A

m

eri

can

Ca

thol

ic

P

hi

lo

so

phi

cal

Quart

e

rly

Vo

lu

me

77

Nu

mb

er 1, W

int

er 2003

Ar

ticle

s

Mark

D. Gos

si

aux

: Th

om

as

Aqu

inas

and Gi

le

s of

Rom

e

on the E

xi

st

en

ce

of

God as

S

el

f-E

vi

dent

Mar

k

D.

G

o

ss

iau

x

:

Th

o

m

as

Aqu

ina

s an

d Gil

es

of

R

o

m

e on

t

h

e Ex

is

te

nce

of

G

o

d as

Sel

f-Ev

ide

n

t

Pa

ge 57

Abs

tra

ct

. T

h

om

as

A

q

ui

na

s ho

ld

s tha

t th

e e

xi

sten

ce

o

f G

od

i

s

se

lf

-e

vi

d

ent i

n

itse

lf

(because

Go

d

’s e

ssence

is his e

xiste

nce

) but not to us (sinc

e we

do

not

know the

d

ivine

esse

nce

). Gi

le

s o

f R

ome

agre

es wi

th the

fi

rst

par

t o

f

Th

om

as’s claim, bu

t h

e par

ts compan

y wi

th

Aq

ui

na

s by m

ain

ta

in

in

g t

h

at

G

od

’s

ex

is

te

n

ce i

s s

elf

-e

vi

d

en

t t

o t

h

e wis

e.

Sin

ce t

h

e wis

e

ca

n

kno

w

t

h

at

Go

d

is

hi

s

exist

enc

e, th

ey ca

nn

ot

t

h

in

k

of him as no

t exi

sting

. This pap

er

re

exa

m

in

es

Thom

as

’s

t

ea

ch

in

g in

t

h

e lig

ht

of

G

iles

’s

c

ri

tic

is

m

s. By e

xam

in

in

g

cl

os

el

y wh

at

i

s in

vo

lved

i

n

t

h

e c

lai

m

t

h

at

G

od

’s

es

se

nc

e

is

hi

s exi

st

en

ce,

a

n

d

h

ow

on

e’

s kn

ow

led

g

e of

t

h

is

c

lai

m

is

r

ela

te

d t

o t

h

e knowl

edge

t

h

at

God

ex

is

ts

,

it

a

rg

u

es

t

h

at

Th

om

as

’s

p

os

iti

on

has the re

sour

ce

s to

w

ith

stand

Gi

le

s’s

obje

ctio

n

s.

Pa

ge 57

T

h

om

as

A

q

ui

na

s is

w

el

l k

n

ow

n f

or hi

s e

ffo

rts

to

d

emo

n

strate

the

e

xis

te

nc

e o

f G

od

.

†1

His

ar

gu

me

n

ts would not be

n

ece

ss

ary

, howe

ver, if th

e e

xiste

n

ce

of

God we

re

se

lf-e

vi

de

n

t (

per se

no

tum

), si

n

ce

a se

lf

-e

vide

n

t pr

op

osi

ti

on is

on

e th

at is known

to

be tru

e as soo

n

as

its te

rm

s

are

un

d

ersto

od

.

†2

Con

seq

uen

tl

y, in

or

der

t

o es

ta

bl

is

h

t

h

e nee

d

(

an

d

t

h

e pos

si

b

ili

ty

) of p

rov

in

g

Go

d

’s e

xiste

nce

, Tho

m

as fre

q

ue

ntly take

s pai

n

s to

show that hi

s e

xiste

nce

is not se

lf

-evi

dent

to us.

Aq

uinas i

s al

so known

fo

r h

is claim that Go

d

’s e

ssence

is his e

xiste

n

ce

, a

vi

ew

t

h

at I

Pa

ge Br

eak

58

sh

al

l c

all t

h

e “i

den

tit

y t

h

es

is

.”

†3

It is be

cause

of his acceptan

ce

of the

i

d

entity the

sis that

T

h

om

as

a

d

d

s a

n

im

p

or

ta

n

t n

u

an

ce

t

o h

is

t

ea

ch

in

g

on

ou

r k

n

ow

led

g

e of

G

od

’s

ex

is

te

n

ce:

t

h

at

God

exis

ts

is

s

el

f-

evid

ent

i

n

itse

lf

, but

not to

us

. O

n

e might

wo

nde

r

whether Thomas

is

just

if

ie

d

in making t

h

is

cl

ai

m. Since

we can

know th

at

G

od’

s e

sse

n

ce

i

s h

is e

xi

stence

, an

d

h

enc

e t

h

at

God

’s

exi

st

en

ce i

s s

elf

-e

vi

den

t in

it

se

lf

, a

re we

n

ot

al

so

a

b

le t

o a

ff

ir

m

t

h

at

God’

s

exi

st

en

ce i

s s

elf

-e

vi

d

en

t eve

n

wi

th

r

es

p

ec

t t

o u

s?

Thi

s lin

e o

f c

rit

ic

is

m

w

as

d

ir

ec

ted

at

Th

om

as

ne

ar

the

end

of his car

ee

r by

Gil

es of

Ro

me. Li

ke T

h

omas,

Gil

es acce

pt

s the

ide

n

tity the

si

s, as

we

ll as the cl

ai

m that

in al

l cre

ature

s the

re

is a real

d

istinc

ti

on betwe

en e

ssence

and

ex

iste

n

ce

.

Howe

ve

r, Gi

le

s parts company

w

ith

Thom

as

b

y hold

in

g t

h

at

God’

s ex

is

te

n

ce

i

s

se

lf-e

vi

d

ent

to

the

le

ar

ne

d

.

†4

Pa

ge 58

In this pape

r I wish to re

examine

Tho

m

as tea

ch

in

g o

n

th

is

issue

in t

h

e li

gh

t o

f Gi

le

s’s

cr

it

ic

is

m

s.

In

pa

rt

ic

ul

ar

, I

sh

all c

on

sider

Th

omas’

s vi

ews o

n

the

re

latio

n

shi

p

betwe

en

o

u

r

kno

w

le

dg

e o

f the

i

d

en

ti

ty

th

es

is

and our

knowl

edge

of

God’s

exi

st

ence. To

e

st

abli

sh a bette

r

cont

ex

t fo

r this e

xami

n

at

io

n, it wi

ll be

use

ful

to be

gin with a

re

vi

ew

of T

h

oma

s’

s te

xt

s o

n

the

se

lf-e

vi

d

ent

ia

l ch

aracter o

f Go

d

’s e

xiste

n

ce

.

I.

Pa

ge 58

Th

om

as

Aqu

in

as

: God’

s E

xis

te

n

ce is

Sel

f-

E

vi

den

t in

it

se

lf

, t

h

ou

g

h

not

t

o us

. T

h

om

as

’s

f

irs

t

discu

ssi

on of

th

is theme

i

s foun

d i

n

his

S

cr

ipt

um

s

u

pe

r

Pa

ge Br

eak

59

Sen

ten

ti

is

, bk.

I,

d.

3,

q.

1

(125

2–

54),

w

h

ere

he

i

s con

cern

ed to

sh

ow

h

ow

on

e arriv

es at a

kn

ow

le

dg

e o

f Go

d

b

y me

ans of

h

is

ve

stige

s i

n

cre

atu

re

s.

†5

In a

.

1 he a

ffi

rm

s that Go

d

ca

n be

kno

w

n

by a

cre

ate

d

int

el

le

ct,

t

h

oug

h

no

t

in su

ch

a way th

at h

is e

ss

ence mi

gh

t be

co

m

p

re

hen

d

ed

. I

n

a

. 2 h

e as

ks

whe

th

er

G

od

’s

exi

st

en

ce is

s

elf

-e

vi

d

en

t.

Th

e op

en

in

g

ob

je

cti

on

s try

to

e

stab

lish an affi

rmat

iv

e an

sw

er

. On

e ar

g

u

m

ent

, d

ra

w

n

f

rom

J

ohn

Dam

asce

n

e, asse

rt

s th

at God’s e

xi

stence

is se

lf

-evi

dent b

ecau

se

th

e kn

ow

le

dg

e o

f h

is

ex

iste

nce

is n

atura

lly

impl

ante

d in

al

l me

n.

A

n

ot

h

er

a

rgu

men

t r

ea

sons

th

at hi

s e

xiste

nce

i

s

se

lf-e

vi

d

ent

be

cause

h

e cann

ot

be

tho

u

ght not to be

. Two ar

gu

me

nt

s ar

e ci

ted to

su

pport

t

h

is

claim. The

fi

rs

t come

s from Anse

lm: Go

d is that

th

an

wh

ich

a gr

ea

te

r ca

nn

ot be

th

ou

gh

t; bu

t

th

at

which ca

n

n

ot be

th

ough

t n

ot

t

o be

is gre

ate

r than

th

at whi

ch can be

thought no

t

to

be

;

the

ref

ore, G

od canno

t be

tho

u

gh

t not to be

. A se

co

nd ar

gum

ent

is at

tribut

ed

by Tho

m

as to

Avi

cen

na

: no thi

n

g

can

be th

ou

gh

t without i

ts q

u

iddi

ty

(fo

r e

xa

m

p

le

, we ca

nnot thi

n

k “

m

an”

wi

th

ou

t t

h

in

kin

g

“m

or

ta

l,” “r

at

io

n

al

,” “an

im

al”); b

u

t God’

s qu

id

dit

y is

h

is

e

sse

; th

u

s he ca

nn

ot

b

e

th

ou

gh

t no

t t

o b

e.

T

h

e tw

o c

on

tr

ar

y a

rg

u

m

ent

s,

w

h

ic

h a

tte

m

p

t

to

s

h

ow

th

at

G

od

’s

ex

iste

nce

is not se

lf

-evi

dent,

bo

th

make

ap

pe

al

s to Ari

sto

tl

e.

Accord

in

g to

th

e first, what i

s

se

lf-

ev

ide

n

t ma

y be

d

eni

ed

wi

th o

n

e’

s

mo

uth

, b

u

t n

eve

r i

n

o

n

e’

s

he

art;

ho

we

ve

r, a

s o

n

e

reads in Ps. 1

4

:1, th

e f

ool

has sai

d

in h

is h

ear

t th

at th

er

e i

s n

o Go

d

. Acco

rd

in

g to th

e se

cond

argume

nt, the

conclusio

n

o

f a

d

emonstr

at

io

n i

s not se

lf

-e

vi

de

nt. Ye

t the

p

h

iloso

p

he

rs

have

demo

nstrate

d

the

exi

st

enc

e o

f Go

d.

Pa

ge 59

In

his re

ply Thomas

t

el

ls us th

at o

n

e can speak of

th

e knowl

ed

g

e of

some

th

ing in tw

o

ways: e

ither i

n

i

tsel

f, o

r wi

th re

g

ar

d

to

us. The

e

xi

ste

nce

o

f Go

d

is se

lf

-evi

dent in itse

lf

;

h

oweve

r,

w

ith

re

gard

t

o u

s a fur

th

er disti

n

ctio

n

i

s n

ee

d

ed. O

n

e can

spe

ak of

God accord

in

g to

h

is

li

ken

es

s a

n

d p

ar

tic

ip

at

ion, t

h

at

is

t

o s

ay

, accord

in

g to

h

is li

ke

n

ess an

d par

ti

cipati

on in

creatures, and the

n

on

e m

ay

s

ay t

h

at

hi

s exis

te

n

ce is

s

el

f-

evid

ent

. F

or

a

t

h

in

g is

kn

ow

n by

i

ts

tr

ut

h

, wh

ic

h

ha

s it

s exem

p

la

r in

G

od, a

n

d

t

h

e e

xis

te

nc

e

of

t

ru

th

is

s

el

f-

evid

ent

. But

w

e c

an

al

so

s

p

ea

k of

G

od

a

s he

s

u

b

sis

ts

a

s s

om

et

h

in

g

in

co

rp

or

ea

l,

a

n

d

t

h

en

t

h

e exi

st

en

ce of

G

od

is

no

t s

el

f-

ev

id

ent.

T

h

e re

as

on

fo

r th

is

, T

h

om

as

expl

ai

ns, is that th

os

e th

in

gs w

h

ich

are

se

lf

-e

vid

ent

t

o u

s ar

e kn

own

im

m

ed

ia

tel

y b

y m

ea

n

s

of

t

h

e s

ens

es

. Thu

s wh

en

o

n

e s

ees

a

wh

ol

e an

d

a

p

ar

t,

on

e i

m

m

ed

iat

el

y kn

ow

s t

h

at

ev

er

y wh

ol

e is

g

rea

te

r t

h

an

it

s p

ar

t.

Ho

wever

,

from the

pe

rceptio

n

o

f se

nsi

b

le

thi

n

gs we

Pa

ge Br

eak

60

arriv

e a

t G

od on

ly

by

a

pro

ce

ss o

f rea

son

in

g.

C

on

se

q

u

en

tly

, hi

s e

xiste

nce

is

not se

lf

-e

vi

den

t

to us.

†6

Pa

ge 60

Since

God is a

n

immat

eria

l b

ein

g, we

d

o n

ot posse

ss

a

n

imme

d

iat

e kn

ow

le

dge o

f his

ex

iste

nce

.

Re

plyi

ng to the

obje

ctio

ns, Tho

m

as de

ni

es

t

h

at the

kno

w

le

dge

of Go

d as he

exi

sts

in

h

is

ow

n n

at

u

re

i

s na

tu

ra

lly

im

pl

an

te

d

i

n

u

s.

†7

Nor i

s i

t the

ca

se

t

h

at we

canno

t think

th

at

Go

d

do

es

n

ot e

xist. According

t

o Th

om

as, o

n

e mu

st const

ru

e Anse

lm as

asse

rt

in

g th

at

afte

r

on

e a

cq

u

ir

es

a

k

n

ow

led

g

e of

G

od

, on

e c

an

n

ot

u

n

d

erst

and that

he

e

xi

sts and

be

ab

le

to thi

n

k

hi

m no

t t

o be

.

Tho

m

as poi

n

ts out

, howe

ver, that

it doe

s not fol

lo

w from this tha

t one co

ul

d

no

t t

h

ink that the

re

is

no G

od. For o

n

e could th

in

k that the

re i

s no such thi

n

g as that than

wh

ich

noth

in

g greater ca

n be

con

ce

ived. An

se

lm’

s ar

gum

ent

is in

effe

ctive

as

a

proo

f for Go

d’

s

exi

st

en

ce,

s

inc

e it

a

ss

u

m

es

at

t

h

e o

u

ts

et

t

h

at

t

h

er

e exi

st

s a

b

ein

g

t

h

an

wh

ic

h

a g

reat

er

ca

n

n

ot

b

e t

h

ou

g

h

t.

†8

Pa

ge 60

In

D

e ve

ri

tate

q.

1

0

, a

.

12 (1

25

7–5

8),

T

h

omas

agai

n a

sks

wh

et

h

er G

od’

s e

xi

ste

nce

i

s

se

lf

-e

vid

ent

. His

a

n

al

ys

is

in

t

h

is

t

ex

t is

c

ons

id

er

ab

ly

more

sophisticat

ed than i

n

the

Sent

en

ces

co

mme

ntary

. H

e b

eg

ins

hi

s re

pl

y b

y

de

lin

eatin

g

t

h

re

e possi

ble

posi

tio

n

s. Th

e fi

rst

, which

h

e

attribute

s to Maimo

n

id

es, as

se

rts t

h

at Go

d’

s e

xiste

nce

i

s ne

it

her se

lf

-e

vi

dent no

r

de

m

on

st

ra

b

le

, bu

t is

h

eld

on

fa

it

h a

lone.

Th

e s

ec

on

d

pos

it

ion

, as

cr

ibe

d

t

o

Av

ic

en

n

a, m

ain

ta

in

s

that

G

od

’s e

xi

st

enc

e i

s n

ot sel

f-e

vide

n

t, bu

t is k

n

own b

y de

monst

rati

on

.

T

he

thi

rdp

os

it

io

n

,

attribute

d

to Ans

el

m

, hol

d

s that G

od’

s e

xi

st

ence

Pa

ge Br

eak

61

is

s

elf

-e

vi

den

t, s

u

ch

t

h

at

n

o on

e m

ay t

h

in

k in

te

rn

al

ly

that Go

d

d

oe

s

not e

xist, altho

u

gh o

n

e

m

ig

h

t as

se

rt

t

h

is

ext

er

n

al

ly.

O

f t

h

es

e t

h

ree p

os

it

io

n

s, Th

om

as re

je

cts

t

h

e first as f

al

se, si

n

ce

the

re are irref

u

tabl

e

arg

u

ments

t

o

pr

ov

e t

h

at

Go

d

exi

st

s. Each

of the o

the

r t

w

o posi

ti

ons,

ho

weve

r,

is true

i

n

a ce

rt

ai

n

re

spect. To

e

xpl

ai

n thi

s Thomas i

n

troduce

s a distinct

io

n be

tw

ee

n

tw

o wa

ys

in

whi

ch

s

om

et

h

in

g

m

ay be

s

elf

-e

vi

den

t, n

am

ely, i

n

it

se

lf

a

n

d

t

o u

s. He t

h

en

n

ot

es

th

at

G

od

’s

e

xi

ste

n

ce

i

s s

el

f-

ev

ide

n

t i

n

i

ts

el

f

th

ou

gh

no

t

to

us

; t

h

er

ef

or

e,

i

n

o

rd

er

to

k

n

ow

h

is

ex

is

te

nc

e w

e

re

q

u

ir

e a

d

emo

ns

tratio

n d

raw

n

fro

m

hi

s e

ffe

ct

s.

†9

Pa

ge 61

Th

om

as su

pports h

is posi

ti

on by ide

n

ti

fying

the co

n

d

it

io

ns requ

ir

ed

f

or a se

lf

-e

vide

n

t

pr

opos

it

ion. A pr

op

os

it

ion i

s s

elf

-e

vi

den

t i

n

it

se

lf

wh

en

t

h

e

p

redi

cat

e is

i

n

cl

ud

ed in

t

h

e

d

efi

ni

ti

on

(

ratio

) of

its subj

ect, fo

r

th

en the

subj

ect

canno

t b

e thought

wi

thout t

h

e pr

ed

icate

appe

aring in it. Ho

we

ve

r,

i

n

o

rd

er fo

r i

t to be

se

lf-e

vi

d

ent

to

us, i

t

is nece

ssary tha

t the

def

inition

of th

e sub

je

ct

b

e kn

ow

n

to

u

s. Some

proposit

ions a

re

se

lf-e

vid

ent

to

a

ll:

th

is o

ccu

rs

wh

en

t

h

e

su

b

jec

t-

te

rm

s a

re kn

ow

n t

o ever

yon

e;

o

th

er

s a

re s

el

f-

evid

ent

o

n

ly t

o wis

e

p

eop

le,

who

al

one

know the

me

anings

of the

se

te

rm

s.

†1

0

Tho

m

as fi

nds support for thi

s posi

tio

n

i

n

B

oe

thi

us

’s

De

he

b

d

om

adibu

s,

w

h

er

e a d

is

ti

n

ct

io

n is

d

raw

n b

et

w

een

t

w

o t

yp

es

of

“c

om

m

on

co

nc

ep

ti

on

s of

t

h

e m

in

d

.”

On

e is

c

om

m

on t

o al

l (

fo

r exa

m

p

le

, if

eq

u

al

s ar

e s

u

b

tr

ac

ted

f

ro

m

eq

ua

ls

t

h

e r

em

ain

d

er

s ar

e eq

u

al

),

wh

ile

t

h

e o

th

er

i

s

u

n

d

er

st

oo

d

o

n

ly

b

y t

h

e lea

rn

ed

(

fo

r

exa

m

p

le,

in

co

rp

or

ea

l t

h

in

g

s d

o no

t exi

st

in

p

lac

e)

.

†1

1

Th

om

as

Pa

ge Br

eak

62

goe

s on to note

that si

nce

e

xiste

nce

(

esse

)

is not included i

n

the e

sse

nce

o

f a cre

ature

, one

ca

nn

ot

s

ay t

h

at

t

h

e exis

te

n

ce of

a

c

rea

tu

re

is

i

n

it

se

lf

s

el

f-

evid

en

t.

How

ever

, exis

te

n

ce is

in

cluded wi

th

in the

qui

d

d

ity

of

G

od, sinc

e G

od i

s

hi

s

ve

ry e

xi

ste

nce

.

The

refo

re, the e

xi

st

enc

e

of God is

i

n

it

se

lf

s

el

f-

evid

ent

. But

s

in

ce t

h

e qui

ddi

ty

of

God is

n

ot

k

n

own

t

o u

s, it

i

s not

se

lf-e

vi

d

ent

to

us that God e

xists; rathe

r, thi

s r

equi

res de

mo

nst

rat

ion. Th

om

as a

dds th

at

in

h

eave

n

,

w

h

er

e we

sh

all

se

e

God’s esse

n

ce

, his e

xiste

n

ce

wil

l be much

mo

re

se

lf

-evi

dent t

o u

s

th

an

t

h

e p

ri

n

ci

p

le of

no

n

-c

on

tr

ad

ic

tio

n

i

s at

p

res

en

t.

†1

2

Pa

ge 62

Th

om

as re

vi

si

ts

this topi

c in

S

u

mma

c

ontra g

enti

le

s I,

cha

p

s.

10–

11

(125

9–

64).

T

h

er

e h

e

conside

rs an

d re

je

cts a se

rie

s o

f argu

me

n

ts to sup

p

or

t th

e cl

ai

m acco

rd

in

g to wh

ic

h

t

h

e

ex

iste

n

ce

of

God i

s sel

f-e

vide

n

t. He

al

so makes so

me

int

ere

st

in

g re

marks

co

n

ce

rn

in

g

th

e

or

ig

in

of

t

h

is

op

in

ion. It

a

ri

ses

pa

rt

ly

f

rom

t

h

e fact tha

t

we

have

be

en accu

sto

m

ed

from

ou

r

ea

rli

est d

ays t

o h

ear

about

an

d call

u

p

on

Go

d

. Such

a lo

n

g

-stand

in

g habit make

s us t

h

ink

th

at

hi

s exis

te

nc

e is

pr

ac

ti

ca

lly

s

elf

-e

vi

den

t. Th

is

opin

ion a

ls

o ar

is

es

f

rom

a f

ailu

re

t

o

distin

gu

ish

be

tw

ee

n

wha

t is

ab

solu

te

ly se

lf

-evident

a

n

d wha

t is

s

elf-e

vide

n

t with r

ega

rd to us.

Th

at God e

xi

sts i

s se

lf-e

vide

n

t abs

olutel

y, since G

od i

s h

is e

xi

stence. Ho

weve

r,

b

ecause

our

mi

nds

ca

n

n

ot concei

ve wh

at

G

od is

, hi

s exist

enc

e is u

n

kn

own to us

.

†1

3

Pa

ge 62

Among

the

arg

u

me

n

ts t

o su

pport th

e se

lf-e

vi

d

ent

characte

r of G

od’

s e

xi

st

en

ce

, o

n

e i

s

base

d on t

h

e n

ot

ion th

at

a se

lf

-evi

d

ent

p

ropo

sitio

n

i

s kn

ow

n

i

mmedi

ate

ly wh

en

its te

rm

s ar

e

kno

w

n. B

u

t si

nce

God i

s und

erstoo

d

to

be that

th

an

wh

ich

a gr

ea

te

r ca

nn

ot

be

co

n

ce

ive

d,

on

e

im

m

edi

at

el

y gr

as

ps

t

h

at

h

e exis

ts

. To t

h

is

Th

om

as

r

epli

es

t

h

at

i

t is

n

ot

k

n

own

t

o a

ll,

n

ot

even

to tho

se

who

co

nce

d

e t

h

at Go

d exi

sts

, that the

An

se

lmian

de

sc

ript

ion of

God is a

prope

r one.

E

ve

n

i

f o

n

e we

re

to

agree

that thi

s is what the

term “

G

od

”

Pa

ge Br

eak

63

signifi

es,

it i

s n

ot

ne

cessar

y th

at t

h

er

e shou

ld

be

some

th

ing in reali

ty t

h

at co

rr

es

p

on

d

s to this

descri

p

ti

on.

For the

thi

n

g and th

e me

ani

n

g o

f the

name

must be

p

osite

d in the

same

manne

r.

From the

f

act that o

n

e understand

s the me

ani

n

g

of

th

e t

erm “

G

od

,”

i

t fol

lo

ws only tha

t God

ex

ists in

the

mi

nd.

†1

4

Pa

ge 63

An

ot

he

r arg

u

ment t

o su

pport th

e cl

ai

m

t

h

at Go

d

’s e

xiste

n

ce

i

s sel

f-e

vide

n

t i

s base

d

u

p

on

the

no

tio

n

that what canno

t b

e th

ought

not to

b

e i

s of

itse

lf

se

lf

-e

vide

nt. B

u

t, fo

llowi

n

g the

reasoning

of

Pr

os

lo

g

ion

cha

p

.

3, Go

d

ca

nnot be

t

h

oug

h

t no

t to

be. To

thi

s Tho

m

as re

p

lie

s that

Go

d

co

ul

d b

e thought

not to

b

e, no

t on account

of

a

n

y impe

rf

ection

of his be

in

g bu

t from th

e

we

ak

n

ess of

our

in

te

lle

ct,

which ca

n

n

ot gra

sp h

im in

h

imse

lf

b

u

t

on

ly by w

ay of

h

is ef

fe

ct

s.

†1

5

Pa

ge 63

S

til

l

ano

the

r

argume

nt is

ba

sed u

p

on

th

e

cl

ai

m tha

t

th

ose

proposi

ti

on

s are

most e

vide

n

t

in

wh

ic

h

t

h

e s

am

e

th

in

g

i

s s

ai

d

of

i

ts

elf

(

for

exa

m

ple

, m

an

is

m

an)

,

or

wh

os

e pr

ed

ic

at

es

a

re

cont

aine

d

w

ith

in

th

e sub

je

ct

te

rms (for e

xample

, man i

s an animal

). Bu

t Go

d’

s e

sse

n

ce

i

s

h

is

exi

st

en

ce;

t

h

er

ef

or

e,

wh

en o

n

e

sa

ys

“G

od

exis

ts

,”

t

h

e p

re

d

ic

at

e i

s eit

h

er

t

h

e s

am

e a

s t

h

e

su

bje

ct, or at

le

ast i

s includ

ed

wi

th

in it. In r

esponse, Thomas con

ce

d

es

t

h

at Go

d’

s e

sse

n

ce

is

h

is

exi

st

en

ce,

a

n

d

t

h

at

f

or

t

h

os

e wh

o

see hi

s es

se

n

ce h

is

exi

st

en

ce i

s t

h

er

ef

or

e s

el

f-

evid

ent

i

n

th

e g

reat

es

t d

eg

ree.

Ho

wev

er

, b

ec

au

se we d

o n

ot

s

ee Go

d

’s

es

se

n

ce,

we

a

rr

ive a

t a

kn

ow

le

dg

e o

f h

is e

xiste

n

ce

only by way o

f h

is e

ffe

ct

s.

†1

6

Pa

ge 63

Fi

n

ally

, in

Summa the

olo

g

ia

e I

, q.

2

,

a.

1 (1

26

5–6

6),

o

n

e fi

nds a

cl

ea

r a

n

d v

ery

con

cise

pr

es

en

tati

on of

Tho

m

as’

s te

aching

. O

n

ce agai

n a distinct

io

n i

s d

rawn betwe

en

two types o

f

se

lf-e

vi

de

n

t p

ro

p

os

it

io

ns,

an

d

ag

ai

n

th

e

Pa

ge Br

eak

64

De

he

b

d

om

adibu

s is ci

ted a

s an aut

h

ori

ty fo

r this. Th

omas a

rgu

es

th

at

th

e propositio

n

“G

od

ex

ists”

is i

n

itse

lf

se

lf

-e

vi

de

nt,

beca

use

the

predi

cate

is i

d

en

tica

l w

it

h

i

ts su

bj

ec

t,

fo

r G

od i

s hi

s

own

es

se

. However

, bec

aus

e we do not

kn

ow wh

at

G

od i

s, t

h

is

pr

opos

it

ion is

n

ot

s

elf

-e

vi

den

t

to

us,

b

u

t r

equ

ires

demonst

ra

tion.

Pa

ge 64

In all

o

f the

se

texts Tho

m

as

hold

s t

h

at

t

h

e pr

opos

it

ion “God

e

xis

ts

,” vie

w

ed s

im

p

ly

i

n

it

se

lf

, i

s s

elf

-e

vi

den

t.

Howev

er

, t

h

is

t

ell

s on

ly pa

rt

of

t

h

e s

tor

y. In

or

d

er

t

o det

er

m

in

e wh

et

h

er

a

p

ropos

it

io

n

is

s

el

f-

evid

ent

, it

i

s

n

ot

s

u

ff

ic

ien

t t

o exa

m

in

e on

ly i

ts

ob

jec

tive

c

on

d

it

ion

(namel

y, the

rel

ati

on betwe

en

su

bj

ect an

d pr

ed

icate);

on

e must

also

take

into acc

ount

its

su

bje

cti

ve

co

n

d

iti

on,

t

h

at i

s

to

say, wh

et

h

er th

e i

n

divi

d

u

al

u

n

derstand

s th

e me

an

in

g of

its

terms. Si

nce

in the

pr

es

en

t l

if

e

we

do

not have

a

q

u

id

d

it

at

ive k

n

ow

led

g

e o

f G

od

, t

h

e exi

st

en

ce

of

God is n

ot

self-e

vide

n

t to us. It

is possibl

e,

the

ref

ore, f

or some

one

t

o thi

n

k that

God doe

s

no

t exi

st.

Pa

ge 64

Tho

m

as i

s unt

ro

u

ble

d

by

th

e fact tha

t

so

m

eo

n

e c

ou

ld

a

ff

ir

m

t

h

at

G

od

’s

exi

st

en

ce is

se

lf-e

vi

de

n

t i

n

itse

lf

ev

en

th

ough

he

doe

s n

ot know what Go

d

is. W

e co

ul

d estab

lis

h that

G

od

is

t

h

e subsiste

nt act o

f e

xiste

nce

(

ipsu

m esse

su

bsi

ste

n

s),

a

n

d stil

l

it i

s no

t se

lf

-e

vi

de

nt to u

s

that

G

od e

xists. O

n

the

se

poi

n

ts Tho

m

as

will be

ch

alleng

ed

by Gile

s o

f Ro

me

.

II.

Pa

ge 64

Gi

le

s o

f Ro

me

: God’s E

xi

ste

nce

i

s Se

lf-Evide

nt e

ven with r

egard to us

. G

ile

s

of

Ro

me

studie

d under Thomas

Aq

uinas duri

ng the

l

atter’s

seco

nd Parisi

an r

ege

ncy. O

n

many poi

n

ts

h

is pe

rs

on

al

th

ou

gh

t shows th

e infl

u

en

ce

o

f Aq

ui

nas

, tho

u

g

h

he

is

by

n

o me

an

s a T

h

om

is

t.

G

ile

s’

s a

ca

d

em

ic

c

ar

eer

wa

s in

te

rr

up

te

d

b

y

th

e s

tor

m

y even

ts

o

f

M

ar

ch

12

7

7

. U

n

d

er

t

h

e

dire

ct

io

n of

Steph

en Te

mp

ie

r,

the co

mmissi

on

of th

eo

lo

gian

s wh

o h

ad

asse

m

b

le

d

t

h

e

syl

la

bu

s

of

219

arti

cl

es

cond

em

ne

d o

n

Mar

ch 7 tur

n

ed the

ir attentio

n

to

Gil

es’

s

Com

m

en

tar

iu

s in

Pri

m

um S

ente

n

ti

arum

(12

7

1

–73

). The

y i

d

en

ti

fi

ed f

ifty-one

p

ro

p

os

iti

ons a

n

d a

ske

d fo

r a

retracti

on. R

ather than do

t

h

is

, G

ile

s

attempte

d

a fo

rm

al de

fe

nse

o

f hi

s vie

w

s, and

he

was

su

bse

q

ue

n

tly “

exi

le

d”

from th

e U

n

iv

ersi

ty

. Hi

s r

ead

mi

ssio

n

to

th

e F

aculty of

Th

eo

lo

gy

oc

cu

rr

ed

o

n

ly

u

p

on

t

h

e in

te

rv

ent

io

n

of

P

op

e Hon

or

iu

s IV in

12

85

.

†1

7

Pa

ge Br

eak

65

Pa

ge 65

In

his

C

om

m

en

ta

ri

us i

n

Primum Se

ntentiar

um

G

ile

s r

ais

es

t

h

ree q

u

es

ti

on

s c

on

cer

ni

ng

o

u

r

kn

ow

led

g

e of

G

od

t

h

at

a

re p

er

tin

en

t t

o

ou

r t

op

ic

.

Th

e f

ir

st

c

on

cer

ns

wh

et

h

er

w

e c

an

kn

ow

God

in

t

h

is

lif

e.

†1

8

Dr

awing

a

distin

ctio

n

be

tw

ee

n

k

n

owin

g th

at

so

mething

is an

d kn

ow

in

g

wh

at

it

is

, Gi

les

a

d

op

ts

a

p

os

it

ion

no

t un

like t

h

e o

n

e d

efe

nd

ed

b

y Aq

u

in

as

: in

t

h

e p

res

en

t li

fe

we ca

n

n

ot kn

ow

wh

at

Go

d i

s, al

th

ou

g

h

w

e c

an

k

n

ow

t

h

at

h

e i

s.

Pa

ge 65

In

sup

p

or

t o

f h

is cl

ai

m

t

h

at we

cann

ot know th

e

qu

od

q

u

id

es

t of

God, Gi

le

s re

asons th

at

our

k

n

owledge

of

simple

th

in

gs is a

n

al

ogous to o

u

r kn

ow

le

dg

e o

f composites. The

latt

er

ma

y

be

kn

own

in th

ree

way

s: (1

) i

m

me

di

ate

ly, in th

e mann

er

of

first pr

in

ci

ple

s; (2)

b

y a pr

oc

ess

of

d

iscove

ry, fo

r e

xa

m

p

le

, whe

n

fro

m

one propo

si

tio

n we

de

d

u

ce

anothe

r; and

(3

) by mea

n

s

of

te

ac

hi

ng

. H

ow

eve

r,

in

no

ne

o

f the

se

th

ree

w

ays

c

an w

e k

n

ow

th

e qu

id

d

ity

o

f G

od.

W

e

ca

nn

ot

know it

i

m

m

ed

ia

tely

, s

in

ce in

t

h

is

li

fe

o

u

r kno

w

le

dg

e i

s ne

ve

r

fr

ee

from

p

h

ant

asms

.

Th

us we

ca

n

n

ot ha

ve q

u

iddit

at

ive kn

owled

g

e o

f a thing

that l

acks ph

ant

asms or th

at

is not

pr

op

ort

io

n

ate

to so

mething

havi

n

g

ph

an

tasms. Ye

t

God nei

th

er h

as p

h

ant

asms n

or

i

s

pr

op

ort

io

n

ate

to so

meth

ing

havi

n

g

ph

an

tasms.

†1

9

For th

e same

re

aso

n

, Gi

le

s re

je

cts

t

h

e

cla

im

th

at w

e can

arriv

e at a

k

n

ow

le

dg

e o

f G

od

’s qu

id

di

ty

by a p

ro

ce

ss o

f disco

ve

ry: cr

ea

tu

re

s

cann

ot

l

ead us

t

o kn

ow

le

dg

e o

f Go

d

’s e

ssence

.

†2

0

No

r

is i

t possibl

e for some

on

e to te

ach us

the

nature

of G

od, since we

can be

taught

o

n

ly

those

thi

n

gs that we can

at

ta

in

b

y

th

e l

ig

h

t o

f

ou

r

m

ind

; ho

weve

r,

in

t

h

e p

res

ent

l

if

e o

u

r

lim

ite

d u

n

d

er

st

an

din

g

ca

nn

ot gra

sp th

e qu

idd

ity of

Go

d

.

†2

1

Pa

ge Br

eak

66

Pa

ge 66

Althou

gh Gi

le

s rej

ect

s the

cl

ai

m ac

co

rd

in

g

to w

h

ich

w

e ca

n a

tt

ain

a qu

iddita

ti

ve

kn

ow

led

g

e of

G

od

i

n

t

h

e p

res

en

t li

fe

, h

e c

on

ced

es

t

h

at

we c

an

k

n

ow

t

h

at

G

od

exi

st

s,

s

inc

e

eve

ry ef

fe

ct

l

ead

s t

o a

kn

owl

ed

g

e

of

it

s c

au

se.

I

n

t

h

e n

ext

q

u

es

ti

on

o

f

h

is

Sentences

comme

n

tary Gi

le

s asks

w

h

et

her G

od’

s e

xi

ste

n

ce

i

s se

lf-e

vi

d

en

t.

†2

2

This te

xt

b

egins with

a

se

ri

es

of

arg

u

me

n

ts t

o sh

ow

t

h

at i

t is

not

se

lf

-evi

d

ent

. That Go

d’

s e

xiste

n

ce

i

s n

ot

easil

y

kno

w

n, t

h

at i

t is de

ni

ed

b

y so

me, a

n

d tha

t

so

me

ha

ve

prove

n

tha

t God e

xi

sts, are

a

ll rea

sons

to

s

u

g

g

es

t t

h

at

hi

s exi

st

en

ce is

n

ot

s

elf

-e

vi

d

en

t.

Th

en

t

w

o c

ou

n

te

r-

ar

g

u

m

en

ts

ar

e g

ive

n:

o

n

e,

dr

awn

from

An

se

lm, re

asons th

at Go

d cann

ot

be

tho

u

ght no

t to be

; the

othe

r, citi

ng

Au

gu

stin

e’s

De T

rin

it

at

e

V.

2,

argue

s

that

God’s

exi

st

ence is

se

lf

-evi

dent

b

ecause

of t

h

e

id

en

ti

ty

i

n

h

im

o

f es

se

n

ce an

d

ex

is

te

n

ce

.

Pa

ge 66

Gile

s be

g

in

s his re

ply by sta

ting t

h

e vie

w

of

Th

om

as Aqu

in

as

. So

me

t

h

inkers, h

e te

lls us

,

di

st

in

gu

is

h

t

w

o way

s in

whi

ch t

h

e ex

is

te

n

ce

of

G

od m

ight

b

e s

elf

-e

vide

nt

, na

m

ely

, in

i

ts

el

f or

in

r

el

at

ion t

o us

.

Con

sid

er

ed

in

i

ts

el

f, t

h

e exis

te

n

ce of

God

i

s s

elf

-e

vi

de

nt

,

b

ec

aus

e e

xis

te

n

ce

bel

on

g

s most of

al

l to

th

e n

ot

ion (

ra

ti

o) o

f Go

d,

s

in

ce

he

ip

su

m e

sse

. In rel

ati

on to us

,

h

oweve

r,

a fur

ther di

st

in

ctio

n

i

s nee

d

ed

, f

or one

m

ay conside

r

God i

n

his l

ike

n

ess o

r i

n

h

im

sel

f.

Ac

co

rd

in

g

t

o t

h

e f

or

m

er

, G

od

’s

exi

st

en

ce i

s s

elf

-e

vi

d

en

t,

s

inc

e wha

tev

er

we kn

ow

is

a

ce

rt

ain li

kene

ss

and par

ti

ci

p

ati

on

of the di

vine

t

ruth; according t

o the

l

atter, howe

ve

r, God’s

exi

st

en

ce i

s no

t s

elf

-e

vid

ent

. Th

e r

eas

on

f

or

t

h

is

, G

ile

s exp

la

in

s,

is

t

h

at

a s

el

f-

evid

ent

p

rop

os

it

io

n i

s

on

e who

se p

red

ic

at

e is

c

ont

ai

n

ed

w

it

h

in

it

s s

u

b

jec

t.

Th

us

, whe

n

o

n

e kn

ow

s t

h

e

q

u

id

d

it

y of

t

h

e s

u

b

jec

t,

on

e im

m

ed

ia

tel

y as

se

nt

s t

o t

h

e p

rop

os

it

io

n.

H

owe

ver

, a

s Boe

th

iu

s

distin

gu

ish

ed in th

e

De

he

b

d

om

adibu

s,

s

ome

con

ce

p

tio

n

s o

f th

e soul

are

co

mmon t

o all

,

ot

he

rs

on

ly

t

o t

h

e wi

se

. Th

er

ef

or

e,

i

f G

od

’s

ex

is

te

n

ce

w

er

e s

el

f-

evi

d

en

t t

o

u

s,

ei

th

er

eve

ryo

ne

would kno

w

what Go

d is, o

r a

t le

as

t the

wi

se

woul

d kno

w

t

h

is. B

u

t si

nce

no o

n

e i

n

thi

s li

fe

kno

w

s the

q

u

iddity o

f God, that

he

e

xists is

se

lf

-e

vide

nt to no o

n

e.

†2

3

Pa

ge Br

eak

67

Pa

ge 67

Althou

gh Gile

s doe

s n

ot n

am

e

the author

of t

h

is

op

inio

n,

h

e cl

ea

rly has i

n

mi

n

d

Thomas

A

q

ui

na

s.

T

h

om

as

’s

o

w

n

Se

n

te

n

ce

s comme

n

tary would ap

pe

ar to

b

e th

e main sour

ce

th

at

G

ile

si

su

si

n

g

, a

lt

h

ou

g

h

h

isc

it

at

io

n

of

the

De

h

eb

d

om

ad

ib

u

s

su

gge

st

s

th

at

h

e

w

as

awa

reo

f

Th

om

as

’s

ot

h

er

t

ex

ts

on

t

h

is

t

opi

c.

Be t

h

is

as

i

t m

ay, Gile

s is

qu

ic

k

to

r

ejec

t

Th

om

as

’s

posi

ti

on:

B

u

t thi

s posi

ti

on i

s

not go

od. For si

nce

in

thi

s li

fe

we

can see

tha

t God i

s hi

s

es

se

, an

d th

at

hi

s

esse

is

i

n

cl

ud

ed in

h

is

qu

idd

it

y,

in

t

h

is

lif

e w

e c

an

know

th

at

no o

n

e concei

ves of

God u

n

le

ss he

th

in

ks

of hi

m as ex

isti

ng

. F

or i

n

a

ll

thi

n

gs othe

r than Go

d

esse

i

s out

si

d

e t

h

e d

efi

ni

tio

n

o

f the

ir

q

u

iddity, and

s

o

the

y can

b

e unde

rs

too

d

witho

u

t unders

tand

in

g the

m

to

exi

st

. B

u

t

onl

y Go

d

ha

s a q

u

id

d

ity

no

t

di

st

in

ct f

ro

m

hi

s

esse

; he

alo

n

e canno

t b

e tho

u

ght not to

ex

is

t.

Mor

eover

, bec

aus

e wha

t is

s

elf

-e

vi

den

t ca

nn

ot

b

e th

ou

ght not to be

, i

t

is ne

cessar

y th

at we say th

at Go

d’

s e

xiste

n

ce

i

s in some

way se

lf

-e

vi

de

n

t

ev

en i

n

r

eg

ar

d

t

o

u

s.

†2

4

Pa

ge 67

Since

we

are

able

to

know that God’s e

sse

nc

e is

id

ent

ic

al wi

th

h

is

e

xis

te

n

ce

, we s

h

ou

ld

sa

y not

onl

y t

h

at

t

h

e exi

st

en

ce of

God is

s

elf

-e

vi

den

t in

it

se

lf

, bu

t al

so

t

h

at

it

i

s s

elf

-e

vi

den

t

to

us

. Granted that Go

d

’s e

xi

ste

nce

may no

t be

se

lf

-e

vide

nt to e

ve

ryo

ne

, it i

s at l

east

se

lf-e

vi

d

ent

to

those

who

have

a co

rr

ec

t

m

etaph

ys

ic

al

u

n

d

er

st

an

d

in

g of

t

h

e wa

y in

wh

ic

h

God

posse

sses be

in

g.

Gil

es doe

s n

ot

see

th

is

vie

w

as entai

lin

g that we

have

a

q

u

idditat

ive

kn

ow

ledg

e of

God

. F

or

one

s

h

oul

d

dis

tin

gu

is

h

bet

w

een

t

h

e k

n

owled

g

e of w

h

at

a t

h

in

g i

s

(qu

id

rei

),

a

n

d

t

h

e kn

ow

led

g

e of

t

h

e m

ea

n

in

g

of

a n

am

e (

quid n

ominis

). Alth

ough

we

ca

nn

ot know

wh

at

G

od is,

we can

kn

ow

w

h

at

th

e term

“God” m

ea

n

s.

Th

u

s when we u

n

d

erst

an

d

“Go

d

” t

o

me

an

ipsu

m e

sse

, and

“

so

m

ething

than

which a gre

ate

r

ca

n

n

ot be

t

h

oug

h

t,

”

w

e immedia

te

ly

und

erstand him to

e

xi

st.

The

refo

re

it i

s ne

ce

ss

ary to

conc

ed

e that

G

od’

s e

xi

st

enc

e i

s

se

lf-e

vi

d

ent

e

ve

n

wi

th re

g

ar

d

to

us.

†2

5

Pa

ge 67

To

su

pp

or

t his po

sitio

n

G

ile

s make

s an int

ere

st

in

g o

b

se

rvatio

n

, wh

ic

h

agai

n

se

em

s ai

med

at A

q

ui

na

s.

T

h

at

in

co

rpo

re

al be

in

gs do n

ot e

xist in

pla

ce

Pa

ge Br

eak

68

is

s

ai

d

to

be se

lf

-e

vide

nt to the

wi

se, ye

t e

ven th

e wise

can

n

ot see

i

n

a posi

ti

ve

mann

er

t

h

e

qui

d

di

tie

s of

in

corporea

l

th

in

gs

, though in some

manne

r the

y

can

know wha

t is me

ant by this

na

me.

I

t w

oul

d

th

ere

fo

re

s

ee

m

in

co

ns

is

ten

t to

ho

ld

(

as

A

q

ui

nas

do

es

)

th

at thi

s s

ta

teme

n

t i

s

se

lf

-e

vid

ent

t

o t

h

e wi

se

, wh

ile G

od

’s

exi

st

en

ce is

n

ot

, s

in

ce we h

av

e q

u

id

d

it

at

ive

k

n

ow

le

d

g

e

n

eit

her

of an

gel

s nor of God.

†2

6

Pa

ge 68

In

t

h

e

fi

na

l pa

rt

of

hi

s r

epl

y Gile

s iden

ti

fi

es

th

re

e

ch

aracte

ristics o

f se

lf

-evi

d

ent

pr

opos

it

ions

,

al

l of

wh

ic

h

he f

inds

p

res

en

t i

n

t

h

e

pr

opos

it

ion “God

e

xis

ts

.” The f

ir

st

is

t

h

at

t

h

e

pr

ed

ic

ate

b

el

ong

s to

t

h

e intel

ligibl

e cont

en

t (

ra

ti

o) o

f th

e sub

je

ct

. The

seco

n

d

i

s

th

at su

ch

pr

opos

it

ions

c

ann

ot

be

dire

ct

ly

de

n

ied. Those

wh

o

d

eny G

od’

s

exi

st

enc

e do

so o

n

ly

ind

irectl

y,

becau

se

th

ey

do not gra

sp wh

at

is me

an

t by

the

te

rm

“

G

od.”

The

thi

rd

c

h

aracte

ristic o

f

se

lf-e

vid

ent

propo

sitio

n

s is th

at

they ar

e prove

n

imme

d

ia

te

ly

upon

b

ein

g h

ear

d. Aga

in

,

who

eve

r und

erstands what is me

ant by the

te

rm

“God” im

m

ed

ia

tely

un

der

st

an

d

s t

h

at

Go

d

exi

st

s.

Pa

ge 68

If

on

e c

onc

ed

es

t

o Gi

les

t

h

at

t

h

e exi

st

en

ce o

f G

od

is

s

el

f-

evid

ent

even

wit

h

r

es

p

ec

t t

o us

,

on

e mig

h

t w

ond

er w

h

ethe

r i

t

ca

n a

lso

b

e th

e o

b

je

ct

o

f a d

emo

n

stra

ti

on

.

C

an w

e ha

ve

“

p

ro

of

s”

fo

r t

h

e exis

te

nc

e of

G

od

? G

ile

s ad

d

res

se

s thi

s que

stio

n

i

n

the

ne

xt ar

ti

cle

.

†2

7

Th

e te

xt

be

gins

with

a se

rie

s o

f obj

ecti

on

s to

sh

ow

that Go

d

’s e

xiste

n

ce

cann

ot be

de

mon

strate

d

. O

n

e

argume

nt state

s that

the propo

si

tio

n “

G

od

ex

ists”

could n

ot be

th

e

con

cl

u

si

on of a

d

emo

ns

tratio

n,

s

inc

e a

co

nc

lu

si

on

c

ons

is

ts

of

a

s

u

b

je

ct an

d

a p

ro

p

er

ty

(

p

assio

); howe

ver,

th

er

e

are

n

o

accide

n

ts i

n

G

od. O

ther ar

gument

s

are

g

rounde

d

on t

h

e claim that the

re i

s no

demo

nstratio

n o

f substance, that

the

same

thi

n

g canno

t

b

e de

mo

n

strate

d

of

itse

lf,

a

n

d tha

t

wh

at

i

s se

lf

-evident

i

s not dem

on

st

rab

le

. O

f the

two

ar

gu

m

ent

s

in

con

tr

ar

iu

m

,o

n

e

ap

p

ea

lst

o

the

authori

ty o

f Avi

cenna,

who hel

d

that

G

od’

s

exi

st

enc

e co

ul

d

b

e de

mons

trate

d

; the

other

reasons t

h

at, since

t

h

e e

xi

stence

of a cause

is mad

e kn

ow

n

th

ro

u

g

h

i

ts ef

fe

ct

s, one

can p

ro

ve

that

G

od e

xists throug

h cr

ea

tu

res,

si

nce

the

l

atter ar

e e

ffe

cts of

God.

Pa

ge 68

In his re

ply Gi

le

s

note

s that

there

are

two so

u

rces o

f di

fficulty concerning

this qu

es

tio

n

.

The

f

irst

is tha

t God i

s hi

s

esse

;

th

e

seco

n

d

i

s

th

at Go

d

’s e

xiste

n

ce

i

s sel

f-e

vide

n

t. E

ach

cl

ai

m

is

r

epu

gn

an

t to a de

mon

stra

tio

n

Pa

ge Br

eak

69

of

God’s e

xi

stence. G

ile

s

th

en

make

s an

i

n

te

re

sting claim. W

h

en

o

n

e de

mon

strate

s th

at G

od

exi

st

s o

n

e

d

oes

n

ot

d

em

ons

tr

at

e t

h

at

esse

be

lo

n

g

s to G

od, sinc

e i

n

t

h

is case

th

e

su

bje

ct and

pr

ed

ic

ate

ar

e ide

n

tic

al a

n

d there

would be

a

de

monst

ra

tion of

su

bst

an

ce

. In

ste

ad, to

demo

nstrate

t

h

at Go

d e

xi

sts

is to

make

e

vi

d

ent

w

h

at h

e

is,

tha

t

is to

sa

y,

wh

at i

s me

ant b

y

the

te

rm

“

G

od.’

Thus the

mo

re

popular

ar

g

u

me

nts show that the

te

rm

“

G

od

” means

some

thi

n

g compl

ete

ly

immov

ab

le

, some

th

ing w

h

ol

ly

p

erfe

ct

, that than

wh

ich

a gr

ea

ter ca

nn

ot

b

e

th

ou

g

h

t,

et

c.

Si

nc

e t

h

es

e c

an

n

ot

n

ot

ex

is

t,

t

h

e

int

el

le

ct i

m

me

diatel

y af

firms that

G

od

exi

st

s.

†28

Pa

ge 69

G

ile

s a

d

d

s tha

t

th

is

ma

nne

r o

f d

emo

ns

tratio

n

is

no

t r

epugnant to

th

e

claim that God i

s

hi

s

esse

, si

nce

the

l

atte

r i

s no

t d

emo

nstr

ated; ra

ther, the

me

aning

of the

te

rm

“

G

od”

i

s

exp

la

in

ed. Th

is ki

nd of demonst

ra

tion i

s als

o

compati

b

le

with the

claim that Go

d

’s e

xiste

nce

is

se

lf-e

vi

d

ent

to

th

e wise

, since

w

h

at i

s se

lf-e

vi

d

ent i

n

th

is

w

ay

i

s no

t s

elf-

ev

id

ent to

j

u

st

anyon

e—he

n

ce

th

e me

an

in

g o

f th

e te

rm

s ca

n be

made

e

vide

n

t to the

le

ss le

ar

ne

d

.

†2

9

Pa

ge 69

In

t

h

e

fi

na

l pa

rt

of

hi

s t

ext

Gi

les

di

st

in

gu

is

h

es

t

h

re

e way

s in

w

h

ic

h t

h

e m

ea

n

in

g of

t

h

e

term “

G

od

” may

be

made

k

n

ow

n to us

, i

n

acco

rd

an

ce

wit

h

t

h

e t

h

reef

ol

d

D

ion

ys

ia

n

a

p

p

roa

ch

to

Go

d,

name

ly

, t

h

e way

of exce

lle

n

ce

,

the

wa

y o

f causal

ity, and

the

way of ne

g

atio

n

. W

ith

respe

ct t

o th

e way o

f e

xcel

le

nce, G

ile

s

obse

rv

es

th

at G

od e

xce

ls

cr

ea

tu

re

s i

n

f

ou

r ways: (1

)

b

y

th

e em

in

enc

e of

hi

s p

ower

; (

2

) b

y t

h

e p

le

n

it

u

d

e of

h

is

p

er

fec

ti

on

; (

3

) b

y

th

e ex

ce

llen

ce

of

h

is goo

d

ne

ss

;

an

d (4) by

the

p

le

n

it

ude

of his be

au

ty

. Go

d is tha

t bein

g which

is mo

st

em

inent,

m

ost p

erfe

ct,

be

st,

and mo

st

be

auti

ful. Si

n

ce

su

ch a be

in

g mu

st e

xist, one

m

ay

spea

k of

th

ese

a

s four d

emo

nstr

at

io

ns fo

r G

od’

s e

xi

st

ence

.

†3

0

Pa

ge Br

eak

70

Pa

ge 70

Wi

th re

sp

ec

t to the way

of caus

alit

y, Gile

s dis

tin

gui

sh

es

f

ou

r t

h

in

gs

in

t

h

e un

iv

er

se

t

h

at

ar

e c

aus

ed

b

y G

od

, na

m

ely

, exi

st

en

ce,

m

ot

io

n

,

ha

rmony,

an

d o

rde

r.

Ag

ain, t

h

is gives rise

to

fo

ur d

emo

ns

tra

tio

ns

fo

r

G

od

’s

ex

is

te

n

ce. (1

) Some

be

ing

is ch

an

ge

abl

e

(ve

rtib

ile

); but the

ch

an

g

ea

b

le

p

res

u

p

p

os

es

t

h

e u

n

cha

ng

eab

le (

in

ve

rt

ib

ile

), j

u

st as what i

s

able

to

b

e cre

ate

d

pr

es

uppose

s the

uncreated.

There

fo

re

, the

re

is an uncreated be

ing t

h

at gi

ve

s e

xiste

nce

to all

th

in

gs, a

n

d

thi

s is Go

d

. (2) Si

nce

every

thi

ng

w

h

ic

h i

s mo

ved is moved b

y an

ot

her

, o

n

e mu

st

ar

ri

ve at

so

m

et

h

in

g

c

om

p

le

tely im

m

ova

bl

e, an

d

th

is

i

s Go

d

. (

3

) Sin

ce we o

b

se

rv

e t

h

at

t

h

e

parts

of the uni

verse

are

contr

ar

y an

d dive

rse, there

mu

st be

some

be

in

g tha

t conn

ec

ts

t

h

ese

pa

rts

t

ogether to

form a

n

orde

re

d cosmo

s, an

d th

is

be

in

g is

God

. (

4

) Si

nc

e w

e s

ee in

na

tu

re

thi

n

gs acti

ng to at

tain a go

od, t

h

er

e mus

t be

some

th

in

g wh

ic

h

di

re

cts th

es

e t

h

ings

t

o th

ei

r

pr

op

er e

n

ds, a

n

d th

is

is Go

d.

†3

1

Pa

ge 70

Fi

nal

ly

, wi

th re

sp

ec

t to the

way o

f negat

ion,

G

iles

o

b

se

rv

es

t

h

at

t

h

is

way

p

rov

es

t

h

e s

am

e

thi

n

g as the

p

re

vio

us ways. Fo

r e

xampl

e,

f

ro

m

th

e fact tha

t one

m

u

st affi

rm t

h

at the

re

is a

most pe

rf

ec

t be

ing

, o

n

e must grant that the

re i

s some

thi

n

g i

n

which

th

ere

i

s no

impe

rfecti

on,

an

d t

h

is is Go

d.

One

follo

w

s a

simila

r re

as

on

in

g with

the

oth

er description

s o

f Go

d.

Pa

ge 70

Ac

co

rd

in

g

t

o G

ile

s,

t

h

er

ef

or

e,

t

o

d

em

on

st

rat

e Go

d

’s

exis

te

n

ce is

t

o exp

lic

at

e t

h

e m

ea

n

in

g

of

t

h

e term “

G

od

.”

Strictl

y

sp

ea

ki

n

g

, su

ch argu

me

n

ts do not arrive

at

t

h

e

con

cl

u

si

on “

G

od

ex

ists”

(though cl

ea

rly

the

y

im

pl

y

such

a

state

m

ent),

b

ut

rat

he

r

“God

is

x.”

By

“x”

is

m

ea

n

t a

bein

g tha

t is

m

ost p

erfe

ct

, be

st,

u

n

cre

at

ed

ca

u

se

o

f a

ll th

in

gs,

immovab

le

, etc. It would

Pa

ge Br

eak

71

se

em

to

be t

h

e case

, t

h

er

ef

or

e,

that

Gil

es

re

gar

d

s th

e e

xiste

n

ce

of

God as ind

u

bita

ble

,

at

le

ast

for tho

se who have

a co

rr

ec

t metap

h

ysical

un

de

rs

ta

nd

in

g o

f Go

d.

If

th

is

is so

,

th

en h

is

th

in

ki

ng i

s in

h

ar

m

ony wi

th

an

ear

lie

r t

h

eol

og

ic

al t

ra

d

it

ion r

epr

es

ent

ed by An

se

lm

an

d

B

on

av

enture

.

†3

2

Pa

ge 71

Ne

ve

rth

ele

ss, Gi

le

s’s

claim th

at God’s e

xi

stence

is se

lf

-e

vi

dent to th

e wi

se

se

em

s to have

b

een r

eg

ar

d

ed

a

s t

h

eol

og

ic

all

y s

u

sp

ec

t b

y h

is

c

on

tem

p

or

ar

ie

s.

On

e of

t

h

e p

ro

p

os

it

io

n

s f

or

w

h

ic

h h

e

wa

s ce

nsure

d

in

12

77 re

ads a

s fol

lo

w

s: “

T

ha

t

G

od e

xists no

t on

ly

i

s k

n

ow

n

ab

so

lu

te

ly

, b

u

t even

wit

h

r

es

p

ec

t t

o us

, b

eca

use we kn

ow

wh

at

G

od is

, beca

use [we kn

ow

that

he

is] that than whi

ch

a gr

ea

te

r ca

nn

ot

be

th

ou

gh

t.”

†3

3

In

h

is

A

p

ol

og

ia

, Gil

es

pr

ot

es

ts

that

this i

s a mi

sreading

o

f his te

xt

. He

had

m

ain

ta

in

ed t

h

at

w

e pos

ses

s a

n

om

in

al

k

n

owle

dge

(q

u

id

no

mi

ni

s) o

f Go

d

, not a r

eal knowle

dge

of the

d

ivine

esse

nce

(

qu

id rei

),

an

d

th

at G

od

’s

exi

st

en

ce i

s

pe

r se

n

ot

u

m

,

b

ecause

it i

s

per se

n

otu

m

to

the

wise

. Gi

le

s ad

mi

ts

t

h

at thi

s

p

os

iti

on

i

s

no

t o

n

e c

ommo

n

ly

he

ld

; n

eve

rthe

le

ss

, i

t p

re

sen

ts

no

da

ng

er

to

fai

th.

†3

4

Pa

ge 71

Inte

resti

n

gly e

n

ou

gh, the cl

ai

m

that

God’s

exi

st

ence i

s se

lf

-evi

dent

t

o the

wise

was

al

so

def

ended by Sig

er of

Br

aba

n

t in

his

Impossibilia

, wh

ic

h

da

te

s f

rom

12

71

–

7

3

, exa

ct

ly

cont

em

porane

ous

w

ith

Gi

le

s’s

C

omme

ntari

u

s i

n

P

ri

m

um S

ente

n

ti

arum

.

†3

5

Sige

r a

rgu

ed

t

h

at

,

si

nce God is th

e fir

st cau

se a

n

d

d

oes

n

ot depend u

p

on a

n

yt

hi

ng

p

rior to hi

msel

f for hi

s bei

n

g

,

he

mu

st h

av

e b

ein

g b

y hi

s o

w

n

na

ture

(ex rati

one

su

a)

. T

h

us

the

v

ery

no

ti

on

o

f G

od

(

de

su

i

ratio

n

e) inc

lu

d

es

e

sse

. But

s

elf

-e

vi

den

t pr

opos

it

ion

s a

re t

h

os

e

w

h

ic

h a

re kn

own by

a

kno

w

le

dg

e o

f the

ir

te

rm

s, be

cause the

p

re

d

icat

e be

lo

ngs to the

ra

ti

o

of

t

h

e s

u

b

jec

t.

Th

er

ef

or

e,

t

h

e p

rop

os

it

io

n “G

od

exis

ts

” is

s

el

f-

evide

nt to

t

h

e wise

, since

th

ey unde

rs

tand the

ratio

of

the

subje

ct of

this

p

ropo

sitio

n, and fo

r

them the

exi

st

enc

e o

f Go

d is not e

ven a

matt

er

fo

r demonst

ra

tion.

†36

Pa

ge Br

eak

72

III.

Pa

ge 72

T

h

om

as

’s

P

os

it

ion

Rec

on

sid

er

ed

. As

we

h

ave s

een

, Tho

m

as

an

d

G

ile

s ag

ree t

h

at

in

t

h

e

pr

es

en

t l

if

e we

ca

n have

no

q

u

iddi

ta

ti

ve

knowl

ed

g

e o

f God. They a

lso

agre

e

th

at Go

d

’s

essence

is his e

xiste

nce

(the

i

d

entity the

sis),

an

d

t

h

at

t

h

e exis

te

n

ce of

G

od

i

s s

elf

-e

vid

ent

i

n

it

se

lf

. Howe

ve

r, Gi

le

s re

je

cts

Th

om

as’

s cl

ai

m, accordi

n

g to wh

ic

h

G

od’

s e

xi

st

en

ce

i

s n

ot

se

lf-e

vi

d

ent

to

us. Si

nce

the

wise

ar

e ab

le

to know that

G

od’

s e

sse

nce

i

s hi

s e

xi

stence

, they

canno

t think

of Go

d witho

u

t th

in

kin

g

o

f h

im

a

s exi

st

in

g

. He

nc

e t

h

e ex

is

te

n

ce

o

f Go

d

is

se

lf-e

vi

d

ent

to

the

wise

, that i

s to say,

to

those

who

understand

an

d acc

ept th

e id

en

ti

ty

the

sis.

Pa

ge 72

O

n

e mi

g

h

t

w

on

d

er

h

ow Thomas h

imsel

f would have

respo

n

ded to

Gil

es’

s cri

ti

cisms. As we

h

ave

s

een

, Aq

ui

na

s r

ej

ec

ted

t

h

e c

la

im

t

h

at

on

e c

oul

d

in

fe

r t

h

e exi

st

en

ce of

G

od

fr

om

a

m

er

e

concept. Whe

the

r o

n

e thi

n

ks o

f Go

d

as that

th

an

wh

ic

h

no

th

in

g

gre

ate

r c

an

be

c

onc

ei

ve

d

, o

r

as that whi

ch canno

t b

e tho

u

ght not to be

, or

even

as

t

h

at

wh

os

e v

er

y es

se

nc

e

is

t

o

ex

is

t,

one

may no

t conc

lu

de

without add

itio

n

al e

vi

d

en

ce th

at God act

u

al

ly

exis

ts. A nom

in

al

def

initi

on

of G

od doe

s n

ot

con

tain h

is r

eal e

xi

st

en

ce

; he

n

ce

one

m

u

st r

esort to a

d

emo

ns

tratio

n.

Pa

ge 72

Fol

lo

wing Ar

is

totl

e, Thomas

unde

rst

ands a

d

emonst

rat

io

n to be

a

sy

llo

g

ism productive

o

f

sc

ient

if

ic

k

n

ow

led

g

e.

Sc

ie

n

ce is

c

aus

al

kn

ow

led

g

e:

wh

en

o

n

e kno

w

s s

ci

en

ti

fi

ca

lly o

n

e

und

erstands why so

mething

i

s the

way that i

t i

s.

†3

7

In

a d

em

on

st

rat

iv

e s

yl

logis

m

it

is

t

h

e

middle cau

se

th

at

expla

in

s wh

y o

n

e sh

ou

ld

c

on

clu

de

th

at

a give

n

pre

d

ica

te

be

lo

n

g

s to a

ce

rtain subje

ct.

L

ike A

ristotl

e, Thomas

d

isting

u

ishes two

ki

nds

of

de

m

on

st

ratio

n.

A

p

ro

p

te

r

qu

id

de

mo

n

stra

ti

on

i

s th

ro

ug

h

th

e c

aus

e,

tha

t

is

to

sa

y,

th

ro

ug

h

wh

at i

s p

ri

or

si

mpli

cite

r. Thi

s

is

a de

monstrati

on

in the

st

ri

ct

s

ense;

th

e

middle

te

rm

e

xpr

esse

s the

qu

od

quid e

st

of the

su

b

jec

t,

a

n

d

i

t exp

lai

ns

w

h

y t

h

e p

red

ic

at

e b

elo

n

g

s t

o

th

e

su

b

jec

t.

A

qu

ia

demonst

ra

tion,

on

th

e other ha

nd

, is th

roug

h th

e effect

, tha

t is

t

o

say

, throug

h wha

t

is prio

r wi

th re

g

ard

to

us.

He

re

the

mi

dd

le

term i

s no

t

a de

finiti

on of

th

e

subje

ct but rathe

r an e

ffe

ct

: i

t al

lo

ws us to

kn

ow

th

at a

co

nc

lu

si

on

is

true

, al

tho

u

g

h

i

t d

oe

s no

t

ex

p

lai

n w

h

y i

t is

true

. A

s T

h

om

as

ob

se

rv

es

, wh

en

a

n

e

ffe

ct

is

m

or

e ev

id

en

t t

o us

Pa

ge Br

eak

73

th

an

it

s c

au

se,

we

a

rr

ive a

t a kn

ow

led

g

e o

f t

h

e c

aus

e t

h

ro

u

g

h

it

s ef

fe

ct

. The r

eas

on

f

or

t

h

is

,

of

cou

rse

, is that an e

ffe

ct

d

epe

n

d

s u

p

on i

ts

c

au

se;

t

h

er

ef

or

e,

fr

om

a

n

ef

fe

ct

on

e c

an

d

em

on

st

ra

te t

h

at

it

s

p

ro

p

er

c

aus

e exis

ts

.

†3

8

Pa

ge 73

According

to

Th

om

as, th

e pr

op

osi

ti

on “

G

od

e

xi

st

s”

can

n

ot be

th

e

con

cl

u

si

on of a

propt

er

qu

id

d

emonstr

at

ion. Si

nce

w

e do

n

ot

know th

e

qu

od

q

u

id

e

st

o

f Go

d

, i

t fol

lo

ws that we

must

reso

rt

to

a

qu

ia

de

m

on

stra

tio

n

to

pr

ov

e G

od’

s e

xist

en

ce

. In su

ch

a proof

t

h

e middle

te

rm

is a

n

omina

l def

inition

of Go

d,

w

h

ich is impose

d from h

is e

ffe

cts.

†3

9

On

e s

ees

t

h

is

e

xem

pl

if

ie

d in

Th

om

as

’s F

iv

e Wa

ys. Th

ere h

e sh

ow

s th

at

th

er

e must be

a fi

rst

unmo

ve

d mov

er, a fi

rst

ef

fi

ci

en

t c

au

se,

a

pe

r se

n

ecessa

ry

be

in

g, a

be

in

g w

h

ich

is th

e ca

use

o

f perfe

ctio

n

i

n

a

ll

th

in

gs, a

n

d

a be

ing

which orders all th

in

gs to

th

eir

e

n

d

. In

ea

ch

c

as

e t

h

es

e a

re n

am

es

whi

ch

we

cal

l G

od. It is cl

ea

r that i

n

t

h

ese

qu

ia

de

m

onstratio

ns Thomas actuall

y int

end

s to

conc

lu

de

that

G

od e

xists. Unli

ke

Gil

es,

he

doe

s no

t inten

d

s

imply to

mani

fe

st t

h

e no

minal

d

efi

ni

tio

n

o

f

G

od

; r

at

h

er

, he

w

is

h

es

t

o us

e a

no

m

in

al d

ef

ini

ti

on

t

o c

onc

lu

d

e

to

G

od’

s r

ea

l

ex

is

te

n

ce

.

Pa

ge 73

Tho

m

as would also

rej

ect

the

cl

ai

m that

in d

emo

nstr

ating

G

od’

s

exi

st

enc

e o

n

e vi

ol

ate

s

the

Aristote

lian di

ct

um

t

h

at the

re

can

b

e no

de

mons

trati

on of sub

stance

.

He

makes this

ev

ide

n

t i

n

con

side

rin

g

an o

b

je

ctio

n tha

t on

e

mi

g

h

t m

ak

e a

g

ai

n

st

th

e i

d

en

ti

ty

t

h

es

is

.

O

n

e

mig

h

t a

rgu

e,

he

no

te

s,

tha

t

si

nc

e w

e c

an

k

n

ow

th

at G

od

is

(

an si

t)

, b

u

t no

t

wh

at he

i

s (

qu

id

sit

), Go

d’

s

esse

and e

ss

enc

e are

not the

same. To

t

h

is

T

h

om

as

r

es

p

on

d

s t

h

at

e

sse

is

s

aid

in

tw

o wa

ys

: in

on

e wa

y it

s

ign

if

ies

t

h

e a

ct

of b

ein

g;

in

an

ot

her

way

t

h

e t

ru

th of

a

pr

opos

it

ion

.

U

n

derstoo

d

in the

forme

r sense, G

od’

s

esse

i

s no

t k

n

ow

n to

us

, j

u

st

as

w

e d

o n

ot k

n

ow

hi

s

essence;

howe

ve

r,

i

n

the l

at

te

r sense

God’s

esse

i

s known to us

, si

nce

we

kno

w

that the

pr

opos

it

ion “God

exis

ts

” is

t

rue.

An

d we

k

n

ow t

h

at

t

h

is

pr

opos

it

io

n

is

t

rue onl

y by r

eas

oni

n

g

from e

ffe

cts to ca

use

s.

†4

0

Pa

ge Br

eak

74

Pa

ge 74

Mor

eover

,

Th

om

as deni

es th

at God ha

s a def

ini

tio

n

. S

tric

tl

y s

p

ea

ki

ng

, a d

efi

ni

ti

on

i

s

fo

rm

ed

from a

genus a

n

d a spe

cif

ic di

ffe

re

nc

e.

Ye

t Go

d

is not a

m

embe

r o

f a

genus, no

r d

oe

s

h

e have

any d

iffe

re

n

tiating

characte

ri

stics.

†4

1

Eve

n

i

f o

n

e could de

fine

God, his de

finiti

on

would n

ot be

b

ein

g, since be

in

g is

n

ot a genu

s and thus

cannot e

n

te

r t

h

e defi

ni

tio

n

o

f

an

yt

hi

ng

.

†4

2

Thus the

i

d

en

ti

ty t

h

es

is doe

s not pr

ov

ide

us wi

th a

d

efi

ni

tio

n

o

f Go

d

.

Pa

ge 74

B

u

t i

f the

i

d

en

ti

ty t

h

es

is by itse

lf

ne

it

he

r shows that

G

od e

xists no

r

re

ve

al

s what he

is, i

t

is

r

ea

so

n

ab

le

to a

sk what i

n

fa

ct it

doe

s te

ll us

about

God. O

n

e mi

g

h

t

al

so wonder ab

ou

t the

rel

ati

on betwe

en

the

i

d

ent

ity t

h

es

is and our kn

owledge

of

God’s e

xistence, an

d fur

ther, a

b

ou

t

h

ow o

n

e

co

m

es

t

o kn

ow

t

h

at

t

h

e id

ent

it

y t

h

es

is

is

i

n

d

eed

t

ru

e.

To

exa

m

in

e t

h

es

e q

u

es

ti

on

s it

wil

l b

e usef

ul

to turn

to

those

te

xt

s i

n

whic

h Th

om

as

exp

lic

it

ly

at

te

m

p

ts

t

o es

ta

bl

is

h

t

h

e

id

en

ti

ty

th

esi

s. His f

irst

t

ext is f

ound in the

Summa

contr

a genti

les

. A

fte

r s

ett

in

g

f

ort

h

a v

er

y

in

volved an

d de

ta

ile

d

a

rgu

me

n

t fo

r G

od’

s e

xist

en

ce

in

bk. I, ch

ap

. 13, Thoma

s be

gins a

n

in

qu

ir

y in

to

God’

s n

at

u

re

. In c

h

ap

. 14

he

t

ell

s us

t

h

at

we m

u

st

u

se t

h

e way

of

ne

gat

ion (

vi

a

remo

tio

n

is

)

w

h

en

c

on

si

d

er

in

g

t

h

e

d

ivi

ne s

u

b

st

an

ce.

G

od

exc

el

s b

y h

is

im

m

ens

it

y ev

er

y f

or

m

that

o

u

r i

n

te

lle

ct

grasps. He

nce

we

ca

nnot kn

ow

what he i

s, only what he

i

s no

t.

In

deve

loping

th

is

“

ne

gative

the

ol

ogy”

T

hom

as

tak

es

as

a

sta

rti

ng

poi

n

t

w

hat

h

as

al

re

ady

be

en

reve

al

ed

a

b

out God in

provin

g h

is e

xiste

n

ce

,

Pa

ge Br

eak

75

n

am

ely, t

h

at

G

od i

s

co

m

p

let

el

y im

m

ova

bl

e.

†4

3

From this he

argue

s in cha

p

. 1

5

tha

t God i

s

et

er

n

al

, in

c

h

ap

. 1

6

t

h

at

he l

ac

ks

m

at

ter

, a

n

d

i

n

c

h

ap

. 18

t

h

at

t

h

er

e is

n

o c

om

p

os

it

ion

wi

th

in

hi

m.

I

n

ch

ap

. 22

T

h

om

as

undertake

s to show that

es

se

an

d

es

se

n

ce a

re t

h

e s

am

e in

G

od

.

Th

e

argu

me

n

ts th

at

h

e e

m

p

loys all

cl

early pres

up

po

se

the arg

u

mentatio

n o

f the

prece

d

in

g

ch

ap

ter

s.

Th

u

s T

h

om

as r

eason

s

th

at

, i

f God wer

e not hi

s

esse

, he

w

oul

d n

ot b

e a

pe

r se

n

ece

ssary b

ei

n

g, h

is be

ing

wo

u

ld

b

e cau

se

d

, he

wou

ld n

ot

b

e pu

re

ac

t, he wo

u

ld

p

ossess

compositio

n

, a

n

d th

er

e wo

u

ld

be

so

m

eth

in

g prio

r

to

h

im.

Pa

ge 75

In the

Summa the

olo

g

ia

e an

d th

e

Co

m

p

en

d

iu

m

t

h

eo

lo

g

ia

e

Thom

as

f

oll

ows

a

s

im

ila

r

pr

oc

ed

ur

e. Af

te

r p

rov

in

g t

h

at

God exi

st

s in

ST

I,

q

. 2,

a

. 3

, Thom

as

b

egin

s a

n

in

qu

ir

y in

to

t

h

e

di

vin

e n

atu

re

. Ho

wever

,

si

nc

e we ca

nn

ot

k

n

ow

wha

t God i

s, b

u

t only wha

t he

i

s no

t,

we

ca

n

n

ot

c

ons

id

er

ho

w

G

od

i

s,

b

u

t rathe

r ho

w

he

i

s

no

t.

I

n

q.

3

T

h

om

as

u

n

d

erta

ke

s to

sh

ow

th

at

G

od i

s

simple

; he

con

si

d

ers an

d rej

ect

s var

ious forms o

f me

ta

p

h

ysical

co

m

p

os

iti

on

, such

as f

orm and

m

att

er

(a. 2

), n

at

u

re

an

d su

pposi

t (a. 3

),

e

sse

n

ce

an

d e

xi

stence

(a. 4

),

ge

n

u

s

an

d d

iffe

re

n

ce

(a

. 5),

a

n

d sub

je

ct

an

d acc

ide

n

ts (a

. 6).

In

ar

gu

in

g fo

r th

e ide

n

tit

y thesis

T

h

om

as a

g

ai

n re

aso

n

s that i

f e

sse

nce

an

d

esse

we

re

no

t the

sa

me

in God, his

esse

wou

ld be

ca

u

sed

, he

w

oul

d

no

t b

e p

u

re

ac

t,

an

d

he

would no

t be the

first bei

n

g (

primum

ens

). In

his

Co

m

p

en

d

iu

m

t

h

eo

lo

g

ia

e (12

65–

67

),

T

h

om

as

dev

el

ops a proo

f o

f G

od’s e

xi

ste

nce

in

cha

p

. 3

.

He

th

en

shows th

at

G

od is

immobile

(cha

p. 4), e

tern

al (ch

ap. 5),

an

d a n

ece

ss

ary

b

ein

g

(cha

p

. 6

). In chap. 9 he

argue

s that Go

d is si

mple

; from the

fact of

t

h

e divi

ne

simpl

ici

ty

he

th

en

in

fe

rs

t

h

at

G

od

is

h

is

es

se

nc

e (

cha

p

. 1

0

) a

n

d

t

h

at

h

is

es

se

n

ce i

s hi

s exis

te

n

ce (

cha

p

.

11

).

Pa

ge 75

In

al

l t

h

ree wo

rk

s

Th

om

as

es

ta

b

lis

h

es

t

h

e id

ent

it

y

th

es

is

on

ly

af

ter

havi

ng pr

ov

en that

Go

d

e

xi

st

s. In e

ach te

xt he

arrive

s at

the

tr

uth of the

ide

n

tity the

si

s

b

y me

ans of

a

me

ta

ph

ysical re

flection on

w

h

at

he

h

as discove

re

d a

b

ou

t Go

d

in

p

ro

vin

g his e

xiste

n

ce

. Whe

n

one

t

u

rns to the

De p

ot

en

ti

a (12

6

5

–66

), one

find

s T

h

omas atte

m

p

ti

ng to e

stabli

sh the

id

en

ti

ty

th

esi

s without havi

ng off

ere

d pr

io

r ar

g

u

m

en

tat

io

n t

h

at

G

od

exi

st

s.

N

ever

thel

es

s,

ev

en

th

er

e

h

is

d

iscu

ssi

on

c

le

arl

y pre

su

ppose

s God’s e

xi

stence. In q. 7 Thomas

is co

n

ce

rne

d

wi

th

th

e si

m

p

lici

ty

of th

e di

vine e

sse

n

ce

. In

a. 1

he

off

ers thre

e argume

nts to sho

w

that G

od i

s

ab

so

lu

te

ly

s

im

p

le

. His

f

ir

st

a

rgu

m

en

t beg

in

s

Pa

ge Br

eak

76

with

t

h

e claim th

at a

ll

b

ein

gs pr

oc

ee

d fro

m

a

firs

t be

in

g (God), wh

o h

as with

in

h

im

se

lf n

o

admi

xtur

e o

f pote

ntial

ity.

B

u

t in any kind

of co

m

p

os

iti

on

th

ere

i

s a mi

xt

ur

e o

f act

and

pote

ncy. For i

n

a composi

te

ei

the

r one

p

ar

t i

s

in

pote

ncy to ano

the

r

(for e

xample

, matte

r to

fo

rm

, subj

ect to

accide

nt, ge

nus to

diffe

re

nce

),

or

a

ll t

h

e p

ar

ts

a

re i

n

pote

ncy to the

who

le.

The

re

fore

, since

God i

s p

u

re a

ct,

he

must be

whol

ly si

mple

.

†4

4

In

a se

cond

arg

u

ment Th

om

as

rea

sons t

h

at i

n

a

n

y compo

si

te

t

h

e part

s

ne

ed

to

b

e uni

ted to

form a

whol

e.

It

f

ol

lo

w

s

th

at

eve

ry c

om

p

os

it

e

d

ep

en

d

s u

p

on

a

p

rio

r c

aus

e.

Ther

ef

or

e,

t

h

e f

ir

st

b

ein

g

(

G

od

),

f

rom

w

h

om

al

l

thi

n

gs e

xi

st, cannot be

some

thi

n

g composi

te.

†4

5

I

n

a thi

rd

argu

me

nt T

h

om

as re

aso

n

s that

G

od m

u

st

be

m

os

t p

er

fe

ct

a

n

d

“

b

es

t.

” B

u

t

th

e be

st

i

s

th

at

i

n

w

h

ic

h

th

er

e i

s no

th

in

g

th

at

l

ac

ks

goo

d

ne

ss

. Ye

t thi

s cannot be

s

om

et

h

in

g c

om

p

os

it

e,

s

in

ce in

t

h

at

t

h

in

g wh

os

e goodn

es

s

results from a compo

si

tio

n

o

f parts,

t

h

e g

oodn

ess o

f th

e wh

ol

e i

s n

ot

p

re

se

n

t in some

o

f th

e

parts

. T

h

er

ef

or

e, th

at wh

ic

h i

s

b

est mu

st be

most simpl

e

an

d l

ack all

mann

er

of

composi

tio

n

.

†4

6

Pa

ge 76

Havi

n

g

sh

ow

n th

at

G

od l

acks al

l

form of

composi

ti

on, Th

om

as tu

rn

s i

n

a. 2 to

sh

ow

that

Go

d

’s

esse

is th

e same as h

is e

ssence. T

h

er

e he

p

oints out

tha

t a

n

y ca

u

se

ha

s its

own

prope

r

effe

ct

, i

n

accordanc

e wi

th

i

ts e

sse

n

ti

al

Pa

ge Br

eak

77

n

at

u

re

. Ca

us

es

t

h

at

ar

e es

se

n

ti

al

ly d

iver

se ha

ve d

iver

se

p

ro

p

er

ef

fe

ct

s.

Wh

en

ever

d

ive

rs

e

causes agr

ee

i

n

produ

ci

n

g th

e same

e

ffe

ct, th

ey

d

o so

in vi

rtu

e of

a sup

erio

r

cau

se

o

f wh

om

th

at

ef

fe

ct

is

p

rop

er

.

†4

7

Th

om

as

r

eas

on

s

th

at

al

l c

reat

ed

c

aus

es

a

g

re

e in

p

ro

d

u

cin

g

on

e

ef

fe

ct

, na

m

ely

b

ein

g (

esse

), alth

ou

gh

each

i

n

di

vi

du

al cau

se

h

as its o

w

n

pr

op

er e

ffe

ct, by

w

h

ic

h i

t is

d

is

ti

n

g

u

is

he

d

fro

m

th

e o

the

rs.

C

ons

eq

u

ently

, the

re

mus

t be

a

s

u

p

erio

r c

aus

e,

wh

os

e prope

r e

ffe

ct

is be

ing

, an

d th

is is G

od. Ha

vin

g

pr

es

en

te

d

a

n

int

ere

st

in

g ar

gu

me

nt

f

or

Go

d

’s e

xiste

nce

, Tho

m

as goe

s on to note

tha

t the prope

r e

ffe

ct

o

f a

n

y cause

p

roce

ed

s from i

t

acco

rd

in

g to th

e l

ik

en

ess o

f i

ts natu

re

. He

conc

lu

de

s th

at

be

in

g mu

st be

t

h

e su

bst

an

ce

o

r

na

ture o

f

G

od

.

†4

8

Pa

ge 77

In

al

l of

t

h

es

e t

ex

ts

Th

om

as

ha

s es

ta

b

lis

h

ed

t

h

e id

ent

it

y

th

es

is

af

te

r h

avi

ng

p

rov

en (

or

a

t

le

ast

p

re

suppose

d) t

h

at Go

d exi

sts

. The

ide

n

ti

ty

thesi

s doe

s no

t r

eve

al

to us what Go

d is; i

t

tel

ls

us wha

t God i

s no

t. In thi

s case

, it te

lls

u

s

th

at

G

od

do

es

no

t h

av

e a

pa

rt

ic

ul

ar

f

orm

o

f

m

et

ap

h

ys

ic

al

c

om

p

os

it

io

n

;

it

f

u

rt

he

r ela

b

or

at

es

t

h

e c

la

im

t

h

at

G

od

i

s s

im

p

le.

I

n

t

h

e eyes

o

f

Th

om

as, Gi

le

s’s fu

ndame

n

tal

clai

m

—

th

at wh

en

on

e un

de

rs

tan

d

s th

at e

sse

n

ce

and

exi

st

ence

ar

e id

en

ti

ca

l in

Go

d one imme

d

ia

te

ly

u

n

d

er

st

an

ds th

at

G

od e

xists—wou

ld a

ppe

ar

mis

g

uide

d

,

si

nc

e o

n

e c

an

n

ot

kn

ow

t

h

at

es

se

nc

e a

n

d

exis

te

n

ce ar

e id

en

ti

ca

l in

G

od

u

n

ti

l o

n

e p

rov

es

G

od

to e

xist.

Pa

ge 77

As we

h

ave

se

en

, Gi

le

s also

cal

le

d

at

te

n

ti

on

t

o a se

em

ing incons

is

tency in Th

om

as’s

posi

ti

on. Accord

in

g to

Gil

es, Aq

uinas asserts

that the propo

si

tio

n “

A

ngel

s do not e

xist i

n

place”

is se

lf-evident t

o th

e wis

e; howe

ver,

he

also

teache

s that

no

one

i

n

this l

if

e

u

n

d

er

st

an

d

s t

h

e es

se

n

ces

o

f

in

co

rp

or

ea

l

su

b

st

an

ces

.

If

t

h

e exi

st

en

ce o

f G

od

is

n

ot

se

lf-e

vi

de

n

t to

us,

the

n

n

eithe

r i

s t

h

is

propo

sitio

n.

U

p

on

cl

os

er

scrutin

y,

h

ow

ev

er,

thi

s

obj

ecti

on d

oe

s no

t pre

sent a si

gni

ficant thre

at

to Thomas

’s posi

tio

n

. F

or

Aqu

in

as i

s

q

u

ite

wi

lli

ng

Pa

ge Br

eak

78

to provi

d

e ar

gum

ent

atio

n to

sh

ow that God e

xists e

ve

rywhe

re

(

ub

iq

u

e), de

sp

it

e th

e fact th

at

we

d

o n

ot posse

ss

a

qu

idd

ita

tive

kn

ow

le

dge

of th

e div

in

e.

†4

9

Mo

re

ov

er, one

ca

n

k

n

ow th

at

G

od

an

d

an

g

el

s ar

e in

co

rp

or

eal

wit

h

ou

t

h

avin

g

a k

n

ow

led

g

e o

f t

h

ei

r r

es

p

ec

ti

ve es

se

nc

es

.

†5

0

Th

er

ef

or

e,

o

n

e

n

eed

no

t kn

ow t

h

e q

u

id

d

it

y of

an

an

g

el

t

o

kn

ow

t

h

at

i

t d

oes

no

t exi

st

in

p

lac

e.

Pa

ge 78

Ne

ve

rthe

le

ss, whe

n

o

n

e e

xami

n

es

Thomas’s texts, one

find

s

not o

n

ly

t

h

at he wo

ul

d

regar

d

th

e propositio

n

“Ang

el

s do not e

xist in

place

” a

s

not

se

lf-e

vi

d

ent

i

n

itse

lf, bu

t also

th

at

h

e wo

u

ld

not even

ac

cept i

t as tr

ue, at l

eas

t wit

h

out

som

e qu

alif

ic

at

io

n

s. Th

om

as

does in

deed

allow th

at

an

an

gel

m

ay ex

ist i

n

a

p

la

ce, al

th

ou

gh

he

is ca

re

ful

to

poi

n

t out t

h

at i

t d

oe

s so i

n

a

m

anner di

ffe

re

nt

fr

om

a bo

d

y. B

od

ie

s are

circumscriptive

ly

in pla

ce

be

cause

of the

ir

dime

nsi

ve

q

u

ant

ity.

An angel

l

acks the

l

atter, al

tho

u

gh i

t doe

s posse

ss

vi

rt

ual

quantity, that i

s

to sa

y, a

n

a

m

ount of

p

ower. There

fore

, by

th

e appli

catio

n o

f i

ts

p

ower i

n

a

ce

rt

ai

n p

la

ce

, a

n

angel

may be

sai

d

to e

xist i

n

that place.

†5

1

Th

e propositio

n

asserting t

h

at

an

ge

ls ar

e

n

on

-spati

al

e

n

titi

es

h

as i

ts sour

ce

i

n

Bo

et

hius’

s

De h

eb

d

om

ad

ib

u

s,

w

h

er

e it

i

s us

ed

t

o

ill

u

str

ate

th

e d

istinct

io

n betwe

en

tho

se

p

ro

p

os

iti

ons

k

n

ow

n to

al

l,

a

n

d

th

os

e known onl

y

to

the

wise

.

†5

2

In

d

iscu

ssi

n

g

wh

et

h

er

God’s

exi

st

ence i

s se

lf

-evi

dent

, T

h

omas h

imsel

f ci

te

s th

is

pr

op

osit

ion, n

ot

to

e

n

dorse

its cla

im,

but

m

ere

ly to

su

pp

or

t his o

w

n

di

st

in

ctio

n

be

twee

n

pr

opos

it

ions

wh

ic

h a

re s

el

f-

evid

ent

i

n

t

h

em

se

lve

s, an

d t

h

os

e s

elf

-e

vi

den

t in

t

h

em

se

lv

es

tho

u

gh not to us.

IV

.

Pa

ge 78

C

onc

lu

d

ing

R

ema

rks

. From a conside

ratio

n o

f Tho

m

as’s texts i

t i

s e

vide

n

t that

hi

s

p

ositi

on

is

no

t u

n

d

ermi

n

ed

b

y G

ile

s’

s c

ri

ti

cis

ms

. T

h

ro

ug

ho

ut hi

s c

are

er

, T

h

om

as

he

ld

tha

t the

exi

st

en

ce

of

God i

s sel

f-

evi

den

t

in

it

se

lf

b

u

tn

ot

to

u

s.I

ti

ss

el

f-e

vi

den

t

in

itse

lf

,

b

ec

au

se

of

th

e r

ea

l i

d

en

ti

ty

in

Go

d

Pa

ge Br

eak

79

of

es

se

nc

e a

n

d

e

xis

te

nc

e;

i

t i

s no

t s

elf-

ev

id

ent to

us

, s

in

ce

we

d

o no

t h

av

e an

un

d

ers

tan

d

in

g

of

th

e d

iv

ine

e

sse

n

ce.

T

h

om

as

’s

te

ac

hi

ng

a

p

pe

ars

to

be

c

ontro

lle

d

b

y

a s

tro

ng

ly

A

ri

sto

te

lian

th

eo

ry

o

f kn

ow

led

g

e.

Si

nc

e

al

l kno

w

le

d

g

e b

eg

in

s in

s

en

se exp

er

ie

n

ce

, an

d

t

h

e es

se

n

ces

o

f

mate

rial thi

n

gs ar

e the

na

tu

ral

o

b

ject

s

of th

e hu

ma

n in

tel

le

ct, the

i

mmate

ri

al

i

s known only

in

di

re

ct

ly, by

m

ean

s of

m

at

er

ia

l t

h

in

gs

.

†5

3

Pa

ge 79

Simi

la

rly, the

re

is nothi

n

g di

stur

bi

n

g

in Thomas’s claim th

at one

can

establ

ish that the

pr

opos

it

ion “God

exis

ts

” is

s

el

f-

evid

ent

in

i

ts

el

f, al

th

ou

gh

i

t is

n

ot

s

elf

-e

vi

den

t t

o an

yone i

n

t

h

e

p

res

en

t li

fe

. F

or

Aq

ui

na

s t

h

e in

qu

iry

in

to w

h

at

a thi

n

g i

s (

qu

id

sit

) is

a

lwa

ys

pos

ter

ior

t

o t

h

e

in

qu

ir

y in

to

w

h

et

her

it

exi

st

s (

an sit

).

A

s w

e ha

ve

s

ee

n

, T

h

om

as

co

ns

is

te

n

tl

y he

ld

th

at o

n

e

ca

nn

ot

kno

w

t

h

e t

ru

th

of

t

h

e id

ent

it

y t

h

es

is

wit

h

ou

t p

res

u

p

p

os

ing

t

h

at

G

od

ex

is

ts

. I

n

t

h

e

or

d

er

of

d

is

cove

ry,

t

h

e exi

st

en

ce o

f

G

od

m

u

st

c

om

e fi

rs

t.

Con

seq

uen

tl

y,

t

h

e id

ent

it

y t

h

es

is

in

it

se

lf doe

s n

ot h

in

d

er

us from provin

g God’s e

xistence

.

†5

4

Pa

ge 79

Loyola Uni

ver

si

ty

N

ew Or

le

an

s

Ne

w Orl

eans,

L

oui

si

an

a

Not

es

F

oo

tno

te

Page

57

1

. T

h

er

e i

s an abundant

se

co

ndary li

te

ra

tu

re co

nce

rni

ng the

Tho

m

isti

c p

ro

ofs fo

r God’s

exi

st

en

ce.

Th

e m

os

t t

h

or

ou

g

h

h

is

tor

ic

al

p

re

sen

ta

ti

on

o

f Th

om

as

’s

a

rg

u

m

en

ts

i

s fo

u

n

d

i

n

F

.

Va

n Steenb

ergh

en

,

Le

pr

ob

lè

me

de

l’e

xi

stence

d

e D

ie

u

dans l

es é

cr

its d

e S. Thoma

s d

’Aqui

n

(Lou

va

in

-la

-Ne

uv

e:

Édi

ti

on

s de

l

’Institut su

pé

ri

eu

r

de

phi

lo

soph

ie

, 19

80).

F

or a re

ce

nt

anal

ysis o

f Th

om

as’s appr

oa

ch t

o Go

d

in th

e cont

ex

t of

h

is

metap

h

ysi

cs of

b

ei

n

g, se

e

J.

F.

Wippel,

Th

e Meta

phy

sica

l Th

ou

gh

t o

f Thoma

s Aqui

na

s: F

rom Finite

Be

ing

t

o Uncr

ea

te

d Be

in

g

(Wa

shi

ngton

,

D.

C.

: C

atho

lic

U

n

iv

er

sity

o

f A

m

er

ic

a P

re

ss,

20

00

),

379

–5

00.

F

oo

tno

te

Page

57

2

. For

a

n

ex

ce

llent

an

al

ys

is

of

T

h

om

as

’s

t

ea

chi

ng

on

s

elf

-e

vi

den

t pr

opos

it

ions

,

see L.

Tu

ni

net

ti,

“P

er

Se

Notu

m.”

D

ie

l

ogi

sc

he

Beschaffe

nh

ei

t de

s Se

lbstv

erstän

d

lichen i

m

De

n

ke

n

des

Th

omas von Aq

ui

n

(Le

ide

n:

B

ri

ll,

19

96

).

For a

bri

ef

hi

st

or

ica

l su

rv

ey

of

va

ri

ou

s me

di

ev

al

vi

ews

o

n

t

h

e s

el

f-

evid

enc

e of

G

od

’s

exi

st

en

ce,

s

ee

A.

D

iN

ot

o,

L’

ev

ide

n

za

di D

io nel

la

fi

lo

sofi

a

del

se

col

o XI

II

(Pa

d

u

a: C

edam,

19

58).

F

oo

tno

te

Page

58

3

. Étie

nn

e G

ilson

fre

q

u

ently

ca

lle

d

att

en

ti

on

to

th

e im

por

ta

n

ce

of

t

h

is

c

lai

m

, wh

ic

h

he t

h

ough

t

was di

st

in

ctive

o

f C

h

risti

an

p

h

iloso

p

hy.

See

his

T

h

e S

p

ir

it

of

M

ed

iev

al

Ph

ilos

op

h

y, tr

an

s. A. H.

C.

D

own

es

(

Lon

d

on:

Sh

eed

&

Wa

rd

, 1

9

3

6

),

51

ff

.;

Be

in

g

an

d Som

e Ph

ilos

oph

er

s, 2nd

e

d

.

(T

oro

n

to: P

on

ti

fi

cal

Insti

tu

te

o

f M

edia

eva

l

S

tu

d

ie

s,

19

52),

3

0–3

1;

E

lem

en

ts

of

C

h

ri

st

ia

n

Phil

oso

p

hy

(G

ar

de

n C

it

y,

N.

Y.

: Dou

b

le

day

, 19

59),

1

2

4

–33

;

C

h

rist

ia

n Phi

loso

p

hy: An

Introducti

on

, tran

s.

A

.

M

aure

r (T

oro

n

to: P

on

ti

fi

cal

Institu

te

o

f M

edia

eva

l S

tu

d

ie

s,

199

3),

24

–3

2.

F

oo

tno

te

Page

58

4

. G

ile

s’

s me

taph

ysi

cs re

mai

n

s re

lative

ly l

it

tl

e

st

ud

ie

d.

A

g

ood co

n

spectu

s is provide

d

by

G.

Su

ár

ez

, “

La

m

etaf

ísi

ca de

E

g

id

io

Ro

man

o a

la luz de

las

24

te

si

s t

omistas,”

La

Ci

uda

d

de

D

io

s

16

1 (1

949

),

93

–13

0,

2

69–

30

9.

For so

me

ana

ly

se

s of

hi

s t

ea

chi

ng on

e

ss

en

ce

and e

xiste

nce

,

se

e

J.

Pa

ulus, “Les disp

ut

es

d’Henr

i de

Gan

d

e

t

d

e Gille

s de

Ro

me

su

r la distin

ctio

n

de

l’es

se

n

ce et

d

e l’

exis

te

n

ce,

”

Arch

iv

es

d

’h

istoi

re

doctrinal

e e

t

lit

té

rai

re

du moye

n

âg

e 13

(19

4

0

–42

),

323

–5

8; G

. S

u

áre

z,

“E

l pe

n

samie

n

to

de

Egidi

o R

oma

no

e

n

torno

a

la

distin

ció

n

de

es

en

ci

a y ex

is

te

n

ci

a,

”

La Ci

en

ci

a

To

mista

7

5

(1

94

8),

66

–99

, 23

0–7

2; G

. T

ra

p

é,

“

L’esse

pa

rt

ec

ipa

to e dis

tin

zione

r

eal

e in

Eg

idi

o Rom

ano,”

A

q

ui

na

s 12

(19

69):

443

–68

; J.

F.

W

ippe

l,

“T

he

R

elatio

n

shi

p

betwe

en

E

sse

nce

and E

xi

stence

in Late

Thi

rte

en

th-C

en

tury Tho

u

ght: G

ile

s

of

Ro

me, H

en

ry o

f Ghent

, G

od

fr

ey o

f Fo

ntai

ne

s,

an

d

J

ame

s

of

Vi

te

rbo

,”

in

Phil

oso

p

hi

es

of

E

xis

te

nc

e:

A

n

ci

ent

an

d

M

ed

ieva

l,

ed

. P

. M

or

ewed

g

e (

N

ew Y

or

k:

F

or

d

ha

m

Un

iv

er

si

ty

Pr

es

s,

19

82

),

1

3

1

–64

. O

n

Gi

le

s’s approach to Go

d’

s e

xiste

n

ce

, se

e

G. Trapé

,

“Esiste

n

za d

i Di

o

dal

l’e

siste

n

za

p

ar

te

ci

p

at

a se

con

d

o E

g

id

io

Ro

man

o,”

Au

g

u

st

in

ia

nu

m

9

(196

9),

9

1–1

17

.

F

oo

tno

te

Page

59

5

. For the

dati

ng of

Tho

m

as’

s te

xt

s

I s

h

all f

ollow J.-

P. Tor

rell

,

Saint

T

h

omas Aq

uina

s, vol. 1

:

Th

e Per

so

n

an

d h

is Work

, tra

n

s.

R. Royal

(Wa

shi

ng

ton, D

.C.: C

at

h

oli

c U

n

iver

sit

y o

f Ameri

ca

Pre

ss, 199

6).

F

oo

tno

te

Page

60

6

. See

In I Se

n

t., d

. 3, q

. 1, a

. 2 (

ed. Man

d

onn

et

,

vo

l.

1, 9

3

–

9

4

):

“de

c

ogn

it

ione a

lic

ui

us

r

ei

pote

st

aliqu

is du

plicit

er

lo

qu

i: a

u

t

se

cun

d

u

m

ips

am rem, au

t qu

oa

d n

os.

L

oqu

en

do

igit

ur

d

e

De

o

se

cun

d

u

m

se

ipsu

m, e

sse

e

st

pe

r se

n

ot

u

m,

e

t i

p

se

e

st pe

r se

i

n

te

lle

ct

u

s (

le

ge

:

in

te

lli

gib

ili

s)

, n

on

per

h

oc

q

u

od f

ac

iam

u

s ip

su

m

i

n

te

lligi

b

ile, s

ic

u

t m

at

er

ia

lia

f

ac

iam

u

s

in

te

lli

gib

ili

a i

n

a

ct

u

. Loq

u

en

do au

te

m

de

De

o pe

r co

mp

aratio

n

em ad

nos, si

c

ite

rum du

pli

ci

te

r

pot

es

t c

on

sid

er

ar

i. Au

t s

ec

u

n

d

u

m

s

u

am

s

im

ilit

ud

in

em

et

pa

rt

ic

ip

at

io

n

em

; et

h

oc

m

odo ips

u

m

esse, e

st per se

notu

m; nihil

e

n

im

cogn

os

ci

tu

r n

isi

p

er ve

ri

tate

m su

am

, qu

ae

e

st

a De

o

ex

empl

ata; ve

ritate

m autem e

sse

, e

st

pe

r se

notum.

Aut secundum sup

p

os

it

um, i

d

est,

conside

ran

do

ipsu

m D

eum,

s

ecun

d

u

m

qu

od

est i

n

natu

ra

su

a

q

u

id i

n

co

rp

ore

u

m; e

t h

oc modo

no

n e

st p

er s

e n

otum.

..

. E

t huj

us

ra

ti

o

es

t,

q

u

ia

e

a

q

u

ae

pe

r

se

nobi

s nota

sunt

, e

ffi

ciuntur

n

ota stati

m

p

er se

n

su

m

; si

cu

t vi

si

s toto

et par

te

, st

atim co

g

n

osci

m

u

s qu

od o

m

n

e totu

m e

st

maj

u

s sua parte

sine

al

iqu

a i

n

qu

is

iti

on

e.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

60

7

. Se

e ibid.,

94:

“Ad

prim

um e

rgo

d

ice

n

d

u

m

, qu

od

a

u

cto

rita

s Dama

sce

n

i intellige

n

d

a e

st de

d

iv

ina

c

og

n

it

io

ne

no

b

is

i

n

se

rta

, s

ec

u

nd

um i

p

si

u

s

si

mi

litu

d

in

em e

t n

on

se

cu

nd

um q

u

od

es

t i

n

su

a n

at

u

ra.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

60

8

. See ibi

d

.,

9

5

:

“Ad

qua

rt

u

m

di

ce

n

d

um

, quod r

at

io An

se

lm

i it

a in

te

llig

en

da es

t.

Pos

tqu

am

in

tel

ligi

mus De

um, non

p

otest i

n

te

lligi

quo

d

si

t

De

u

s, e

t possit co

g

itari

n

on e

sse;

se

d tame

n

ex h

oc

n

on seq

u

it

ur

quod a

liq

ui

s non p

ossi

t ne

gar

e ve

l

co

gita

re

, De

u

m

non e

sse

; pote

st e

n

im

cogi

ta

re nihil

hu

ju

smodi

esse

qu

o maj

u

s co

g

itari

non possi

t;

e

t i

d

eo

ratio

sua pr

oc

edi

t ex hac

su

pposi

ti

one

,

q

u

od su

pponatu

r ali

q

u

id

e

sse

qu

o maj

u

s cogi

ta

ri non potest.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

61

9

. See

De v

er

it

at

e q.

10,

a

.

12

(Le

oni

ne

e

d

.,

v

ol.

22

.2

, 34

0): “

Prima

qu

ide

m

opi

n

io

ma

ni

fe

st

e

fa

ls

a

ap

p

are

t:

i

n

ve

ni

tur e

n

im

ho

c qu

od

e

st De

um e

ss

e d

emo

ns

tra

tio

ni

bu

s irre

fra

g

ab

ili

b

u

s

et

iam

a

ph

ilos

oph

is

pr

oba

tu

m

, qu

am

vi

s et

ia

m

a

nonn

u

lli

s ad

h

oc

os

te

n

d

end

um

a

liq

ua

e

ratio

n

es

fri

vo

la

e in

d

u

ca

n

tu

r;

du

arum v

ero

o

p

in

io

num s

eq

u

en

ti

um u

tra

qu

e

se

cu

nd

um a

liq

ui

d

ve

ra

e

st

. Est

e

n

im du

pl

ici

ter ali

q

u

id

p

er se

n

ot

u

m,

s

ci

lice

t secun

d

u

m

se

e

t qu

oad n

os.

De

u

m

ig

it

u

r e

ss

e se

cu

ndu

m

se

e

st

pe

r se

n

ot

u

m,

n

on aut

em qu

oa

d nos; e

t ide

o

n

obi

s n

ece

ssarium

es

t

ad h

oc cogn

oscend

um demo

n

stratio

n

es h

abere

e

x e

ffe

ct

ib

u

s su

mptas.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

61

10

. See i

b

id

. (

3

4

0

–

4

1

):

“Ad h

oc

e

n

im

q

u

od a

liq

ui

d s

it

p

er

s

e n

ot

u

m

s

ec

u

n

d

u

m

s

e, ni

hi

l a

liu

d

requiritur

nisi ut

pra

edicatu

m sit de

ra

tion

e su

b

iec

ti

: t

u

nc

en

im

s

u

b

iec

tum cogi

tari non pote

st

sine

h

oc q

u

od prae

dicat

u

m e

i i

n

esse

appare

at; ad hoc au

te

m q

u

od si

t

p

er se

n

ot

u

m n

ob

is,

opo

rte

t q

u

od nobis si

t cogni

ta rati

o sub

ie

ct

i i

n

qu

a in

clu

d

itu

r pra

edicat

u

m. E

t in

de

est qu

od

qu

aedam

p

er se

n

ot

a su

nt

omn

ibu

s, qu

an

do sci

lice

t propo

si

tio

n

es h

u

iusmodi

h

abe

n

t tal

ia

subi

ecta

q

u

orum rat

io o

m

ni

bus no

ta e

st,

ut

om

ne

t

ot

u

m

m

aiu

s es

t s

u

a p

ar

te:

q

u

ili

b

et

en

im

scit qu

id e

st

to

tu

m e

t

q

u

id e

st pa

rs; q

u

ae

da

m ve

ro sun

t per se

n

ota

sap

ie

n

tibus t

an

tu

m

qui

ratio

n

es

te

rmi

n

or

u

m

c

og

n

os

cunt,

v

u

lg

o e

as

ig

no

ra

nte

.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

61

11

.

Fo

r

th

e Bo

et

h

ia

n

t

ext

, s

ee

B

oethius

:

The

Theo

lo

gical Trac

tat

es

, tr

an

s. Stew

ar

d

, Ra

nd,

a

n

d

Te

st

er

(C

ambridge, M

ass.: Harvard

Unive

rsi

ty Pre

ss, 1

9

7

3

), 40

.

On B

oe

thi

us a

s a

so

urce

for

T

h

om

as

’s

un

de

rs

ta

nd

in

g

o

f s

el

f-

ev

id

ent p

ro

p

os

it

io

ns

, s

ee

T

uni

ne

tti,

“Pe

r Se N

ot

u

m

,”

48–

67

.

F

oo

tno

te

Page

62

12

. See

De

ve

ritate

q. 10, a

. 12

(34

1

). “

H

oc a

u

te

m q

u

od e

st e

ss

e, i

n

nul

liu

s cre

aturae

ra

ti

one

in

cluditu

r:

cu

iu

slib

et

en

im

cr

eat

u

ra

e

es

se

es

t

al

iu

d

ab

eiu

s

q

u

id

it

at

e;

un

d

e

n

on

p

ot

es

t

d

ic

i

d

e

al

iq

ua cre

atu

ra

q

u

od e

am e

sse

sit pe

r se

n

otum

eti

am se

cu

nd

um se

. Se

d i

n

De

o e

ss

e i

p

sius

in

cl

udi

tu

r in

s

u

ae

qu

idi

ta

tis

r

at

ion

e qu

ia

in

eo es

t idem

q

u

od es

t et

es

se

, u

t Boet

iu

s di

ci

t,

e

t

id

em

an

es

t et

q

u

id

es

t,

ut

d

ic

it

Avic

en

n

a;

id

eo s

ec

u

n

d

u

m

s

e es

t p

er

s

e n

ot

u

m

. Sed

q

u

ia

q

u

id

it

as

De

i no

n e

st no

b

is

n

ota,

i

d

eo

q

u

oa

d

no

s De

um e

ss

e no

n e

st no

bi

s no

tum s

ed

in

di

g

et

d

emo

ns

tratio

ne

.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

62

13

. S

C

G

I,

cha

p

. 1

1

(e

d.

le

on

in

a manu

al

is

[Ro

m

e:

A

p

u

d

S

ede

m C

ommissi

on

is Le

on

in

ae

,

19

34

], 9

): “

Pra

edi

ct

a au

tem o

p

in

io

pr

ov

en

it partim qu

ide

m

e

x

co

nsu

etu

di

ne

qua

e

x pri

n

ci

pi

o

assueti

su

nt

nome

n

De

i au

dire

e

t invocare

.

C

onsuetud

o autem, e

t pr

ae

ci

pue

quae

est a

pue

ro, vim naturae

obt

ine

t: e

x

qu

o

con

tin

git ut ea qu

ibu

s a

p

u

er

itia a

n

imu

s

imbu

itu

r,

ita

fi

rm

iter te

ne

at a

c si

esse

nt natural

it

er

e

t

p

er se

no

ta

. Pa

rt

im

vero

conti

n

gi

t e

x e

o

q

u

od no

n

disti

n

gu

it

ur q

u

od e

st n

ot

u

m per se

si

m

p

lici

ter, e

t q

u

od e

st qu

oad n

os p

er se

n

ot

u

m. Nam

simpl

ici

ter qu

id

em

De

u

m

e

sse pe

r se

n

ot

u

m e

st: cum h

oc

ipsu

m qu

od

De

u

s e

st,

s

it su

um

esse. Se

d qu

ia

hoc i

p

su

m qu

od D

eus e

st

me

nt

e co

n

cipe

re

n

on possu

mus,

r

emane

t i

g

n

ot

u

m

qu

oa

d n

os.

”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

63

14

. I

b

id

.:

“

N

ec

o

p

or

te

t

ut s

tatim,

c

ogn

ita

hui

us

n

omi

ni

s

De

us

signifi

cati

on

e, De

um esse

si

t

no

tum,

ut

prima ra

tio

in

te

n

d

eb

at

. Pr

im

o q

u

id

em

, q

u

ia

no

n

o

m

n

ib

u

s n

ot

u

m

es

t,

et

ia

m

concede

n

ti

b

u

s De

u

m

e

sse

,

q

u

od De

us

s

it i

d

quo maius

c

ogitari

n

on

po

ss

it

: cu

m mu

lt

i

an

tiqu

or

um mu

nd

um istu

m dixerin

t De

u

m

e

sse

..

.. De

in

de

qu

ia

, da

to

q

u

od a

b

o

m

n

ib

u

s per

ho

c no

men

De

us

i

n

te

lligat

ur

al

iqu

id qu

o

mai

u

s cogi

ta

ri non p

ossit, n

on

ne

ce

sse

e

rit al

iq

uid

esse quo maius

cogitar

i n

on

po

te

st in re

ru

m

n

at

u

ra

. E

od

em

en

im

m

od

o n

ec

es

se es

t p

oni

r

em

,

et

n

omi

n

is rati

on

em

. E

x hoc au

te

m q

u

od me

n

te

concipi

tur

q

u

od pr

of

er

tu

r

h

oc nomi

n

e

De

u

s,

n

on

se

qu

it

u

r De

u

m

e

sse

n

isi i

n

int

el

le

ctu

. U

n

de

n

ec opo

rte

bit i

d

q

u

o maius cogitar

i n

on

po

te

st

esse nisi

i

n

i

n

te

lle

ct

u

. E

t e

x h

oc n

on

se

qu

it

ur

q

u

od si

t ali

q

u

id in reru

m

n

atu

ra qu

o

m

aius

cogi

ta

ri non p

ossit.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

63

15

. Ibid.: “

N

ec

e

ti

am o

p

ortet, ut

se

cu

nd

a ra

tio proponebat

, Deo

posse

a

liquid ma

iu

s

co

gita

ri si

pote

st

co

gitari

n

on

e

sse

.

N

am qu

od

po

ss

it

cogi

ta

ri

non

esse

, n

on

e

x i

m

p

erfe

ct

ione

su

i e

ss

e e

st

ve

l i

n

ce

rt

it

u

d

in

e,

cu

m su

um e

sse

si

t secun

d

u

m

se

manif

esti

ss

imu

m: se

d e

x d

ebi

litate

n

os

tri

in

tel

le

ctus

, qui e

u

m

int

u

eri

n

on

pote

st per se

ip

sum

, se

d e

x e

ffe

ct

ib

u

s e

ius, et si

c ad

cogn

oscendu

m

i

p

sum e

sse

rati

oci

n

an

do pe

rd

ucitu

r.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

63

16

. Ibi

d

.: “E

x quo e

ti

am

tertia

ratio

sol

vitur

. Nam

s

icut nobis

p

er se

no

tu

m e

st quod totum

su

a part

e si

t mai

u

s, si

c

vi

dentibu

s i

p

sam di

vi

n

am e

sse

nt

ia

m pe

r se

n

ot

issimum

est De

um

esse, e

x h

oc qu

od

sua e

sse

n

tia e

st

su

u

m

e

sse

. Sed quia e

ius

esse

n

ti

am vi

d

ere

n

on

possum

u

s,

ad e

iu

s e

sse

cogn

os

ce

nd

um n

on

pe

r

se

ip

su

m, sed pe

r e

ius

ef

fectus

p

ervenimus.

”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

64

17

. On

G

iles

’s

li

fe

an

d wr

it

in

gs

,

see J. Ea

st

m

an

, “Da

s Le

b

en des Augu

stiner-E

re

mite

n

Aegid

iu

s

R

oman

u

s,

ca.

1

2

4

3–1

314

,”

Ze

itsch

rif

t fü

r

Kirch

en

g

esch

ic

h

te

100

(19

8

9

),

318

–3

9; “

D

ie

We

rk

e

des Aegid

iu

s

Ro

m

an

u

s,

”

Au

g

u

st

in

ia

na

44

(19

94),

2

09–

31

.

On

G

ile

s’s r

el

ati

on

to

A

q

ui

na

s,

se

e

P.

N

as

h

, “

G

iles

of

Ro

m

e,

a

u

d

it

or

a

n

d

c

rit

ic

of

S

t.

T

h

om

as

,”

Mode

rn

Sch

oolma

n

28

(

1

95

0–

5

1

),

1–

20

. F

or G

ile

s’s

A

p

ol

og

ia

,

se

e t

h

e ed

it

io

n a

n

d

v

al

u

ab

le

c

om

m

en

ta

ry b

y R.

Wi

elo

ckx,

Aeg

id

ii

Rom

ani

O

p

er

a

Om

n

ia

, vo

l. III. 1:

Apologia

(Fl

ore

nce

: L.

S

.

Ol

schk

i,

198

5).

O

n

t

h

e

da

tin

g

o

f

Gi

le

s’s

Co

mmen

tariu

s in

Pri

m

u

m

S

ente

n

tia

rum

, see

W

iel

ockx’s

d

iscu

ssi

on

o

n

pp. 23

6–

40.

F

oo

tno

te

Page

65

18

. See

In

I

Sent

.,

d.

3,

p.

1,

pr.

1,

q.

1 (V

en

ic

e,

152

1; re

pr

in

t,

Fran

kf

urt: M

in

er

va

, 1

9

6

8

, fo

l.

21

rB

): “

U

tru

m

De

u

m

p

oss

im

u

s

co

gn

osce

re in

h

ac

vi

ta.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

65

19

. Se

e ibi

d

. (f

ol

.

21rD): “

Isto

tr

ip

lic

i mo

d

o posse

t

int

el

lig

i quod cogn

oscere

mu

s D

ei

qu

id

dit

at

em

:

ve

l im

m

edi

at

e,

ut

s

i s

in

e m

edi

o f

er

em

u

r in

a

p

er

ta

m

vis

ion

em

ei

us

; ve

l per

in

ve

n

tio

n

em, u

t pe

r e

a qu

ae

sun

t i

n

cre

atu

ris ve

n

ire

m

u

s in cognitio

n

e qu

id

d

itati

s ipsi

u

s; ve

l

per do

ct

rinam, qu

od

al

iqu

is scie

n

s q

u

iddi

ta

tem D

ei

n

os doce

ret e

am

. P

ri

m

u

s mo

du

s e

st

im

pos

sibi

lis

. N

am

c

u

m

in

via

, u

t t

an

g

eb

at

u

r in

a

rgu

en

do

, nost

ra

co

g

n

iti

o

n

on

ab

so

lv

atu

r

a

ph

an

ta

sma

tib

us: n

u

lliu

s rei qu

an

tu

m ad q

u

iddit

at

em e

t posit

ive

cogn

itio

n

em h

abere

pote

ri

mu

s, qu

od

v

el n

on

ha

be

at

ph

an

ta

sma v

el n

on

sit pr

op

or

ti

ona

ta

h

abe

n

tib

us ph

an

ta

sma

.

De

u

s au

te

m su

mma

re

s e

st

q

u

ae

nec phan

tasm

a h

abet, n

ec habe

n

tibus

p

h

ant

asmata e

st

p

rop

or

ti

on

at

a.

”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

65

20

. Ibi

d

.: “E

x hoc app

ar

et qu

od

s

ecun

d

u

s mo

d

u

s st

ar

e non potes

t. Nam

s

i per

i

n

ve

nt

ionem

sive

pe

r

n

ostra

m in

qu

isitionem

q

u

idditat

em De

i posse

mu

s cognosce

re

, tu

nc

q

u

idditas De

i his

qu

o cogn

os

ci

mu

s proportio

n

em

ha

be

re

t: qu

od

non e

st

ve

ru

m.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

65

21

. See i

b

id

. (

fo

l.

2

1

rE

):

“N

ec

et

ia

m

t

er

ti

a via

s

ta

re p

ot

es

t.

N

am

d

at

o q

u

od

a

liq

u

is

s

ci

at

d

iv

ina

m

qu

id

d

ita

te

m,

no

s in

v

ia

e

xis

te

nte

s do

ce

re

non

p

oteri

t. Et

est rati

o: qui

a

nul

lu

s pote

st

d

oc

eri n

is

i ad

i

llu

d

p

oss

it

attin

g

ere

l

u

me

n q

u

od

ha

be

t.

C

u

m ig

it

ur in

v

ia

no

n h

ab

eamus

ni

si

lu

m

en

na

tu

ra

le ve

l en

igm

at

ic

u

m

: a

d

c

ognos

ce

n

d

um qui

d

d

itate

m De

i

non pote

ri

t attingere

tal

e

lu

me

n:

e

t id

eo

nul

lu

s v

ia

to

r man

en

s v

ia

to

r e

t

no

n

ha

be

n

s lu

men

e

xce

lle

n

ti

us

l

u

mi

ne

v

iato

ri

s

per do

ct

rina

m quiddita

te

m De

i cogn

os

ce

re

t.

”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

66

22

. See

In

I

Sent

., d. 3, p. 1, pr. 1, q. 2 (fo

l. 21rG): “U

tr

um De

u

m

e

sse

sit pe

r se

notu

m.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

66

23

. Se

e ibi

d

. (f

ol

.

21vIK): “

R

espondeo

dice

n

d

um

q

u

od ali

q

u

i d

isting

u

u

n

t hic:

q

u

od e

st

esse

per se

notu

m, qu

ia

dup

lici

ter po

te

st h

oc intel

ligi:

ve

l i

n

se

, e

t tun

c De

u

m

e

sse

e

st

p

er se

n

otu

m, qu

ia

e

sse

maxime

e

st de

ra

ti

one

De

i

cu

m sit i

p

su

m e

sse;

ve

l in comparat

io

ne

ad n

os.

Sed

s

i loqu

im

u

r in

c

om

p

ar

at

io

n

e ad

nos

, it

er

u

m

dis

tin

guu

n

t:

qu

ia

h

oc

vel er

it

i

n

s

u

o s

im

ili

, et

tu

n

c

De

u

m

e

sse

est pe

r se

notu

m, qu

ia

q

u

icqu

id

cogn

oscimu

s e

st qu

aedam simi

litu

do e

t

qu

aedam

p

ar

ticipat

io divina

e ve

ri

ta

tis. In se

t

ame

n

De

um

esse

qu

oa

d n

os n

on

e

st per se

no

tum. E

t rati

o e

st ut dicunt: qui

a i

llud

e

st pe

r se

notu

m cuius

r

atio

p

raedi

cati

co

n

ti

n

et

u

r in

su

bi

ecto, e

t i

mmo stati

m

c

u

m scimus q

u

id e

st su

bi

ectu

m assentimus

p

ropo

sitio

n

i. E

t i

d

em e

st

qu

od

qua

eda

m su

nt p

rin

cip

ia

c

ommu

n

ia omn

ibu

s qu

ae

d

am sa

pient

ibu

s...

. Si igitu

r De

um

esse

esset pe

r

se notu

m

n

obi

s: vel

o

m

ne

s sc

ir

en

t qu

id

e

st De

u

s;

ve

l sal

tem sap

ie

n

te

s h

oc scire

n

t.

Sed

c

u

m

n

u

llu

s in

v

ia

s

cia

t qu

id s

it

De

us

,

n

u

lli

in

via

es

t h

oc

pe

r s

e not

u

m

.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

67

24

. Ibi

d

. (fo

l. 21

vL): “Se

d

ista

po

si

ti

o n

on

e

st bona. Nam cum in via possu

mu

s

h

oc vi

dere

qu

od

es

se

D

ei es

t ips

e

D

eus

, et

quod es

se

De

i in

cl

u

d

it

ur

in

q

u

iddi

ta

te

D

ei:

in

via

pos

su

m

u

s

h

oc scire

qu

od nu

llus cogitat

De

u

m

, n

isi co

gite

t

ipsu

m e

sse

.

Nam i

n

ce

teri

s al

iis a

p

ri

m

o e

sse

es

t

p

ra

et

er

r

at

ion

em

qu

id

dit

at

is

: et

im

m

o pos

su

nt

i

n

te

lligi

abs

q

ue

e

o qu

od

in

te

lliga

n

tu

r es

se

.

Sol

u

s au

te

m pr

im

u

s habe

t

q

u

idditat

em i

n

di

st

an

te

m

ab e

sse: so

lus ipse

n

on

po

te

rit co

g

itari

n

on

e

sse

. E

t qu

ia

hoc e

st e

sse

pe

r se

n

otum

q

u

od n

on

po

te

st cogi

ta

ri non e

sse

, o

p

or

te

t n

os

er

go

dice

re D

eum e

sse, e

sse

al

iquo mo

d

o per se

n

otu

m e

tiam qu

oad n

os

.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

67

25

. Se

e i

b

id

.: “Et q

u

od ip

si di

cun

t, qu

od tun

c de

De

o sci

re

mu

s quid e

st,

e

q

u

ivocan

t i

n

e

o quod

es

t

qu

id e

st.

N

am no

n o

p

ort

et sci

re

de

De

o qu

id re

i,

se

d qu

id n

omi

ni

s..

. e

t li

ce

t

de

D

eo

no

n

possu

mus sc

ir

e q

u

id re

i, po

ss

umu

s tame

n

s

ci

re

q

u

id e

st qu

od di

citu

r pe

r

n

ome

n

. Et h

oc

sc

it

o

qu

ia

e

st ipsum

esse

, e

t

q

u

ia e

st

al

iqu

id qu

o

m

aius cogi

ta

ri non p

otest, e

t h

u

iu

s

st

at

im

in

tel

ligi

mus i

p

sum esse

, pr

op

te

r quo

d

est pe

r

se

notum.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

68

26

. S

ee

ibi

d

.:

“

N

am

in

corporal

ia

i

n

l

oco

non

e

sse

est pe

r

se

notum sapie

n

ti

b

u

s,

et tam

en

sapi

entes quidditate

s i

n

corpor

aliu

m

vi

der

e p

os

it

iv

e non pos

su

nt

, lic

et

al

iq

uo m

odo s

ci

re

possu

nt

q

u

id e

st qu

od dicitu

r pe

r

n

ome

n.

” For

Aqu

in

as’s de

n

ia

l of

an

y qu

iddita

tiv

e knowle

dge

of

a

n

g

els

,

see

Sup

er

Boet

iu

m

De

T

rin

it

at

e, q.

6

, a.

3.

F

oo

tno

te

Page

68

27

. See

In

I

Sent

., d. 3, p. 1, pr. 1, q. 3 (fo

l. 21vP

): “

U

tru

m

De

u

m

esse

possi

t d

emonst

rar

i.

”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

69

28

. See i

b

id

. (

fo

l.

2

1

vQ)

: “E

t id

eo

no

ta

nd

um

q

u

od

d

em

ons

tr

ar

e D

eu

m

es

se

n

on

es

t

demo

n

stra

re

esse

div

in

u

m de Deo

, qu

ia

tu

nc ide

m

e

sset qu

od

demo

n

str

atu

r e

t

d

e qu

o

demo

nstatu

r e

t su

bstant

ia

e

esse

t

d

em

onst

rat

io.

S

ed

dem

on

st

ra

re

D

eu

m

esse

,

est

de

cla

ra

re

qu

id

est: qu

od

importa

tu

r pe

r

h

oc

n

ome

n

De

u

s, qu

od pat

et e

x omn

ibu

s de

mons

tra

tionibu

s

qu

ae hoc proba

n

t.

E

x e

o e

n

im qu

od

d

ecla

ra

tu

m

e

st qu

od

p

er h

oc n

omen De

u

s import

atu

r id

qu

od

pe

n

itu

s e

st immo

b

ile, id qu

od pe

n

itu

s e

st

p

erfe

ct

u

m, id qu

o ma

iu

s co

g

ita

ri

n

on pote

st

et

ce

te

ra hu

iu

smo

d

i:

qu

ia

tale

n

on

po

te

st n

on

e

sse

, st

atim i

n

te

lle

ct

u

s cons

en

ti

t De

u

m

e

sse

.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

69

29

. S

ee

ibi

d

. (f

ol

.

21v

Q

–

2

2

rA

): “

Isti a

u

te

m modo

d

emonst

rat

ioni

s non repu

gna

t qu

od

esse D

ei

es

t

ipse

De

u

s, cu

m hoc non

d

emonstr

et

u

r de

De

o, se

d r

atio

h

u

ius

t

ermini D

eus decl

are

tu

r.

R

u

rsu

s cu

m i

llo

modo de

monst

ran

di po

te

st stare

q

u

od De

um

esse

si

t

p

er se

n

ot

u

m

sa

pientibu

s: quia illu

d qu

od e

st sic pe

r se

no

tu

m no

n ha

b

et ra

ti

on

es

te

rmin

or

um n

otas

cu

ili

b

et

; e

t i

mmo non

est contr

a ratio

n

em

qu

od

al

iqu

id sit si

c per se

n

otu

m.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

69

30

. Se

e ibi

d

. (f

ol

.

22rA): “

Id autem

q

u

od i

m

p

or

tat

ur

p

er ho

c no

men De

us tripl

ici

ter

cogn

oscitu

r: pe

r exce

lle

n

ti

am, pe

r cau

sa

lit

atem, e

t per re

moti

one

m

, ut di

citur 5

de d

ivi

ni

s

no

min

ib

u

s.

E

xce

llit au

te

m

De

u

s qu

an

tu

m ad

p

rae

se

n

s quadr

u

pli

cite

r cr

ea

tu

ra

s. Primum

qu

an

tu

m

ad

em

in

en

ti

am

pot

en

tia

e. Sec

u

n

d

o q

u

an

tu

m

a

d

pu

lc

h

rit

ud

in

em

[

leg

e:

plen

it

ud

in

em

]

F

oo

tno

te

Page

Br

ea

k

70

pe

rf

ec

ti

on

is

. Ter

tio qu

an

tu

m

ad ex

ce

llen

ti

am

bonitat

is. Q

u

ar

to

q

u

ant

u

m ad ple

n

itudi

n

em

p

u

lc

hritud

in

is

.

Et s

ec

und

um h

ae

c s

u

n

t q

u

atu

or d

emo

ns

tra

tio

ne

s i

n

l

itte

ra

p

os

ita

e pe

r q

u

as

decl

arat

ur

De

u

m

e

sse. Nam cu

m de

clar

at

um e

st

quod De

u

s e

st illu

d qu

od

emin

et

omnibu

s

rebus

, cum n

ece

ss

e si

t tal

e

esse

, de

n

ecessi

tate

con

cl

u

di

tu

r De

u

m

e

sse

. Si

mi

le

e

st d

e

perfe

ctio

n

e.

Nam cum sit n

ece

ssari

u

m

e

sse

p

erfe

ct

issimum,

cum h

oc sit De

u

s, ne

ce

sse

e

st

De

u

m

e

sse

. Iteru

m

, cum

s

it n

ece

ssarium e

ss

e o

p

ti

mu

m e

t pu

lc

h

err

im

u

m

, n

ece

sse

est De

um

esse.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

70

31

. S

ee

ibi

d

. (f

ol

.

22rB

C

D): “

S

ec

undo

modo

de

cl

ar

at

u

r id

q

u

od di

citu

r per hoc nomen

Deus

p

er

c

au

sa

lit

at

em

. Ca

us

at

en

im

q

u

an

tu

m

a

d

p

res

ens

q

u

at

u

or

i

n

h

oc

u

n

iv

er

so

: ex q

u

ib

us

decl

arar

i h

abet. P

ri

m

o cau

sat e

sse

: qu

ia

totum

u

n

ive

rs

um

p

er i

p

sum e

st. Se

cu

nd

o motu

m.

Te

rt

io co

n

co

rdia

m

. Qu

ar

to

ordi

nem....

Pri

m

a [demo

n

str

ati

o]

e

st

: qui

a cu

m sit

ali

q

u

id e

n

s

ver

tib

ile

et

ver

tibi

le p

rae

su

p

p

on

at

in

ver

tibi

le, et

c

rea

bil

e in

cr

ea

bi

le;

i

g

it

u

r a

liq

ui

d es

t e

n

s

in

creabil

e: et hoc e

st De

us. Hoc i

d

em

est ar

guere

: omne

cr

ea

tu

m e

st ab

al

iquo

; cum non sit

ab

ir

e in

i

n

fi

ni

tu

m

, ne

c

si

t da

re

c

ir

cu

la

tion

em

in

cau

sis,

est dev

eni

re a

d

cau

sa

m

non ca

us

ata

m

:

quo

d

e

st De

us.

Et

il

la

demo

nstratio

sumi

tur e

x

eo

q

u

od

De

us

c

reat

r

es

et

d

at

es

se

r

eb

u

s.

..

.

Se

cunda [demo

n

str

atio

] sumi

tu

r

ex mo

tu

: qu

ia

o

m

ne

quo

d

mo

vetur

a

b

al

io

move

tur;

deve

n

ire

e

st e

rgo ad

p

en

itu

s immobi

le

: e

t h

oc

est De

us

.... Te

rt

ia

[de

m

ons

tra

tio] sumi

tu

r e

x

conn

ex

io

n

e. Nam cum

vi

de

amu

s par

te

s u

n

ive

rs

i e

sse

sic co

n

tr

arias et di

ve

rsas: o

p

ort

et e

sse

aliq

uod conn

ec

tens, e

t hoc e

st De

u

s....

Q

u

ar

ta

[de

m

ons

tra

tio] sum

itu

r e

x ordi

ne. C

u

m

eni

m

vide

amus nat

u

ra

m ordinate

age

re

et se

mper prop

ter bonum: o

p

or

te

t qui

d

esse

quo

d

nat

u

ra

m

d

ir

iga

t pr

op

te

r bo

nu

m

.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

71

32

. A

n

se

lm

ha

d a

rgu

ed

th

at G

od c

ann

ot

b

e c

onc

ei

ve

d

a

s no

t e

xi

sti

ng

i

n

Pr

os

lo

g

ion

ch

ap.

3.

Fo

r t

h

is

in

Bon

av

ent

ur

e s

ee h

is

In I Se

n

t.,

d

. 8

,

p

. 1

,

a. 1, q. 2;

De m

ys

ter

io Tr

in

it

at

is

, q.

1

, a

.

1.

F

oo

tno

te

Page

71

33

.

Aeg

idi

i Rom

an

i Op

er

a Om

ni

a,

ed. Wie

lockx,

v

ol. III. 1, 49: “Qu

od D

eum e

sse

non solu

m

es

t

si

mplicite

r n

ot

u

m,

sed e

tiam qu

oad n

os,

qu

ia scimu

s

d

e De

o qu

id

e

st, qu

ia

qu

o ma

iu

s

cogi

ta

ri non p

otest.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

71

34

. S

ee

ibi

d

.,

4

9–5

0: “

S

ed

no

n e

st i

ta

ib

i. Immo si

c: ‘

O

porte

t

n

os di

ce

re

De

um

esse

e

sse

al

iq

uo mo

d

o pe

r se

notu

m e

tiam qu

oa

d n

os.

’ Et

sub

d

it

u

r qu

od de

De

o

p

ossu

mu

s sci

re

non

qu

id

r

ei

,

sed qu

id

n

ominis, qu

ia

sci

mu

s qu

id

e

st qu

od

sign

if

ic

at h

oc n

omen ‘De

u

s.’

Et

in fi

ne

conclud

itu

r h

oc modo:

Deum e

sse e

sse

pe

r se

notu

m qu

oa

d nos, qu

ia

e

st per se

n

otu

m

sapi

entibu

s. Et

si

hoc n

on

te

n

etu

r commun

it

er,

nu

llum tame

n

v

ide

tu

r in

ho

c pe

ri

cu

lu

m fi

de

i.

”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

71

35

. Fo

r the

La

tin t

ext se

e

Sige

r

d

e Bra

b

an

t. É

crits de

lo

giqu

e,

de

mora

le

e

t de

ph

ysiq

ue

, e

d

.

B. Ba

zán

(

Lou

va

in

: Pu

bl

ic

at

ions

u

n

iver

sit

ai

re

s;

Pa

ri

s:

Béat

ri

ce

-N

au

wel

aer

ts

, 1

9

7

4

), 67

–7

3

.

Fo

r a br

ie

f discuss

io

n

o

f th

is

p

oint see

F

. Van

Ste

en

be

rg

hen,

M

aî

tr

e S

iger d

e B

rab

an

t

(Lou

va

in

: Pu

bli

cati

ons u

n

iv

ersi

ta

ire

s; Pa

ris: V

ande

r-O

ye

z,

197

7),

29

5–

96.

F

oo

tno

te

Page

71

36

. See

Imp

ossibi

lia

I

(ed. Bazán

, 7

0

): “

q

u

od De

u

m

e

sse

sapie

n

ti

bu

s si

t pe

r se

n

ot

u

m,

q

u

ia

ill

u

d qu

od

est causans t

an

tu

m

non caus

atu

m

, n

on

de

pendens in e

sse suo e

x ali

q

uo

F

oo

tno

te

Page

Br

ea

k

72

sicut

ex causa, o

p

ortet quo

d

ex

rat

ione

sua

habe

at e

sse

, no

n e

x al

iquo ali

o, i

ta quo

d

est re

s

qu

ae de

su

i rati

one

est e

sse. Nun

c au

te

m

p

er se

n

ot

a su

nt

p

ri

n

ci

p

ia

q

u

ae

cognoscu

nt

ur

cogn

itio

n

e te

rm

in

or

um, eo

qu

od

p

ra

edica

tu

m si

t

d

e rati

one

su

bie

cti. Et

i

d

eo

sap

ie

n

tibus

,

qu

ib

us n

ot

a e

st r

atio

su

bie

cti

h

u

iu

s propo

si

tio

n

is: ‘

D

eus e

st

,’ cu

m e

x su

a ratio

n

e si

t,

non e

x

al

iq

u

o a

lio

, p

er s

e

no

ta

e

st,

n

on

ex

a

liq

uo

al

io

; i

ta

q

u

od

D

eu

m

e

sse

q

u

ae

st

io

n

em no

n ha

b

et,

q

u

ia

c

aus

am n

on

ha

be

t.

Q

u

ae

st

io

ne

s e

n

im a

eq

u

al

es nume

ro sunt sciti

s.

No

n e

st aut

em hoc

scibi

le

, se

d

n

otum p

er se

sapi

entibu

s.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

72

37

. See

In

I

Post. An

al

., le

ct

. 4.

F

oo

tno

te

Page

73

38

. Se

e ST I, q. 2, a. 2

: “

d

uple

x e

st demo

nstr

atio

.

Una quae

e

st pe

r causam,

et di

citur

pr

op

te

r qu

id

:

et hae

c e

st

p

er pr

io

ra simpl

ici

te

r. Ali

a

est pe

r

ef

fectum

, e

t dici

tur demo

nstratio

qu

ia

: e

t h

ae

c est pe

r ea qu

ae

su

n

t prio

ra

qu

oa

d n

os: cu

m e

n

im e

ffe

ctu

s a

liq

uis nobis

est

manife

stio

r qu

am sua cau

sa, pe

r e

ffe

ct

um p

roc

ed

im

u

s a

d

c

og

n

it

ione

m

c

au

sae

. Ex

q

u

oli

b

et

au

tem e

ffe

ctu

po

te

st de

m

on

stra

ri

p

ropri

am ca

usa

m

e

ius e

sse... qu

ia

, cu

m e

ffe

ctu

s de

pendeat

a

ca

us

a,

po

si

to

e

ff

ect

u

ne

ce

ss

e e

st

c

au

sam

p

rae

ex

is

tere

.”

Also

se

e

Th

om

as’

s di

scu

ssio

n

i

n

In

I P

ost.

An

al

., le

ct

. 24

.

F

oo

tno

te

Page

73

39

. Se

e ST I, q. 2, a. 2

, ad

2:

“c

u

m

de

m

on

stratu

r causa pe

r ef

fe

ct

um,

ne

cesse

e

st u

ti

ef

fectu

lo

co de

fi

n

itio

n

is

cau

sae

, ad pr

ob

an

du

m cau

sam

esse

: e

t h

oc maxime

co

n

tingit i

n

De

o.

Quia ad

pr

ob

an

dum

al

iqu

id e

sse, nece

sse

e

st

accipe

re

p

ro

m

edi

o

qu

id s

ig

n

if

ic

et

nom

en

, non a

u

te

m

qu

od

quid e

st

: q

u

ia qu

aesti

o

qu

id e

st

, se

qu

it

ur a

d

qu

aestionem

an

est

. Nomi

na

aute

m De

i

im

p

onun

tur ab

e

ffe

ct

ib

us

, u

t

po

st

ea

o

ste

nd

et

u

r:

und

e,

d

emo

ns

trand

o De

um e

ss

e pe

r

effe

ct

um, acci

p

ere

possu

mu

s pro

m

edi

o qu

id

sign

if

ic

et hoc nome

n

Deu

s.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

73

40

. Se

e ST I, q. 3, a. 4

, ad

2: “

A

d

s

ecun

d

u

m

dice

nd

um

q

u

od

esse

du

plicite

r d

icit

u

r:

u

n

o modo

si

gni

fic

at

ac

tu

m

es

se

nd

i;

a

lio m

od

o s

igni

fic

at

c

om

p

os

it

io

n

em

pr

opos

it

ion

is

, qu

am

F

oo

tno

te

Page

Br

ea

k

74

an

ima

ad

in

ve

ni

t

co

ni

un

ge

n

s pra

ed

ic

atum s

u

bi

ec

to

. Primo

i

g

it

ur mo

d

o

ac

ci

p

ie

n

d

o

esse

, no

n

possu

mus sc

ir

e e

sse

De

i,

sicut

ne

c e

ius

esse

n

ti

am: se

d sol

u

m se

cu

nd

o modo. Sci

m

u

s e

n

im

quo

d

hae

c proposi

ti

o q

u

am fo

rm

am

us de

De

o, cum d

ici

m

u

s

De

us est

, v

era

e

st.

E

t

ho

c

sc

im

us

ex

ei

u

s

eff

ecti

b

us, u

t su

pra di

ct

um e

st.”

Al

so se

e Th

om

as’s r

emar

ks i

n

De

pote

n

tia

, q.

7

, a

. 2,

ad 1

(Mari

etti

e

d

., 19

1–

92):

“A

d

primum e

rgo

d

ice

ndum, quo

d

ens e

t

esse

dici

tur dupli

cite

r,

ut pate

t V

Me

ta

ph

. Qu

an

doque

enim sign

ificat

esse

n

ti

am

re

i, si

ve

actu

m e

ssendi; quan

do

q

u

e

ver

o s

ign

if

ic

at

veri

tat

em

p

ro

p

os

iti

onis, e

tiam

in h

is qu

ae

e

sse

n

on

habe

n

t: sicut

d

icimus qu

od

cae

ci

tas e

st

, qu

ia

ve

ru

m e

st h

ominem e

sse

cae

cu

m

. C

u

m e

rgo di

ca

t Damascenu

s, qu

od

esse

De

i est nobis

m

an

ife

st

um, acci

p

itu

r e

ss

e D

ei

se

cu

nd

o modo, e

t n

on

pri

m

o.

Pri

m

o e

n

im

modo

es

t

id

em

es

se

D

ei q

u

od

es

t s

u

b

st

ant

ia

:

et

s

ic

u

t ei

us

s

u

b

st

an

tia

es

t i

g

no

ta

, it

a et

es

se

.

Se

cundo

aut

em mo

d

o scimus

q

u

onia

m De

us e

st,

qu

on

ia

m

han

c

pr

op

ositi

on

em in

in

te

lle

ctu

n

ost

ro

con

ci

p

imus ex e

ffe

cti

b

us ipsi

u

s.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

74

41

. Se

e ST I, q. 3, a. 5

: “

E

t e

x ho

c pate

t

q

u

od

no

n habe

t g

enus, ne

que

dif

fe

re

n

ti

as; ne

q

u

e

est

def

initi

o i

p

si

us; ne

q

u

e d

emo

nstr

atio

,

ni

si

pe

r

ef

fectum

:

q

u

ia def

initi

o e

st e

x ge

ne

re

e

t

di

ff

er

en

ti

a,

d

em

on

st

ratio

ni

s

autem

me

dium

es

t

d

ef

in

it

io.

”

See

al

so

De

p

ote

n

tia

,

q

.7

,a

.3

;

SC

G I, ch

ap

. 2

5

.

F

oo

tno

te

Page

74

42

. S

ee

S

T

I

, q

. 3,

a.

5

: “

ens

n

on

po

tes

t e

ss

e ge

n

u

s al

ic

ui

us

: o

m

n

e e

n

im

ge

nu

s ha

b

et

diff

ere

n

ti

as qua

e sunt e

xtr

a e

ss

ent

ia

m

g

ene

ri

s;

nul

la

a

u

te

m

d

iffe

re

ntia

posse

t

inve

niri, quae

esset e

xtr

a e

n

s; qu

ia

non e

n

s n

on

po

te

st e

sse

d

iffe

rentia.

”

Th

at

be

in

g i

s

n

ot a genu

s i

s

im

plie

d by Th

om

as

’s

t

h

eo

ry

of the an

alo

g

y

of be

ing.

For th

is in Th

om

as

se

e Wipp

el

,

Th

e

Me

ta

ph

ysi

cal

Th

ou

gh

t of Th

om

as

Aqu

in

as

, 66

–93

.

F

oo

tno

te

Page

75

43

. S

ee

S

C

G

I,

chap.

1

4

(e

d.

le

on

in

a ma

nu

al

is,

15

): “

E

st a

u

te

m

vi

a

re

moti

on

is u

te

n

du

m

pr

ae

cipu

e in

co

n

sid

er

at

ion

e divina

e su

bsta

nt

ia

e.

Na

m divina

su

bsta

nt

ia

omne

m fo

rm

am

qua

m

in

tel

le

ctus

noste

r

atting

it

,

sua imme

nsi

tate ex

ce

dit: e

t sic i

p

sam ap

pre

h

en

de

re

non p

ossu

mu

s

cogn

oscendo qu

id e

st

....

Ad

p

roce

d

en

du

m igi

tu

r cir

ca De

i

cogn

it

io

n

em p

er via

m

re

m

oti

on

is,

acci

piam

us pr

in

ci

pium id qu

od

ex sup

eri

oribu

s i

am

m

an

ife

st

um e

st

, sci

lice

t quod De

u

s si

t

omni

no immobi

lis.

”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

76

44

. See

De

pote

n

tia

, q. 7

, a.

1

(

M

ar

iet

ti ed.

, 18

9

):

“O

st

en

su

m

e

st

en

im

in

al

ia

dis

p

ut

at

io

n

e,

omnia e

n

tia a

b

un

o pr

imo e

n

te

e

sse

,

q

u

od

qu

idem primum e

n

s De

u

m

dicimus

. Qua

m

vis

au

tem in

u

n

o e

t

eo

dem quod qu

an

doqu

e in

ve

n

itu

r in a

ctu

, qua

n

do

q

u

e in pote

n

tia, p

otentia

tempo

re

prius sit ac

tu,

natur

a aut

em poste

rius,

si

mpli

cite

r t

ame

n o

p

or

te

t actum e

sse

pr

io

re

m

p

ote

ntia

, no

n s

olu

m

natu

ra

s

ed te

mp

or

e,

eo

q

u

od

o

m

ne

e

n

s i

n

po

te

n

ti

a

re

d

u

ci

tu

r in

ac

tum a

b

aliq

uo

ent

e ac

tu

. I

llu

d

er

g

o en

s q

u

od

o

m

ni

a en

ti

a f

ec

it

es

se

a

ct

u

, et

i

p

su

m

a

nu

llo a

lio

es

t,

opo

rte

t e

sse

primum in actu, ab

sque

ali

q

ua po

te

ntia

e pe

rmix

ti

one

. Na

m

s

i e

sse

t a

liquo

modo

in

pote

n

tia

, opo

rte

ret aliu

d e

n

s prius e

sse pe

r qu

od fie

ret act

u

. In

o

m

n

i a

u

te

m co

m

p

os

ito

quali

cumque

composi

tio

ne

, opo

rte

t p

otentiam ac

tu

i commi

sc

er

i.

I

n

composi

tis e

n

im ve

l

u

n

u

m

eor

u

m

ex qu

ibu

s es

t

co

m

p

os

it

io es

t in

pot

en

tia

ad

a

lt

er

u

m

, ut

m

at

er

ia

ad

f

or

m

am

, s

u

biec

tu

m

ad

acci

de

n

s, genu

s ad d

iffe

re

n

ti

am; vel sal

te

m

omn

es pa

rte

s su

n

t in

p

ot

ent

ia

a

d

totu

m... e

t

sic nu

llum composi

tu

m

pote

st

esse

ac

tus p

ri

m

u

s. E

n

s aut

em primu

m

, qu

od

De

u

s e

st,

oporte

t

es

se

ac

tu

m

p

u

ru

m

, ut

os

te

ns

u

m

es

t.

I

m

p

os

sib

ile es

t er

g

o D

eum

c

om

p

os

it

um

es

se

, un

d

e

opo

rte

t q

u

od sit

omn

in

o simplex.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

76

45

. Ibid.

: “

S

ec

un

da

ratio

e

st

qu

ia

cum co

mpo

siti

o n

on

si

t ni

si

ex

di

ve

rsis,

i

p

sa div

ersa i

n

di

ge

n

t

aliq

uo agent

e ad h

oc q

u

od un

ia

n

tur

. No

n

en

im di

vers

a, i

n

qu

an

tu

m h

u

iu

smodi

, un

it

a su

nt.

Omn

e a

u

tem co

mp

os

it

um

h

abet ess

e, secu

nd

um qu

od ea,

ex qu

ibu

s compo

n

it

ur

, un

iu

nt

ur

.

Oport

et e

rg

o qu

od

o

m

n

e compo

situ

m

de

pendeat

a

b

a

liq

uo prio

re

ag

en

te. P

rimu

m

e

rgo e

n

s,

q

u

od

D

eu

s e

st,

a

q

u

o

sunt o

m

ni

a,

no

n p

ote

st

e

sse

c

ompo

situm.

”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

76

46

. Ibid.: “

T

er

ti

o

ra

tio

e

st, qui

a o

p

ortet primum

ens,

q

u

od De

us

est, e

sse pe

rfe

ct

issimum,

e

t

per co

nse

q

ue

ns o

p

ti

mum.... O

p

timum

aute

m e

st

in

q

u

o nihil

e

st qu

od car

eat

bo

n

it

ate, si

cu

t

al

bissi

mum e

st in

quo

ni

hi

l n

igre

d

in

is

admi

sc

et

ur.

H

oc a

u

te

m in

nu

llo

co

mposito

e

st

po

ss

ib

ile

.

Na

m bo

n

u

m

quod resulta

t e

x compo

sitio

n

e pa

rtium,

p

er qu

od

t

ot

u

m e

st

bo

n

u

m, non ine

st

al

ic

ui

p

art

iu

m. U

n

de

part

es

non sunt bonae

i

lla

b

oni

tate

q

u

ae

e

st totius pr

op

ri

a. O

p

ortet e

rgo

id

quod e

st

opt

imu

m, e

sse

simpli

ci

ss

im

u

m

, e

t omni co

mp

os

iti

on

e car

ere

.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

77

47

. See

De

pote

n

tia

, q. 7, a

.

2 (19

1

): “

cum al

iquae

causae

e

ffe

ctus dive

rs

os

pr

od

uce

n

te

s

communicant i

n

uno

ef

fe

ct

u,

p

rae

te

r

d

ive

rs

os

ef

fe

ct

us

, o

p

ortet quo

d

il

lu

d commune

p

ro

d

ucant

ex

vi

rtu

te

al

icuius

su

peri

oris

ca

u

sae

cu

ius i

llu

d e

st

p

ropri

u

s e

ffe

ctu

s. E

t h

oc i

d

eo

q

u

ia, cu

m

pr

or

ius

ef

fectus

p

roducatur ab a

liq

ua

causa

se

cu

n

d

u

m

suam propriam n

at

u

ra

m vel

fo

rm

am,

dive

rs

ae

ca

usa

e h

abent

es

div

ersa

s na

tu

ra

s

et

fo

rm

as

opo

rte

t q

u

od habe

ant proprio

s e

ffe

ct

us

dive

rs

os

.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

77

48

. Se

e ibi

d

.: “

O

mnes au

te

m caus

ae

cr

ea

ta

e commu

nican

t i

n

un

o

eff

ectu

q

u

i e

st e

sse, l

ic

et

singu

la

e pr

op

ri

os e

ff

ectu

s ha

be

an

t,

in

quibu

s dist

in

guu

n

tu

r. C

alor e

n

im fac

it ca

lidum esse

, e

t

ae

di

ficat

or faci

t d

omu

m e

sse

.

Co

n

ve

n

iu

n

t e

rgo i

n

hoc qu

od

cau

san

t e

sse, se

d diff

erun

t in h

oc

qu

od

i

g

n

is caus

at ignem, e

t ae

di

fica

to

r causa

t d

omum.

O

p

or

te

t

er

g

o

esse

al

iqu

am

caus

am

su

pe

ri

or

em

o

m

nibus

cu

ius virtu

te

omnia caus

en

t

esse

, e

t

ei

u

s e

sse

sit proprius e

ffe

ct

us.

E

t

h

ae

c

cau

sa e

st

D

eus. Proprius aut

em e

ffe

ctu

s cu

iu

sl

ib

et

causae

proce

d

it

ab i

p

sa

se

cu

n

d

um

simi

litudi

ne

m suae

natur

ae. O

p

orte

t

ergo quod

h

oc qu

od e

st e

sse, si

t su

bst

an

ti

a ve

l natu

ra

De

i.

Et pr

op

te

r h

oc d

ici

tu

r

in li

b.

de

C

au

sis

, quo

d

int

el

lig

entia no

n dat e

sse

ni

si i

n

q

u

ant

u

m e

st

d

ivin

a,

et

q

u

od

p

rim

u

s ef

fe

ct

u

s es

t

es

se

, et

n

on

es

t

an

te

ip

su

m

c

reat

u

m

a

liq

ui

d

.”

F

oo

tno

te

Page

78

49

. Se

e ST I, q. 8, a. 2

.

F

oo

tno

te

Page

78

50

. Tho

m

as ar

gues f

or the

i

n

corpore

al

ity o

f God i

n

SC

G I

, chap. 20

; ST I, q. 3, a

.

1. O

n

the

in

co

rp

or

ea

lit

y of a

n

g

els

,

see

De en

te

, chap. 4; ST

I,

q

. 5

0

, a

. 2

. In a

d

opting

this posi

tio

n

Th

om

as i

s al

so re

je

cti

n

g a theo

ry

o

f un

iv

er

sal

h

yl

omo

rp

h

ism. F

or a discu

ssi

on of this, se

e A.

Fo

re

st

,

La

str

u

ct

ure

m

étaphysi

q

ue

du co

ncret se

lo

n

sa

int Tho

m

as d’

Aquin

,

2nd

e

d

. (

Pa

ri

s:

V

rin

, 195

6),

9

8–1

27

.

F

oo

tno

te

Page

78

51

. See

In

I

Sent

.,

d.

37

,

q.

3

, a.

1;

Qu

odl

.

I,

q.

3

,

a.

1;

S

T

I,

q.

52,

a

. 1.

F

oo

tno

te

Page

78

52

. O

n

e sho

u

ld

no

te

that in hi

s

Ex

posi

tio

li

bri B

oeti

i

De

e

b

do

madi

bu

s Th

om

as

in

ter

p

ret

s

B

oe

thi

us

to

mea

n

th

at an

ge

ls

are

no

t in

p

la

ce

ci

rc

ums

cr

ip

tiv

ely

: “

S

et

ad

a

p

p

re

h

en

d

end

um

rem i

n

co

rp

or

ea

m,

s

olus intel

le

ctu

s

sa

pie

n

tum

c

ons

u

rg

it,

n

am u

u

lg

ar

iu

m

ho

mi

nu

m in

tel

le

ct

us

n

on

t

ra

n

sc

end

u

n

t ym

ag

in

at

io

ne

m

, q

u

e es

t s

olu

m

c

or

p

or

al

iu

m

r

er

u

m

, et

id

eo

ea

q

u

e s

u

n

t

pr

op

ri

a co

rp

or

um, p

u

ta e

sse

in lo

co ci

rc

umscr

ip

ti

ve

, i

n

te

lle

ctu

s sapi

en

tu

m stati

m

r

emo

u

et

a

rebus

incorp

or

ei

s,

qu

od

uul

g

u

s face

re

non

p

otest”

(Le

onine

ed., vol

.

50, 2

6

9

).

F

oo

tno

te

Page

79

53

. F

or

a su

cci

n

ct state

m

en

t

of th

is

se

e ST I, q. 84, a. 7.

F

oo

tno

te

Page

79

54

. An

ea

rl

ie

r v

ersio

n o

f thi

s

p

aper was

re

ad a

t th

e 3

5

th

I

n

te

rn

at

io

n

al

C

ong

re

ss

o

n

M

ed

ie

va

l

S

tudie

s,

he

ld

at K

al

ama

zo

o,

M

ich.

, M

ay

4–7

, 200

0.

Pa

ge Br

eak

80

Pa

ge Br

eak

81

NO

TE

:

T

h

is

is a prin

ta

ble pag

e of

a

ll

th

e

re

co

rds in th

e art

icl

e y

ou w

ere v

iew

ing.

T

h

is

is

not

an ap

prox

imat

ion of

th

e

ap

pear

ance of

th

e

or

igin

al prin

te

d

page

.

A

ll

rig

h

ts r

ese

rv

ed

. T

h

ese

w

o

rks ar

e

co

p

yrig

h

t

p

ro

tect

ed

. A

n

y

u

se

o

th

er

t

h

a

n

p

er

s

on

al

r

eq

u

ir

es

p

er

m

iss

io

n

f

rom

t

h

e r

esp

ec

ti

ve

jour

na

l pub

lis

he

rs

.

P

O

IES

IS

i

s a j

o

in

t v

ent

ur

e betw

ee

n Int

eLe

x Co

rp

o

rati

o

n

a

n

d the

P

h

ilos

o

p

hy

Do

cu

men

ta

ti

o

n Ce

nte

r.

T

o

su

bs

cr

ib

e to

PO

IES

IS

, pl

ea

se

se

nd a mes

sa

ge

to

or

der

@

pdc

n

et.

or

g. Co

py

ri

gh

t fo

r al

l jo

ur

na

l tex

t i

s h

el

d

by

th

e r

espe

cti

ve

o

w

ne

r o

f e

ac

h

jo

ur

n

al

ti

tl

e.

In

fo

rm

ati

o

n i

s s

u

bj

ec

t to

ch

an

ge w

ith

ou

t n

oti

ce

. P

le

as

e d

ir

ec

t

inq

u

ir

ies

a

b

ou

t th

is web

sit

e t

o

we

b

m

as

te

r@

nlx.

co

m