78666 kryzys bułgarski (3)

CHAPTER 9

hctwccn these rwo powers a5 good as they were at thc beginning of this century, and w hkb mav be folfowcd by thc rapprochement of both to ourselves. Perhaps this aira carmot be realizcd. but that too is not ecrtain. If only England and Russia could agree to thc proposition of thc one controlling Egypt, and the other the Black Sea, both nught find it possible to remain content with maintaining the status quo for a long period At the same time. in their chief interests they would still be rivals, which would pnacticalh preclude their joining in coalitions against us, quite apart from the domcsbc pressures which would dissuade England from such a combination.

A French paper recenth attributed to me “le cauchemar des coalitions.”This sort of bogey will for long—perhaps for evef—be quite rightly feared by all German min-isters. Coalitions may be formed against us by the Western Powers, joined by Austria; or. of greater danger to us. among France. Russia, and Austria. A dose rapprochement ber» ren any rwo of these three powers would give the third the means to exert grierous pressure on us. My ansiety in the face of these possibilities leads me to re-| gard as desirabłe, not at once, but as time goes on, the following consequences of the Eastem Crisis: (1) Graritation of the interests of Russia and Austria, and their mutual rk valnes. towards the East; (2) Russia to be impelled to take up a strong defensive poa-, bon in the East. and on its own shores, and to need an alliance with us; (3) For En-j gland and Russia a satisfactory status quo giving them the same interest which we have in thc maintenance of things as they are; (4) Separation of England from FranceJ which is still hostile to us, over Egypt and the Mediterranean; (5) Relations betweed Russia and Austria to be such that it is difficult for both to carry on a joint anti-Germanj conspiracy. which in some measure attracts the clerical and centralizing elements in Austria

If I were abłe to work. I could fili in and develop in greater detail the picture in my mind s eye. It is not one portraying any acquisition of tenitory, but rather one showing a political landscape in w hich all the Powers, except France, need us and anS pcewentedL by rirtue of their relations towards each other, from the possibility of coaJ lescing against us____

—GP,2i

&

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Bismarck in tbe Reichstag, 19 February 1878

... [Out role] in the peacemaking process [Vermittelung des Friedens) I do not vi alize in the following mann er that, when opinions diverge, we play the referee I say,~this is the way things should be and behind this looms the power of the Geifl Reich’' [very good!], but morę modestły, indeed—perhaps I can cite an analogy 9 everyday life—as that of an honest broker, who is chiefly interested in clinching deal.... There are many in Russia who have no love for Germany and who are, foJ nateły. not in power, but who would be far from disconsolate should they find th selves in power [amusement]: how would they speak to their compatriots, to othJ perhaps to other statesmen who up to now cannot yet be counted among our mies^They would say: consider the sacrifices in blood, men, treasure through w we have attained a position for which Russia has striven for centuries! We were to ward off those opponents who had a natural interest in denying us these ga| w as not Austria, with which we have coexisted for a long time; it was not En

prfaich has a national interest openly acknowledged to be contrary to ours; but it was [Germany, our close friend to whom we have rendered semces in the past, from whom we could expect repayment, who has no interest in the Near East; it was Germany which unsheathed not the saber but a dagger behind our back. This is what we would hear—I have exaggerated the picture, but don’t think that Russian public opin-ioa wouldn’t exaggerate—and this picture corresponds to the truth. We will never Kake upon ourselves the responsibility of sacrificing a secure friendship with a great bod powerful neighboring nation, proven over generations, to the temptation ofplzy-mg judge and jury in Europę [bravo!]....

—Kohl, Reden, 71)2, 95-96

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Herbert ton Bismarck¹⁷ to Bernhard Ernst ton Bulów,¹⁸ 2 Notember 1878

--. The essential point of these documents¹⁹ is, in brief, that a lasting peace in the Pfear East is not in Germany’s interest: given our geographic position, the neighboring jGreat Powers—all of which hate us—would probably seek and find a common de-lator [ Vereinigungspunkt] with an anti-German edge as soon as their hands are g Moreover, Austria could undergo in a surprisingly short span of time a change of emment and in outlook which could bring to power anti-German and ultramon-:e forces, providing a cover for a rapprochement with France .. . that could lead to alliance. For this reason, we have to nurse along our relations with Russia: [on the er hand] we have always tumed down every unjustified Russian demand which gressed the limits of friendship, thus enabling us to remain on good terms with id and Austria. It would be a triumph of our statecraft if we succeeded in keep-open the Near Eastem wound in order to prevent the other Great Powers from iting [against us] and to secure our peace... .

—PA Turkei IA.B.q. 133 secr.

*

Bernhard Ernst ton Bulów to Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm,

Notember 1878

. Germany’s main interest is not in this or that domestic setup in the Ottoman Em-~, but in the attitude of ffiendły powers towards us and towards one another. The tion whether Germany, because of the Near Eastem troubies, wili become en-hed in a lasting dispute with Austria, England, or Russia is infinitely morę impor-

"Herbert von Bismarck (1849-1904). Bismarcka oldest son; member of the foreign ministry start' 1874 onward; State secretary, 1886-1890.

"Bernhard Ernst von Bulów (1815-1879). State secretary in the German foreign ministry, 3-1879. Father of Bernhard von Billów (cf. Chapters 10 and 11).

"This letter was prompted by the crown prince's request for representative documents on German in the Bałkan crisis. The selection referred to here included the Kissingen memorandum. The m prince was known to favor a pro-British and anti-Kussian policy.