30346 kryzysy marokańskie (16)

388 □ The Franco-German Duel

Once he had madę his formal entry into the city, the dramatic possibilities the occasion excited his imagination and his representation of the German positi" od Morocco was a good deal morę vigorous and provocative than his govemnrr had intended. Instead of ignoring the French, the kaiser pointedly informed French representative in Tangier that he intended to deal with the sułtan as a and equal ruler of an independent state, that he would know how to safeg Germany’s interests in Morocco, and that he would expect these to be recog by France.

With the kaiser’s landing in Tangier, the Germans threw down the gauntlet France and set off what became known as the First Morocco Crisis. There has be much speculation about the fundamental purpose of Holstein’s Morocco policy. strong case can be madę that his ultimate purpose was to provoke war with Franc and from a cold-blooded point of view war would certainly have been in Germany¹ interest in 1905. France was allied with Russia and had recently arranged diploma-alignments with Britain, Italy, and Spain. Germany was thus encircled by a ring hostile powers and left with only one ally, Austria-Hungary, and even that ally mig be wooed successfully if the encircling powers offered Austria the prospect of re-gaining its former dominant position in central Europę.

Quite the simplest way for Germany to have abolished the danger of encircled ment would have been to smash the parts of the circle, and in 1905 its chances for doing so were exceptionally good. Russia, France's most formidable Continental ally, was immobilized by defeat in Asia and revolution at home; Britain was reorganiz _ its*armed forces, but that process had barely begun and British sea power would be of no use in defending Paris. German mili tary leaders had great respect for the French army, which they considered far superior to that of 1870, but France itself had been weakened by domestic conflict, the legacy of the Dreyfus case, and bitter controversy between church and State. The Germans thus had a uniąue op-portunity, and one they themselves realized would be of short duration, to fight France without having to face the prospect of a war on two fronts. After that they would be free to deal with Russia, drill Italy back into linę, and ensure the loyalty of Austria. In short, they had an opportunity to establish their hegemony over Europę, a prospect the British justifiably dreaded.

It was with fuli awareness of this opportunity that General Alfred von Schlieffen, chief of the German generał staff, perfected his famous Schlieffen plan, which de-pended for its success on Germany’s concentrating its forces in the west to achieve a ąuick and decisive victory over France before Russia could intervene. (For a fuller discussion of the Schlieffen plan, see pp. 455-457.) As Holstein and Schlieffen were in freąuent touch with each other throughout the Morocco crisis, there can be no doubt that they discussed the possibility—and desirability—of war against France at this time.

The most obvious objection to the theory that Holstein’s Morocco campaign was designed to provoke war with France is that Germany did not go to war. But the war theory is also undercut, and very convincingly so, by the documentary record of Germany’s diplomatic strategy and its overalI conduct of policy. Here the important difference must be borne in mind between a diplomatic campaign con-ducted with the deliberate purpose of provoking war, and one that is based on the threat or possibility of war.

The immediate purpose of German policy was to prevent France from gaining

benefit from its entente with Britain and to make both powers realize that they d conclude no far-reaching colonial settlement without the 'participation and ~nt of Germany. “We don’t want to achieve anything in particular,” Holstein te to his cousin and confidante. “Our action was intended to demonstrate ‘that ~s can’t be done without us.’” France was to be taught a lesson, but far from tig a rupture with France, Holstein wanted this lesson to be administered in a way as to avoid a Franco-German confrontation, and for this purpose he posed to make use of that familiar instrument of the European concert: an in-tional conference attended by representatives of all the States that had signed 1880 Madrid Convention. “Contractual collectivity,” he wrote to Biilow on April “is a principle on which we can take a firm stand without ourselves appearing harbor aggressive intentions. Moreover, this idea has the advantage that while cting French interests it does not affect French pride, just as the collective vic-~es of 1814 were less of an insult to France than the German victory, gained ne, of 1870. . . . If the conference is held it will, whatever the result, definitely hand Morocco over to the French.”

An intemational conference had the further merit of opening the way for an •entual settlement between Germany and France, for arrangements could be madę ~hind the scenes to give Germany as well as France an intemational mandate for toring order in certain parts of Morocco. In this way, Germany would be eased at of its commitments to Morocco, France would have been taught its lesson, and imany would receive a share of the spoils of Morocco or suitable compensation -where. Before the conference met at which such arrangements could be madę, wever, Germany could not appear willing to bargain over Morocco, for this would dercut the very principle on which its intemational support would be based.

That Germany would receive such support Holstein did not doubt for a moment, ne United States would automatically champion the principle of the Open Door in Morocco as it had in China. Britain could not afford to back France actively for fear offending the Americans, and in any case influential interest groups in Britain would welcome the opportunity to evade their govemment’s commitments to France under the umbrella of an intemational agreement. “We will surely be able to hołd Italy in linę,” Holstein said, “if necessary by a gentle hint that while we settle [i.e., reach a compromise agreement] with France, Austria might make a settlement about the irredenta.” Moreover, Italy would be unwilling to see Morocco reduced to the status of Tunis, where French political ascendancy had already been accompanied by the gradual exclusion of Italian interests. Spain, which had kmg coveted Morocco for itself, would certainly oppose a French takeover, and the smaller signatory States would vote readily enough for the principle of the Opcn Door when they saw they were in good company. Finally, Russia, in defeat and revolution, would not dare oppose an intemational mandate or run the risk of an altercation with Germany.

Holstein’s assessment of the foreign powers’ positions on Morocco prowed to be totally wrong in almost every respect, but the important point insofar as his motives are concemed is that the diplomatic victory he so confidently ezpectcd eliminated any reason for war. Foreign powers, of course, had no way of 1 the limited naturę of Holstein’s objectives, which he failed to clarify with i cision for the benefit of his own govemment—or for himself for that i don’t want to achieve anything in particular” is a ludicrously inadeouate j