16619 kryzysy marokańskie (18)

Q The Franco-German Duel

bmw to the Russo-German treaty. “Morocco could not serve a better purpose for as,” he said, “and would be far and away the best outeome of our Morocco cam-paagn.’

Holstein did his best to convince Bulów that a policy of bribery and concessions would be disastrous. If Germany now retreated over Morocco, no matter for what reason, “it would put an end to any doubts as to the usefulness of the entente [with Britain] for France, and France would not be drawn closer to Germany but driven further away.” It was not up to Germany to conciliate France for the purpose of luring France into the Russo-German alliance. Rather it was the task of Russia to persuade France to take a morę conciliatory attitude toward Germany. Moreover, Russia had every reason to prevent France from scoring a resounding diplomatic victory in partnership with Britain, because a victory for the Anglo-French entente would Iower the value of the Russian alliance for France.

□ The Aftermath of Bjórkó; Germany’s Diplomatic Defeat

After Bjórkó, however, Holstein’s Morocco policy was totally bankrupt, a victim of the kaiser’s (and now Bulow’s) willingness to sell out what remained of the German position on behalf of the Russian alliance. Instead of persuading the French to be morę conciliatory to the Germans, the tsar and his ministers did everything they could to persuade the Germans to yield to France over Morocco. They received signińcant support from Count Witte, the president of the Russian council of ministers and leader of the Russian delegation to the peace conference with Japan at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. After signing the peace treaty with Japan on Septem-ber 5, 1905, Witte retumed to Russia by way of Paris, where he was entrusted with the task of securing a major loan for Russia, in desperate financial straits following the disastrous war in Asia and confronted with revolution at home. In Paris he was informed by Rouvier that a loan was out of the ąuestion until the Morocco affair was settled, and he asked Witte to persuade the Germans to be morę amenable. “In return for my services,” Witte wrote in his memoirs, “he promised to give me fuli assistance in the matter of the loan.” Witte immediately called on the German am-bassador to urge that Germany settle its differences with France at all costs, for never again would there be a French cabinet so favorably disposed to Germany or so immune to the blandishments of Britain. Witte madę a number of specific pro-posals as to how such a settlement could be reached, all of them along the lines recommended to him by Rouvier.

Upon receiving Witte’s reports from Paris, his govemment instructed him to go to Berlin to talk directly with the kaiser and his ministers in the sense desired by the French. Witte did his work well. To Bulów he held out the prospect of an alignment of Germany, France, and Russia to put an end to Britain’s prospering at the expense of others; but to win over France, it would be necessary to make further concessions over Morocco. Bulów promised that this would be done, as did the kaiser. He wanted the “disgusting bickering” with France over Morocco to end. “Gaul must now be accorded conciliatory treatment,” he said, . . so that she can make the necessary shift that will take her into our alliance.” Witte promptly in-formed the French of his success. The kaiser had told him “that he did not intend to make difficulties for the French govemment and that he would give imperial

'ers to this effect.” These orders were transmitted through Bulów and < ally everything the French wanted on the agenda of the forthcotmng t er Morocco.

The ItancoOcnaiM

These concessions gained the Germans nothing except a broad hinr *o wir ~re concessions. Persuading the French to join their alliance was going 10 be 'cult, the tsar wrote the kaiser on October 7, and it might be a good idea to tpone ratiflcation of the Bjórkó treaty “until we know how the French wfll lock it.” Witte madę the case for further concessions morę specific. Because the French vemment could not act against the sentiment of French public opinion, Germany ould cultivate French opinion through friendly gestures to prepare the way for nce to join the Russo-German alliance.

Although discouraged, the kaiser pressed on. The Russians were having great Hculty persuading the French to enter into an alliance with Germany, he told ”ow on November 26. “We must therefore do this ourselves, and try to resołve e great problem of winning over Gaul supported by our elear conscience and the id cause.” Bulów saw the situation morę clearly and realized that the tsar’s de-dsion to await the consent of France before ratifying the Bjórkó treaty was equiv-'ent to its repudiation by the Russian govemment. With Germany’s Russian policy shambles, Billów now advocated retuming to a firm linę on Morocco, but in a letter written on New Year’s Eve of 1905 the kaiser ordered him to preserve peace, virtually at any price. A firm stand on Morocco would run the risk of war. Before Germany could even consider a foreign war, it would be necessary to conclude a firm alliance with Turkey, equip the German army with new weapons, and above all eliminate the socialist menace at home. “First the Socialists, cut off their heads and make them harmless, if necessary by a blood bath, and then a foreign war. But not before and not a tempo!” German foreign policy should be conducted to avoid war “so far as at all possible, and certainly for thepresent.” Such hysteria over the Socialists, or indeed any person or group opposing his policies, was typical, but it is noteworthy that the kaiser rejected war as a “solution” to the Socialist problem, at least at this time, because some historians believe a major motive of the German govemment’s decision to go to war in 1914 was to divert domestic discontent to foreign battlefields.

Billów was careful not to comment on his sovereign’s domestic program, but he fully agreed with the kaiser in rejecting a military solution to the Morocco problem. Instead he opted for what he called a “well managed and graceful retreat,” which he believed would preserve Germany’s prestige and save face for its govem-ment.

Biilow’s policy achieved neither objective. The intemational conference on Morocco finally convened in the Spanish city of Algeciras, directly opposite Gibraltar, on January 16, 1906. By March it was evident to the Germans that they did not have majority support at the conference and were doomed to defeat, but they were bound to accept the decisions of a conference they themselves had demanded at the cost of so much intemational tension.

X he finał Act of Algeciras reaffirmed the independence and territorial integrity of Morocco, but France and Spain were given control of the Moroccan police and France predominant control 0Ver a Moroccan State bank. These provisions were generally understood to give France and Spain the necessary footholds for graduaOy