TheChoiseulRaid

October28–November3,1943

EricHammel

Bymid-1943,followingprotractedandnastyslogsonGuadalcanalandNew

Georgia,theAlliedcommandersintheSouthPacificAreadecidedtobypassthelarge
islandofChoiseulinordertoseizethebeststrategictargetontheirstrategicand
operationalmaps.Choiseulwasadeadend;therewasnoplaceworthattackingfromthe
airthatcouldbereachedfrompotentialairbasesontheisland.Bythisstageofthe
SolomonsCampaign,airstrategyshapedgroundstrategy.InasmuchasAlliedfighter
aircraftbasedincentralornorthernBougainvillewouldbeabletoescortbomberstoand
fromRabaul,themainJapanesebaseintheregion,theU.S.3rdMarineDivisionmade
readytolandonBougainville’swestcoast,atEmpressAugustaBay.

PlanningfortheEmpressAugustaBayoperationledtoaninterestinginsight:If

theJapaneseexpectedanAlliedinvasionofapossibleair-basesiteonChoiseul,whynot
feedintothatexpectationbygivingthemwhatappearedtobeaninvasionofChoiseul?
ThatmightfooltheJapaneseintonotrushingreinforcementstoEmpressAugustaBay.So
itwasdecidedthatthe2ndMarineParachuteBattalionwouldmountanamphibious
landingonChoiseulaheadoftheBougainvilleinvasionandputonenoughofashowto
convincetheJapanesethatitwastherealthingandthatBougainvillewasthefeint.

TheChoiseulRaid

October28–November3,1943

EricHammel

BooksbyEricHammel

76Hours:TheInvasionofTarawa(withJohnE.Lane)

Chosin:HeroicOrdealoftheKoreanWar

TheRoot:TheMarinesinBeirut

Ace!:AMarineNight-FighterPilotinWorldWarII(withR.BrucePorter)

DuelfortheGolan(withJerryAsher)

Guadalcanal:StarvationIsland

Guadalcanal:TheCarrierBattles

Guadalcanal:DecisionatSea

MundaTrail:TheNewGeorgiaCampaign

TheJollyRogers(withTomBlackburn)

KheSanh:SiegeintheClouds

FirstAcrosstheRhine(withDavidE.Pergrin)

Lima-6:AMarineCompanyCommanderinVietnam(withRichardD.Camp)

AmbushValley

FireintheStreets

AcesAgainstJapan

AcesAgainstJapanII

AcesAgainstGermany

AirWarEuropa:Chronology

CarrierClash

AcesatWar

AirWarPacific:Chronology

AcesinCombat

MarinesatWar

CarrierStrike

PacificWarriors:TheU.S.MarinesinWorldWarII

IwoJima:PortraitofaBattle

MarinesinHueCity:PortraitofanUrbanBattle

TheU.S.MarinesinWorldWarII:Guadalcanal

TheU.S.MarinesinWorldWarII:NewGeorgia,Bougainville,andCapeGloucester

TheU.S.MarinesinWorldWarII:TarawaandtheMarshalls

TheForge

CoralandBlood

TheRoadtoBigWeek

IslandsofHell

AlwaysFaithful

TheSteelWedge

MarinesOnGuadalcanal

MarinesIntheSolomons

MarinesOnNewBritain

BloodyTarawa

MarinesIntheMarshalls

MarinesIntheMarianas:Vol.1:Saipan

MarinesIntheMarianas:Vol,2:TinianandGuam

MarinesOnPeleliu

MarinesOnIwoJima:Vol.1and2

MarinesOnOkinawa

TiltheLastBugleCall

TheChoiseulRaid

October28–November3,1943

EricHammel

PacificaMilitaryHistory

Copyright©2016byEricHammel

Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproducedortransmittedinany
formorbyanymeans,electronicormechanical,includingphotocopy,recording,orany
informationstorageandretrievalsystem,withoutpermissioninwritingfromthepublisher.

Requestsforpermissiontomakecopiesofanypartoftheworkshouldbemailedto:
Permissions,PacificaMilitaryHistory,1149GrandTetonDrive,Pacifica,California
94044.

CoverbyTomHeffron,Hudson,Wisconsin

SolomonIslandsMapbyMeridianMapping,Minneapolis,Minnesota

ForacompletelistingofallthemilitaryhistorybookswrittenbyEricHammeland
currentlyavailableinprintorforKindle,visit:http://www.EricHammelBooks.com

Afreesamplechapterfromeachbookisavailableinthesite’sFreesection.

Pleasealsovisithttp://www.PacificaMilitary.com

TheChoiseulRaid

October28–November3,1943

EricHammel

CharlesJ.“Nick”WaddellandC.W.Setonhadbeenservingformanymonthsas

coastwatchersonthelargeislandofChoiseul,inthecentralSolomonIslands.Theironly
contactwiththeoutsideworldwastheirradiotransmitterandreceiver.Althoughthere
werealsomanyJapaneseservingontheisland,WaddellandSetonfeltfairlysecure.The
islanderswerefriendlyandalmostcompletelyloyaltotheBritishCrown.Like
coastwatchersservinginotherJapanese-occupiedareasoftheSolomons,Waddelland
SetonwereeagerlyawaitingamajorAlliedinvasion,forbyOctober1943,eventhemost
loyaloftheislandersweregrowingdepressedafterbeingsolongunderJapanese
domination;theydidnotunderstandwhytheall-powerfulBritishhadnotyetbootedout
theinferiorandreliablybrutalJapanese.

SetonmorethanWaddellwasalsogrowingrestive;hewantedtogetoutintothe

bushandkillJapanese.AlthoughheandWaddellhadarmedabouttwenty-fivescoutswith
capturedJapanesearmsandammunition,ordersfromhigherheadquarterssaidtoavoid
scrapswiththeJapanese.Coastwatchersweretoovaluablefromtheintelligence-gathering
standpointtoallowthemtogoaboutriskingtheirlivesonnuisanceattacksthatcouldhave
nopossiblebearingontheprogressofthewar.Theironlyrecoursewastowait,andwatch,
andhope.

*

UnbeknowntoSeton,Waddell,andtheirscoutsandsupporters,Choiseulwastobe

bypassedbyAlliedforces;noinvasionandnoliberationweretotakeplace.Rather,the
U.S.3rdMarineDivisionwastolandatEmpressAugustaBay,onnearbyBougainville’s
westcoast,onNovember1,1943.BythisstageoftheSolomonsCampaign,airstrategy
shapedgroundstrategy.Choiseulwasadeadend;therewasnoplaceworthattackingfrom
theairthatcouldbereachedfrompotentialairbasesontheisland.Butfromcentral
Bougainville,AlliedfighterswouldbeabletoreachRabaul,themainJapanesebaseinthe
region.

BecausetheJapaneseforcesholdingBougainville’smanycoastalbaseswerequite

powerfulinaggregate,andAlliedforceswererelativelyweak,itwasdecidedearlyonin
theinvasionplanningtotiedownlargenumbersofJapanesebyforcingthemtodefend
manypossibleinvasionsites.Infact,itseemedmostprobabletotheJapanesethatan
invasionwouldtakeplaceintheShortlandIslandsoronsouthernBougainville,wherea
numberofwell-developedairandnavalbaseshadalreadybeenbuilt.Thiswassound

logicbyJapanesestandards,buttheAllieshadlearnedtobuildairfieldsfromscratchin
verylittletime,andsoattackingandcapturingadefendedbasewasnotnecessary.This
waswhyEmpressAugustaBaywasselected.Itwaslightlydefended,andnewairfields
couldbebuiltquicklywherenoneexistedbefore.Andthosebaseswouldbemorethan
fiftymilesclosertoRabaulthanexistingJapanesebasesinsouthernBougainvilleandthe
ShortlandIslands.

ChoiseulwasnotfavorableforbasesfromwhichRabaulcouldbeattacked,buta

logicalargumentcouldbemadeforanAlliedinvasionthere.Theisland’sJapanese
garrisondidflanktheAlliedholdingsinthecentralSolomons—onNewGeorgia,Vella
Lavella,andKolombangara—andtheAllieshadneverbeforebypassedaJapanesebase,
sotherewasnowaytoanticipatethattheywouldnow.

TohelpkeeptheJapanesefocusedontheunnecessarydefenseofChoiseul,

southernBougainville,andtheShortlandIslands—tokeepJapanesegroundforcestied
downindefenseofwide-spreadandisolatedbases—aNewZealandArmybrigadewasto
occupytheTreasuryIslandsonOctober27,1943,andthe2dU.S.MarineParachute
BattalionwastomountitsraidagainstJapanesebasesonChoiseul.TheTreasuryswereof
somevaluetotheAllies,buttheChoiseuloperationwasarusethathadnostrategic
purposebeyondkeepingtheJapanesetherepinneddownwhiletheinvasionatEmpress
AugustaBaytookplace.

*

BeforeChoiseulwasremovedfromactiveconsiderationasaninvasiontarget,

operationalintelligencedataabouttheisland’sJapanesegarrisonhadbeensystematically
obtainedviathecoastwatchersandaerialreconnaissance.Aswell,smallpatrolswere
organizedandinsertedatvariouspointsonChoiseulbysubmarine,PT-boat,and
amphibianbomber.OnesuchpatrolmovedfromPTboatsundercoverofdarknesson
September6,1943,andhikedfromthelandingsite,onthesouthwestcoast,toapointabit
southoftheJapanesebaseatKakasa,onNewGeorgiaSound(the“Slot”)sideofthe
island.Fromthere,thepatrolturnedinlandandcrossedtheisland.ItreachedKanaga
safelyandwaswelcomedintothecampofcoastwatchersSetonandWaddell.U.S.Navy
PBYamphibianpatrolbombersflewuponthenightofSeptember12andtookthepatrol
outwithoutincident.

TwootherpatrolsweredispatchedtothenorthernendoftheislandandChoiseul

BayonSeptember22.Theseroamedtheirassignedareasandwerewithdrawnwithout
incidentonSeptember30.TheMarinesandNewZealanderswhoundertookthesetwo
patrolsreportedthataboutathousandJapanesewereatKakasaandaroundthreehundred
othersmaintainedabargedepotatChoiseulBay.Bothpatrolsfoundanumberofsuitable
airfieldsitesandbothmarkedanumberofsuitablelandingbeaches.InsofarasJapanese
militaryactivitywasconcerned,onlyfootpatrolsweresighted,andonlyintheimmediate
areasofKakasaandChoiseulBay.

*

FollowingthecaptureofMundaField,onNewGeorgia,inAugust1943,Seton

andWaddellhadbusytimeofit.Notonlydidtheyhavetorescue,host,andsendhomean
increasingnumberofdownedAlliedaviators,orassistthefewoutsideintelligence-

gatheringpatrolsthatcametheirway,theyhadtomaintaintheirwatchonJapanese
activitiesintheirrealm.DuringtheJapaneseevacuationofthecentralSolomonslatethat
summer,Choiseulbecameamajorrelaypointinthemovementoftroopsandequipment
fromKolombangaratoBougainville.Transportbargeswereconstantlydepositingtroops
onthesouthernendoftheisland,andotherbargespickedthetroopsupatChoiseulBay
foratripacrossopenwatertoBougainville.WaddellandSetonhadtokeepaclosewatch
onthebargetraffictoandfromBougainville,andonthemanyhundredsofJapanese
soldierswhohadtomarchfromsouthernChoiseultoChoiseulBay.

OnOctober13,1943,SetonreportedviaradiotoliaisonofficersonGuadalcanal

thatbetweenthreeandfourJapanesehadpassedBambatanaMission,aboutthirty-five
milessouthofChoiseulBay.OnOctober19,hereportedthatJapanesecampsinthe
vicinityofChoiseulBayandSangigaiwereoccupiedbynofewerthanthreethousand
JapanesewhowereapparentlyawaitingtransporttoBougainville.Accordingtohisscouts,
Setonreported,thesemenwereshortonrationsandlivingindispersedcampsites.
Islanders’gardenswerebeinglooted,andforagingpartieswereconstantlyinthebushin
searchofediblewildlife.SetonaddedthattheseJapanesetroopswereparticularlyedgy
andhadblockedalltrails,tightenedsecurity,andtakentoshootingfirstandasking
questionsafter.Setondidnotmentionthatthisupswinginuneasinesswasprobablythe
resultofaminorforayonOctober2inwhichsevenJapanesehaddiedatthehandsof
twenty-fiveofhisarmedscouts.

Withthisinformationonhand,itwasfinallyanddefinitelydecidedbytheAllied

SouthPacificAreaheadquartersthatamajoreffortwouldnotbemadeagainstChoiseul.
Nevertheless,onOctober20,LieutenantColonelRobertWilliams,the1stMarine
ParachuteRegimentcommandingofficer,andLieutenantColonelVictorKrulak,the2d
MarineParachuteBattalioncommandingofficer,weresummonedfromtheircampon
VellaLavellatoGuadalcanaltoabriefingconductedbyIMarineAmphibiousCorps
(IMAC)staffofficers.Indeed,itwastheIMACstaffsecretary,MajorJamesMurray,who
firstthoughtofmountingaraid-in-forceagainstChoiseul,anditwassucharaidthat
WilliamsandKrulakhadbeencalleddowntoGuadalcanaltodiscuss.

AllLieutenantColonelKrulak’sbattalionhadtodowasgetsafelyashorein

northernChoiseulandraisearuckusbigenoughtoleadtheJapanesetobelievethata
majorinvasionwasunderwayorimminent.Atthesametime,thoughonaverylowkey,
severalreconnaissancemissionswouldbecarriedoutandapotentialsiteforapossible
PT-boatbasewastobeassessed.

TheenablingorderforOperationBLISSFULwasissuedbyIMACheadquarters

onOctober22.BasedonasuggestionfromSeton,thelandingwastobemadeatVoza,a
villageabouthalfwaybetweenChoiseulBayandBambatanaMission.Thebeacheswere
reportedlygood,andthelocalislanderswerebothloyalandwillingtoassistineveryway
possible.MoreimportantwasthefactthatnoJapanesewereknowntobeintheareaeven
thoughVozawasdirectlyontheJapaneseevacuationroute.

Krulaknosoonerpickeduphisoperationsordersthanhepreparedtoreturntohis

battaliononVellaLavella.Whilewaitingforhisplane,hewroteouttheentireworking
orderforthemission.

*

The2dParachuteBattalionhadneverbeenincombat,butithadtrainedhardand

hadotherwiseprepareditselfforbattle.Itmighthavebeenharder,infact,thanmany
combat-experiencedunitsoftheday.

Krulak’soriginalplanenvisionedacombatjumpintoVoza,buttherewasno

suitabledropzonenearby;therainforest,whichwasasthickasanyintheSolomon
Islands,cloakedtheobjectiveandspreadformanymilesinalldirectionssaveone,which
waswestwardintoNewGeorgiaSound.Also,therewerenotenoughtransportaircraftin
theSouthPacifictocarryafullbattalionandallitsrequiredsuppliesandequipmentto
anydestinationinasinglelift.AshadtheonlyotherMarineparachutebattaliontoenter
combat—the1st,atGavutu,onAugust7,1942—Krulak’swouldhavetomountan
amphibiouslanding.Thiswasaheartbreakerforeverymemberofthebattalion,butthe
factthatcombatwasimminentwasmoreimportanttomanythanthemethodofinsertion.

Krulak’sbattalionhadfourdaystogetreadyandgetthere.Frenzyreignedinthe

1stMarineParachuteRegimentbivouaconVellaLavellaasallnecessarygearwassorted
intofourhugestacks,allordersissuedtothethreeparachute-infantrycompaniesand
supportingunits(theregimentalweaponscompanymortarsandmachinegunsweregoing,
too,aswasadetachmentfromanexperimentalrocketplatoonthatwasarmedwith
bazookasandrockets.TotalstrengthwhenthebattalionleftVellaLavellastoodat30
officersand626enlistedmen.OneNavyofficerwasattachedtoassesssitesforthe
proposedPT-boatbase.

*

AtduskonOctober27,1943,theU.S.Navydestroyer-transportsWard,Kilty,

Crosby,andMcKeanarrivedatVellaLavellafollowingtheirparticipationinlandinga
NewZealandArmybrigadeatMono,intheTreasuryIslands.The2dParachuteBattalion,
whichwasstandingbywithallitsequipmentandsuppliesaboardeightLCMlanding
craft,boardedthedestroyer-transportsinveryshortorder,atestamenttotheunit’s
discipline.Theentireoperationwascompletedinarecordforty-fiveminutes.At1921,
withthefleetdestroyerConwayactingasescort,theladendestroyer-transportssetcourse
forChoiseul.TheConway’ssurface-searchradarwouldpinpointthelandingsiteonthe
Choiseulcoast.AmongthoseaboardtheshipswascoastwatcherSeton,whohadbeen
pluckedfromChoiseulinordertoguidetheparachutebattalion.

Shortlyafter2300,whilemakingwayincolumn,theshipswerespottedbya

Japanesepatrolplane,whichdroppedasinglebombandran.Thebomblandedcloseto
therearvesselbutcausednodamage.

Shortlyaftermidnight,atapointsometwothousandyardsoffthenorthwestcoast

ofChoiseul,thelittleflotillastopped.Areconnaissancepartywasorderedoverthesideof
oneoftheships,andtheseMarinespaddledashoreinarubberraft.Whilethe
reconnaissancewasbeingcarriedout,LieutenantColonelKrulakorderedCompanyGand
CompanyFintotheirlandingcraft.Ifthepropersignalcamefromthebeach—asingle
light,indicatingthattheareawasfreeofJapanese—thetwocompanieswouldbereadyto
goashore.

AstheParamarineswaited,itwasnotedthatthedestroyer-transportsweredrifting

fartherapart.By0019,October28,CompanyF,aboardtheKilty,wasclosertothebeach
eventhoughCompanyGwastohavelandedfirst.TheCompanyGcommander,Captain
SpencerPratt,wasorderedtotakehismenintothebeach.

Astherehadbeennolightfromthereconnaissanceteam,Pratt’scompany

expectedtogoinshooting.Butnothinghappened.Thepatrolwaswaitingonthebeach.
Thesignallighthadbeenspottedaboardtheshipsat0023,buttheParamarinesmaking
thelandinghadnotseenit.

AfterCompanyGhadestablishedadefensiveperimeterashore,Krulakordered

theremainderofthebattaliontoland.Assoonasthemainbodyoftroopswasashore,the
landingcraftreturnedtotheshipstobeginoffloadingsupplies.Whilethesupplieswere
beingbroughtashore,theConway,whichwasstandingwellouttosea,wassightedand
attackedbyaloneJapaneseairplane.Thedestroyer’scaptaindidnotwanttodrawthe
fullywarrantedattentionoflargerJapaneseforces,sohewithheldhisfireastwobombs
landednearhisship.AnAlliednight-fighterpilot,whowasovertheflotillainorderto
forestallsuchanattack,drewconsiderablecriticismfornothavingbeenlowenoughto
intercepttheenemyplane.

Atabout0200,astheParamarinesweregettingtheirgearsafelyoffthebeach,the

entireconvoystoodouttoseaandmadeforVellaLavella.FourLCP(R)landingcraftand
theircrewswereleftwiththeMarines.Thesecraftweredispersedundercoveralongthe
shorenearZinoaIsland.

C.W.Seton,whohadwanderedintotheforestassoonashehadlanded,returned

tothebeachwithalargegroupofislanders,whoimmediatelygottoworkhelpingthe
Marinesgettheirsuppliesoffthebeach.Allthegearwassafelyhiddeninthebushwhena
groupofJapaneseplanesarrivedatdawntobombtherecentlyvacatedbeach.

DuringOctober28,theParamarinessetupabaseofoperationsaboutamileinland

fromthebeach,onahighplateaunorthwestofVoza.Outpostswereestablishedandwire
communicationswereinstalled.Thebaseofoperationswashiddenbytherainforestand
ondefensibleterrain.

Whilethebasewasbeingputtogether,asecondflightofJapaneseaircraftbombed

andstrafedthelandingbeach.Theislandershadvirtuallyobliteratedalltracesofuseat
thebeachaftereverythinghadbeensafelydispersedandcamouflagedinland.Infact,they
fashionedadummybeachheadseveralmilesnorthofVozatogivetheJapanesesomething
toattackandthinkabout.

The2dParachuteBattaliongotdowntobusinessonOctober29.Adayearlier,

Seton’sscoutshadinformedKrulakthattherewasabarge-stagingbaseeightmilessouth
oftheMarinebase,atSangigai,andanoutpostseventeenmilestothenorth,onthe
WarriorRiver.Thus,onthemorningofOctober29,Krulakdispatchedcombatpatrolsin
bothdirectionstolocatetrails,pinpointtheJapanesepositions,andbecomefamiliarwith
thearea.KrulakaccompaniedthepatroltoSangigai.AsitnearedtheVagaraRiver,about
halfwaytotheobjective,thepatrolsplit.HalftheMarinesturnedinlandtoscoutthearea
andlocateaninlandapproachtoSangigai,andKrulakcontinuedwiththeremainder
towardtheVagaraRiver.

Attheriver,thestealthy,silentMarineswatchedtenJapaneseunloadabargeatthe

shore.Determiningthatthiswasasgoodatimeandplaceasanytoleavehiscallingcard,
thebattalioncommanderorderedhistroopstoopenfire.SevenoftheJapanesewerekilled
andthebargewassunk.Krulakthenledhismenbacktothebasecamp.

ThesecondhalfofthepatrolreturnedtothebasecampsoonafterKrulak’s,and

thenasquadwasdispatchedtotheVagaraRivertolearnwhattheJapaneseweregoingto
doabouttheattack.ItbumpedintoaplatoonofJapaneseaboutthree-quartersofamile
fromtheoriginallandingsitebutwasabletodriveoffthesuperiorforce.

*

OnthemorningofOctober30,KrulakledCompanyE,CompanyF,andtheIMAC

rocketdetachmentaboardtheLCP(R)shiddenatVozaandpreparedtosetsailforthe
Sangigaiferrybase,whichwasmarkedfordestruction.ThestrengthoftheJapaneseat
Sangigaihadbeenestimatedatonehundredfiftyarmedtroops.SetonwarnedtheMarines
thatthebasecouldeasilybereinforcedfromthesouth—andprobablyhadbeensincethe
battalion’slanding.

TohelpfostertheimpressionthatChoiseulwasthesceneofanall-outinvasion,

Krulakhadrequestedpowerfulairsupportfortheattack.Justastheattackforcewas
gettingreadytosailfromVoza,oneoftheLCP(R)swasdamagedinanattackbyan
Americanwarplane.Asaresult,theattackplanhadtobealtered.

At0610,thescheduledairstrikehitSangigai.Astwenty-sixAlliedfightersflew

escort,twelveMarineTBFAvengerlightbombersdroppedmorethantwotonsofbombs
ontheJapanesebase.

Meantime,withmoretroopsthancouldpossiblybecarriedbythreelandingcraft,

KrulakorderedthetwocompaniestomarchoverlandtotheVagara.Setonandhisscouts
ledtheway.CompanyFfollowedSetonalongwithamachine-gunsectionandtheIMAC
rocketdetachment,andCompanyEfollowedwithattachedunits.

Nothinghappeneduntil1110,whenJapanesetroopspostedattheVagaraRiver

openedfireontheheadoftheapproachingbattalioncolumn.TheMarinesreturnedthe
fire,andtheJapanesewereforcedtopullbacktoSangigai.Atthispoint,Krulakordered
CaptainRobertManchester’sCompanyEtopressonalongthecoastwhiletheremainder
oftheforcecutinlandtosecurepositionsonthehighgroundattherearandeastofthe
Japanesedefenses.

AtH-hour,Krulak’senvelopingforcewasstilltangledupinthehilly,denserain

forestbehindSangigai.Assoundsofgunfirereachedtheinlandforcefromthedirectionof
thebeach,Seton’sscoutstoldtheharriedbattalioncommanderthattheJapanesewerejust
ahead.

CaptainManchester’stroopshadopenedtheirattackonlyafewminutesbehind

schedule.TheJapaneseresistedforafewmoments,buttheMarinerocketandmortarfire,
combinedwithrifleandmachine-gunfire,provedtobetoomuchforthem,andthey
hurriedfromthevillage,leavingCompanyEfreetopressontotheobjectivevirtually
unhindered.

MarinesfromKrulak’sforcespottedtheJapaneseafewminutesaftertheaction

beganonthebeach,andtheymovedtopreventtheenemyfromdispersingintothebush.

Thiswasofparamountimportance,becauseKrulakwantedtodestroyratherthandisperse
theJapaneseforce.Itwasamatterofluckratherthangoodtiming,buttheJapanesewere
forcedtogroundinpreparedpositions,whichwereimmediatelycontainedbythe
Americans.

AstheJapanesemovednorthfromthevillage,theyranhead-onintoCaptain

SpencerPratt’sCompanyF,whichimmediatelyopenedfireonthem.Apitchedbattle
ragedonfornearlyanhour.CompanyFthenmanagedtocompletethedesired
envelopmentbehindascreenoflight-machine-gunfire.TheJapanesepanickedand
mountedseveraluncoordinatedrushesthatonlyresultedinadditionalcasualties.Asthe
Marinesmaneuveredtoclosetherightflank,theJapanesebrokecontactandaboutfortyof
themescapedintothebush.Nevertheless,seventy-twoJapanesewerekilledintheaction.
FourMarineswerealsokilled,andtwelve,includingKrulakandCaptainPratt,were
wounded.

WhileCompanyFwasfightinginthebush,CompanyEhadbeenblowingupthe

Japanesebase.Brand-newbargeswerescuttled,allJapanesesuppliesweredestroyed,and
manydocumentsweretaken,includingachartshowingallthenavalminefieldsoff
southernBougainville.AftertheSangigaibasehadbeenrazed,CompanyEwithdrewto
theVagaraRiverandallfourlandingcraft—thedamagedonehadbeenrepaired—picked
itupandreturnedittoVoza.

Meantime,Krulakandtherestoftheattackersburiedthedeadinthebushand

hikedtotheVagaraRiver,wheretheyarrivedwithoutincidentafterCompanyEhadleft.
WhenCompanyEreturnedtoVozaatdusk,MajorWarnerBigger,thebattalionexecutive
officer,canceledtheplannedpick-upofKrulak’sforce—becausetheoperationwasmany
hoursbehindschedule.Unfortunately,Krulak’scommandradiohadbrokendown,sohe
didnotreceivewordofBigger’sdecisionandcouldonlyguessatwhathissecond-in-
commandwasdoing.Thebattalioncommanderandhistroopsspentanextremelyanxious
butuneventfulnight.

EarlyonthemorningofOctober31,thelandingcraftarrivedandwithdrew

Krulak’sforcefromthebeach.UponhisreturntoVoza,Krulakorderedthatambushesbe
setupandaggressivepatrolsbesentouttoseewhattheJapaneseweregoingtodoabout
theirdefeatatSangigai.

OnNovember1,aNavyPBYlandedinthewateroffVozatopickupwounded

Marinesandcaptureddocuments.Also,inanswertoanurgentrequest,1,000poundsof
riceforSeton’sscouts,500poundsofTNT,and250handgrenadeswereair-droppednear
Voza.Severalbriskpatrolclashestookplaceduringtheday,butthebasecampwasnot
threatened.Seton’sscoutsreportedthattheJapanesehadreoccupiedSangigai.

*

OnNovember1,MajorBiggerledacombatpatrolconsistingof87menfrom

CaptainWilliamDay’sCompanyGtowardNukikiVillage,abouttenmilesnorthofthe
basecamp.ThiswasBigger’ssecondtimeouttoNukiki;hehadscoutedtheplacetheday
before.ThepurposeofthelargepatrolwastocheckonreportsfromSeton’sscoutsthata
largeforceofJapanesewasmanninganoutpostontheWarriorRiver.Biggerwastomove
throughNukiki;crosstheWarrior;destroyallJapaneseinstallations,outposts,and

emplacementsinhispath;andadvancecloseenoughtothemainbaseatChoiseulBayto
hittheplacewith60mmmortarfire.KrulakapprovedofGuppyIsland,inChoiseulBay,
asanalternativeobjectiveincaseBigger’spatrolcouldnotgettothemainbase.

Bigger’sforcemadeitpastNukikiwithoutincident,buttheLCP(R)sinwhichit

wasridingconstantlybeachedintheWarriorRiver’sshallowmouth.Theroarofthe
enginesbeinggunnedtobreakfreefromthemuckybottomwasquiteloud,andBigger
fearedthateveryoneformilesaroundcouldhearit.Hethereforeorderedhismento
disembarkandsenttheboatsdownrivertobehiddeninacovenearNukiki.FourMarines
andaradiowereleftontheeastbankoftheriverandallexcessgearwascached.The
Paramarinesmarchedinlandaconsiderabledistancebeforecrossingtheriver.

Inthemiddleoftheafternoon,followingalongmarch,thescoutsconfessedto

MajorBiggerthattheywerelost.Biggerdecidedtowaitandrest,andheorderedhis
troopstobivouaconthespot,eventhoughtheywereinthemiddleofaswamp.Asmall
patrolwassentbacktotheradiotoreportthefoul-uptobase.WhenKrulakreceivedthe
report,heaskedSetonifamanwhoknewtheareawasavailable.Setonsuppliedtheonly
manhehadwithhimwhowasfromthearea,andthisscoutwasimmediatelydispatched
tolocateBigger’sforce.Meanwhile,atBigger’sorder,theLCP(R)sweresentbackto
Voza.

ThesmallpatrolfromBigger’smainforcespentthenightwiththeradioteam.

Whentheyawokenextmorning,theyfoundthataboutthirtyJapanesehadmoveddirectly
betweentheirpositionandBigger’s.BeforetheJapanesecouldact,thehandfulofMarines
madetheirwaystealthilytothelandingcraft,whichwerestillhiddeninthecoveatthe
Warrior’smouth,andreturnedimmediatelytoVoza,wheretheyreportedeverythingto
Krulak.Uponreceivingthenews,thebattalioncommanderaskedIMACforimmediateair
support,pluswhateverPT-boatstheycouldarrangetogettherefast.

Allthewhile,MajorBiggerwascompletelyunawareoftheactivityinhisrear.He

hadlostmuchtime,sohedecidedtostrikeoutdirectlyforChoiseulBay.Thepatrol’s
positionwasdetermined,andasecondsmallpatrolwasdispatchedtotheradiositeto
requestthattheboatspickupthemainbodythatafternoon.

Shortlyafterleaving,thesecondsmallpatroldiscoveredthatalargeJapaneseforce

wastailingBigger.TheseMarineswereunabletoreturntoBigger’sforce,buttheywere
abletofighttheirwaythroughtoNukiki,wheretheyweresoonspottedbythecrewsof
thereturninglandingcraft.

Meanwhile,Seton’sguidehadfoundBiggerandwasleadingthepatrolthrough

thinningjungletowardtheChoiseulBaybase.AstheMarinescameabreastRedman
Island,asmalloffshorehunkofrock,afour-manJapaneseoutpostopenedfireonthem.
ThreeoftheJapanesewerequicklyshotdead,butthefourthmadegoodhisescapeand
apparentlyspreadthealarm.Surprisewaslost.Becausetheforestalongthebeachwastoo
thintoprovideadequatecover,BiggerdecidedtobombardGuppyIsland.

TheParamarinesmovedintopositionsoppositetheisland,buttheyquickly

discoveredthatforestgrowthmaskedthefirefromtheirmortars.Themortarsweremoved
outtothebeachandsetupwiththeirbaseplatespartiallysubmerged.Thegunnersthen
proceededtofire143high-explosiveroundsintotheJapanesefuelandsupplydumpson

theisland.Astheywereretiring,largefires—atleasttwo—werespottedinthetargetarea.
Proddedbyreturnfire,theMarineswithdrewtowardtheWarriorRiver.

TheJapanesewantedBigger’shide.Groupsofinfantrymenweredispatchedon

fastbarges,fromwhichtheylandedatseveralpointsalongBigger’santicipatedescape
route.TheretiringMarineswereattackedfourseparatetimesbeforetheyreachedthe
WarriorRiver,buttheyovercametheoppositioneachtime.Whentheyreachedtheriver,
theyestablishedadefensiveperimeterandwaitedforthelandingcraft.

Whentheyfeltthatthepressurehadsubsided,severalParamarinesventuredinto

thesurftowashoffsomeofthejunglegrimeaccumulatedduringtheexhaustingmarch.
Astheydid,theyweretakenunderfirefromtheoppositebankoftheriver.Theexposed
Marinesdivedforthenearestcover,buttheybelievedtheywerebeingfiredonbyfellow
Marineswhohadarrivedonthescenetoreinforcetheirgroup.SeveralAmericanflags
werewavedatthebushwhackers,buttheseonlydrewincreasedfire.Bigger’sforcesent
backheavyreturnfire,whichobligedthemuchsmallerJapaneseforcetowithdraw.

Biggerorderedthreestrongswimmersintothewatertotrytoreachtheexpected

rescuepartyandwarnitoftheambush.SeveralJapanesehadremainedinthetreesonthe
oppositebankoftheriver,andtheyfiredatthethreehelplessswimmers,ofwhomonly
onelivedtoreturntoBigger’sgroup.

Asthefirefightbecamemoreintense,Bigger’sMarinesspottedthefourLCP(R)s

comingtheirway.Butastormwasalsomovingin,andtheseawasquiterough.Under
heavycoveringfirefromBigger’stroops,theboatsbeachedthemselvesonthewestern
bankoftheriver,andBigger’smenclamberedaboard.Asthetinyflotillabackedoffthe
beach,oneofthefullyladenLCP(R)shaditsmotorswampedbytherisingsurf,andit
driftedtowardtheJapanese-heldsideoftheriver.Fortunately,itbecamefouledonacoral
crag.

Atthisjuncture,twoPT-boats(oneofwhichwasskipperedbyLieutenantJohn

FitzgeraldKennedy)dashedinfromtheseawithallgunsblazingattheJapanese-heldside
oftheriver.WhilethePTs’20mmcannonand.50-calibermachinegunsrakedthe
Japanesepositions,ParamarineshurriedlytransferredfromthestalledLCP(R)toanother.
ThestalledLCP(R)wastowedawayfromthebeachanditsenginewasrestarted.Allthe
landingcraftthenwithdrewfromrangeofthebeachundercoverofarainsquall.Aircraft
fromMundaFieldandthetwoPT-boatsprovidedclosecoverduringthejourneybackto
Voza.

*

AlsoonNovember1,aboutthetimetheBiggerpatrolwasdepartingthebase

camp,asecondstrongcombatpatrolmarchedtotheVagaraRiverinthehopeofdrivinga
strongforceofJapaneseinfantrybacktowardtheirbaseatSangigai.TheJapanese
encounteredbythispatrolputupaparticularlyhardfight.

Inassessingthevariousactionsthatevening,LieutenantColonelKrulakandhis

staffconcludedthatthesmallsizeand,inallprobability,theintentionsoftheirforcehad
beendivinedtosomeextentbytheiradversaries.ThefindingsofseveralMarinepatrols
wereevaluated,anditwasdeterminedthatgrowingnumbersofwell-armedandwell-
organizedJapaneseweredrawingcloserandclosertothebasecamp.Itappearedtobe

onlyamatteroftimebeforetheJapaneselocatedthe2dParachuteBattalion’shideaway
anddiscoveredthattheyfacedonlyaverylimitedraid-in-forceratherthananall-out
invasion.Ifthathappened,theParamarineswouldbeextremelyvulnerabletoanorganized
clearingoperationbythelargenumbersofJapanesethatseemedtobeconcentratingnear
Voza.

AlthoughKrulakhadoriginallyenvisionedaneight-toten-daymission,henow

realizedthatthetimetowithdrawwasfastapproaching.TheclinchercameonNovember
3,whenagroupofSeton’sscoutsreportedthataforceofbetweeneighthundredandone
thousandwell-armedJapanesewasatSangigaiandthatanotherstrongforcewasnorthof
Voza,atMoliPoint.

AfterBigger’spatrolhadbeenpickedupatNukiki,IMACheadquartersradioed

Krulaktoaskwhetherhethoughthismissioncouldbecompleted.Bythen—November3
—theEmpressAugustaBaylandingsonBougainvillehadbeenundertakensuccessfully
bythebulkofthe3rdMarineDivision,andtheJapanesehadquicklycometothe
conclusionthatitwasthemainevent—andthatAmericanactivityonChoiseulwas
obviouslyadiversion.Evenso,withBougainvillenowthecenterofattention,the
JapaneseneededtheirChoiseulevacuationroutemorethanever,fortheirmanybasesin
southernBougainvilleandtheShortlandIslandshadbeenbypassed.Theyneededto
evacuateorredeploymanyoftheirunits,andChoiseulwasstillthebestrouteformany
suchmovements.ItwasbecomingpainfullyobviousthattheJapaneseonChoiseulnow
realizedthattheywerefacingaraidingforceofaboutbattalionstrength,andthatthey
werebusilypreparingtolaunchacounterstrokewithinforty-eighthours.Krulaktoldhis
superiorsthathisfoodsupplywassufficientforanothersevendays,thatammunitionwas
plentiful,andthathewasholdingastrongposition,butheaddedthatIMACmightaswell
evacuatehisbattalionif,infact,hismissionhadfulfilleditsstrategicpurpose.

Krulakwouldlaterwriteofthesituation:“Asamatteroffact,Ifeltwe’dnot

possiblybewithdrawnbeforethe[Japanese]cutthebeachroute.However,wewereso
muchbetteroffthanthe[Japanese]thatitwasnotworrisome(Isaynow!).Thenatives
wereonourside—wecouldmoveacrosstheislandfarfasterthanthe[Japanese]could
follow,andIfeltifwewerenotpickedupontheVozaside,wecouldmakeitontheother
side.Setonagreed,andwehadalreadyplannedsuchamove.Besidesthat,wefelt
confidentthatourpositionwasstrongenoughtoholdinplaceifnecessary.”

Nevertheless,onthenightofNovember3,threelargeLCIlandingshipsarrived

northofVozaandbeganembarkingthewaiting2dParachuteBattalion.Asthetroopsfiled
uptheramps,loudexplosionscouldbeheard—presumablyfromminesandboobytraps
theMarineshadsettodelaytheoncomingJapanese.Krulak’sMarinesloadedallgear
(lesstheirfood,whichwenttoSeton)andboardedingoodorderasthenervousLCI
crewmenimploredthemtohurry.

Theentireloadingoperationtookfifteenminutes.TheLCIsretractedfromthe

beachandsetcourseforVellaLavella,wheretheyarrivedshortlyafterdawnon
November4.

*

InalaterstudyoftheoperationinwhichJapaneserecordswereperused,itwas

foundthatKrulak’sestimationofthesituationonNovember3waslargelyincorrect.
Withinmerehoursofthewithdrawal—andnottwodayslater,asthebattalioncommander
guessed—largeandpowerfulJapaneseinfantryunitsclosedinonthebasecampand
beachpositionsformerlyheldbythe2dParachuteBattalion.TheJapanesehadindeed
beenthoroughlysurprisedbytheParamarines’initialactionsonChoiseul,and,inthe
wordsoftheassessment,“undoubtedly[they]hadbeendupedregardingthesizeofthe
landingforcebytheswiftactivityofthebattalionovera25-milefront.”Nevertheless,
oncethebigshowgotunderwayatBougainville,therewasfarlessdoubtinJapanese
mindsastowhattheChoiseulactionmeant.Thataverysmallforcewasconductinga
verylimiteddiversionaryoperationonChoiseulbecameobvious,andimmediatesteps
weretakentoerasethatforceandreinstatethemuch-neededevacuationroutes.

TheoperationcosttheJapaneseaknown143deadintheWarriorRiverand

Sangigaiactions.Equipmentlossesincludedtwobarges,morethan180tonsofequipment
andstores,total(buttemporary)destructionoftheSangigaibase,andanunknownbut
presumablylargelossoffuelandsuppliesinthedumpsonGuppyIsland.Theminefield
mapstakenatSangigaigreatlyeasedthemindsofmanyAlliednavalofficersand
eventuallyledtotheminingofadditionalwatersaroundBougainville.

Althoughsourcesdiffer,itappearsthatnineMarineswerekilledinactionon

Choiseul,thatfifteenwerewoundedandtwoweremissinginaction(andlaterpresumed
dead).

Theactualtotalimpactofthediversionarymissionwassmall.The2dParachute

BattalionarrivedonChoiseultooclosetotheEmpressAugustaBaylandingstocauseany
majorchangesinthecomplexionofthetotalJapanesedefensivesystem.Hadthebattalion
landedaweekearlier,theJapanesemighthavemovedalargeinfantryforceandadequate
supportingarmsfromBougainvilleandtheShortlands.Also,thesmallsizeofKrulak’s
forcelimiteditseffectivescopeofoperations.Theparachutebattalionsweresmallerthan
otherMarineinfantrybattalions,andtheirlargestsupportingarmswere81mmmortars.
Therewaslittledamagetheraidingforcecouldhaveinflicted—andlittlepermanent
damagethatitdidinflict.

TheChoiseulRaidwasaminorsuccessoflittlestrategicvalue,butitwasagood

shownonetheless.Itwastheonlytimethepainstakinglytrained2dParachuteBattalion
sawaction,forthe1stParachuteRegimentwasdissolvedin1944anditspersonnel
convertedtoregularinfantry,manyofwhomtookpartinthebattleforIwoJima.

DearReader,

IfyouenjoyedthisbookfromPacificaMilitaryHistoryandIPSBooks,please
visitourwebsiteathttp://www.PacificaMilitary.com,wheremanyother
booksofsimilarhighqualityareofferedinprintedorelectronicversions.The
sitealsooffersafreebook-lengthsamplerwithexcerptsfrommostofour
activetitles.

Yourpatronageisdeeplyappreciated.

PacificaMilitaryHistory