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duo to the conoerted team work of the Polish crewa
and the Polish ground personnel.
Data reoently obtained allow us to suppose that improved HALIFAX aireraft may attain a fhrther 150 - 200 miles and that flights might be starte d in August 1942; ais o that we shall obtain several modified HALIFAX airoraft for the flights to Poland.
Should this supposition materialise, then this solution, regarded as me rety temporaiy and only for the firat period of operations may be satisfectoiy. The serious oontribution to the war effort whioh oan be madę ty the Militaiy Organisation in Poland renders it imperative that further long rangę air-craft should be alloted to us.
If LIBERATOR aireraft will not be available in 1942 then it become3 necessaiy that at least 6 aireraft of the IANCASTER type be allotted with the least delay possible.
Six airoraft of the IANCASTER type and six aireraft of the HALIFAX type, brought up to datę, will allow us to transfer by air to Poland the ?/ar materiał indispensible for operations in the East.
In order to ensure the effioient ezploitation of the airoraft it is iraperative that these aireraft should be flown by Polish erews and senriced by Polish ground personnel^
It becomes obyious, therefore, that the taking of decisions regarding the allocation of aireraft and personnel as we 11 as the issue of all necessary instructions of a teohnioal and organisational naturę are most urgently needed.
It should be stressed that the period of flights 1942/4~3 is the last period yfoen help oan be sent to the Mili-tary Organisation in Poland.
Jork so far carried out by the Militaiy Organisation gives ample proof that help, sent out to that Organisation, will be exploited fU13y and to the best advantage within the generał scope of operations against Germany.
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