that is carried.

The Panther is basically mvulnerable to artillery fire. How-ever. direct hits by calibers of over 150 mm on the roof of the nuli and tur ret had the effect ofdeforming the armor and caus-,ng mternal damage. Hits by lighter caliber shells hitting the commander s cupola and the roof armor showed no effect.

Weak spots Pistol port plugs were hit (possibly by 45 mm armor piercmg shells) and shot into the inside ofthe turret A loader and a commander were killed The rim of the pistol port plugs should be remforced. The Communications hatch on the left turret wali was cracked by a direct hit (possibly by a 76.2 mm armor piercing Shell) and mcapacitated the turret crew

There is concern, that rounds hitting the lower halfof the gun mantlet will be deflected downward and penetrate through the roof of the crew compartment.

Etfects of Mines About 40 Panthers fell out during the first few days due to enemy mines. In generał, only 4 to 6 track hnks and 2 to 4 roadwheels were damaged. On several Panthers the roadwheel support arms were also bent. Occasion-ally damage occurred to the dnve sprocket and idler wheel In seyeral cases the ammumtion stored under the turret platform igmted and the Panthers burnt out

Turret It is difficult to operate the hatch for the commander s cupola when the Panther is standmg on a slope or when the Panther is on fire. Hatches for the dr ty er and radio operator have jammed so that evacuation was not possible.

In generał the brackets for the gun sight have held up. In only one case was it reported that the bracket was bent. A wiper for the front optics is absolutely necessary, sińce it takes too long to retract the gun sight during combat

Mechanical Deflciencles In the Chassis Most mechanical failures were defective fuel pumps (20 in Panzer-Abteilung 52 by 8 July). Fuel collected on the floor due to fuel pump leaks and resulted m the total writeoffof three Panthers due to fires. When on a steep side slope. the Panther easily catches on fire In most cases, the motor fires were extin-

guished by the crew or the automatic fire extinguisher system activated.

Motor fallure: During this period, motor failures were abnor-mally high. Panzer-Abteilung 52 already had 12 defective motors by 8 July. Atter several days. the number of breakdowns decreased. Therefore it is speculated that the motors were not sufficiently run in.

Transmissions Transmissions didn t experience a high number of breakdowns. The transmission modification at Grafenwoehr were apparently successful By 8 July. Panzer-Abteilung 52 had experienced 5 transmission failures.

The numbers used by Guderian in his report, showing the status of the Panthers on 10 July. were mitial estimates This data was corrected by the report dated 11 July which was compiled to show the status as of 2400 hours on 10 July. The detailed report lists the problems with the Panthers need-ing repair and reveals the cause of breakdowns. Many morę Panthers were rendered inoperable due to damage from hits and mines than from mechanical breakdowns as shown m the detailed lists from 10 and 12 July 1943:

Repair Needed:

Suspension

Motor

Turret

Hull

Radio Set

Transmission

Gun

133

1

Of which 12 are both suspension and radio sets

On 26 July 1943. Oberstleutnant Reinhold attached the 4 Panzer-Armee during Operation 'Zitadelle" reported i the "PŁKpfw.y tPanihery.

2

Total: