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of five, owing to the shorta^^ of iren and specialists. Gen.A.replied that the tank brigade must have the xxx± best equipment, i.e.Shermano.
A brigade of three-tj) scuadrons would be too weak.
Gen.S.asked where and how did gen.A.intend to use the Polish Corps. Gen.A.replied 'that he int&nded to use it witłi the 8th Aimy, on account of it*s British eąuipment. Gen.S.said the Polish troope would be gla to fight under gen .^ontgominery. ftiuptfU: Hę suggested the possibility of using the Corps in the raountainous part of the front, especially as the 3 Carpathian Division had been trained for this type of warfare in Southern Syria. Gen.A.said he was very gl&d, as he n.eeded these units. The Corps could therefore be used in the central eector, a^rorciuiatel1" Horth-East tff Orvietto. (TTe hoped by theJkti,g^ Polish Corps is
r.ssembled in Italy, the 8th Arcay would reąch the llne Orvietto-Ancona).
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Gen.S.xx±ri asked gen.A.to give his opąinion on the possibility of maint&ining the organization of 2’divs of 2 bgdes in the first phase, and then azBBpipaułeCtiiBZ givingh the Corps another organization, according to circumstances*
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Gen.A. - "The polish nation can make the greatesft n.me for itself by achieving ni li tary. succefeses by your troops. The aaacfc best way to achieve these succeśsds is to adopt the proper org&nization at once?
Gen .S.again streesed the bad effect which the reduction of the Polish unit, generally khown as an ATCT, wirtually to one difcision, would have on the morale of the troopfe and on the Polish opinion in Poland and elsewhere. Cadres of ah Army |iad been organised in anticipation of further* contingents óf Pol es Corning fi-orr. Russia. Aft er the diplomatio relations oetweeh Poland and Russia had been broken, this source of manpower ceased to exist.
Gen.A.repeats that whatever ±fcs organisation of the fJorps would be adopted, he had decided to consider the Polish Córffi ak ą? ‘Corss. having due regard to the morał motives put forward by the Polish C-in-C. He then śuggested the foWowing solutlon.
jChe Polish Corps should consist of an Infantry 0ivision of three Infantry Bgdes and an Armoured Bivision, both organized 'on British war establishmentem. In the event cf eufficient reinforcer.;ents not being available for the infantry ćxvision (if tosses exceed 20 p.c.), it might be neceesary to take efdł theci,from tlie infantry of the armoured division, or to replace one of the infantry brigh&es in the infantry division by that fróm the amoured divfsion. Owińg to the length of tŁme which would be takAn to assemble the Polish Corps in Italy, such neans of finding. r-e-inf or cement s .might never be necessary.
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Gen.S.śiid it was a feurth alternative to rthose discussed at A.P.H.O,* Heiagain iaid emphasfs *oifi bringing the whole of the Polish Corps to Italy. Gen .A. assured tfcat this would be dorle. He thought thi foregoing was the best solution, as it gives 2.aivisions in the Polish Corps and thus giudatroi makes póssible to roganize the armoured division according to British Y/ar Establishments• Gen.Si asked to have all elements of the armoured &ivPbróught over to Italy’and