3784495610

Literatura

[1]    R. Aumann, S. Hart. Handbook of Gamę Theory. North-Holland, vol. I: 1992, vol. II: 1994, vol. III: 2002.

[2]    G. Brown. Iterative Solutions of games by fictituous play. in T.C.Koopmans, ed. ”Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, NY: Wiley, 374-376, 1951.

[3]    L.A. Dugatkin, H.K. Reeve. Gamę Theory and Animal Behauior. Oxford University Press, 1998.

[4]    A. Flachę, M. Macy. Stochastic collusion and the power law of leaming: a generał reinforcement leaming model of cooperation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(5) 629-653, 2002.

[5]    D. Fudenberg, D. K. Lewin. Theory of Leaming in Games. MIT Press, 1998.

[6]    D. Fudenberg, J. Tirole. Gamę Theory. MIT Press, 1998.

[7]    R. Gibbons. Gamę Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton Univ. Press, 1992.

[8]    H. Gintis. The Bounds of Reason. Gamę Theory and the Unification of the Behamoral Sciences. Princeton Univ. Press, 2009.

[9]    H. Gintis. Gamę Theory Evolving. Princeton Univ. Press, 2009.

[10]    J. Harsanyi, R. Selten. A General Theory of Eąuilibrium Selection in Games. MIT Press, 1988.

[11]    J. Hofbauer, K. Sigmund. Euolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. 1998, Cambridge Univ. Press.

[12]    L.R. Iząuierdo, N.M. Gotts, J.G. Polhill. Case-based reasoning, social dilemmas and a new eąuili-brium concept. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 7(3) Article 1, 2004.

[13]    D. Luce, H. Raiffa. Gry i decyzje. 1994, 1994.

[14]    M. Malawski, A. Wieczorek, H. Sosnowska. Konkurencja i kooperacja. Teoria gier w ekonomii i naukach społecznych. Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1997.

[15]    E. R. Nelson, S. G. Winter. An Euolutionary Theory of Economic Change Belknap Press. Belknap Press, 1982.

[16]    J. von Neumann, O. Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economic Behauior. Princeton Univ. Press, 1944.

[17]    M. J. Osborne. An Introduction to Gamę Theory. 2004, Oxford Univ. Press.

[18]    M. J. Osborne, A. Rubinstein. Games uńth procedurally rational players. American Economic Review, 88, 834-847, 1998.

[19]    M. J. Osborne, A. Rubinstein. A Course in Gamę Theory. NIT Press, 2002.

[20]    G. Owen. Teoria Gier. PWN, 1975.

[21]    M. Posch. Cycling in a stochastic leaming algorithm for normal-form games. Journal of Evolutio-nary Economics, 7, 193-207, 1997.

[22]    T. Piątkowski. Enhanced cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma uńth aspiration. Applied Mathematic Letters, 22, 1161-1165, 2009.

[23]    T. Piątkowski, P. Bujnowski. Cooperation in aspiration-based N-person prisoner’s dilemmas. Phy-sical Review E, 79, 036103, 2009.

[24]    H. Raiffa. The Art and Science of Negotiations. Harvard University Press, 1982.

[25]    M. Ramsza. Elementy modelowania ekonomicznego opartego na teorii uczenia się w grach populacyjnych. Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH Warszawa, 2010.

[26]    M. Ramsza, R.M. Seymour. Fictitious play in an euolutionary enuironment. Games and Economic Behavior, 68 (2010) 303-324, 2010.

[27]    J. Robinson. An iteratiue method of soluing a gamę. The Annals of Mathematics 54(2) 296-301, 1951.

[28]    A.E. Roth, I. Erev. Leaming in extensiue-form gamę: experimental datę and simple dynamie models in the intermediate term. Games and Economic Behavior, 8, 164-212, 1995.

[29]    A. Rubinstein. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining gamę. Econometrica 52 (1982) 1351-1364, 1982.

[30]    A. Rubinstein. Perfect eąuilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica, 50, 97-109, 1982.

Wstęp do Teorii Gier © T.Piątkowski, Uniwersytet Warszawski, 2011.