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The aim of the reform is to change fundamentally the present status of the working man, that is to establish such socio-economic relations under which associated workers will have an absolute power to make decisions about accumulation. For this reason, the present status of the working class in relation to the labour surplus and de-cision-making about it cannot be the target of our critiąue sińce such a criticjue has already been expressed by the reform, having a radical change of that status for its principal goal. The question that has, however, remained open for the futurę is as follows: how, by what mcans and in what ways could that critique be transformed into ac-tion? How could the working class take the cause of the reform in its own hands? Opposition to the reform has taken root, first of all, in the political sphere. The discrepancy between words and deeds has been manifested above all as a discrepancy between political statements about the reform and concrete decisions and tasks as set up in these statements. But as the working class does not dispose of economic instruments in our country, it does not sufficiently posses political power in order to influence decisively the transformation of our so-ciety. In the institutions which make decisions about the reform, there are almost no workers at all. Moreover, the greater the social power of an institution, the smaller the number of workers in it. In addition, the number of workers in the Federal Assembly, republic and com-munal assemblies has been decreasing during the period of the reform at the time when one should really expect a substantial inerease of their number within these bodies. »While workers within Federal Assembly were represtented by 5.5% in 1963, in 1965 by 3.9%, and in 1967 by 1.9%, they totaled to only 0.6% in 1969. (Totally, there are 4 workers in the Economic Council; in other Councils of the Federal Assembly there are no workers at all.)

An identical tendency can be observed in republic and regional assemblies. Thus, in all republic assemblies in 1963 there was a total of 7.5% of workers, in 1965 4.6%, in 1967 2.5%, and in 1969 1.3% ...

The same tendency but, nevcrtheless, a somewhat higher participa-tion of direct producers, indicate data on the composition of commun-al assemblies: in 1963 - 14.6%, in 1965 - 15.4% in 1967 - 14.5%, and in 1969 - 13.1%.¹⁰

Consequently, the number of workers in the institutions which make decisions about the reform is quite insignificant. Therefore, the associated producers cannot express their will directly through these institutions and influence social events or the reform. There are too many people in these institutions to whom politics has become a vocation, a profession, and these people, as Max Weber noticed it shrewdly, live

the one hand, been »proving« without any evidcncc, that »there is no danger of a republic statism«, while tlicy have been prcdicting, on the other hand, ( being awarc of their own pcrsonal intcrcr.ts to maintain statism) that »repub!ic statisin will havc to be somewhat strengthencd** on account of the dcclinc of federal statism will havc dccciving gamę and bluff does not only provc that they have understood nothing about the charactcr of the Yugoslav socialist revolution, but it also produces cvid-cncc of their being counter-rcvolutionarics!

¹⁰ D. Tozi & D. Petrović: Political Relations and Composition of Assemblies of Socio-Political Communitics; Socialism, No. 12/19G9, p. 1591.

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