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New Series No. 96

and control are concerned, is simply a delegation of the Government in London --is to be treated aa though it were a separate body. (4) That the National Committee of Liberation, which in reality is far morę representative and broadly based than the London Government, is not to be recognised as such, but to be treated as though it were simply a group of merabers of the Communist Farty.

The first point is a matter of common agreement. The second speaks for itself. The third is an attempt to Jerrymander the representation in any new Government so as to ensure a 2-1 representation for the present London emigres. The fourth i3 based on an absurdity.

M. Mikolajozyk¹s Position

Those olose to the Polish emigre Premier were this week offering two entirely oontradiotory explanations of his behaviour. One lot say that ho agreed to undertake a mission to Moscow which he did not intend should be successful, but which was thought to be useful as a "gesture". There was, therefore, according to them, no real change of linę at all after his return. They even hint. that he may perhaps have known something about the Warsaw coup designed by Sosnkowski and Bor, and have refrained deliberately from countermanding it, or insisting that the matter be discussed with the Soviet High Command.

The. other lot say that he did intend genuinely to reach agreement, that he knew absolutely nothing of the wrecking coup in Warsaw, that he accepted the present proposals knowing that they will be rejected, and believing that this finał rejection will expose the futility of the plans of the Sosnkowski people and the Socialists, after which he will feel free to "get on with the job".

It is certain that there is atill a considerable number of Polish leadera in London who would be perfectly ready to follow the Prime Minister to Poland, if he would accept the invitation already cordially extended to him by the President of the National Liberation Committee.

The British Attitude

Morę serious than the manoeuvrings in progross among the London Polos, however, is the faot that at this moment they should have been madę the occa3ion for the oreation of a "crisis" of the kind that has broken this week.

It is hardly conceivable, for example, that the three leading Diplomatic Correspondents of BritiBh national daily newspapers who almost simultaneously took the "crisis" linę should not have reoeived some indioation from 3riti3h offioial sources.

It is not conceivable at all that the B.B.C. Foreign News Service should have put Mr. Bartletfs article into its European news unless directed so to do by the Foreign Office. Yet it did so--with the result that the whole of Europę, including listeners to the B.B.C. service in German, were regaled with the 3tory of disputea between the United Nations...grave conseąuenceb may follow...strained relations between the three major Allies, etc., eto.

The alleged reason for all these outbursts--the ąuestion of supplies for the Poles fighting in Warsaw--was obviously not the true reason. General Żymierski, Director of National Defence of the National Liberation Committee, had already fully explained that arms or other supplies dropped into Warsaw would do the Gormans morę good than the Poles, sińce no definite area of the city is held by the Poles. Even supposing that 5 per cent. of any consignment dropped were to reach Polish hands, it would obviously be entirely outbalanced by the romainder, falling straight into the hands of the enemy.

The kindest explanatlon offered in diplomatic circles this week was that somcbody in high place in Britain must have had a rush of blood to the head at the news of the fine advances in France and have decided that about now was the tine to start putting our tongues out at our Allies.

THE BALKANS

Indications this week were that the new Rumanian Government--certainly the policy of that Government--is firmer and morę solidly established than at first seemed prooable.

From this follow two immediate conseąuences: First, the extent to which the Army, partioularly in the Carpathian passes, will vigorously follow the new Government's lead, is likely to be greater than first estimates led many observers to suppose.

Secondly, the fact that it has been possible to solve the internal crisis in this way will have an immediate bearing upon the situation in

Bułgaria.