1410610411

gcographical, and Imgumk affmicics of this region to thc adjacent Dina kil arras of Ethiopia.

14|. Ai regat Js thc Western Provin<c. thc United Kingdom Govcmmcnt did not consUcr chat thc inhabi-tanes should be irxof porated in Ex hi opia contrary to their cxprc&scd w ishci. nor that thc Prorince could justifiably be placcd under a separatc truscecship looking to »ts futurę cxistencc as a separatc Sute. k, therefore. sup-ported it* incorporation in the adjacent Sudan, as bcing thc beat solution on ethnic, gcographic and rdigious ground*.

149.    The Govcrnm<nc ot the United Kingdom was fumly of optnion that the establishment of an iode-pendent Eritrean State is not a peacticable sohmon. h suted that the territory U not and nerce has been eco-nomically viable and that it postesses neither thcruiiorul, rdipous, racial. linguistic, nor gcographkal unity whieh would be prerequiiśtet of such a Sute.

The Govcmment stated that »t could not support any proposal involvm£ thc return of an ltaliin Administra* tion to Eriuca in any form.

150.    The United Kingdom Govcmmcnt cxpressrd • its oppoution to trustecship, cither for a dchnuc or an

indcErutc period, and stated that on account of the faeis . givcn above crusieeship could Kave no aim or purpose sińce thc tnhabitants of Eriuca could not, in the foresce-ablc futurę, be in a position to uke orer their m govcrnmer.t froro a Truttec Power. It stared thsough its iepresf nutive that it would noc accept the reiponsihiliues of tru^tetship for the whole or any pan of the tertitocy.

V. Peace and security in East Afrka

151.    The Commissioa has be en direcud to uU panicular accojnt of the following faciors in examixurg thc problem of the disposal of Eriuca:

(a)    The wishes of the inhabiunu of Eriuca;

(b)    The best roeans of promociag their wcl/are;

(c)    The capachy of the pcoplc for sclf-govenuT>ent;

• (d) The tights and claims of Ethiopia;

(e) The interesu of peace and security in East Af-

rica.

The facu perta Lning to the fint four icems harc already been set out in this memorandum. The interesu of peace and security in East Africa remain to be considcred.

152- Eriuca is a rery rugged and broken counuy, and this fan has throughour madę adcąuate policing difficulc and costly. Suategicaily, the cxccrnil defence of Eriuca is rendered complicated by her longcoastlinc and fiat coasu) plain and by the absenre of na tur a 1 fronner barrict s in the interior. Whcther or not peace and security could be mainuined in Such conditiocis would, h owo er, bc tnflucnced less by pure strategie considerations than by thc abilky of the territory to mcet the costs of policing and deur.ee, by the degrec of intern al unity ot disscnsion and by che polhical relarioruhipt with nc»ghbouring coumries.

153.    Thcre is an acu:e interna 1 po W tkał dińtśon amonest the people of Eriuca on the basie qocstion of the foturc of the country. This dirision of opinion has rc-cemh led to an ootbrcak of politkal violcnce bcrwccn groups of Moskrns and Copts in Asmara, whilc "Shift a" band* hast c.er a period commined sporadk outrages in yarious paru of the territory. The security position in • E/iuca is, therefore, perilous. The faa musi be faccd, moreorer, that the movement for union with Łthiopia has many of thc characserisrics of a popular nsoremenf, and tc is morę than likcły that ourright frustracion of thesc wishes would make the position of inccmal security in Eriuca untcnablc. Nor would it in that orne be unieah i Stic to cxpca assistance lor thc umooisr groups fi om Ethiopia. in vi*w of that country *s own espousal of thc same ciusq. *

154.    h has, in addicion, beCn dfmonuratcd that ‘Eriuca is not cconoraically viablc and lacki the rcsourccs and fmancial means to become such in the for rtecabk futurę. In such drcunuunccs and in vicw of che acutc mtemal politkal dmtion and sute of tension in Eriucs, * thc condusion is inelucuble that the creation of a sępa-ratę Eritrean Sute entirdy on its own would contain atl the clemenu ncćcssary scriously to prejudke thc interesu of peace and security in East Afrka, oow and ia the futurę.

TAKT U. fROfOSALS FOR THE SOLUTlON OFTHE TKOMSlOf ERTTRIA

VL General condusions

155.    A fair and lauing soluaon lor the problem of Eritrea mus: be realiście and uke into account aD the sakimt facu of the case. They were, therefore, ntamincd in deuil in part 1 of this memorandum.

156.    Actcntion is, firsdy. drawn to thc faa that Eriuca is a poor country, without any prespecu of pro-grosing as a separatc ccc nornic emicy, and dependent in most vital respecu on Ethiopia's nch farmrrg rcsourccs and transie uadc. In the vicw of theddegatiom of hurma. Norway and thc Union of South A/rica, thesc facts pre-dude a soludon w nich has as its aim thc creabon of an entirdy separatc Eritrean State, whcther in the immedute futurę or aficr an inccoal of imrmational Uustcnhip.

157.    Secondly, anemion is drawn to thc capctssed poktical wishes of thc people. With thc defcction of the Mosiem League of thc Western Provirvcc fvom the Indc* pendenee Moc, the proragonists of an independent Enuean Sute, w ho werc probabfy dose on hals the toul population beforc. are now in a dcfmiie mi non ty. On rhc

7g THŁ USTTU) SATTOSS AND *n« tSDtrtNPCNCl OT CRCTRU

ot Ker hand, tt is noc unlifccty thjt an ovcr-aM matoricy of the total Eritrean population favour rcunion    Eihio-

pis, in view of the suppon for this coursc by the ovcr-wbclming mass of Christian Copcs and by siteablc numbers of Motlcms liring r.ext to fhem in the high-ands and in thc Red Sca Division.

1SS. Thirdly, attemion is drawn to thc Icptimate aspiranons of Ethiopia for aeccss to thc sca. boch on cconomk ind tccuńry grounds, ind for the reimegration of thc Eritrean people, many of whom have thc most incimatc bonds with the people of northera Eih-opia.

159. The doić affmicics betwcen largr sections of thc Eritrean and Erhiopian people*, the scroog demar.d for rcunion by probably thc majorny of Efk/cans, the common strategie interno of the rwo coumncs and the faa that Eritrea laeks the rcsourccs co p<o:ea hciself, kav* eonvinced the dcJegations of Burma, Norway and the Union of South Africa that, in the intereso of peace and security in ^ast Africa and of the wcl/are of thc Eritrean people, the best sokifioo for Erinra musi be based on closcpohacj! assodation with Eiłuopta. Eco-nomie and finandal auodatio n also is a sine qv a no a in* vicw of the depcndcnce of Eiiitca on the rich Ethaopiin himcrland and o/ Ethiopia on the transport and harbour fadiitie* of Eritrca, and in vi*w of Eritrea** poor ic-sourccs, weak finances and inabiJiry to mainiain iuclf without lid from i strong partner.

16C. It is appreciated that a solution. based on the principie of cconomic and politkal assodation with Ethiopia. may not ac thc moment command generał support in Eriuca, wherc passions have bcen inflamcd by political propaganda and the resort to violen:c by irre-sponablc de menu. Thrsc acńvities do not, howene, reftea the truć fedings of the people. AUbough Eritrea'* boundarics arc the produa of colonial expansion in the 1S80'*. so that it is neither a geogripKicał unit nor an cconomic wholc, a common past and scvency yeao of common nile havc had potent unifying effeets not oniy betwcen the dtverse people* of Eritrea but also in their iclations with thc Italian settkrs; such amicy cannot readily bc dcsuoyed and thert is no doubc that resort to Woleocc is repugnant to thc deep-rooced desire of atl secrions in Entrca to concinuc to live in peace side by sidc. The deteganons of Bur ma, Norway and thc Union of South Africa, in condcmmng the resort to murder and vio!encc by incsponsible clemencs, musi craphasiic that they belicvc this in largc part to be a direct c©nscqurncc of the unfonunaic delay in senling the fuure of the country. They truły fcar that the skuarion would, perhaps irrctrieyably, go from bad to worse unlcss a finał sett!e-ount is c/fected soon.

161. In vicw of this paramount nced for an carly and finał solution, thc delrgacion of the Union of South

Africa has dccidcd to relmqui>h tr.c suggrstion it madę to the Commission during the generał debatę, łt then pro-posed that thc highlands and Red Sca DiVi»on bc placed under Ethiopian truscceship with a ńew to cvcru©a! sclf-govcmmcot as a federal part of Ethiopia, and that Bricish Adminiitratton be temporardy cootinucd in the Western Provincc until the people there arc ablc co make up their minds betwcen joining either Ethiopu or the Sudan sincc an independent State in che Western Proróce would bc fsnmtic The coursc suggested would, how-cvcr, invo!ve a rut ther period oi suspensę bcforc a per na-nent scttlcmcnt of thc problem could bc cffcacd, and in order to avoid this the delcgacion of the Union of South Africa has dccided to join with the dclegarioa of Barma and suppon its federal solution which would perma-nentły and effectńcły mcet the eaigenaes of the e*sc.

162.    The dclegation of Norway, l.ke the dclcg*-tiom of Burma and the Uoion of South Africa, subsrribes to the principje of politieal and cconomic assooatioa betwcen Eritrea and Ethiopia, but differs fsom these delegatiocts in regard to thc predse formula to be appltcd to that end. The deleginons of Burma and thc Union of South. Africa, therefore, subrnk their joint recommendi-tions helowy and these arc followcd by separatc rccom-mendations by the dclegation of Norway.

VII. Proposals by the dekgadonf of Burma and

thc Union of South Africa

163.    In the coursc of uwestigarions, it sooa became apparem that the crux of thc ptoblem in Eritrea is the conilict of iwo ardent form* of nationaliim. na/neły, thc desire of thc Uniomst groups co join Ethiopia and thc striving of thc Indcpcndencc Bloc for an independent Eritrean Sute. These respectivc dauns hm the tramp of validity and they havc bccn stcadfastly put forward hy these cwo political groups. As these daims arc inccoodl-able, it is imposuble fully co sadsfy thc dcmands of either group without causing a gravc miscarriage of jusdcc to the other. A fair buc cffcctwc compromisc is, therefore, neccssary.

16A For the reasons stated in conjunaion with thc delegańon of Norway, thc delegations of Burma and thc Union of South Africa are comrinccd that a solution for Eritrea must be based on elose political and complrtc cconomic assodation with Ethiopu. On thc other hand, the ddegations of Burma and the Union of South A/rica arc emphatie that such a solution should bc designrd so as also to satisfy to a materiał cxtenc thc politkal scnii-bilitścs of thc Mosiem populaóon of Entrca, who on the whok are afraid to join Ethiopia, and to ufeguard the position of the Italian settlers and halo-Eritrcan half-castes who havt a permsnecit siake in thc country.

Documenr 4    79