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DINNACA ON TRIKALA-PARIK$A : AN EXPLORATION INTO SOME AYENUES... 121

especially when we are obstructed by ihe non-availability of a number of his writings.

Prima tacie the plan is attractive and thcre seems to be a point in its favour. Nonctheless, if one is aware of the intellectual past of Indian philosophy, one cannot be oblivious to the debates and conlroversies that have taken place. For, while studying such controversies wilh regard to different issues, one comes to know facts which are sometimes very slrange.¹⁴ In stating the views of the opponents, writers have often slated the views of their opponents as a purva-paksa, a prima lacie view but in doing so they have sometimes put them forth in such a manner that they could easily be repudiaied, deprwing the dispute of the warmth and heat. This is especially the case if they are Buddhists, as very often their argumenls are twisted and misinterpreted to suit their refutalion at the hands of their non-Buddhist opponents. Really speaking, to show inadequacies and limitations inherent in the arguments of the Buddhists, they are re-formulaled and articulated in such a manner that criticising them would become easier.

Furlhcr, while evaluating Dińnaga’s philosophy, opponents have been creditcd for providing an appropriate impetus. In order to show the faults and limitations in the writings and lhoughts of the opponents, prcdecessors and contcmporaries, it seems, it is argued, DińnSga wrote certain works and hence they cannot be called original writings of his but ralhcr merely as his responses. Further, he has also uscd some terms and expressions, conccpls and ideas, etc. from the writings of his predecessors and contemporaries, and hence, we cannot say that he prescnls himseif as an independent thinker. This argument is justified on the basis that one notices the views of NySya, S&ihkhya, Vaiśesika, Mlmathsś, C2rvaka, Jaina and evcn Grammarians as the purva-paksas and also that certain terms used by them are traceable in the writings of Dińnfiga.

Thcre is certain strength in the vicw that onc’s philosophy evolves out of the responses to the problcms that one confronts. In this context, controversies may, sometimes, provide an impetus and evokc certain responses. Bul, this much alone can hardly be the nuclcus of the original writings. Similarly, occurrence in the writings of Dihnaga of certain terms, conccpls uscd by his prcdecessors or contcmporaries in ilsclf does not seem to put him on an altogcthcr wrong fooling.¹⁵ Further, such a phenomenon ilsclf seems to be misleading a criterion of evalualing and characlcrising his philosophical acumen. While discovering the conceptual framework of the philosophy of a particular philosophcr, one has to be carcful about the meaning and use of a particular concept or term madę by him. Otherwise, one is likcly to be carricd away by the superficial similarities of the concept/s mentioned. For, one may use the same exprcssion in an altogelher different way. Or, even when one borrows a particular concept one may relate it with others