The Infamous Svjatoslav: Master of Duplicity in War and

Peace?

By Walter K. Hanak

from: Peace and War in Byzantium

Several decades ago Jonathan Shepard elaborated upon the notion, although as he admits the
idea was not original with him and earlier had been expounded upon by other scholars, that
the Byzantine empire had gained a brief respite from Northern barbarians when in 968
Svjatoslav (942-972?), the prince of Kievan Rus', abandoned his Bulgar campaign below the
Danube and was compelled by circumstances to return, albeit reluctantly, to Kiev. Two
paramount factors explain Svjatoslav's return. First, the fortified city of Kiev had come under
a prolonged siege by the Turkic Pechenegs, and second, the return was prompted at the behest
of his mother Olga to save Rus' from ruin. The Byzantine empire had gained a momentary
advantage, and their steppe diplomacy of inciting one barbarian nation against another had
proved successful. Shepard, however, primarily is concerned in this essay

1

with the role of

Byzantine propaganda and its impact upon the Kievan Rus' rather than simply with the
mechanism of state diplomacy. He notes, "the Byzantines feared the Russians [Rus']. It is now
worth considering how the Byzantines frightened the Russians, or at least how they tried to."

2

In the course of age-old struggles between emerging nations and established powers, the
interaction between advocacy, diplomacy, and the solutions to the problems introduced by
war and/or peace obviously are all-important and complicated. And yet, while the role of
propaganda doubtless is essential in state relations, what is central to this discussion is the
Rus' and Byzantine annalistic fascination with one key figure - the Kievan Rus' prince
Svjatoslav, the son of the Varangian prince Igor and of the renown Slavic princess and sainted
mother Olga who had undertaken a personal conversion to Byzantine Christianity a decade
earlier.

3

For the Rus' annalists,

4

the pagan Svjatoslav was an unprincipled warrior who enjoyed

the reckless life of a Varangian adventurer and thrived on the exploits of military campaigns.
Before his inroads into the Balkans, he first, at the relatively young age of twenty-one or
twenty-two, campaigned extensively in the Don Volga region, warring against the Vjatichi
and Khazars, and even the Jasy, known as the Alans, and the Kasogy or the Adygi who
inhabited the Kuban basin that adjoined the region of the Caucasus. His conquests included
the cities of Kazeran, Itil, Semender, and Tmutorokan. His exploits entered for the year 965
are described vividly in The Russian Primary Chronicle.

5

The annalists relate: "Svjatoslav

went against the Khazars. The Khazars learned of this and came out against them with their
prince, the khagan; and a battle began to take place, there on the field of battle. Svjatoslav
defeated the Khazars and even took their city of Bjela Vjezha [Sarkel, the Khazar fortress-city
on the lower Don River]. And he triumphed over the Jasy and Kasogy."

More significant for this discussion is the characterization by the Rus' annalists of

Svjatoslav and his men. The preceding entry for 964

6

views him not as a disciplined

commander of a large army, but as a Varangian renegade who moved about like a snow
leopard and surrounded himself with a small, select retinue of brave warriors as undisciplined
in the skills of organized warfare as himself. We are told that they lived as typical Varangians,

having neither wagons nor kettles for the preparation of food. Rather, they cut up their meat -
mainly horseflesh, game, or beef - into thin strips and heated it over the coals of a fire. They
did not sleep in tents, but on horse blankets, and placed saddles under their heads.

7

This was

then a small select retinue composed of valiant warriors from diverse nations, but mainly a
retinue attracted to Svjatoslav, one of the Varangian leaders who through the fortunes of war
undoubtedly could lead them to achieve fame and gain plunder. This was not a homogeneous
and great army that sought to conquer and to occupy the Don-Volga region, creating in effect
a territorial adjunct to the Kievan Rus' state.

8

Its primary goals were far more limited, as

stated above to gain fame and plunder.

While in the vicinity of the Caucasus, the exploits of Svjatoslav came to the attention

of the Byzantines. As the Byzantine-Bulgar conflict of the mid-960s intensified, the
Byzantine emperor Nikephoros Phokas sought a barbarian ally to apply pressure upon the
Bulgars to their north while the imperial forces would press the attack from the south. For this
purpose, Nikephoros instructed his patrician and chief magistrate of Cherson, Kalokyras, to
negotiate an alliance with Svjatoslav.

9

An agreement was consummated, and the Rus' prince

received a generous inducement for himself and his retinue of fifteen hundred pounds of gold,
the equivalent of 180,000 Byzantine gold solidi.

10

Byzantine historians relate that Kalokyras

promised Svjatoslav not only that he could conquer Bulgaria, but that he also could retain the
territory for himself. And as a further inducement, Kalokyras had promised the Rus' prince
immeasurable treasures from the Byzantine purse. All of this, we are told by Byzantine
historians, was intended to aid Kalokyras in his grandiose scheme to secure the imperial
throne for himself, an attempt at which he obviously failed. There survives no evidence that
Svjatoslav assisted Kalokyras in gaining the imperial seat, for the Rus' prince had other
alternative designs that suited him better.

11

In 967 Svjatoslav marched to the Danube to attack the Bulgars. His plan of action was

designed for the expediencies of the moment, and lacked a consistent and well-planned
process, concerned as he was with a prolonged military undertaking. Achieving a great
victory, however, he captured eighty Bulgar towns along the Danube and established his new
political center in Perejaslavets or Little Preslav.

12

His stay there, however, was brief, perhaps

only for the winter and the early months of the following year. The Khazars, previously
humiliated by Svjatoslav, sought revenge and permitted large hordes of Pechenegs to enter the
Rus' steppe and to threaten Kiev, then under the regency of his mother Olga. She and her
grandsons, Jaropolk, Oleg, and Vladimir, the progeny of Svjatoslav by different women,
defended Kiev with limited resources, lacking sufficient troops for its defense, and food and
water for its residents.

13

Olga had even contemplated surrender rather than accept the ruin of

the city and the annihilation of its populace.

Svjatoslav had as yet played no major role in the defense of Kiev and appeared not to

have been too concerned about its fate. The Russian Primary Chronicle records Olga's and her
grandsons' stern admonition: "You prince, square accounts and observe foreign lands, but
your own you abandon. The Pechenegs have all but seized us, even your mother and your
children. If you do not come to return to us, then they will capture us."

14

He quickly returned

to Kiev, lifted the siege of the city, and drove the Pechenegs far off and deep into the steppe.
It was not his intention, however, to dem–onstrate a magnanimous response to the plight of
Kiev, nor to be in permanent residence there. On the contrary, he announced to his mother and
nobles: "It is not pleasant for me to remain in Kiev; I desire to reside in Perejaslavets on the
Danube, for that is the center of my land, where all wealth is concentrated."

15

His motive for

relocating his center to Perejaslavets were the riches available there, among them gold, silks,

wine, fruits from the Byzantine empire, silver and horses from Hungary and Bohemia, and
from his own Kievan lands furs, wax, honey, and slaves.

16

Though he may not have wished

totally to relinquish his rule over Kievan Rus', for he depended upon Rus' natural resources to
sustain his trade relations with the Balkans and East European nations, there is no evidence in
the Rus' annals that he sought peaceful intercourse in the Danubian region. More than likely,
he sought to acquire these new riches through intrigue, armed conflict, and plunder. Also, his
duplicity must not have endeared him to his mother, his sons to whom he had relinquished his
authority, and the Kievan populace, for Olga in particular, aged, in declining health, and
broken-hearted, passed away within a few days of his announcement to depart. Svjatoslav
remained in Kiev only to witness her interment and then returned to the Danube region.

Svjatoslav's absence from Perejaslavets gave the Bulgars ample opportunity to plan a

recapture of the city. Having retaken it early in 969, they fortified themselves within its walls.
Upon his return in the same year, perhaps August,

17

to the Danubian estuary the Rus' prince,

however, sought to recapture this prize from the Bulgars, who had now settled their
differences with the Byzantines and were allied with them against Svjatoslav.

18

In the initial

stage of the battle for Perejaslavets, in the early morning hours, Svjatoslav failed to dislodge
the Bulgars, and as The Russian Primary Chronicle relates, "there was great carnage."

19

He

beseeched his men: "Here we will fall. Let us advance men, brothers and reti–nue."

20

Such an

entreaty to troops is a commonplace in medieval sources and does not merit special
identification with Varangian military strategy nor their will to die on the field of battle, lest
they be accused of cowardice. By nightfall, the men he had rallied succeeded in storming the
city and captured the fortification. With this victory, Svjatoslav was inflated with success and
he now even contemplated a conquest of other cities and especially Constantinople. Since the
first Varangian assault upon Constantinople about 860 and the repeated attacks of 911 and
941, there had persisted among the Byzantines a concern about possible Varangian conquest.
Their fears, therefore, were not unjustified. But regarding the events of 969, Leo Diakonos
said only that the Rus' prince's victory had been achieved by one with an uncultivated
courage.

21

Turning his attention first to the Byzantine cities en route to Constantinople,
Svjatoslav took pleasure in informing them of his intent to conquer them.

22

The Russian

Primary Chronicle wishes to convey to us the impression that the Byzantines were unable to
offer adequate military resistance; hence, Svjatoslav laid waste their cities along the route and
they remained uninhabited even centuries later, even at the time of the compilation of the Rus'
annal in the early twelfth century. Whether Svjatoslav totally depopulated these centers is
unclear from the evidence at hand in the several sources. Also, the Chronicle forcefully
stressed that Byzantine officials sought to offer Svjatoslav tribute in the form of a bribe for
the prince and his men to avoid a military disaster. This assertion in the Rus' annal must be
treated with substantial circumspection. The Rus' annal notes that the Byzantines sought to
determine the exact number of warriors led by Svjatoslav so that they might pay the correct
sum per head. The Rus' annalists, however, would have us believe that this overture was not
made in good faith, but on the contrary that the Byzantines, given to being deceptive and
making falsehoods, had employed deception and "were crafty."

23

The Rus' annalists appear to

applaud Svjatoslav for his ability to avoid being misled by the mendacious Greeks. Thus he
informed the Byzantines that he had a force of twenty thousand men, twice the number he
supposedly had.

24

And the Rus' annal relates that the Byzantines had amassed a force of one

hundred thousand men, although this figure may as well be inflated, and paid no tribute to the
Rus' prince and his men.

The Greek chronicles of Leo Diakonos and Kedrenos

25

provide us with a more

accurate chronology and description of the events that had transpired. In the summer of 969
Svjatoslav took Great Preslav, the capital of the Bulgar state. The city was situated to the
north of the Haemus Mountains, which terrain he then crossed the following spring. His
immediate goal was to attack and to occupy Adrianople. Political circumstances within the
Byzantine em–pire, however, complicated Svjatoslav's designs. The Byzantine emperor,
Nikephoros Phokas, was assassinated on 10 December 969, and was succeeded by his nephew
John Tzimiskes. Tzimiskes apparently sought a brief respite from military confrontation to
consolidate his imperial position; thus he sought to come to a temporary arrangement with
Svjatoslav. The negotiations, however, were fruitless. We are provided with a detailed
description by the Rus' annalists of how their prince was not deceived by the envoys of the
emperor. To determine whether he preferred gold or silks, the Greek envoys brought both,
placed the items before the prince, and were instructed to observe carefully whether the prince
was affected by one or the other, that is, which item was more to his liking and caught his
attention. Svjatoslav, however, did not notice the gifts and instructed his servants to remove
them from his presence and to retain them for safekeeping. Not having detected any visible
response demonstrating his preferences, Tzimiskes advised his envoys to return to Svjatoslav
and to make a gift of arms, among them a sword and the proper military accoutrements. We
are then told that Svjatoslav admired these gifts and praised them, leaving us with the
impression that the Rus' prince only prized gifts of martial value.

Having gained a brief delay in the fighting, Tzimiskes used the interlude to train

special military forces, and by the end of the summer of 970 he was prepared to attack
Svjatoslav and his retinue. Detailed information on how this iron-clad force was trained for
combat with the Varangians who possessed superior swords and greater agility in their use is
not furnished in the Byzantine sources. We do not know that Tzimiskes prepared for both a
land and sea attack. And we can only surmise that Tzimiskes was familiar with Varangian
tactics and arms, and that these Rus' were more comfortable fighting a sea battle than one on
land. He denied the Varangians a sea advantage and prepared his special forces accordingly.
Shortly thereafter, the army of Tzimiskes commanded by Bardas Skleros soundly routed
Svjatoslav's band of adventurers before Arcadiopolis, a band whose numbers apparently had
been substantially depleted by previous assaults. The Rus' were lured into an ambush that had
been disguised by Skleros as a strategic withdrawal.

26

The actual Rus' losses cannot be

determined, although we may surmise that there were substantial casualties and even
desertions.

The Russian Primary Chronicle, on the other hand, furnishes us with a contrasting

description of the battle and of its outcome. S.N. Soloviev correctly observes that the Rus'
annalistic account, though clearly inconsistent with Greek sources, is based upon the
exaggerations of Svjatoslav's lieutenant, Sveinald, who had safely returned to Kiev after this
major battle. The annal further erroneously claims a victory for Svjatoslav.

27

The Rus' annal,

though admitting that Svjatoslav and his retinue were startled at the sight of an overwhelming
multitude of Byzantine forces that far outnumbered his retainers, notes that they were
encouraged to make a stand against the Greeks. Svjatoslav in a lengthy statement is reputed to
have said:

"Already there is nowhere we can flee. Whether we wish or do not wish to make a stand, let us not bring shame
upon the land of Rus'.

28

But let us sacrifice our bodies here to death, for we cannot have shame. And if we flee,

we shall be disgraced. Let us not run off, but stand firmly. I shall lead before you, and wherever my head falls,
then care for yourselves." And his warriors replied: "Wherever your head [falls], there we will even place our
heads."

29

Svjatoslav's expression of concern and fear of embarrassing the land of Rus' is without doubt
an exaggeration, for the Rus' prince had lost interest in his homeland, viewed Kiev with
disregard and contempt, and sought fame and fortune elsewhere. The Rus' annalists should
have correctly interpreted Svjatoslav's statements as an expression of preserving a Varangian
tradition of fighting to the death even against overwhelming odds.

Tzimiskes could not at once follow up on this victory because of an internal uprising

conducted by Bardas Phokas, and hence the emperor delayed until the spring of 971 to
continue an aggressive campaign against Svjatoslav. Once he did launch the assault, both on
land and sea, the Byzantine emperor was determined to conduct a life and death struggle with
his adversary. The enormous forces available to Tzimiskes were too awesome and materially
and physically overpowering for Svjatoslav. Great Preslav, valiantly defended by the Rus'
prince's inferior retinue, fell before the furious Greek assault of 12-13 April 971. The Rus'
retreated to Silistria, entrenched themselves within the fortification of Dorystolum on the
Danube, and following a siege of three months, surrendered to the imperial forces on 21
July.

30

If Svjatoslav had contemplated a flight from Silistria, all of his sea avenues were cut

off by a Byzantine naval fleet of three hundred vessels that had in the meantime showered a
rain of Greek fire upon the Rus' forces. This terrifying weapon had been the scourge of the
Varangians and a distinctive advantage for the Byzantines. Defeated and humiliated,
Svjatoslav was compelled to sue for peace. He offered the surrender of the fortification, return
of prisoners, and an evacuation from Bulgaria. The dream that he had harbored of building a
new center of military activity within the bounds of Bulgaria was forever shattered.

Tzimiskes and Svjatoslav arrived separately for their historic en–counter, and a vivid

description of this meeting is furnished in the account of Leo Diakonos. Svjatoslav
approached the meeting place on the Danube in a boat, a distinctive symbol of Varangian love
for the sea. He wielded an oar as an equal of his Varangian warriors. Leo Diakonos also
provides a physical description of the Rus' prince, noting that he was of medium height, had a
flat nose, blue eyes, thick eyebrows, a stout neck, broad chest, and well proportioned
members. He wore a sparse beard and had a long shaggy mustache. His head was completely
shaved, except for a tuft of hair that was braided and hung on one side of his head. Although
Leo Diakonos does not stress the significance of the tuft of hair, for the Rus' prince this was a
sign of his distinguished origin. His attire included a ring in one ear and a white linen
garment, which notably was clean, unlike the garb of the other Rus'.

31

Even in defeat, the

proud and defiant Rus' prince presented an impressive figure, one that the Byzantines
apparently respected, for their annalistic entries contain no disparaging statements of his
bearing and demeanor.

The emperor without doubt had dictated the terms of the treaty, which was recorded

by Theophilos, the imperial secretary. Its provisions are straightforward, containing a pledge
to maintain peace and perfect amity between the Rus' and the Byzantines. The text includes a
statement of a resumption of normal commercial relations,

32

a provision that was most

important to both parties. Svjatoslav sealed the treaty with an oath to Perun and Volos, the
leading pagan deities of the Varangians and the Slavic Rus'. The Byzantine sources that cite
the treaty are magnanimous in their portrayal of the Rus' prince and do not humble him in the
face of defeat. On the contrary, the participants in the treaty process were awed by
Svjatoslav's presence and appearance, and regarded him in diplomatic terms as a head of state,
although his demeanor was described as being somewhat somber and ferocious. It is this
characterization in particular that was preserved in Byzantine sources.

33

And the Greeks

clearly treated this leader with respect as their sources attest. They had granted to Svjatoslav

his request for a public meeting with Tzimiskes. The Rus' prince throughout the encounter sat
in his boat and the emperor on his white mount.

34

Although Svjatoslav hoped to regain his

prestige, he had, nevertheless, suffered a devastating misfortune, had concluded a
disadvantageous peace, and was forced to agree to abandon Bul–garia. He was granted
permission to return to his native land.

In the spring of 972, although the date appears to be somewhat late and more probably

soon after the confirmation of the treaty in July, 971, Svjatoslav set sail for the mouth of the
Dnieper River after receiving assurances of safe conduct from Tzimiskes.

35

Whether with or

without Byzantine connivance, the Bulgar inhabitants of Perejaslavets, fearing Svjatoslav's
return, enticed a Pecheneg renegade band to lay a trap for the Rus' prince when his boat
approached the Dnieper River cataracts. Not having com–mitted themselves to the Byzantine
emperor regarding an agreement of safe conduct,

36

the Pechenegs were informed by the

Bulgars that Svjatoslav had few men and great wealth in his possession. This doubtless was a
clear inducement for these steppe renegades. Unable to pass through the cataracts, Svjatoslav
spent the winter in Belobereg, situated near the Kilija estuary of the Dnieper. Hardship befell
the Rus' prince. His stores of food were exhausted, and he and his men were compelled to pay
a handsome sum of a half grivna [a Kievan Rus' monetary unit] for each horse's head. By the
spring of 972, Svjatoslav's situation had become desperate. He and his retinue had no
alternative but to attempt to advance upon the rapids, hoping to escape the Pecheneg trap.
Kurja, the Pecheneg prince, and his forces attacked and defeated the Rus'. Svjatoslav was
slain, and this marks perhaps the last major chapter of Varangian exploits in Kievan Rus'
history.

Svjatoslav could have escaped this end. His lieutenant and close advisor, Sveinald,

recognizing the dangers of sailing upon the river, had the previous summer advised the prince
to bypass the Dnieper cataracts on horseback. Perhaps Svjatoslav rejected this plan because
the Varangians were not good horsemen and because they loved the sea and the dangers that it
posed. The Varangian tradition of military intrepidity, even in the face of certain death, was
no doubt a dominating element in Svjatoslav's decision to sail around the cataracts held by the
Pechenegs. We should further stress that Svjatoslav was a defeated and humiliated warrior,
and he was returning to a homeland that he had renounced. Could he then reclaim his legacy
after having relinquished his authority to his young sons? It is doubtful that he had much to
return to. He must have understood that his position was tenuous and his end was near, and
thus he resigned himself to an ignominious fate.

Rus' legend concludes with an account of how Kurja and his Pecheneg band, having

slain Svjatoslav, took his head and made a cup out of his skull. It was overlaid with gold and
they drank from it.

37

Svjatoslav had merited a ferocious and duplicitous reputation, but in the

end a primitive Turkic tradition of celebrating a victory over one's mortal foe, of passing the
cup, prevailed.

End Notes

1. Shepard, "Some Problems of Russ-Byzantine Realations c.860-c.1050", Slavonic and East
European Review 52 (1974) 10-33.

2. Ibid, 15.

3. That Byzantine curiosity at an early date was much aroused about this Varangian-Slavic
prince, Svjatoslav, is demonstrated by the statements of Constantine Porphyrogennetos in his
monumental work, De administrando imperio (Moravcsik and Jenkins, eds. and trans.,
Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De administrando imperio, chap. 9, line 4) wherein a notation
is made regarding Svjatoslav's early childhood. The emperor records: “The monoxyla that
descend out of Rus' to Constantinople are from Novgorod, in which [town] Svjatoslav, the son
of Igor, the prince of Rus', sat .... ).” On the linguistic controversy surrounding this passage
(i.e., the Old Slavonic rendition of the name Svjatoslav), see Dvornik et al., De administrando
imperio: Commentary, 2:19, 27-28. There exists a considerable literature on the conversion of
Olga and her visit to the court of Constantine Porphyrogennetos. The account of the visit
appears in Constantin Porphyrogenitus, De cerimoniis (Bonn ed.), 1:594-98. Most recently,
see Vodoff, Naissance de la chretiente, esp. 52-56.

4. The main source for Svjatoslav remains the Povest' Vremennykh Let (The Tale of Bygone
Years, more commonly known as The Russian Primary Chronicle), which appears in two
major redactions, the Laurentian text, in PSRL, vol. 1, and the Hypatian text, PSRL, vol. 2. For
an English translation, see Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, eds. and trans., Russian Primary
Chronicle. On the multiple authorship of the chronicle, see Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor,
trans., Russian Primary Chronicle, 6-12; and Shakhmatov, Povest' Vremennykh Let, vol. 1,
passim.

5. PSRL, 11:65; ibid., 2:53; cf. Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, trans., Russian Primary
Chronicle, 84-85. The Hypatian redaction contains a variant: ". . . and they themselves began
to fight and there was a battle between them . . . ." There is evidence that about September
962 Svjatoslav received a delegation from the Crimean Goths who had sought assistance
against the Khazars. On this see Hanak, "Sviatoslav I Igorevich," 114-15. Bjela Vjezha was
the principal Khazar fortification on the Don.

6. PSRL, 1:64-65; ibid., 2:52-53. Cf. Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, trans., Russian Primary
Chronicle, 84.

7. Chadwick, Beginnings of Russian History, 32, correctly suggests that the lines "are derived,
at least in part, from early panegyric poetry rather than from saga . . ." and read "like an echo
of the Norse Hrafnsmkl, a brief panegyric poem by a Norse skald, or court poet . . . ."

8. Vernadsky, Kievan Russia, 19, views Varangian and Kievan Rus' expansion "to build up a
vast empire." His contention of imperial expansion and permanent settlement in the Don-
Volga region is not supported by the extant sources. His argument stands in opposition to the
more plausible interpretation of Paszkiewicz, Making of the Russian Nation, 181, who
concludes that Svjatoslav extended his campaigns in many directions and they brought no
territorial gains. Soviet historians, on the other hand, contend that these campaigns ensured
for the Kievan Rus' access to the free trade routes along the Volga and Don river systems.
None of Svjatoslav's campaigns, however, brought to him or the Kievan state direct trade
benefits or great wealth. On this see Grekov, Izbrannye Trudy; and Pashuto, Vnesh–niaia
politika, 68-69. For an extended bibliography on the subject of Rus' political and economic
relations, see Litavrin, "Kieven Rus'," 43-44, and note r.

9. Leo Diaconus (Bonn ed.), 63; Cedrenus (Bonn ed.), 2:372; Noonan, "By–zantium and the
Khazars," 120, is in error when he asserts that "the governor of Cherson, Kalokyras [sic], was
dispatched to Kiev [italics mine] where he paid Prince Sviatoslav fifteen hundred pounds of

gold (approximately 455 kg.) to attack Dan–ubian Bulgars." More probably, as Vernadsky
(Kievan Russia, 45) demonstrates, Svjatoslav was in the northern Crimea at the time of the
meeting and there was no need for the patrician to travel to Kiev. Cf. Levchenko, Ocherki,
255, who also incorrectly implies that Kalokyras went to Kiev where he made the payment.
The Byzantine sources do not confirm this. Both Leo Diakonos (Leo Diaconus [Bonn ed.],
63) and Kedrenos (Cedrenus [Bonn ed.], 2:372) note the place of meeting above the Crimea
and appear to imply that the gold payment itself was made in Moesia or in its vicinity. There
remains, however, chronological confusion and the Byzantine and Rus' sources are not clear
on the precise year that Svjatoslav first entered the Balkans, either in the year 966 or 967, or
perhaps even in 968. On this question see Obolensky, "Empire and its Northern Neighbors,"
Sri, note 3; and Levchenko, Ocherki, 258.

10. Leo Diaconus (Bonn ed.), 63; Cedrenus (Bonn ed.), 2:372. Pashuto, Vneshniaia politika,
69 maintains that Svjatoslav led a force of sixty thousand men into the Balkans against the
Bulgars. The size of the retinue appears quite inflated. Other Russian historians conjecture
that the force was composed of forty thousand men. See, for example, Vernadsky, Kievan
Russia, 45. More plausible is the view that, if Svjatoslav knew of the Byzantine practice of
paying nine solidi per hired soldier, then the force that he led into the Balkans could number
no more than 12,000 men, assuming that the force was not substantially smaller and
Svjatoslav had not retained a large portion of the inducement for himself. If Svjatoslav had
retained upwards of one third or one half of the total payment, the former being the more
common practice, then clearly the size of his army was substantially smaller. Cf. Hanak,
"Sviatoslav I Igorevich," 115; and Pashuto, Vnesbniaia politika, 69.

11. On this see Leo Diaconus (Bonn ed.), 63, 77, 79-80; Cedrenus (Bonn ed.), 1:372-85; cf.
Sreznevskij, Slavjanskij perevod, 149ff. Soloviev, Istoriia Rossii, 161, lends credence to the
account about the treasonable actions of Kalokyras.

12. PSRL, 1:65; ibid., 2:53; cf. Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, trans., Russian Primary
Chronicle, 84. On the controversy of the geographical location of Perejaslavets, most recently
see Oikonomides, "Presthlavitza," 7-8.

13. PSRL, 1:65; ibid., 1:53. Cf. Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, trans., Russian Primary
Chronicle, 85.

14. PSRL, 1:67; ibid., 2:55; cf. Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, trans., Russian Primary
Chronicle, 86.

15. PSRL, 1:67; ibid., 2:55; cf. Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, trans., Russian Primary
Chronicle, 86.

16. PSRL, 1:67; ibid., 2:55; cf. Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, trans., Russian Primary
Chronicle, 86. Soloviev, Istoriia Rossii, 163, concludes that this expres–sion, "there [sic] is
the center of my realm," can be interpreted in two ways. First, it was a geographical center for
trade, the main focus of his economic interests. Soloviev prefers the second argument that
Svjatoslav had conquered Bulgaria and it was considered to be his domain, a part of his kin
lands. I agree with the second line of reasoning, but I must note that Soloviev fails to
demonstrate whether Bulgaria was integrated into the Kievan Rus' state structure or remained
an indepen–dent entity with Svjatoslav as its sovereign. Oikonomides, "Presthlavitza," 8,
explains why Perejaslavets flourished as a major commercial center.

17. There remains a basic unanswered question here, one that is sufficiently clarified neither
by Rus' nor Byzantine sources. When Svjatoslav returned to Kiev to lift its siege, did his
entire military force of perhaps ten thousand men return with him, or did a large portion of his
retinue, as one would surmise, remain nearby in the upper Balkans, most probably at
Perejaslavets, to retain occupation of the fortification? If the latter were so, then why did they
not attempt more vigorously to hold on to Perejaslavets (unless they were a small force and
were overwhelmed by superior Bulgar forces) until the return of the Rus' prince? Most
probably, Svjatoslav left behind only a small garrison that proved to be no equal for the
attackers.

Further, there exists herein a substantial chronological problem. The Russian Primary

Chronicle would have us believe that Svjatoslav did not arrive before Perejaslavets for the
second attack until 971, two years after the death of his mother (PSRL, 1:69; ibid., 2:57; cf.
Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, trans., Russian Primary Chronicle, 87). Leo Diaconus (Bonn
ed.), 77, in an extensive discussion of Svjatoslav's activities upon his return to the Danube
region, places the return in the same year as Olga's death, i.e., 969. This date of return appears
more plausible. Cedrenus (Bonn ed.), 2:372 ff., appears to agree with Diakonos' chronology
of events, certainly for the first invasion, but he is equally clear for the second, citing the year
as 969. Cf. Dolger, "Chronologie des grossen Feldzuges," 275-92; Gollner, "Expeditions
byzantines," 342-58; Gregoire, "Derniere campagne," 267-76; Karyshkovsky, "O khronologii
russko-vizantiiskoi," 127-38.

18. Leo Diaconus (Bonn ed.), 77-78; and regarding the treaty, ibid., 85; Ced–renus (Bonn
ed.), 2:372-73.

19. PSRL, 1:69; ibid., 2:57; cf. Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, trans., Russian Primary
Chronicle, 87.

20. PSRL, 1:69; ibid., 2:57; cf. Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, trans., Russian Primary
Chronicle, 87.

21. Leo Diaconus (Bonn ed.), 105.

22. PSRL, 1:69; ibid., 2:57; cf. Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, trans., Russian Primary
Chronicle, 87.

23. Regarding the inaccuracy of reporting the second attack in The Russian Primary
Chronicle and the literature on the topic, see Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, trans., Russian
Primary Chronicle, 241, note 72.

24. On the question of the size of Svjatoslav's force, see above, note 10.

25. Leo Diaconus (Bonn ed.), 156 ff.; Cedrenus (Bonn ed.), 2:392.

26. Cedrenus (Bonn ed.), 2: 400-403. Levchenko, Ocherki, 276-77, maintains that the battle
of Arcadiopolis occurred in 970 rather than in 971 as has been frequently believed by
numerous historians. His line of reasoning appears quite plausible.

27. PSRL, 1: 70; ibid., 2:5; cf. Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, trans., Russian Primary
Chronicle, 88.

28. It is unclear in what context Svjatoslav uses the phrase "the land of Rus'." He may well be
referring to the traditional Scandinavian homeland of the Varangians prior to their migration
about 860 to what is now northern Russia. His reference, then, is legendary and emotive in
context. Also, it is questionable that he is making reference to "the land of the Kievan Rus',"
which he had earlier renounced for the riches of the Balkans.

29. PSRL, 1:70; ibid., 2:5; cf. Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, trans., Russian Primary
Chronicle, 88.

30. See especially Gregoire, "Derniere campagne," 267ff.

31. Leo Diaconus (Bonn ed.), 156-57.

32. Leo Diaconus (Bonn ed.), 156; Cedrenus (Bonn ed.), 2:412; Symeon Logothetes (Bonn
ed.), 153-54.

33. Cedrenus (Bonn ed.), 2:409ff.; cf. Shepard, "Some Problems," 24.

34. Leo Diaconus (Bonn ed.), 156-57.

35. Cedrenus (Bonn ed.), 2: 412-13.

36. Ibid.

37. PSRL, 1:73-74; ibid., 2:61-62; cf. Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, trans., Russian Primary
Chronicle, 90.

This article was first published in Peace and War in Byzantium: Essays in Honor of George
T. Dennis, S.J., edited by Timothy S. Miller and John Nesbitt (Washington: The Catholic
University of America Press, 1995). We thank the

Catholic University of America Press

for

their permission to republish this article.