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8 Małgorzata Kr&l Prectdnu orni (hr law 9

thc courts is thc admimstration of justice. On ihc other hand, adjudicalion bascd on unprodaimed norms is law making.’

2. The conccpt of pnccdcnt

While this too is a controvcrsial conccpt, tt will sufTicc herc to assume that prcccdcnt is thc first judicial dccision of givcn typc in a casc of a spcdfic kind, a dccision which then bccomcs binding on equal or lower rank courts. Prcccdcnt then constitutcs an individual, concrctc dccision referring to a particular individual in his or her concrctc legał situauon. A courl judgement imliating subscqucnt dccuions is a leading case. In this kind of system thc law consists of court judgements - case law. Bcing denved front thc courts. it is judgt madę law.

2.1.    The constitucnts of prcccdcnt

It is convcnlionally rccognizcd that prcccdcnt iovolves a uniquc factual piane which is individual and concrctc (obiter dicta) and a normative piane, which is generał and abstract (ratio decidendi). Noteworthy is thc purcly factual character of obiter dicta and thc normativc character of ratio decidendi. The distinction is howcver conwcntional as thc narning of a fact invo!vcs its normativc ąualirication.''

2.2.    Ibc binding forcc of prcccdcnt

On thc normatiw piane a prcccdcnt is binding and subjccl to thc doctrinc of Marc decisis et ąuleta non ntosere whereby thc courts arc requircd to stand by or adhcrc to decidcd cases and not to altcr thc esisting State of affairs.’ The doctrinc is fundamenta! to thc prcccdcnt system through its salidation and systemie (incltrdsc) functions.

It is gcncrally accepted at krasi in positivist approachcs that judidaJ dccisions should not be arbilrary in thdr dcscriptiv_C or postulative aspeets. On thc contrary, its validity should dcrivc from generał, abstract rules (ratio decidendi) of thc given legał system. Subjcct to debatę may only be whether thc judgement was corrcctly dcrived from thc rc!cvanl ratio in thc forma!

sense ot whether thc judgement and the ratio arc substantially adcquatc. Thus, ratio decidendi is binding by virtuc of stare decisis and constitutes thc ground for thc binding force of thc judgement. The systemie function of stare decisis, on the other hand, is inclusivc by its naturę, whereby a generał rulc (ratio decidendi) is includcd in thc system, or its place in thc legał system is confirmcd. The systemie function is inscparatablc from thc vahda-tion aspeet of stare decisis doctrinc, as dcscrihed abovc. It is thc basis for thc binding forcc of thc generał role if thc rulc is part of the legał system, i.c. if it mccts thc crileria roquired by the system. These may be dcscriptivc or evaluating, with thc łatlcr including the vałue of justice. A legał system is cspectcd to possess at least a modieum of ‘decency’ or morality, including thc cxpcctation of it bdng just. The same applies to court dccisions. Adjudication can be considcrcd just only if similar cases arc decidcd in similar ways. This is possibtc only if generał and abstract legał norms arc uscd which guarantee derivation of similar particular concrctc norms to dcał with similar cases. In this way thc stare decisis doctrine is par excellence systemie. It rcquircs that a norm be established and applied as binding. It may thus be concludcd that the prcccdcnt system, just as thc statutory system, is a set of generał and abstract norms. though thc lcvcl of generalily is an open qucstion.

The assumption of thc binding force of abstract and generał legał norm as the basis for courl dccuions is of speaal importancc to legał positivists. IIaving to decide a case in thc absencc of a generał rulc to constitulc thc basis for such a dedsion is a dramatic situation for a legał positmst regardlcss of thc typc of law he or she is operating in. Such a person is then forced to crcatc a generał rulc to deal with thc particular case in hand. The positmst ideals will howcver be savcd if thc generał rulc thus crcated b rccogniscd as legał, as if it nerc part of tbc system. In such a case thc nile is positivizcd by the judge*

23. Kinds of prccedent

A varicty of prcccdcnt lypcs have bccn dcscńbed in tbc literaturę.’ Among these the so-callcd lcgislative and non-legislativc prcccdcnt typcs merit attention. To cxplain what is involvcd let us first considcr the following distinctions:

' S« J. Wróblewski. Sqda** tioionamr prawa (Judicul npptication of law). Warszawa 1988, p. 398

* I billem, p. 171.

⁵ Sec J. Jabłońska-Ił one a, iifirowaizesk Je prana [An Introduction lo Law], W'ar-M*»a 2094, p. 72

‘ Sce M. Zirk-Sadowski. WpronaJient* Jo filozof u prana [An mtrodiKtioo lo philo *oph) oT lam). ZaUmyca* 2000. p 182T. p 203f

' S« l. Wróblewski, A/eaiur^ ani Tnah m JuJuiat Deelslon, Hehinki 1983. Pf. 157-180; I, Leszczyński, Z/tgeJnitnia teorii KotonaMa prana Doktryna i tezy oruft-roctwo [ProbJans of the theory of law). Zikamyac 2001, p. 30lf.