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Journal of Asian and African Studies
DOI: 10.1177/0021909607076708
2007; 42; 297
Journal of Asian and African Studies
Tsuneo Akaha
Multilateralism
Japanese Policy toward the North Korean Problem: Balancing Bilateralism and
http://jas.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/42/3-4/297
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Citations
Japanese Policy
toward the North
Korean Problem
Balancing Bilateralism
and Multilateralism
Tsuneo Akaha
Monterey Institute of International Studies, USA
Journal of Asian and African Studies
Copyright © 2007
SAGE Publications
www.sagepublications.com
(Los Angeles, London, New Delhi
and Singapore)
Vol 42(3/4): 297–320
DOI: 10.1177/0021909607076708
Abstract
North Korea became an urgent problem for Japan as a result of the 1994
nuclear crisis in North Korea, the 1998 missile launch over Japan and the 2003–4
nuclear crisis. At the historic Tokyo–Pyongyang summit in September 2002, both
sides acknowledged the need to solve the security issues surrounding the
Korean Peninsula through peaceful, multilateral efforts. However, the issue of
North Korean abduction of Japanese citizens in earlier decades intensified
Japanese sentiment against the North and this issue halted bilateral normaliza-
tion talks. Japan has participated in six-party talks on the nuclear issue since
2004, but its distinct bilateral interests vis-à-vis North Korea, South Korea and
the United States limit its influence in the multiparty engagement.
Keywords abduction • normalization • nuclear crisis • Pyongyang Declaration
• sanctions • six-party talks
Introduction
During the Cold War, Japan’s policy toward North Korea was informed by five
goals. First, Japan’s overall foreign policy goal was to maintain a stable and
peaceful international environment favorable to its peace and prosperity.
Second, Japan sought to maintain a close alliance with the United States for its
own security and for the peace and stability of the region. Third, Japan was
keen on developing friendly relations with its regional neighbors, including the
Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea). Fourth, Japan wanted to expand its
regional security role. The fifth and the least urgent of Japan’s foreign policy
goals was to resolve bilateral issues with North Korea (Akaha, 2002).
The first two goals placed Japan’s alliance with the United States at the cen-
ter of the nation’s foreign policy but, as a consequence, they severely constrained
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Japan’s ability to develop friendly relations with China until the thaw in Sino–US
relations in the early 1970s. Japan’s desire to improve relations with South Korea
was compatible with the first two goals, but in practice it was frustrated by the
weight of history, lack of mutual trust and absence of domestic consensus in both
countries on how best to overcome the past and forge a future-oriented rela-
tionship. Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union were strained – occasionally
even hostile – during much of the Cold War decades, but the end of the Cold War
and the demise of the Soviet Union promised the beginning of new and much
improved bilateral ties, with the dispute over the northern islands being the only
remaining bilateral issue.
1
With respect to the fourth goal – Japan’s security role in the region – the
thawing of Cold War tensions allowed Japan to make substantial progress with-
in the framework of its alliance with the United States. Most important in this
context was the formulation of the 1997 Guidelines for US–Japan Defense
Cooperation (Akaha, 1998). Subsequent developments, most importantly the
US-led war on terrorism post-9/11 and invasion of Iraq in 2003, added weight to
Japan’s expanded security role within (and beyond) the region, culminating in
the dispatch of Japanese Self-defense Force personnel to Iraq in 2003.
Throughout the Cold War, improvement of relations with Pyongyang was at
the bottom of Tokyo’s foreign policy priorities in Northeast Asia. By the end of
the 20th century, however, North Korea had become an important factor in
Japan’s efforts to ensure its own security and to contribute to the peace and sta-
bility of the region. The North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993–4 brought home to
Japanese policymakers the importance of arms control and non-proliferation in
Northeast Asia. Japan’s concern led to its participation in the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization (KEDO) that was established by the Agreed
Framework, which brought a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis. However,
with the North Korean missile launch over Japan on 31 August 1998 Japan’s sense
of insecurity grew. In 2002, a second North Korean nuclear crisis emerged.
Pyongyang admitted it had a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program, ordered
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to leave North Korea,
and announced it was withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
These developments added to the urgency with which Japan had to develop a
serious policy toward North Korea.
By early 2006, Japan had developed a multilevel approach to North Korea that
included direct, bilateral talks with North Korea, close bilateral and trilat-eral
coordination with the United States and South Korea over a broad range of
issues, including nuclear, missile and other security issues, and participation in the
Six-party Talks involving the United States, South Korea, Russia, China and
North Korea. The bilateral talks with North Korea addressed the nuclear and
missile issues, diplomatic normalization and the abduction issue.
In the following analysis, we will examine the factors informing Japan’s multi-
level policy toward North Korea and critically evaluate its effect and effectiveness
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in meeting the nation’s security and foreign policy interests. The discussion will
include how Japan’s interests converge or diverge with those of the other coun-
tries concerned and how the differences constrain or complicate the effectiveness
of Japan’s policy.The analysis will conclude with the exploration of a desirable but
unlikely policy that builds on the multilevel approach Japan currently pursues.The
central argument is that the current nuclear crisis in North Korea needs to be
linked to the broader context of regional peace and security, of which the secur-
ity of North Korea is an essential element, and that Japan’s multilevel policy will
have only limited effect because it will make little or no contribution to the secur-
ity of North Korea or to the survival of the Kim Jong-Il regime, which is the over-
arching interest of the North Korean leader.
Bilateralism in Japan’s Policy
In the post-Cold War environment of the 1990s, the overwhelming importance
of Japan’s alliance with the United States rendered bilateralism vis-à-vis
Washington the most prominent feature of Japan’s foreign policy. In 1996–7,
Japan reaffirmed the centrality of its alliance with the United States to its for-
eign and security policies and took steps to strengthen the alliance by formu-
lating new guidelines for defense cooperation with the United States (Akaha,
1998). Bilateral relations with the fast-growing China were also an important
element of Tokyo’s foreign policy, with economic considerations in Japan’s
China policy enjoying a degree of independence from the Pacific alliance. The
US alliance remained pivotal in Tokyo’s approach to the Korean Peninsula.
Tokyo also took steps to ensure that its policy toward North Korea did not harm
its bilateral interests with Washington and Seoul (Akaha, 2002). Fundamentally,
Japan’s behavior was as Rozman (2003) described it: ‘When in danger, Japan
reverts to the alliance [with the United States] that has protected it for more
than half a century’ (p. 538).
Normalization talks between Tokyo and Pyongyang could not and did not
begin until after the resumption of high-level talks between Seoul and
Pyongyang in December 1990. Japan welcomed the simultaneous admission of
North and South Korea into the United Nations in September 1991 and the
North–South basic agreement and joint declaration on a nuclear-free Korean
Peninsula in December. Japan also welcomed South Korean–Chinese rap-
prochement in 1992 as a development favorable to the improvement of the
regional security environment.
Tokyo’s normalization talks with Pyongyang proved formidable. At the most
fundamental level, the two sides had a number of legal and jurisdictional dis-
agreements. First, Japan wanted to establish that North Korea’s jurisdiction did
not extend beyond the 38th Parallel, whereas Pyongyang apparently feared that
such an interpretation would justify the division of the Korean Peninsula. Second,
Tokyo asserted that the 1910 treaty of annexation of Korea was legally concluded
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and was therefore a legitimate treaty, but Pyongyang insisted that the treaty was
null and void from the very beginning.Third, Japan asserted that the San Francisco
peace treaty was an important consideration in the restoration of diplomatic
relations with Pyongyang, but Pyongyang rejected Japan’s assertion because it
was not a party to the treaty. A more tangible issue related to North Korea’s
demand for compensation for Japan’s colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula until
1945, war reparations and compensation, payment for the losses Japan caused
North Korea by recognizing the South in 1965 and damages for what North
Korea called Japan’s complicity in the Korean War. Japan rejected all of these
demands, and the normalization talks were suspended in 1992. Finally, in March
1995, Tokyo and Pyongyang agreed on the need to resume normalization talks
without any pre-conditions. When party-level talks resumed in 1997, however,
the two sides stuck to their positions on the bilateral issues and government-
level talks could not take place.
To make matters worse, North Korea launched a Taepodong missile over
Japan on 31 August 1998, shocking the Japanese and heightening their fear of
the North Korean threat. Tokyo quickly responded by announcing unilateral
sanctions against Pyongyang. It froze chartered flights to Pyongyang, stopped
humanitarian assistance to North Korea, froze financial contributions to the
KEDO and suspended negotiations for diplomatic normalization. It was not
until December 1999 that a Japanese delegation representing all major polit-
ical parties visited Pyongyang. The two sides agreed on the need to resume nor-
malization talks (Murayama, 2000). State-level talks resumed in April 2000 in
Beijing, followed by another round in Tokyo in August 2000. Tokyo was
encouraged by a visible improvement in North–South Korean relations, which
culminated in the summit between President Kim Dae-jung and Chairman Kim
Jong-Il in June 2000.
Japan has proposed that diplomatic normalization with North Korea should
follow the formula used for the normalization with South Korea in 1965, which
would include large economic assistance from Japan. Given North Korea’s dire
economic situation, despite signs of some improvement in recent months,
Japanese economic assistance – both its size and timing – will be key to suc-
cessful normalization talks. Another issue that will likely determine the fate of
the normalization talks relates to the abduction by North Korean agents of
Japanese citizens inside and outside Japan in the 1970s and 1980s. We will
return to this issue later.
The most important development in Japan’s bilateral approach to date has
been the summit between Prime Minister Koizumi and Chairman Kim in
Pyongyang on 17 September 2002. What caused Kim to seek an opening with
Koizumi remains a matter for speculation, but the timing would suggest that the
North Korean leader’s decision was a response to the hardening US position
against North Korea, as well as the US preparation for war against the Taliban
and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in the wake of ‘11 September’ (Okonogi, 2003: 47).
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For Koizumi, the abduction issue weighed heavily on his decision to meet Kim.
The Japanese Prime Minister stated that without progress on this issue Japan
would not enter into normalization talks with North Korea and Pyongyang re-
sponded by showing willingness to take action. Washington was not pleased that
Tokyo was preparing for a summit with Pyongyang when evidence was growing
that North Korea might be developing nuclear weapons (Yakushiji, 2003: 3–6).
Koizumi and Kim met on 17 September 2002. The historic summit produced
a joint statement, known as the Pyongyang Declaration. It addressed virtually
every single outstanding issue between the two countries and more. The declar-
ation stated that the two sides agreed to resume normalization talks in October
2002. The Japanese side apologized for the damage and suffering its colonial
rule of Korea had inflicted upon the Korean people and agreed to extend
economic assistance to North Korea upon restoration of bilateral diplomatic
ties. The two sides agreed to ‘waive all their property claims and those of their
nationals that had arisen from causes which occurred before August 15, 1945’.
They also agreed to discuss the status of Korean residents in Japan and the
issue of cultural property through normalization talks. They concurred that the
two countries would ‘comply with international law and would not commit
conducts that would threaten the other side’. With regard to the ‘outstanding
issues of concern related to the lives and security of Japanese citizens’ – a ref-
erence to the abduction issue – Pyongyang agreed to take appropriate meas-
ures to prevent the recurrence of ‘these regrettable incidents’ (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2005). To the surprise of the Japanese side, Kim Jong-Il per-
sonally admitted and apologized for the North Korean kidnapping of Japanese
citizens.
The declaration went beyond bilateral issues and stated that the two sides
would cooperate in maintaining and strengthening the peace and stability of
Northeast Asia and confirmed the ‘importance of establishing cooperative rela-
tionships based upon mutual trust among countries concerned in this region’
and the importance of building a framework for confidence building among the
regional powers as part of the process of normalizing relations among the coun-
tries of the region. On the nuclear issue, the declaration stated that the two
sides would comply with ‘all related international agreements’. They also af-
firmed ‘the necessity of resolving security problems including nuclear and mis-
sile issues by promoting dialogues among countries concerned’. Pyongyang
stated it would extend the moratorium on missile launching beyond 2003.
Finally, the two sides agreed to consult each other on security issues (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, 2003). Japan also told the North Korean side that it was
important for North–South Korean dialogue to move forward and for
US–North Korean discussions to reopen (Takesada, 2003: 35).
Japanese observers welcomed the declaration as an important diplomatic
achievement for Japan. A long-time analyst of Korean affairs stressed approv-
ingly that in the Pyongyang summit Japanese diplomacy exhibited an unusual
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degree of independence from the United States (Okonogi, 2003: 47–8). Another
observer echoed the same sentiment and stated that the Pyongyang Declaration
was ‘an epoch-making’ document in that it represented Japan’s ‘first step toward
“a new Northeast Asian” regionalism, after 57 years of hiding behind the bilat-
eral relations with the United States since the miserable failure of its “Greater
East Asia Coprosperity Sphere” scheme’ (Wada, 2003: 166). A University of
Tokyo professor stated that the declaration opened up a possibility of multilat-
eral talks on the Korean Peninsula and that the document stressed the impor-
tance of solving the nuclear, missile and other security problems through
multilateral dialogues involving Northeast Asian countries (Kan, 2003: 176–81).
A senior researcher of the National Institute for Defense Studies concurred and
wrote that Japan succeeded in obtaining North Korea’s acknowledgement of the
need to develop a multilateral framework for confidence-building and dialogue
for peace and stability in the region (Takesada, 2003: 35).
The upbeat appraisal of the Koizumi–Kim summit was soon overtaken by
the turn of events surrounding the issue of the North Korean abduction of
Japanese citizens in earlier decades. The issue has since become a formidable
obstacle to the normalization of bilateral relations, as it has become a rallying
point uniting the victims’ families and right-wing political forces in Japan. It is
to this issue that we now turn.
The Abduction Issue as an Obstacle to Diplomatic Normalization
Just when Japan and North Korea were about to enter a new chapter in their
relationship, the abduction issue quickly moved to the top of Tokyo’s agenda
toward Pyongyang and disrupted the normalization process. Pyongyang revealed
that 13 Japanese nationals had been taken from Japan and eight of them had
died in North Korea. Following the Koizumi–Kim summit, North Korea
announced that the five surviving Japanese abductees would be allowed tem-
porarily to return to Japan.
The five individuals returned to Japan on 15 October 2002, to a thunderous
welcome. At first, it was reported that they would stay in Japan for two weeks,
but their families and some politicians pressed for their permanent resettle-
ment in Japan. The Japanese government announced on the 14th that the repat-
riated Japanese could resettle permanently, prompting North Korea to accuse
Japan of reneging on the temporary return of the former abductees to Japan.
The revelation of the eight Japanese abductees’ deaths and North Korea’s less-
than-full accounting of the circumstances of their demise angered the Japanese
public. Politicians responded. Deputy Cabinet Minister, Shinzo Abe, publicly
demanded that the family members of the five returnees who were left in
North Korea be allowed to come to Japan. Right-wing members of the Liberal
Democratic Party pressed for a tougher policy toward North Korea, and a non-
partisan Diet Members’ League on the Abduction Issue demanded that the
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government not enter into normalization talks unless and until the abduction
issue was satisfactorily resolved.
Japanese–North Korean normalization had become a virtual hostage to the
abduction issue. The Japanese delegation to the normalization talks held in
Kuala Lumpur in late October 2002 pressed their demands on the abduction
issue but received no satisfactory response.
After nearly 20 months of suspended negotiations, Prime Minister Koizumi
once again visited Pyongyang on 22 May 2004. This visit did not necessarily have
new goals. It appears that Koizumi’s goal was simply to resume the negotiations.
Before and after the second summit, Koizumi emphasized the importance of
implementation of the Japan–North Korea Pyongyang Declaration, and to im-
prove the atmosphere of Japanese–North Korean relations. The meeting result-
ed in the return to Japan of only three abductees, with the whereabouts of the
other victims that Japan claimed were still missing remaining unknown and the
two sides simply agreeing that there should be a full-scale reinvestigation
(Okonogi, 2004: 6–7).
Koizumi and Kim reaffirmed the Pyongyang Declaration. The Japanese Prime
Minister announced his Government’s plan to extend 250,000 tons of food aid and
$10 million in pharmaceutical supplies as humanitarian aid through international
organizations. The North Korean leader stated that North Korea would maintain
a moratorium on missile tests. Kim also stated that North Korea’s ultimate goal
was the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and would work through the
six-party talks toward a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue (Cabinet Office,
2004; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004).
The domestic reaction to the summit was mixed, with the mass media lament-
ing the Prime Minister paid too high a price for few results on the nuclear, mis-
sile and abduction issues but with a majority of the public praising their leader
for bringing home the family members (Brooke, 2004). The American husband
and two daughters of a repatriated Japanese abductee, Hitomi Soga, decided to
stay behind in Pyongyang for fear that the American, Charles Robert Jenkins,
could be extradited and court-martialed by the United States for having des-
erted the US Army and ending up in Pyongyang. The three were later reunited
with Soga and now live in Japan.
More recently, the abduction issue has produced an unexpected result.
A series of DNA tests conducted by Japanese officials in April 2006 had estab-
lished an almost certain connection between Kim Young Nam, a South Korean
citizen kidnapped and taken to North Korea when he was 16, and Megumi
Yokota, a Japanese girl abducted at the age of 13. Japan and South Korea now
appeared to share the same goal over the issue of abduction. In fact, some
South Korean citizens who were critical of their own government’s unwilling-
ness to press North Korea on the issue of the 485 South Koreans suspected to
be living in the North after they were taken there after the Korean War,
expressed appreciation for the Japanese government’s more aggressive policy
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on this issue (International Herald Tribune, 2006). This does not mean, how-
ever, that Tokyo and Seoul can easily coordinate their policy toward Pyongyang
over this issue (Schoff, 2006). Despite the shared goal of a peaceful, negotiated
settlement of the nuclear crisis, Tokyo and Seoul take very different approaches
to the human rights issues in North Korea. Tokyo has stepped up pressure on
Pyongyang, including de facto sanctions, while Seoul remains committed to a
more conciliatory approach, believing that a hard-line approach would further
harden Pyongyang’s position on this and other issues. The gap between Japan
and South Korean became apparent when the UN General Assembly in
December 2005 adopted a resolution criticizing North Korea’s human rights
record and abduction of Japanese and other foreign nationals. Japan and the
United States co-sponsored and voted for the EU-proposed resolution but
South Korea abstained, while China, Russia and 19 other countries voted against
it (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2005b).
The resolution of the abduction issue remains elusive. In February 2006, Japan
and North Korea held ‘parallel discussions’ of the issues of abduction, normal-
ization and security, including nuclear and missile issues. The two sides remained
far apart on all these issues. On the abduction issue, Japan demanded the return
of surviving abductees to Japan, thorough investigation of the kidnapping issue
and the handing-over of North Korean agents suspected of involvement in kid-
napping cases. North Korea called for the handing over of seven Japanese who
had assisted North Korean defectors and also expressed doubts about the results
of the DNA tests conducted by Japan, which contradicted North Korea’s claim
that the cremated remains returned to Japan were those of abductee Megumi
Yokota (Foreign Press Center Japan, 2006).
The same parallel discussions failed to move the two sides closer on the nor-
malization issue. Japan stated that in the Pyongyang Declaration of 2002 North
Korea had forfeited its right to claim compensation for Japan’s colonial rule of the
Korean Peninsula but that Japan would extend economic assistance to North
Korea upon normalization of diplomatic relations. The North Korean side did not
accept the Japanese position. Instead, it demanded improvement in the status of
Koreans in Japan and an ‘appropriate response’ by the Resolution and Collection
Corporation (RCC) toward a credit association operated by Koreans in Japan. As
a measure to put pressure on North Korea, the RCC had initiated legal proceed-
ings against the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryun)
demanding that the pro-Pyongyang association return the bad debts it had taken
over from the credit association in question in order to protect North Korean
members’ assets from Japanese authorities (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2006).
As the two sides remain deadlocked over the abduction issue, domestic pres-
sure has been building for taking a more hard-line policy toward North Korea,
including economic sanctions.A Kyodo News poll in December 2004 showed that
75.1 per cent wanted the Japanese government to ‘invoke economic sanctions and
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take a stern posture’ against North Korea (Brooke and Sanger, 2005). Similarly,
in a Yomiuri Shimbun (2005b) public opinion poll taken shortly after the North
Korean declaration that it had nuclear weapons, 71 per cent of the respondents
stated Japan should set a deadline for resolving the abduction issue and impose
economic sanctions. In February 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi received a petition,
signed by 5 million people, demanding economic sanctions against North Korea
(Brooke and Sanger, 2005).
South Korea opposes economic sanctions, whereas the United States has long
maintained economic sanctions against North Korea. Although the Japanese
government has not imposed explicit sanctions, it has taken some steps to put
pressure on North Korea. In 2004, for example, Japanese parliament approved
legislation requiring all foreign ships coming to Japan to carry liability insurance
against environmental damages they might cause while in Japanese waters. The
legislation, which went into effect on 1 March 2005, applied to vessels of any
nationality, but it was understood that the new law was aimed at North Korean
ships, most of which had no such insurance. As well, in 2005 municipal govern-
ments in Japan began terminating the preferential tax status of the facilities
owned and operated by Chongryun (Japan Times, 2006).
On 6 December 2005, the Japanese government appointed its ambassador
to Norway, Fumiko Saiga, as Japanese human rights ambassador to coordinate
Japan’s effort to put international pressure on North Korea to improve its human
rights record, including the resolution of the Japanese abduction issue.
Some Japanese remain skeptical as the effectiveness of Japanese sanctions had
weakened further (Takahara, 2005). According to a long-time Japanese observer
of Korean affairs, Japan’s unilateral economic sanctions against North Korea
would not only have limited effect but also give Pyongyang an additional excuse
to boycott the six-party talks. Over one-half of North Korea’s international trade
is with South Korea and China, not including China’s delivery of heavy oil to
North Korea. In comparison, Japan’s trade with North Korea represents a mere
8 per cent of the latter’s total trade (Izumi, 2005: 149). Therefore, even a com-
plete breakdown of trade between Japan and North Korea would have only
a limited impact on North Korea as long as South Korea and China did not join
Japan’s trade sanctions, and they are unlikely to do so. Moreover, Pyongyang
has stated on several occasions that it would consider economic sanctions
against North Korea as an act of war. An ‘act of war’ against North Korea
would give the nation another justification for boycotting the six-party talks. If
Pyongyang’s refusal to attend the six-party talks continued or if the talks are
unable to resolve the current impasse, the matter might be submitted to the UN
Security Council. However, China and South Korea would oppose such a move.
Even if the matter is brought before the Security Council, there are serious
doubts as to whether China will support a resolution calling for sanctions against
Pyongyang.
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Multilateralism in Japan’s Policy: The Second Nuclear Crisis and
the Six-party Talks
In October 2002, US Assistant Secretary of State, James Kelly, visited Pyongyang
and reiterated the US position that Washington would not enter into bilateral
talks with Pyongyang until the latter completely, verifiably and irreversibly halted
its nuclear weapons program. Washington then revealed that Pyongyang stated
it had an uranium-enriching program. According to Kelly, North Korea also
proposed the conclusion of a non-aggression accord with the United States and
removal of obstacles to its economic development. Pyongyang’s central concern
was clearly the survival of the Kim regime – essentially prevention of a US mili-
tary attack. In retaliation against the North Korean admission of nuclear
weapons development, the US-led KEDO announced on 14 November that it
was suspending the delivery of heavy oil to North Korea in December. North
Korea charged that this was a violation of the Agreed Framework. By the end of
the year North Korea had reopened its nuclear facilities at Yongbyong, unsealed
spent fuel rods and expelled IAEA inspectors from the country. Pyongyang
ratcheted up pressure by announcing on 10 January 2003 that it was withdrawing
from the NPT.
2
Pyongyang proposed that North Korea and the United States meet bilaterally
to discuss the nuclear issue, but the Bush Administration insisted on multilateral
talks. After weeks of intense behind-the-scenes negotiations, China agreed to
host a trilateral meeting in Beijing. The talks took place on 23–4 April, where the
United States learned that Pyongyang had an ongoing nuclear weapons pro-
gram. On 15 July, the US government revealed that North Korea had notified it
had completed reprocessing 8000 spent fuel rods. The announcement alarmed
the international community because if the North Korean claims were true,
Pyongyang would have enough plutonium to produce six or more nuclear
weapons. After the Beijing meeting North Korea continued to insist on bilateral
talks with the United States, but China and Russia pressed North Korea to
accept the participation of other powers in multilateral talks. Pyongyang ultim-
ately agreed.
North and South Korea, the United States, China, Russia and Japan met in
Beijing on 27–9 August 2003. The six-party talks could not bridge what the
Chinese host, Wang Yi, called ‘comprehensive differences’ between the United
States and North Korea (Kahn, 2003). US chief negotiator, James Kelly, insisted
that North Korea agree to a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement
of its nuclear weapons program before any talks on diplomatic normalization or
economic assistance. North Korea’s chief negotiator Kim Yong-il startled the
other negotiators by declaring that his country had developed nuclear weapons
and was prepared to prove its ability to explode and deliver them (Kahn, 2003).
However, he denied that North Korea had an uranium-enriching program (Asahi
Shimbun, 2003).
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Japan’s chief delegate, Mitoji Yabunaka, stated that Japan would not accept
a nuclear North Korea and urged a peaceful resolution to the problem. He also
emphasized the importance of solving the nuclear, missile and abduction issues
in a comprehensive manner, adding that these issues would have to be resolved
before Japan would normalize relations with North Korea. Once bilateral rela-
tions were normalized, he said, Japan would consider extending economic assist-
ance to North Korea. He also stated that Japan was ready to consider providing
energy aid to North Korea if Pyongyang would take concrete steps to end its
nuclear program (Japan Times, 2003).
Prior to the Beijing meeting, Japan had hoped to bring the abduction issue
to the multilateral talks in Beijing, but China made it clear that it did not want
the issue included in the agenda of the six-party talks, in apparent deference to
North Korea (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2003b). Japan actively sought and won the
endorsement of the United States and South Korea for its position. As noted
earlier, Japan has been conducting and continues to conduct a visible campaign
to turn the abduction issue into a high-profile international issue.
Japan took steps to impress on the international community how much import-
ance Tokyo attaches to the abduction issue (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2003a). In the end,
a compromise was reached – to raise the issue during the six-party talks but to
discuss it in a separate bilateral meeting between Japan and North Korea. On the
sidelines of the six-party talks, the Japanese delegation pressed the North Korean
side to turn over the family members of the five former abductees who were now
in Japan and to account for the eight abductees who had died in North Korea and
an additional two Japanese suspected to have also been kidnapped by North
Korea. The North Korean side simply stated that the abduction issue had already
been resolved and criticized Japan for reneging on the agreement to return the
five Japanese back to North Korea (Mainichi Shimbun, 2003).
The second round of six-party talks took place in Beijing on 25–8 February
2004 but the countries were far from finding a solution to the nuclear crisis. The
United States, Japan and South Korea demanded that North Korea halt all of its
nuclear programs, but North Korea offered to freeze its nuclear weapons pro-
gram – but not its civilian nuclear programs – in exchange for energy aid and
other economic benefits, as well as security assurances. China and Russia sup-
ported South Korea’s proposal to provide energy aid after a nuclear program
freeze as long as the freeze was a step toward dismantlement, but the United
States stated it would not offer aid at that stage. The United States also con-
tinued to insist on North Korea’s commitment to a complete, verifiable and irre-
versible dismantlement of all of its nuclear programs, and Japan supported the
US position. Russia and China were agreeable to North Korea’s scientific
research in civilian nuclear energy development (Kahn, 2004a, 2004b; Pan and
Kessler, 2004).
Despite the lack of substantive progress, North Korea for the first time
committed itself publicly to eventual dismantlement of its nuclear program,
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although not under the conditions demanded by the United States. The six
countries also agreed to hold the third round of talks in Beijing no later than
the end of June 2004. Moreover, the six parties agreed to set up a working group
or groups to continue discussions (Asahi Shimbun, 2004), media reports sug-
gesting that working group sessions might start in April.
The third round of the six-party talks was held in Beijing from 23–6 June 2004.
The United States proposed gradual economic aid and investment in North
Korea in return for highly intrusive inspections and an agreement for complete
dismantling of all of its nuclear facilities. North Korea rejected the proposal and
the talks ended with no accord, but the parties did agree to continue to work
through the working group and to hold the next round of talks by the end of
September. Japan supported the US position on security assurances through the
six-party framework. Japan announced its readiness to join energy assistance
through the six-nation talks on condition that North Korea freeze all nuclear pro-
grams, including the uranium-enrichment program, declare all nuclear programs
and submit to adequate verification. Japan also reiterated that it would provide
economic cooperation to North Korea only after the nuclear, missile and abduc-
tion issues had been comprehensively resolved on the basis of the Pyongyang
Declaration and bilateral relations had been normalized.
After a long delay, the fourth round of talks took place in Beijing from 26 July
to 7 August and from 13–19 September 2005. North Korea promised to scrap all
its nuclear weapons-related programs, rejoin the NPT and allow outside nuclear
inspections in exchange for security guarantees and economic aid. The United
States pledged not to attack North Korea militarily and to join South Korea,
Japan, China and Russia in providing energy supplies to North Korea. These
promises led to the announcement on 19 September of a Joint Statement of
principles for guiding the parties toward a resolution of the nuclear crisis.
According to the statement, the parties agreed on the ultimate goal of verifi-
able denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. The part-
ies pledged to pursue ‘commitment for commitment, action for action’ as a guid-
ing principle in implementing eventual agreements concerning North Korea’s
denuclearization and normalization of relations among all parties.
3
The six-party talks resumed on 9 November but it soon became apparent that
the positions of North Korea and the United States remained far apart on the tim-
ing of economic assistance to North Korea, with Pyongyang demanding en-
ergy and economic aid in exchange for suspension of its nuclear program and
Washington insisting on verifiable abandonment of North Korea’s nuclear
weapons development prior to supplying any aid. Moreover, the United States
insisted that North Korea scrap both its plutonium and HEU programs but North
Korea continued to deny the existence of an HEU program. By 11 November the
parties had reaffirmed that: ‘[T]hey would fully implement the joint statement in
line with the principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action,” so as
to realize the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula at an early
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date’.
4
However, the parties went into a recess on 12 November, with no date set
for the resumption of talks. As of this writing – 25 April 2006 – it remained uncer-
tain whether North Korea and the United States could bridge the gap in their
positions.
Japan’s Interests vis-à-vis the Other Regional Powers
Japan shares a number of interests with the other countries in the region. First,
Japan’s desire for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula is shared by South Korea,
China, Russia and the United States. Second, a negotiated settlement to the cur-
rent crisis is another goal Japan shares with the other powers. Third, Japan wants
some form of security assurances for North Korea (Sankei Shimbun, 2003).
However, the United States rejects the North Korean demand for a bilateral non-
aggression pact between Washington and Pyongyang. Fourth, Japan shares with
China, South Korea and Russia the concern that a regime collapse in North
Korea or a major military conflict on the Korean Peninsula would result in a
humanitarian catastrophe. Japan shudders at the prospect of tens of thousands of
North Korean refugees fleeing into Japan and other neighboring countries. Fifth,
Japan and all other powers want North Korea to reform its economy. However,
these countries are not agreed on what kind of economic reform North Korea
should undertake and what role they should play in support of reform. Sixth,
Japan and Russia recognize that their participation in the six-party talks estab-
lishes their importance to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia beyond the
nuclear crisis, although Japan is likely to bear a substantially larger share of the
burden of extending humanitarian aid and economic assistance to North Korea
than Russia if the crisis is resolved and the international community is called
upon to offer such support.
Japan differs from the other regional powers in three important respects.
First, as detailed earlier, Japan has outstanding issues with North Korea, which
can only be resolved bilaterally. Second, Japan’s security is fundamentally tied
to US policy, and therefore Japan is not in a position to oppose, much less veto,
the US policy toward North Korea. China and Russia have no such constraints.
Third, whereas Japan’s security concerns regarding North Korea are based on
North Korea’s past actions, for example the intrusion of North Korean spy
boats into Japanese waters and the missile launch over Japan noted earlier,
Chinese and Russian security concerns relate not to any specific actions against
them but to the future possibilities of an armed conflict on the Korean
Peninsula. South Korea’s threat perception vis-à-vis North Korea is more com-
plex than Japan’s. The South Koreans’ sense of ethnic bond with the North
Koreans tends to diffuse their perception of North Korean threat, but an armed
conflict on the peninsula would certainly engulf South Korea.
Among the Northeast Asian countries, Japan and South Korea share the most
immediate security concern with respect to North Korea. To both countries, the
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end of the Cold War meant the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a security
threat and the possibility of expanding relations with China. The two countries
are now peacefully engaged with both Russia and China and developing polit-
ical, economic and even security cooperation with them. Japan and South Korea
are both interested in the development of oil and gas reserves in Siberia and the
Russian Far East to reduce their heavy dependence on Middle East oil. In this
connection, Japan and South Korea share a common interest in the develop-
ment of railroad and pipeline links from Russia to their markets and they both
know this would require North Korea’s participation. China’s burgeoning power
is generating conflicting views in both Japan and South Korea, but with respect
to the North Korean nuclear crisis, both Japan and South Korea welcome Beijing’s
engagement in recent years. They would be concerned, however, if China were
to supplant the United States as the leading power shaping the post-conflict
political landscape on the peninsula.
Japan and South Korea both recognize the crucial role the US military pres-
ence in the region plays in preventing a possible Chinese dominance and in
deterring North Korean aggression. Tokyo and Seoul both believe close con-
sultations with Washington are crucial in dealing with Pyongyang. Many ana-
lysts also point out the role the United States has played and continues to play
in providing an indirect channel of defense cooperation between Japan and
South Korea as well as in ameliorating bilateral tension between Tokyo and
Seoul (Cha, 2002; Okazaki, 2002). Some observers have called the relations
among Japan, South Korea and the United States a ‘virtual alliance’ (Cossa,
1999; Sajima, 2003). Since 1969, Japan has acknowledged the critical importance
of the defense of South Korea to its own security (Cha, 2002: 103). South Korea
has also recognized the value of Japanese defense policy (Takesada, 2002: 126).
Additionally, the US bases in Japan would play a critical role in supporting the
ROK forces and the US forces in South Korea in the event of a North Korean
attack on the South. Japan is also expected to provide rear support for US
forces in such an eventuality (Cha, 2002: 103; Okazaki, 2002: 93).
It is North Korea and the security threats it poses that are the most pressing
security concerns in Japan and South Korea (Takesada, 2002; Manosevitz, 2003).
In the post-Cold War years, Japan–South Korea–USA defense cooperation has
focused on operational requirements for responding to contingencies on the
Korean Peninsula (Cha, 2002: 105). During the 1994 nuclear crisis, Washington
encouraged and mediated defense interaction between Tokyo and Seoul.Through
this experience, Tokyo and Seoul came to appreciate the importance of strength-
ening their respective alliance with Washington and also stepped up communi-
cation between themselves. A series of incidents involving North Korea in
1996–9 further highlighted the importance of Japan–South Korea defense coop-
eration. In September 1996, a North Korean submarine ran aground on South
Korea’s eastern coast; in June 1998, the South Korean navy captured a North
Korean submarine; and in August 1998, North Korea launched a Taepodong
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missile over Japan. The South Korean navy sank a North Korean submarine in
its southern waters in December 1998, and in March 1999, two ships suspected
to be of North Korean origin invaded Japanese territorial waters before return-
ing to North Korea. These incidents led to the establishment of a hotline and an
emergency communication system between Tokyo and Seoul and the start of
joint Japanese–ROK search and rescue exercises on the high seas. Moreover, in
1999 Japan, South Korea and the United States created a trilateral consultation
mechanism (Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group, or TCOG) to coor-
dinate their approaches to North Korea.
The improving political relations between the two countries have made expan-
sion of bilateral defense cooperation possible. The 1998 Partnership Declaration
between Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and President Kim Dae-jung referred to
the two countries’ mutual security concerns, including the missile development in
North Korea. The declaration also formalized the meetings between the defense
ministers of the two countries, which had begun in 1996.Although bilateral secur-
ity cooperation has not been trouble-free and it continues to face some diffi-
culties, Japan–South Korea relations are clearly on an upward path and this has
allowed the two countries to develop security consultations and defense cooper-
ation, including consultations over the North Korean situation.
5
US Policy and Complications for Japan
Japan preferred incremental, evolutionary changes in North Korea to other
scenarios, such as a military confrontation between North and South Korea, a
collapse of North Korea and US military intervention. To the extent that the
Bill Clinton Administration’s selective engagement and the Kim Dae-jung gov-
ernment’s Sunshine Policy toward North Korea were expected to induce a less
hostile North Korean behavior, Tokyo supported those policies. Japan also
believed that improvement in US and South Korean relations with North Korea
would have a favorable impact on its normalization agenda with North Korea.
Additionally, Tokyo hoped that its own normalization efforts would contribute to
the opening up of North Korea. However, Pyongyang’s strategy to drive a wedge
between Washington, Seoul and Tokyo frustrated Japan’s hopes.
The 1994 nuclear crisis in North Korea directly threatened Japan’s overall
goal of maintaining a stable and peaceful international environment favorable
to its own peace and prosperity. Fortunately for Japan, the Clinton Administration
responded to the crisis by engaging Pyongyang and producing the Agreed
Framework. The United States led the creation of the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO) to implement the bilateral accord. Follow-
ing some initial grumbling about lack of prior consultations, Tokyo agreed to
support the Agreed Framework and joined the KEDO. South Korea’s participa-
tion in the KEDO was also in line with Japan’s desire to maintain friendly rela-
tions with its neighbor.
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The inauguration of the George W. Bush Administration in January 2001 dra-
matically changed the dynamic of international relations surrounding North
Korea. The new Administration systematically distanced itself from the Clinton
Administration’s policy of selective engagement with North Korea and the 1994
Agreed Framework. The Bush Administration was also openly skeptical about
South Korea’s Sunshine Policy. The terrorist attacks on the United States on
11 September 2001 and Bush’s ‘war on terrorism’ all but dashed any hope of
US–North Korean engagement. In his State of the Union address on 1 February
2002 Bush labeled North Korea, Iran and Iraq an ‘axis of evil’. On 20 September,
the Bush Administration released a new strategic doctrine declaring US willing-
ness to launch a pre-emptive attack on terrorist groups and rogue states that
threatened US security interests. All these developments complicated Japan’s
normalization effort with North Korea.
The real goal of the Bush Administration’s policy toward North Korea remains
unclear and this seriously complicates Japan’s approach to the North Korean
problem. Does the United States want the removal of Kim Jong-Il from power,
the collapse of the Stalinist regime regardless of who leads the country, or a
change in Pyongyang’s policy and behavior? Whether regime collapse would
bring about the collapse of the North Korean state or its absorption by the
South is a difficult question with no clear answer. The removal of Kim Jong-Il
appears impossible today; the fall of the North Korean regime is less likely now
than when Kim first assumed power. The collapse of North Korea as a state and
a society would be disastrous from a humanitarian perspective and also impose
an enormous economic burden on the US allies in the region. So, the immedi-
ate focus of US policy appears to be on the military aspect of the North Korean
problem. Even this goal is formidable, however.
The near-term goals of the Bush Administration are to stop North Korea’s
nuclear weapons and missile development, establish a verifiable arms control
regime for North Korea, stop North Korea’s export of nuclear weapons, nuclear
material, missiles and missile technology and reduce the conventional weapons
threat against the South. It is unrealistic to expect to be able to achieve these goals
without offering North Korea some incentives, but the Bush Administration is
opposed to rewarding North Korea for its ‘bad behavior’. Japan, the United States
and South Korea agree that the attainment of these goals will require multilateral
solutions involving, at a minimum, South Korea, China, Russia and Japan.
6
Military options are more problematic from Japan’s perspective. First, the
Bush Administration would want to keep North Korea on its toes by intimating
that the United States had military options, including the use of nuclear weapons
should North Korea launch an attack on US allies. Although the Koizumi gov-
ernment has spoken in favor of the ‘carrot and stick’ approach, many domestic
critics are skeptical about the effectiveness of this approach in changing North
Korean behavior. Moreover, the crisis atmosphere engendered by the talk of mili-
tary options encourages Japanese hawks to advocate major rearmament in Japan,
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including the nuclear option, and this would be very destabilizing for the entire
region. As well, a US pre-emptive attack on North Korea would require the con-
sent of South Korea, but without a military provocation by the North, South
Korean consent would be difficult to obtain. Second, unlike in Iraq, North Korea
is covered mostly by granite, making concealed military facilities underground
invulnerable even to ‘bunker busters’. There are reportedly numerous under-
ground military facilities in North Korea. Moreover, it is common knowledge that
the 8000 artilleries of North Korea can easily reach Seoul. Even if 90 per cent of
them were destroyed by a pre-emptive strike, the remaining 10 per cent could
cause massive casualties and damage in the South.A North Korean attack on the
South would also risk major US military and civilian casualties, and political fall-
out in the United States would be unpredictable, particularly if the conflict was
prolonged, as the war in Iraq has shown. North Korea could also retaliate by
launching some of its 30 Rodong-1 missiles against Japan – a prospect most
feared by the Japanese. Despite these nightmarish consequences of a US attack
on North Korea, if it should take place, Japan would support US action under its
security treaty obligations.
Major disagreements between the United States and South Korea would also
be troubling to Japan. In the run-up to the presidential elections in December
2002, Roh Moo-hyun advocated a relationship of equality with the United States
and trumpeted an independent North Korea policy. The presidential candidate
reportedly believed that the common bond as a nation between the North and
South Koreans should be the basis of Seoul’s policy. It appeared that Seoul and
Washington were on a major collision course. By March the following year, how-
ever, Roh’s statements had dramatically softened. He also appointed a defense
advisor who emphasized the importance of the ROK–US alliance and in mid-
March overcame popular opposition and sent troops to Iraq to support the US
war effort there. These developments were reassuring to the Koizumi govern-
ment, which also dispatched Self-defense Forces personnel to Iraq.
Given the important differences between Japan, the United States and South
Korea over the best approach to North Korea, policy coordination among the
three countries is very important. Trilateral consultations have become an
essential element of Japan’s multilateral engagement over the North Korean
problem.
Japan, South Korea and the United States have urged North Korea to return
to the multilateral talks and said that they are prepared to discuss ‘all issues’ with
the North, although they have not indicated whether they are willing to offer
any concessions (New York Times, 2005). Japanese Foreign Minister, Nobutaka
Machimura, and US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, met in Washington,
DC on 19 February 2005 and issued a joint statement urging North Korea ‘to
return to the six-way talks at an early date without preconditions and to com-
mit itself to the complete dismantlement of all its nuclear programs, including
its uranium enrichment program, under credible international verification’.
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They also urged North Korea ‘to speedily and completely resolve the abduction
issue’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005).
As of this writing, it remained doubtful that North Korea would accept the
US demand for complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of its
nuclear weapons program. Nor did it appear likely that the United States would
agree to enter into a bilateral non-aggression pact with North Korea or offer
any economic assistance before the North dismantled its nuclear programs.
Meanwhile, Japan and the United States have hinted at the possibility of bring-
ing the North Korean nuclear issue to the UN Security Council (Yomiuri
Shimbun, 2005a). Seoul has so far opposed such a move, fearing that it would
harden Pyongyang’s position even more and further delay resolution of the cri-
sis. Clearly the move would test the trilateral coordination mechanism.
A Desirable but Unlikely Solution
The most desirable outcome for Japan would be a peaceful, negotiated settle-
ment of the current nuclear crisis, such that it would lead to a broader, com-
prehensive and necessarily multilateral approach to the establishment of a
peaceful system of international relations in Northeast Asia. This is the general
approach envisaged by the Pyongyang Declaration. Such a settlement would
include several interrelated elements.
First, Japan would favor US assurances of security for North Korea, by formal
agreement or unilateral declaration, in exchange for the latter’s commitment to
complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear weapons pro-
gram. Japan would need to be assured, however, that such an agreement would
not negate US security protection of Japan against a North Korean attack
(Nishihara, 2003). Unfortunately, North Korea is not likely to agree to a complete,
verifiable and irreversible halt to its nuclear program because it would deprive
Pyongyang of its only leverage against Washington. Moreover, the quid pro quo in
this scenario would strip Pyongyang of its ability to create a crisis as a bargaining
ploy. There are also doubts about whether the Bush Administration would com-
mit to a legally binding non-aggression treaty that would require Congressional
approval. If indeed North Korea has developed nuclear weapons and continued
to add to its nuclear arsenal, this would be a serious blow to the NPT,
7
not to men-
tion its destabilizing consequences for the regional security.
Second, Japan would participate in economic assistance coordinated among the
United States, South Korea, Japan and China in exchange for North Korea’s
agreement to open up the country for international investment, trade and tourism.
Bilaterally Japan could do much to assist North Korea, but only after substantial
progress on diplomatic normalization. Tokyo is also aware that Washington
opposes economic engagement with Pyongyang until the dismantlement of the
North Korean nuclear program.
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Third, Japan would welcome a synchronized mutual reduction and restruc-
turing of forces in North and South Korea for defensive purposes. This would
remove a major source of tension on the Korean Peninsula. However, Japan has
no influence, bilaterally or multilaterally, to bring it about. At any rate, it is far
from certain that North Korea would agree to reduce its forces because such a
move would limit the North’s leverage against the South. It would also reduce
the political influence of the North’s military, upon which Kim Jong-Il’s control
of the country depends.
Fourth, Japan would welcome the resumption of the four-power talks to turn
the Korean armistice into a permanent peace treaty but again Japan has no lever-
age. Tokyo would prefer a six-party framework so that Japan (and Russia) might
also have a say in the final shape of the peace treaty. North Korea would likely
oppose the inclusion of Russia and Japan because it would limit Pyongyang’s abil-
ity to divide the regional powers. At any rate, the relationship between the four-
power peace talks and the six-party talks over the nuclear issue remains unclear.
Fifth, Japan would support a multilateral agreement to establish a nuclear-
free Korean Peninsula. Although all six parties have stated they desire a non-
nuclear peninsula, North Korea would not agree unless and until its security
concerns were removed by a US commitment to non-aggression. Again, Japan
has little to offer to bridge the gap. Moreover, an agreement on a non-nuclear
Korean Peninsula would require certification of non-nuclear status in both
North and South and removal of security concerns on both sides. This, too, is an
unlikely prospect in the near future.
Sixth, Japan would also support a multilateral agreement to establish a mis-
sile control regime for the Korean Peninsula. Neutralization or elimination of
the missile threat would remove Japan’s immediate security concern. It would
also obviate the need to consider Japan’s nuclear option. On the other hand, it
would weaken the rationale for missile defense in and around Japan and com-
plicate US policy. The downplaying or elimination of the North Korean missile
threat would expose US concern about China’s missile development.
Seventh, an international agreement on non-interference in the internal
affairs of North and South Korea would substantially reduce tension on the
peninsula, but the United States would have difficulty supporting such an
agreement because it would mean recognition of the Kim Jong-Il regime and
acceptance of an indefinite division of the peninsula. It would also entail even-
tual withdrawal of US troops from South Korea. Such a development would
signal a major shift in the strategic mission of the US military presence in Japan
– from defense of Japan to rapid deployment elsewhere in the region and
beyond. Moreover, it would strengthen advocacy for a major military build-up
in Japan – an unsettling prospect for Beijing.
Eighth, and finally, Japan is likely to welcome agreement between North Korea
and each neighboring country to resolve outstanding issues in their bilateral
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relations. Particularly important in this context would be the normalization of
relations between Japan and North Korea. Obviously, this is the area in which
Japan could make the most contribution.
Conclusion
The foregoing analysis shows that circumstances beyond Japan’s control have
forced the nation to pursue both bilateral and multilateral approaches toward
North Korea in recent years. It also indicates that Japan’s bilateral initiatives
are generally compatible with the development of multilateralism over the
evolving North Korean situation. However, the analysis demonstrates that the
desirable approach to the resolution of the current nuclear crisis is replete with
immediate difficulties and longer-term complications, for Japan as well as for
the other countries.
Tokyo’s best bet seems to be to continue trilateral coordination with the
United States and South Korea. It must do so, however, while pressing its demand
for a peaceful solution to the current crisis, urging Washington on to engage more
actively with Pyongyang, and supporting Seoul’s policy of engagement. Tokyo
should also encourage Beijing’s active participation to obtain a more construct-
ive policy in North Korea. Japan must also demonstrate that it is willing to give
priority to the issue of global significance, that is, the nuclear weapons develop-
ment in North Korea, over the abduction issue if doing so will enhance the prob-
ability of success of the multilateral talks. Resolution of the nuclear issue would
require a package agreement, in which Japan’s extension of economic aid to
North Korea would be an important element. This would require substantial
progress on normalization between Tokyo and Pyongyang. Should normalization
be delayed due to Japan’s insistence on a satisfactory resolution of the abduction
issue, the latter issue could very well delay the end to the nuclear stalemate. The
abduction issue is understandably a very emotional issue in Japan and its humani-
tarian stake should not be underestimated, but Japan should define the solution
of the abduction issue not as a precondition for the resumption of normalization
talks with North Korea but as a part of the talks.
In short, a balanced pursuit of bilateralism and multilateralism to overcome
the current crisis will bring the first four of the five goals of Japan in line with
each other and this will improve Japan’s chance of achieving the fifth goal, nor-
malization with North Korea.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks the following individuals, as well as an anonymous reviewer, for helpful com-
ments on earlier versions of this article: Robert Hathaway, Xiaobo Hu, Mitsuru Kurosawa, Yasuyo
Sakata and Jing-Dong Yuan.
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Notes
1. Japan also had and continues to have territorial disputes with China and South Korea over the
Senkaku (Tiaoyu) Island and Takeshima (Tokto), respectively.
2. North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT took effect on 10 April 2003.
3. The full text of the statement is available at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ home-
page, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/6party/joint0509.html (accessed 22
September 2005).
4. The statement was read by China’s chief delegate, Deputy Foreign Minister Wu Dawei, before
the other envoys; quoted in an Associated Press report appearing in International Herald Tribune,
11 November 2005. Accessed 12 November 2005 at: http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/11/11/
news/talks.php
5. Divisive issues between Japan and South Korea include the controversy over Japanese his-
tory textbooks, Japanese cabinet ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, the comfort woman
issue, the sovereignty dispute over the Takeshima (Tokto) Island and the related squabble
over maritime boundaries, the use of the name ‘the Sea of Japan’ (the East Sea) in inter-
national forums and Japanese economic dominance in South Korea.
6. It will also require the involvement of the EU (a member of the KEDO board), the IAEA
and the UN Security Council.
7. Author conversation with W.J. Perry, San Francisco, 18 August 2003. See also Perry (2003).
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Akaha: Japanese Policy toward the North Korean Problem
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Tsuneo Akaha is a professor of international policy studies and director of the
Center for East Asian Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies,
California. He received his PhD in International Relations from the University
of Southern California in 1981. He is the author of Japan in Global Ocean Politics
(University of Hawaii Press and the Law of the Sea Institute, 1985) and editor/
co-editor of Crossing National Borders: Human Migration Issues in Northeast
Asia (United Nations University Press, 2005), The Future of North Korea
(Routledge, 2002), Politics and Economics in Northeast Asia (Palgrave, 1999),
Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East (Routledge, 1997), Japan in the
Post-hegemonic World (Lynne Rienner, 1993) and International Political
Economy (HarperCollins, 1991). He has published over 80 journal articles and
book chapters on Japan’s foreign, security, and environmental policies and rela-
tions with the USA, Russia and Korea, regionalism, migration and traditional and
non-traditional security issues in Northeast Asia and marine affairs in the North
Pacific. Professor Akaha is on the editorial board of the academic journal Inter-
national Relations of the Asia Pacific (Oxford University Press).
Address: Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International
Studies, 460 Pierce Street, Monterey, CA 93940, USA (TAkaha@miis.edu)
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