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IV

Tl,v "Wbittimll ŃeW» ¹ S;-.tnix!av, .Inne 10. 1£>*U

WHITEHALL NEWS

1i-6gi(tterc<l at i ho ii.P.O. as a Netc^paper.

SIXPENCE

Edłloriftl Office*. 79, GLOUCESTER ROAD, S.W.7.

Vol. 1 No. 5 (New Edition). SATURDAY. JUNE 10, 1944

INYASION

DIPLOMATIC COMMENT

The invasion which is now under way i.s the rcsult. of n fuiulomcntul change/m Imperial policy. Il was Marsh nl Śmuts W ho, iii 194J3, used the expressidn "Mcditerraneaii Base" m a speech at Pretoria.

W bat he meant was that the Mediterranonn would Im* tho hast* for the uiain offensivo on*the part of the Western Powera against Germany. Hatl this conception becn uphcld, the "ScCoud Front " would have been est&blislied in the Balkatts and not in Western Kurope. Mr. Churchill was sym-pathetie to this conception. He was an ".Kasterner." in this war as in the last. The chan go eonie at Teheran włien Mr. OJmrcMlI was persuiided not ordy by Stalin,, but also by ITesident Roosevell, ti> abandon his cn.sl.crn strat egy and agreo to that iinasion of Western Kurope whioh has now bogini. The consequenees of this change wore farrcaehing in a polilical as well as in ,a nulUary sense. and profoundly affected the polilical situation. not only in the Bałkan# but in (‘entral Europo and Polatul. Thcrc will. no doiiht. la* a subsidiary itivasion of the Ballcans so tłiai the enemy will be attfteked on three big fronts.

How do os the enemy regard the changę mado at Teheran, and now finding ifs fultilmeiit? It is <*vident that ho sces n possibility (the last possibility. evcn to his

NORTHERN EUROPE.

By the severity of hor terms to Finland, and by lier domnnd for Koenigsberg as a Russian naval base after tłie war, Kussia is now showing clearly that she rneans not only.to i>e a Baltie power, but to be the one and only Baltic power. It is for this reason, no doubt, that she is taking an interest in the futurę of Kici and i.s attemptimr to promoto particu-

mind) not of wiiining the war. but of pot losing it uttcrly and irre-Lrievably. Ile is. in tlie West, on his owi. lamilir.r groiind where the proxijnity of his main bases of supply and his elotse network of oommunications give him the gron test mobility ho e.ould com-inaud in any the&tre- of war, nlthough this mobility will be much impaired by the bomb-i ng of those conumuiications. which Brilish and American sąuadrons I^iyo carried out, and will contimte to carry nut. with prodigious destruetive eiTeet.

The enemy will no doubt tliink in terms of his own classieal strategy in terms of the "l>c-eisivo Battle."

It is hnrd to conceivo that. with the ntmost siiecess on his part it eould be iłecisive in a finał sense, even if he were to win one big battle in the West. His vie!.ory would be tnetieal not strategie. It might prolong the war far into the ycar 1945.

This is perhaps the utrnost he himsclf is hoping for- -a hope .which he ccrtainly couples with the expectation that losses and war-weariness will i n duce the United Nations. especinlly Great Britnin, to modify those eonditious of micondit ional stirrender which he musi *know to be as drastic as indeed they ought to be.

larly cordial relations hetween her-sclf and Uenmark. lf the Herman cmitrolled ('openlugei Press and Radio are any guide, the Danos are becoming perturbed at the idea of Russian ront roi over the Kici Oaiiul. Certain Danes liying outside Der.mark, and uninflucnced by the Germans nre not, however. unfavotmible to the idea What the Russians appoar to hnve in mind is that Denmark should have

81esvig-Hol»tein, so that the Tanal would pass througli Danish instead of (Jernian territory. Li is sug-gęste 1 that Deninark hersclf would then eonclude an alliańee with liussia, and that Kieł would bpeome a Russian nnval bnsc.

The rccciit No r wegi an-Bo v iet agreement has ealled foj*tli a cer-tain amotint of eriticism in the •Swedisli Press. It li«s becn sug-gested that a liussian oęeupation of Northern Nprway. inehnling Narvik, would not be popular with the Western Powera. But as Jiinny Norwegians, both in London and Norway, regard the Russkin army as their łiberatora, it is not surprising that: they have agreed to a Russian oecupation. Furt henn nre. there nppears to be little fear of coininunisnr in Norway.

THE BALKANS.**

The recenl. warning addresscd to the '•Satellite States" by the Britislt. American and Uiussian Goyernments. appears to have had no eiTeet on any of those c.ountries. In Rumania tiw* official rejection of the warning certainly has the approvttl of puhlie opinion. At the same time, there is no, real hatred in Rumania towards the Allies, least ol: all to the Western Allies. On May I8th, the Buearest . radio transmitted a broadcast ’ staling that Rumunia still believes “in- her friemlś of the past" and that hor people wore “eonscioits of t.hcir gnit itude to Óreat Britnin and the United States." to wliom they owed their national indepen-tlence after the last war.

The peaee iliseussions initiated by Russia betweon Allied and Rumaniaji representat iees have eonie to nolhing so far. hut it dpes not appear that they will be abandonęd. The Russian demands are purely territorial, lor P.essnr-abia and Northern Bukoyinn {the territories oceupied by the Russian •army in 1940). The Russians dn not (leniami reparations. and de-elare they will not intorfere in Ruina nimi internal nffairs. but they propose 1lut1 Kumania slmll recover Transylyania, as far as her prę-war front ier with I lun gary.

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