41604 kryzys bułgarski (5)

CHAPTER 9

Kn 19 The war indemnity and the losses imposcd on Russia which His Majestyj du Empcror of Russia daims, and which the Sublimc Porte has bound itself to rcim-| bursę to hitn. consist of...

Total 1,410.000,000 roubles.

Tałdng into consideration the hnancial embarrassments of Turkey, ... the Emj peror of Russia consents to substitute for the payment of the greater part of the mon-J cvs .the fbllowing territorial cessions:... b)Ardahan,Kars,Batoum,Bayazid,; the tcrritoiy as far as the Saganlough.

—Hertslet, 4:2672ff. (with maps); Hurst, 2:52£

b)

Memorandum for tbe Britisb Cabinet, 3 May 1878

The objcctions of Great Britain to the Treaty of San Stefano rest principally three grounds: (1) that it admits a new naval power to the coasts of the Aegean; j that it threatens with extinction the non-Slav populations of the Bałkan peninsula;i that it places the Porte so much at the mercy of Russia, that it is no longer able to| charge with independence political functions which are still assigned to it, and fl deeply interest other nations.

The remedy for the first two of these evils, is to push the frontier of the Slavfl back from the Aegean and Macedonia. This change is essential to any agreement I tween England and Russia. Due securities for good govemment must, of coursej prOYided for the populations of the regions thus excluded from the autonoiS State....

In the first tank of importance stands the configuration of the Slav State. It i dose up to Constantinople, is separated from it by no effective or defensible frj and severs it from communication with the remaining European provinces [of thej toman Empire!. These effects must be considered, together with the influence j this State conferred upon Russia by the provisions as to government and occujH A remedy for this evil would be in the restriction of the Slav State to the north afj Balkans. together with a limitation of the time of occupation.

In the second place come the annexations in Asia. They despoil the Por the only good harbor in the Black Sea; menace from the conąuered linę of fon the richest of the remaining provinces; and, by the acąuisition of Kars, will fl from Turkey the respect, and shake the fidelity, of the Mesopotamian and populations.

In the third rank stand the vague provisions of the indemnity clause, wf capable of being converted either into further annexations, or into a compt liance.

And, after these, stand such provisions as the alienation of Bessarabia, thej mentation of temtory given to the tributary States, and some other less pr stipulations. . .. As it is the operation of the instrument as a whole to which ] objects, so it is the result of the modifications as a whole, and not the particulad which they take.to which England looks as a condition of her assenting to anyj itiveTreaty founded on the Preliminaries of San Stefano.

—Sumner, Russia and the BalkartsA

CYPRUS CONYENTION, 4 JUNE 1878

Anglo-Russian Memorandum (No. 3), 31 May 1878 •

Anglo-Ottoman Cyprus Conventlon, 4 June 1878

jflhe Marquess of Salisbury took over the Foreign Office in March 1878. His task was to pres-

npe Russia to abandon the Treaty of San Stefano in favor of a settlement morę palatable to Iritain; his powers of persuasion were augmented by the presence of the British fleet at Con-nantinople. His bargaining position thus enhanced, Salisbury adopted a two-pronged strategy. Ile reached agreement with the Russian ambassador in London, Count Peter Shuvalov, on the Menda for the forthcoming peace congress in Berlin; and, insuring himself against the possi-pfity that the congress might end in failure, devised a fall-back strategy of propping up the Ot-inian Empire. The cornerstone of this latter course was the Cyprus convention of 4 June p78: Britain pledged to defend Turkey-in-Asia in return for the right to occupy Cyprus and

p. The Cyprus convention was the most visible manifestation of what might be called Salis-p^s grand design for the defense of British interests in the Middle East. As an exercise in the ■■lainment of Russia, its scope was ambitious: over the next year, a smali army of British ad-Mers descended on Anatolia to jump-start the reforms; Cyprus, under British tutelage, was to ■come a model for the modernization of the mainland provinces; the British ambassador in ■nstantinople promoted a scheme for a railroad connecting Alexandretta with Karachi. The Kjpose of these projects was ostensibly to help the Ottoman Empire defend itself against fur-

endeavors were about to transform Turkey-in-'e resisted by the Porte for precisely this rea-the unwillingness of British financiers to risk n Anatolia brought down Salisbury's plan. Its as the British presence in Cyprus.

178 had proved wrong Palmerston's hope that ison of the preceding decades seemed elear: tside power could stave off the collapse of this part. Salisbury may well have been moti-i of power in the Middle East. But it is just as vder calculation. The avowed purpose of the I to Russian expansion in the Caucasus. Yet is secret negotiations with Shuvalov, acqui-s it had wrested from the Ottomans. Though > convention kept alive the illusion that these

:t thus resembled that of a corporate raider,

ed by others and through the withholding of )ney down.

im (No. 3), 31 May 1878

>nsented to return to His Majesty the Sul-f Bayazid, and having no intention of ex-Batoum, and the limits imposed by the ;d by the above-mentioned retrocession,