Bismarck l p XIX w

1-8 CHAPTER 9

3.    If, as a result of this understanding, a military action should become necessary, it would be govemed by a special convention to be concluded between Their Nlajesties.

4.    If one of the High Contracting Parties, wishing to recoyer its independence of action, should desire to renounce the present Agreement, it must do so two years in adyance, in order to give the other Party time to make whatever arrangements may be suitable.

—GP, 1:129; Hurst, 2:508-9 (archaic translation!)

9.2

IS WAR IN SIGHT?

Disraeli to Derby, 6 May 1875 • Ponsonby to Derby, 9 May 1875 • Victoria to Alexander II. 10 May 1875 • Bismarck to Munster, 14 May 1875 •

Marginalia by Wilhelm I, 16 May 1875

The brittleness of the first Three Emperors' League and the precariousness of Germany's posi-tion in Europę were revealed to Bismarck during April and May 1875. In an article entitled "Is War in Sight?" published on 8 April, a Berlin paper conjured up the specter of an anti-German coalition, organized by the chief opponents of the new European order—France and the Catholic church.¹ The article culminated in the thinly veiled suggestion that Germany should strike before its opponents had readied their armaments.

In subsequent weeks, the Berlin press and a number of German officials—among them Helmuth von Moltke, chief of the Prussian generał Staff; Georg von Kameke, the Prussian minister of war; and Joseph von Radowitz, a high-ranking diplomat—created the impression that Bismarck contemplated a preventive war against France. The French, British, and Russian govemments reacted with dismay and, as is evident from the documents excerpted here, forced Bismarck to retreat.

For Bismarck, the most obvious lesson of the "war-in-sight" crisis was that neither Britain nor Russia would tolerate the destruction of France as a Great Power. But this lesson could be tumed to fuli advantage: Bismarck could use the British and Russian intervention to show those in Berlin who advocated preventive war that they had better be prepared to fight not only France but also Britain and Russia—an undertaking which even the Prussian generał Staff understood to be well beyond the resources of the new German State.

Disraeli to Derby,² 6 May 1875

My own impression is that we should construct some concerted movement to pre-serve the peace of Europę like Pa[l]m[erston] did when he baffled France and ex-pelled the Egyptians from Syria.⁹ There might be an alliance between Russia and ourselves for this special purpose; and other powers, as Austria and perhaps Italy might be invited to accede....

—W. F. Monypenny and G. E. Buckie, Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beacons field (London, 1920),

5:422

Ponsonby¹⁰ to Derby, 9 May 1875

... it is scarcely correct to assume that no such design as making war for the recov-ery of the lost provinces is entertained by France, for no such intention is dreamt of a t present, the Queen is surę that the wish exists in almost every Frenchman’s heart, and that the Germans know this better than we do. Her Majesty therefore thinks that, while remonstrating with Germany, it becomes our duty also to wam France against aggressive movements.

—QV, 2nd Series, 2:393-96

c)

Queen Yictoria to Alexander II, 10 May 1875

... I cannot finish this letter without expressing to you the firm hope that you wili use your great influence to assure the maintenance of peace, and to dissipate the pro foimd alarm which the language used by Berlin has caused in all Europę....

—QV, 2nd Series, 2:393-96

Bismarck to Miinster,'¹14 May 1875

. . . We have to draw the conclusion that England would be ready to alert [aufzurufenJ Europę against us and in favor of the French, if we cver—which is not the case now— madę military or diplomatic preparations to fend off rcnewed French attacks....

—CP, 1:180

Marginalia by Wilhelm I, 16 May 1875

... In order to wagę i successful war, the attacker must be able to count on the sym-pathy of all noble individuals and countries, while public opinion must cast stones at whocver unjustły provokes war. That was the secret of the enthusiasm in Germany in 1870! Whoever unjustły takes up arms, wili have public opinion against him; he will find no allies, no benevolent neutrals, probably no neutrals but only adversaries.—I

1

For the text of the article in the Berlin Post, see Lucius von Ballhausen, Bismarck-Erinnerungen

2

(Stuttgart, 1921), 531-34.