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10 Makarrata Król

From thc institutional point of vicw there are:

formal prcccdcnts. in thc strict scnse, which constitutc sourccs of law and legał institutions, and

informal, or ^uaji-prcocdents, which are not legał institutions bul ncvcrtheles¹ function as preccdcnts and cxcrt a factual - though not institutional - influence on other judidal dcasion¹

From thc substantivc point of vicw, a diuinction ain be madę betwccn

(a)    constitutivc. iaw-making prcccdcnts which crcatc ncw legał norms, and

(b)    rcgulativc prcccdents. which establish a new mcaning of legał rule alrcady in thc system or rcdcfinc its scopc.

Just as formal and informal preoedents can havc constitutive or regulativc character. so constitutive or rcgulativc prcccdcnts can be forma! or informal.

To arrivc at - and pronouncc a dcasion, a judge crcates and makes uncquivocal a legał norm which constitutes thc generał basis for that decision (legał norms as distinct from legał prescriptions).¹ To this end hc or she has to intcrprcl cxi$ting legał rułcs if they happen not to be elear cnough rclativc to thc casc m hand. Use is also madę in this proccss of infcrential rułcs, viz. per analogiom, a fortiori, a conirańo, etc. That legał rułcs may rcquirc interpretation is rclatcd to the maturę of language. with its inhcrcnl ambiguities. fuzziness, and open-endedness. The use of inferential rułcs is madę necessary by thc incompłctcncss, inconsistcncics, and axiological conf-licts in thc legał system.⁹

In this way legał regulations as formulated by the legjslature are opera-tionally adjusted to suit they rcquircmcnts of a particular casc. Formally, thc linguistic and łogical operalions are undertaken to serve the administ-ration of justicc. Nevcrthelcss, judidal interpretation and infcrcncing may affect thc content of cxisting legał norms and a judidal dcasion bascd on a legał norm interpreted or inferred in a oovel way will itsclf be a prccedcnt Such a prccedcnt may be said to be constitutivc-rcgulalivc or opcrativc and it is logical and linguistic by naturę. Moreovcr, ii is thus sccondary to language, irrcdudble and. con¹cqucntly, incscapably present in any legał system. Kcgardlcss of thc ideological assumptions bchind thc givcn legał system, preccdcnts of this kind shape thc laws and affect their apphcation.

Ilowcvcr, whcn Ihc cxlcnt of oonnilive novelty exceed$ a ccrtain critical potnt, such opcraaonal adjuxtment may bc pcrccivcd as law maktng on ibc parł or thc court. For thc judidal apphcation of law thc moot point herc is thc ćefinition of noraative novelty,'° an issuc hotly debated in Poland in conncction with thc so-callcd diroctivcs for thc administration of justicc, i&sued in Poland by thc Suprcmc Court up to 1989² and inicndcd to ensure uniformity of court rulings. The chief objcction was that thc dircctivcs rcstrictcd thc judges' indcpcndcncc, thc constitutionaJ pnnaplc being that jud ges are only bound by thc constilution and act* of parliamcnt. Morcover, thc diroctivcs werc a manifestation - and an instrument - of thc Suprcmc Court’s (unconstitutional) lcgislativc activity. The polilical transformatom of 1989 and thc widespread criticisn of thc dircctivcs rcsulted in their rcpcal. Yet thc pcrsua$ivc ctTcct of higher-level court rulings on lowcr courts rcmains an open qucstion. The position of such courts, thc cxpcricncc of thc jud ges sitting on them, and thc rcspcct they cnjoy combinc to put them in a position of authority and influence ovcr thc lowcr lcvcls of thc administration of justicc. Not withoul an influence on this State of affairs are qucstions of Professional pra-gniatism on thc part of judges. To have a successful car cer it may sccm scnsiblc not to Split hours or bclabour thc obvious or, abovc all, not to qucsiion thc authority of thc Suprcmc Court. The novelty of normativc yubstancc is thc basis for distinguishing bctwccn constitutivc and rcgulative prcccdents. It also determines thc paradigms of thc work of thc courts and parliamcnt as organs of State. It is neverthele$s a controvcrsial concept, and one that is vcry difficult to apply in practicc. Any attempt to dcfinc prccisdy the scope of constitutivc and rcgulalivc preccdents in teras of thc existing rcgulations and currcnt practicc is bound to fail.

There is no question that our undcrstandmg of thc two conccpts is convcntional, as are the criteria in teras of which we evaluate thc cxtcnt of normativc novclty of a prccedcnt. It is thus possiblc to adopt a convcntion on thc basis of which thc typological charactcnstics of constitutive and rcgulative prccedcnt can bc establisbed producing a continuum along which morę or less rcgulativc and morę or less oonstitutivc prcccdcnts can bc płaced. At one end of the continuum we will havc regulativc prccedcnt, and at thc other - con$titutivc precedent, cspccially one that establishes a ncw legał rulc. Constilulivc prcccdcnts result from legał institutions making up

1

.J¹rzcp« to naptnicyt/a pdnostka syiicmAtyTacyjea aktu prawnego. norma prawni ai to reguła zachowania skonstruowana z daacntow zawartych w    prawnych według

okredonego wzoru" ["Rrgulalion is thc unałkst uiut of a legat act, whik a kgal norm is o nile of conduct coentructed of cocponcnls of kpi regulaiions in accurdance wilh a oertain uand&rd"] - kc W. Lang, i. Wróblewski, S. Zawadzki, op. ca., p. 341 f.

^f Sec Z- Ziembiński, Problemy poduanowe prawommrstma [Basic nsues m kgal iheoryL Warszawa 1980. p. IlOf, p 299f: S. Lewandowski i LoyiU dla puwirikdw [Logic for Uwyers), Warszawa 2002, p. 247f.

2

Sec M. Zirk-Sadowskł, PrMcm nonolet aormaiywne) frhe que$tioo of och nor* matiw fub*Utwv|. Sluiia Pranno-Ekonomie :rx 1979, v. XXII. pp 47-42.

¹¹ Sec c.g A. Stelmachowski, "Prawotwórcza rota widów" fThe U w nulu r.a role of couna], PaAitwo I Prano fThe State and the Law| 1967, v. 4-5; M. Zirk-Sadowski, "Precedens a t/w. dccy/ji prawotwórcza'* filie Uwtnakuig rulc of thc courts). Patii rwo i Prawe, fTŁe Sute and the law) 1980. v. 6.