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THE CZEClIOSLOVAK REPUDLIC, 1918-1938

financial stability wcrc largcly annulled by thc indiscriminatc printing of bank bills in Vicnna and Budapcst, which unleashcd a runaway infla-tion.^4S He proposcd, tiicreforc, to scparatc the Czcchoslovak currcncy frora tiiose of tlić other succcssor States and to reform it. The esscntial features of his currcncy reform, whicli thc National Assembly approved on Fcbruary 25, 1919, was to stamp bank bills in Czechoslovakia in order to dillcrcntiatc them from thosc in circulation in thc other succes-sor States, and to hołd—as a foreed loan to the stale—one half of all per-sonal and corporate cash holdings and savings in order to rcduce the amount of currcncy in circulation.⁴¹ Likc a bitter but ncccssary incdicinc, RasńTs currcncy reform was unpopular but it worked. While the other succcssor States suflcrcd further inflation and financial confusion, Czcch-oslovakia became an island of financial order and stability in East Central Europę. Tliis image was of great benefit to it at thc Paris Pcacc Conference.

CzechosIovakia’s most menacing postwar problem, however, was not economic but political. It was thc intcrnal conflict within thc large Czcch-oslovak Social Democratic party which, because of thc party’s hołd on the Czechoslovak working class, cast a spcll over all of Czcchoslovak politics. The conflict was not singular; analogous conflicts were raging within nearly all European socialist partics at the time. They had their source in Europe’s postwar social convulsions and ranged from the Rus-sian Revolution to social turmoil in East Central Europę. As early as the first postwar congress of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic party in December, 1918, a dispute developed between the moderate leadership of the party which subscribed to evolutionary socialism within the frame-work of democratic Czechoslovakia, and the left-wing extremists in the party who were morę or less prepared to emulate the example of the Boishevik Revolution.⁴⁵ While the moderates retained the leadership of thc party, the radical lcft-wingers were ablc to infiltrate the party ap-paratus and press, thus gradually acąuiring tłie power to thwart the moderate policies of the party leadership and to spread their own concept of socialism among the broad masses of the population.

At the congress, however, Bohumir Smcral, who had led the party until 1917 when he was removed from its leadership because of his op-

⁴³    Kareł Engliś, “Oulline of thc DcveIopmcnt of Czcchoslovak Currcncy” in National Bank of Czechoslovakia, Ten Years of the National Bank of Czecho-s!ovakia (Prague, 1937), p. 38.

⁴⁴    Peroutka, Bitdovant stal u, li, 701-24; Chaptcr V below.

15 Only one month after liberation, Alois Muna, thc founder of thc Czccho-slovak Communist party in Russia, and a member of thc Red Guards appeared in Prague and immediately found a warm reception among the members of thc left wing led by Bohumir Smcral, Antonin Zapotocky, Josef Skalak, and Vdclav Sturc. Muna spoke openly in favor of the Bolshevik Revolution. See Peroutka, Budovóni stal u, li, 561-80.

DEMOCRACY AND ITS PRODLEMS, 1918-1920

position to thc Czcchoslovak strugglc for national indcpcndcnce, publicly admittcd his past mistakcs and subscribed to both thc Czechoslovak Re-public and thc spccial conditions of thc Czcchoslovak proletariat.⁴⁰ Nei-ther lic nor his supporters—who latcr constitutcd thc corc of thc leadership of thc Communist Party of Czcchoslovakia—intended to rcmain faithful to thc promises madę at the first postwar congress. They con-tinucd their membership in thc Social Democratic party, aiming at achicving control ovcr its organization and ils not inconsidcrable prop-crty.⁴⁷ Using radical slogans which were intended to incitc the povcrty-strickcn and cxcitablc workers, they pushed thc moderate majority of thc party leadership into a dcfcnsivc position.⁴⁸

Conscious of this danger and recognizing tlić rclevancc of social is-sues, the Kramar cabinct adopted, at thc beginning of January, 1919, a declaration in which it announeed its determination to punish all those who were guilty of profitccring and to work for thc nationalization of coal mines and the cxpropriation of all estates above a ccrtain acrcage.⁴⁹ Even the rcpresentatives of thc conservativc partics dcclarcd themseWes in favor of further nationalization, suggesting that it might cover iron and Steel works and all enterprises which were monopolistic in naturę.⁰⁰

The actual moving force behind thc socialization program, however, was the Socialist Council, which was composed of the Social Democrats and thc (National) Socialists. The organization of the Socialist Council in September, 1918, rcprcscntcd an attempt to separate thc revolutionary approach from thc morę cautious and legalistic approach of the moderate parties that looked to thc Prague National Committee for leadership. During thc course of 1919, however, thc Social Democrats and National Socialists split and the drive for socialization lost momentum, ultimately ending in complete failure.

The New Government

It was the pressure of the left-wing Social Democrats which caused the first crisis in thc Kramar cabinet, in March, 1919. Accusing their part-ners of sabotaging the promised socialization and land reform, the Social Democratic ministers presented a virtual ultimatum to the governmcnt.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 517-24. Speaking of the mission of the Social Democratic party, Smcral dcclarcd that “it has thc power to givc to Czech indcpcndcnce and thc Czech rcpublic | correct guidance.” Adolf Mokry (cd.), Osemdesdt let ćeskoslovenskć socialni demokracie [Eighty Years of Czechoslovak Social Democracy] (London, 1958), p. 99. On Smcral sec also Zdcnck KArnik, Socialistć na rozcesti: Habsburg, Masaryk ci S/neral? [The Socialists at the Crossroads: Habsburg, Masaryk or Smcral?| (Prague, 1968); and Karci Gorovsky, “Bohumir Smcral,’' Revue dejtn socialismu, ix (1969) 893-922, and 1 (1970), pp. 112-39.

H Peroutka, Budordni stalli, ii, 853.    ⁴⁸ Mokry, Osemdesdt let, pp. 98-99.

⁴⁰ Kocman, Boj o snter, i, 167-68 .    ⁵⁰ Peroutka, Budovdtd stdtu, u, 545.

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