kryzysy marokańskie (17)

O The Franco-German Duel

for the conduct of a diplomatic campaign, and this very lack of a elear perć of purposes and goals among the Germans themselves was certainly a major i for Gennany’s ultimate diplomatic debacie.

In the first weeks of the Morocco crisis, however, Holstein’s policy see~ be working beautifully. On June 6, 1905, Delcasse, the principal architect Anglo-French entente and the statesman Germans regarded as their most for foe, resigned under pressure from ministerial colleagues who feared that his mination to stand firm over Morocco would play into Germany’s hands by on an excuse for war.

In bringing about Delcasse’s fali, the Germans appeared to have scored a diplomatic triumph, but that triumph was illusory at best. They had achieved ing concrete: the Anglo-French entente was still intact; they had secured no cessions. Ali they had achieved in fact was to alarm the world over their inten ' and confirm their reputation abroad as saber-rattling bullies. As if to emphasize many’s insensitivity to its appearance, the kaiser chose the day Delcasse resig elevate Biilow, to whom he gave sole credit for this diplomatic success, to the of prince.

The fali of Delcasse did not lead to a relaxation of German pressure on F On the contrary, now that Delcasse was gone the Germans expected the F govemment to agree at last to their proposal for an intemational conference, Holstein at least believed would provide the forum for an amicable settlement. * sically, the problem between ourselves and France is now a matter of form,” wrote to his friend Radolin, the German ambassador to Paris, “for we don’t to upset France’s futurę.” Holstein’s “vision of the futurę,” as he himself term" was that an honest effort should be madę to introduce reforms in Morocco, pr ably ilhder intemational mandate. In all likelihood these reforms would fail. In situation Germany would be free from commitments to the sułtan and in a posi to reach a direct understanding with France to the exclusion of third parties, cifically Spain, whereby Germany might be conceded a sphere of influence in rocco while all the rest went to France.

But Rouvier, the French prime minister, who upon Delcasse’s fali took over portfolio for foreign affairs as well, proved to be no morę yielding than Delcasse German demands. He had received what the French interpreted to be unequiv" assurances of support from Britain; Italy and Spain were already enrolled on Frań side over Morocco; and from the United States he had received word from Presi Roosevelt that his govemment would decline to participate in a conference if F so desired. The most encouraging assurances of all, however, came from Ge^-itself, where the kaiser, ąuite as baffled as were foreign powers by his govemme insistence on a conference and elated by the fali of Delcasse, informed the Fre" of his desire to extend the hand of friendship. On the occasion of the wedding his son, the German crown prince, on June 6, 1905, William expressed his dis about the uproar his own govemment was causing. “I haven’t the slightest intenti of waging war with France over Morocco,” he told General de Lacroix, the lea of the French delegation at the ceremony, an assurance he authorized the gen to report to his govemment. Thus the French knew they had nothing to fear standing firm. Germany’s negotiators were dismayed by the Rouvier govemme" rigidity, which differed not at all from Delcasse’s policy, and though they suspect

i indiscretions had something to do with it, they had no idea to what extem own emperor had sold them out.

On July 8, 1905, the French at last agreed to a conference over Morocco, but acceptance hardly represented a victory for the Germans, for the French only after making certain the majority of States represented at the conference sided them. Even then, as the price for their acceptance they compelled the Germans in advance to onerous conditions, in particular to secure French consent items on the conference agenda. This meant in effect that the Germans would bliged to yield on all differences over the agenda or accept the blame for tbe bdown of negotiations in setting up a conference they themselves had de-“d.

The Kaiser’s Diplomatic Initiatire: The Bjorkó Treaty

July 20, 1905, just a fortnight after France agreed to attend the Morocco con-ice, Biilow received a message from the kaiser that shifted the focus of German . The tsar had agreed to meet the kaiser on board his yacht in the Bay of o (off the coast of Finland), and he asked Bulów to telegraph him ‘ at once directly" the text of the draft defensive alliance treaty Germany had proposed Russia the previous November (see p. 395). The kaiser was evidently comńnced, wing Russia’s most recent military and naval disasters in Asia, that the time was to renew his bid for a Russian alliance, and he announced his intention to push through “no matter what the cost.”

The meeting of the imperial cousins at Bjorkó took place on July 24. When ented with the German treaty, the tsar protested that he could not possibly e because of Germany’s strained relations with France over Morocco. The kaiser hed this objection aside. He regarded Morocco as a “steppingstone” to better tions with France, and he assured the tsar that he intended to adopt a concilia-attitude on this ąuestion. With that the tsar was won over. “Treaty just signed the tsar and me,” the kaiser telegraphed triumphantly to Biilow that same day.

. Tsar immediately willing because we were now on good terms witb France, iiich especially pleased him. He regards this as the permanent settlement of the ace-Lorraine ąuestion. It is to remain secret until peace [with Japan] is coo-ded.”

Biilow was effusive with his praise. “For this success Your Majesty alone is to congratulated, for Your Majesty alone has madę it possible and realized this tum f events.” The kaiser declined all personal credit. “God arranged and willed it so," e said. “. . . That which Russia dismissed in her pride last Winter, and in her passion for intrigue tried to exploit to our harm, she has now accepted with thanta and pleasure as a lovely gift after being humiliated by the terrible, hard, and 1 bling hand of the Lord.”

Biilow, although disturbed by changes the kaiser had introduced in the < draft of the treaty making it, he thought, morę favorable to Germany, that even in its present form it would free Germany from the Franco-Rnssan ihe, and like the kaiser he believed Morocco could be used as a steppingstone to I relations with France, an ideał bribe to secure France’s agreement and ]