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OCT. 1958] GERMAN JTESISTANCR IN ITS INTERNATIONAL ASPECTŚ 483

with NeviUe Chamberlain, Lord Halifajc, and other leading men. He reported on them with the purpose of at least delaying the outbrealc of war and convincing Hitler that no second Munich was possible; yet with some of his friends he did not avoid giving the impression that he had come as an 'appeaser'. Suspicion of this kind, or even of Nazi sympathy, was to pursue him and prove a severe handicap for his further efforts. Id fact, his report to Berlin which was published in 1956 teems with Nazi phraseology and outright flattery of Hitler; it has, of course, to be read with its purpose in mind, and ample evidence is available of Trott's real intent as well as of the ideas and constructive proposals which he laid hefore the British statesmen.¹

The second mission of von Trott stands out in even clearer perspective; it led him to the United States in October 1939. In Washington, he in-formed liigh officials and other policy-makers of the aims and personalities of the German underground. Moreover, in a memorandum, now in the files of the State Department, Trott suggested that, with the backing of the United States, the Allied Govemments should State that the territorial concessions to be asked of the German people would not go beyond the status quo of Yersailles. In addition, certain minimum commitments should be considered regarding economic concessions and generał con-ditions which would enable Germany to participate in a co-operative European futurę. As to Germany’s own contribution, it should consist not only in the overthrow of the present leadership and the prosecution of ąll Lhosc involved in horrible criraes; there must also be assurance that a new Germany would be an honest and effective partner in peace. While point-ing to necessary changes in Germany's social, economic, and political structure, von Trott stated unequivocally that Germany must be able to satisfy the desire of the European peoples as a whole that another war among them should be ruled out as a possibility.

Obviously, a constructive concept of a German and a European futurę was the pivotal point in von Trott's proposals. Such a concept, he thought, would provide decisive support for the German Opposition by giving the lie to Hitler's propaganda of an anti-German war of extermination. It would strengthen all rational and sound elements against the nihilistic and destructive forces. In a letter von Trott wrote from Washington to his friend David Astor, he spoke of a basie mental transformation as an 'elemcntal nccessity for the life of Europę as a whole if our individual co u n tri es and what we consider worth preserving in them is to survive\ Passionately German, hc was convinced that the nation State and its sovereignty was a thing of the past, fully discredited by totalitarian excess.

¹ For the Trott report sec Dccnmmti on Gtrmam Foreign Potiey, Serie* D. vtłL VLJPp. °74 -8S- For u correct appnusal cf. letter by D«vłd Astor in thm Mrnncktsitr Cinanw

Wtekly, 4 June 1956.    .. x. \