of the revolutionary movenmet, the theory could operate only as a tool of external manipulation and would soon transform itself into a specific kind of technocratic and/or bureaucratic consciousness. Un-fortunately, Habermas’s analyses of internal revolutionary possibiliti-es in industrially developed capitalist societies do not differ much from those of Marcuse.70
There is a very widespread thought in the critical theory that sup-port for the unity of theory and practice does not mean wanting to strengthen the activism of practice, especially in developing forces of production and in political life, as almost all other Marxist currents interpret the advantages of this unity. Marcuse ,for example, believes that the ratę of technological development, which in developed coun-tries is showing a tendency of ever greater acceleration, should be slowed down. This is one of the requirements of his thesis about »pacifying the struggle for existence«, which is fundamental to his »historical project«.71 Horkheimer held somewhat similar viewpoints earlier, but he did express scepticism in regard to political activism.72 It is not easy to explain all the factors affecting these standpoints. It is certain that we must take into consideration senseless abuses of technology for destructive, oppressive and manipulative purposes, nu-merous obvious irrationalities in production and in the social functions of consumer goods. This already contains a measure of awareness of the increasing application of typically manipulative methods in mas-sive political action, especially when it acquires dynamie forms. All this gives rise to a critical attitude toward the technocratic myth about the development of technology as a decisive factor of social progress and prompts thinking about morę sensible forms of exploiting the enormous technological possibilities, but it does not justify the con-servative idealization of some past forms of social life and relation-ships existing in them. Furthermore, Marcuse rightly points out that a change in the ratio between the time filled with work necessary for subsistence and the time of leisure in the life of men calls for a re-examination of the criteria of rationality wich have historically arisen under the pressure of the overwhelming necessity for work. Rationality within the framework of compulsion is vitally different from rationality within freedom. It is an old rule that we must not make a virtue of necessity.
EXPERIENCE AND IMAG1NATION
The conception of the naturę of society and the basie practical interest leading to its study have a very strong effect upon the episte-mological definitions of scientific experience about society and scien-tific objectivity. This view is bound to cause opposition and to be interpreted as a defence of relativism. For this reason we should at-
7* See Habcrmaa, Technik und Wissenschafł ais 'Ideologie, pp. 84-103.
n H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, especially chapters 9 and 10.
» See M. Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason. (Serbo-Ćroatian translation) pp. 159-162.
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