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Amateurish discussions of the economic functions of the Federation, the tax system, the substitution of agreements (in fact of perverted bureaucratic organization) for the market and such, only strengthen those ominous indications, Amateurish guesswork always prepares fertile soil for political bargaining, and from there it is not far from discrediting of a self-managed economy and through it, selfmanage-ment socialism.

In so far as economic theory is further ignored and some of the momentarily popular positions become the basis for carrying out economic policy, it is not difficult to foresse a further deceleration of growth and new dangerous convulsions of the economy and society after the next four to five years, when the cycle into which we are entering is completed. Now in that case the question is posed: Can our political system survive a third unsuccessful reform? Hence the accent in this work is not on analysis, forecasting and a program for action. That we had earlier, but they remained without effect. The accent is on the question how the existing knowledge can be applied and the consequences which are known in advance avoided. The answer to this question is not of an economic, but of a political naturę. The retrospective reflections above had the objective of stressing that fact as clearly as possibly.

II. PROPOSAL OF A POSSIBLE PROGRAM OF ACTION

The reform of 1965 was politically very well prepared. It enjoyed broad support, inspired confidence and created a readiness for tem-porary sacrifices for attaining durable goals. If the reform had also been as well prepared economically, Yugoslavia would today have a per capita income of over 1,000 dollars, dynamie growth as before 1960, fuli employment, a stable market, a convertible currency, reduc-ed regional differences, developed and well equipped social services, significant results of scientific research and - a perspective of still morę satisfactory development in the futurę. Ali that would have madę the majority of inter-republic disagreements and political tensi-ons pointless. Unfortunately, that exceptional chance was not utilized and each of the mentioned potential positive results has today its actual negative contrast in our social liabilities.

A certain chance of quietly preparing a serious stabilization program still existed in 1969, before the inflation madę headway and before the balance of payments deficit exploded and drastic adminis-trative measures became unavoidable. That chance was allowed to pass. Today with respect to the economy we are again working in conditions of a State of siege. The political support which was ma-nifested at recent political meetings, as well as that which exsists among the public is obviously only a pale reflection of the mood of five years ago. However, it is elear that even that little political Capital must be utilized to the maximum to correct the State of affairs as soon as possible.

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