kryzysy marokańskie (15)

396 □ The Franco-German Duel

possiblc to cultivate our relations with America and Japan,” he said. “We must l Russa with very definite coolness, and keep America and Japan friendly.” The i sians. however, skillfully kept the kaiser’s hopes for a rapprochement alive so i he continued to woo Russia throughout the years that Russia was immobilized I the west by defeat in Asia and domestic revolution. The kaiser’s Russian during this period was an important and perhaps the principal reason why Ger failed to take advantage of this uniąuely favorable opportunity to improve its ino national position.

□ The First Morocco Crisis

Germany’s failure to destroy or dilute the Franco-Russian partnership through alliance of its own with Russia coincided with the first French move to begin i takeover of Morocco, which had been conceded to them by their treaties Britain, Italy, and Spain. The French had hoped to delay this move until Rus support would again be available to them in the West, but their hand was for by events in Morocco, where it appeared the existing govemment would soon I overthrown and France’s carefully prepared plans disrupted.

On January 25, 1905, after much hesitation, a French mission arrived in Fez to| open negotiations with the sułtan designed to lead to the establishment of a de fac French protectorate over the country. The Germans had repeatedly stressed the lack of interest in Morocco, but they were decidedly interested in the Anglo-Frenc entente, which had been arranged through a division of spheres of influence countries that did not belong to Britain or France in the first place—and all this Ż/_: without consulting or offering compensation of any kind to Germany. They there-^Jl fore determined to błock the French takeover of Morocco, and by thus depriving the French of their chief reward for relinąuishing their rights in Egypt, knock the keystone out of the Anglo-French entente and sow suspicion and discord between ■ the entente partners.

Germany’s Morocco campaign was largely the conception of Friedrich von Floł-stein, a senior official of the German foreign Office, who convinced Chancellor Bulów of its feasibility and necessity. Holstein’s policy was based on the expectation that the British and French, if faced with intemational opposition over Morocco and the prospect of a serious crisis, would each have doubts about the reliability of the other and would seek to evade entente commitments through separate bargains of maximum advantage to itself.

The Germans were in a strong legał and seemingly strong diplomatic position to błock a French takeover of Morocco. The Madrid Convention of July 3, 1880, signed by all the European countries with an interest in Morocco and by the United States, guaranteed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Morocco and guaran-teed all the signatory States a most favored nation status in the country. Thus, ac-cording to an intemational treaty the French themselves had signed, they could do nothing in Morocco that would infringe on the rights of other signatory States without their consent.

To initiate its Morocco campaign and proclaim to the world its intention to defend Morocco’s sovereignty as established by the Madrid Convention, the German govemment decided to make use of the kaiser’s forthcoming cruise to the Mediter-

18 THE MOROCCO QUESTION

SPAIN

MEDITERRANEAN

ATLANTIC

OCEAN

Bergucnt*

Mazagan

Marrakesh

'Colomb-Bechar

Spanish sphere of influence according to draft Franco-Spanish treaty of 8 Nov., 1902

Spanish sphere of influence according to draft Franco-Spanish treaty of 3 Oct, 1904

Spanish protectorate established by Franco-Spanish treaty of 27 Nov., 1912

ranean. He was to land at Tangier, on the Moroccan coast opposite Gibraltar, where he was to ignore the French altogether and deal solely with the govemment of the sułtan, which was to be assured that the preservation of Moroccan independenee was in the interest of all trading nations. It was with some difficulty that the kaiser was persuaded to land at Tangier, where reports of civic disturbances gave him reason to fear for his personal safety, but he finally disembarked at the Moroccan seaport on March 31, 1905.