Group Decis Negot (2008) 17:1–11
DOI 10.1007/s10726-007-9091-9

Emotions in negotiation

Daniel Druckman

· Mara Olekalns

Published online: 4 July 2007
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Abstract

In this article, we discuss the ways in which emotions influence the course of

negotiation. Emotions play a role in the development of relationships among negotiators; they
also facilitate or hinder coordination of strategic exchanges. These functions highlight an
interplay between information-processing and emotional expressions: intentions are inferred
from statements made and nonverbal gestures sent. They are understood as part of an expres-
sion game that emphasizes interaction dynamics. They are also understood in terms of the
organizational contexts surrounding negotiation. These are some of the themes that surface
in the articles contributed to this special issue. An overview of the articles calls attention to
key points but also expands on the themes suggested by the authors. The work reported in
this issue provides a basis for a continuing research agenda on emotions in negotiation.

Keywords

Emotions

· Experimentation · Expression games · Information-processing ·

Intentions

· Negotiation

D. Druckman (

B

)

George Mason University,
Fairfax, VA 22030, USA
e-mail: [e-mail]

D. Druckman
University of Queensland,
Brisbane, Australia
e-mail: [e-mail]

M. Olekalns
Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne,
Melbourne, Australia
e-mail: [e-mail]

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Introduction

An increasingly popular topic in current research is the way that emotional expressions
influence the course of negotiation and related interactions. Negotiation is a form of social
exchange that pits the opposing motives of cooperating and competing against one another.
Most negotiators seek to reach an agreement with the other; they also strive for an agreement
that serves their own goals. This dual concern is reflected in a process that consists of both
bargaining and problem solving. A good deal of the research and practice literatures con-
centrates on ways to perform these activities effectively. In earlier writing, emotions were
viewed largely as factors that impede performance, preventing successful coordination from
occurring. More recently we have learned that emotions can both help and hinder progress.
Expressions may convey useful information about preferences; they can also signal dislike
or malevolent intentions. Whether emotions move a negotiation forward or backward—or
improve/threaten a relationship—depends on a variety of process and context variables. A
number of these variables are explored in the articles to follow. In this article we provide
background on the topic and introduce each of the articles to follow.

The role of emotions in negotiation

The study of emotions has been neglected in a literature that emphasizes strategy and informa-
tion-processing. This emphasis is prominent in several dominant paradigms that have guided
much of the research, including game and decision theory, behavioral approaches, cognitive
framing/prospect theory, and the dual concern model. Concepts that would seem to have
substantial emotional content have been described mostly in terms of strategy. Examples are
motives, trust, and identity. Motives have been construed in terms of relative and absolute
or joint gains (

De Dreu et al. 2000; Hopmann 1995

). Trust has been defined as calculus,

knowledge and identification-based (

Irmer 2003; Lewicki and Stevenson 1997

). And, iden-

tity has been treated as constituent-based representative role obligations (

Druckman 1994;

Wall 1975; Bartunek et al. 1975

). Because of these emphases progress in developing theories

or frameworks for understanding the role of emotions in negotiation has been slow. However,
a rash of recent studies bodes well for development of this topic. Some of the progress is
reflected in the articles selected for publication in this issue.

Several earlier studies on negotiation have called attention to the importance of such

emotional expressions as happiness and anger. Both these emotions can be socially-induced,
leading to reciprocated expressions (

McIntosh 1996

). Good feelings have been shown to have

beneficial effects on bargaining. Even when the feelings are induced in the simplest ways,
negotiators indicate that they have increased confidence in their judgments, more creative
approaches to solving problems, expect more favorable outcomes, and offer more concessions
(

Baron 1990; Carnevale and Isen 1986; Kopelman et al. 2006

). However when positive emo-

tion is induced as flattery, negotiators may become wary of the flatterer’s intentions. When
flattery is viewed as being manipulative or ingratiating it can backfire (

Baron 1990

). Similarly

anger can have positive or negative effects on negotiation. Displays of anger can be beneficial
if used to signal how strongly one feels about an issue, about the fairness of proposed distribu-
tions or procedures, or about possible consequences of continuing intransigence. The key is to
distinguish between anger directed at the task and at the other person (

Daly 1991; Jehn 1994

).

For example, a negotiator can direct attention to some possible unfair distributions implied
by a proposal (the task) or to the other’s intention to be exploitative or self-serving (the per-
son). The former communication is likely to elicit reciprocated anger and delay settlement

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Emotions in negotiation

3

(

Brett et al. 2007; Friedman et al. 2004

). Anger has received attention in the more recent

studies reviewed by Van Kleef and colleagues in this issue.

Emotional expression serves important social functions and assists in the coordination

of social action. For individuals, emotional expression facilitates survival; for groups, it
facilitates social bonding and collaboration (

Keltner et al. 2006; Shiota et al. 2004; Mor-

ris and Keltner 2000

). Emotional expression is thus likely to play a role in the develop-

ment of relationships between bargainers. Improved relationships have been shown to re-
sult from cooperative processes and mutually-beneficial outcomes (e.g.,

Druckman 1998;

Olekalns and Smith 2005

). Importantly, the expression of positive emotion is identified as

critical to forming and maintaining social bonds (

Shiota et al. 2004

).

Dunn and Schweit-

zer (2005)

point to the relationship between positive emotions and perceived trustworthi-

ness. Furthermore, negotiators who displayed positive emotion in an interactive dispute
simulation were more likely to include in their agreements provisions for future business
relationships that increase joint outcomes (Kopelman et al. 2006). While—on this basis—
it is easy to conclude that positive emotions should facilitate collaboration, the impact of
emotional expression appears to be context sensitive. For example, recent research shows
that power and affect interact to shape negotiators’ outcomes (

Anderson and Thompson

2004

) and behaviors (

Anderson and Galinsky 2006; Olekalns and Smith 2007; Van Kleef

et al. 2006

).

Tiedens and Linton (2001) found that emotions associated with certainty, such as happiness

and anger, can be differentiated from those associated with uncertainty, such as surprise
and worry. A possible consequence is that these differently valenced emotions (positive vs.
negative) create certain, optimistic expectations when negotiators are happy. They create
certain, pessimistic expectations when negotiators are angry. As a result, happy negotiators
anticipate that the other party is skilled and that a settlement is likely to occur. The authors
conclude that cooperation is an appropriate strategy. Conversely, angry negotiators anticipate
a difficult, competitive negotiation, triggering disinterest and withdrawal from the process
(Forgas 1998; Knapp and Miller 1985; Van Kleef et al. 2004).

Gender stereotypes influence expectations about the expression of emotion. Consistent

with the stereotype of a female negotiating style as more emotional (

Kray and Thompson

2005

), women are expected to both experience and express a greater range of emotions than

men. The two exceptions to this general expectation relate to expressions of anger and pride,
both of which are seen as more typical of men than women. When emotional expression
is ambiguous, individuals attribute gender-congruent emotions to others (

Plant et al. 2000

).

The idea that there are gender-based expectations about emotional expression is interesting,
in light of work on expectancy violation and emotion in negotiation: negotiators who switch
strategies and thereby violate the expectations of the other negotiator affect the other party’s
mood (Barry and Oliver 1996;

Olekalns et al. 2005

). What happens when men and women

violate gender-based expectations about emotional expression? Will women who violate
such expectations encounter the same relational backlash that is evident in other social and
organizational relationships (

Rudman and Glick 1999

).

Emotions and Intentions

Negotiation researchers continue to concentrate their work primarily on two emotions, hap-
piness and anger. A few studies have examined impacts of surprise on bargaining moves
(e.g.,

Druckman et al. 1986

) and on the arousal of guilt when outcomes clearly favor oneself

(

Hegtvedt and Killian 1999

). These and other emotional states have been studied in psy-

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D. Druckman, M. Olekalns

chology. Starting with

Darwin’s (1872)

account of the processes of emotional expression

in animals and humans, investigators have searched for the way in which different emo-
tions are conveyed through speech and nonverbal behavior, particularly facial expressions.

Woodworth’s (1938)

listing of primary emotions was the basis for studies designed to isolate

expressions corresponding to each state (see

Ekman and Friesen 1975

). These emotions are:

happiness, surprise, fear, sadness, anger, disgust/contempt, and interest. A question asked
in many of these studies is whether these are universal emotions or cultural-specific states
(

Ekman 1972

). For negotiation researchers, an important question concerns the connection

between emotions and intentions.

Emotions influence information processing (e.g., Clore et al. 2001). The search for in-

formation during bargaining depends for its effectiveness on skilled problem solving and
judgments of authenticity. Problem solving is a cognitive activity that improves with prac-
tice (Kressel et al. 1994). Judgments of authenticity involve interpretations about the other’s
intentions, which are likely to be influenced by emotional expressions (Baron 1990). Both
skills, known as decoding – diagnosing the other’s intentions – and encoding – conveying
impressions – improve with experience (Thompson 1990).

Research on nonverbal indicators of deception has explored this connection (

Ekman and

Friesen 1974; DePaulo et al. 1980

). Honest and deceptive intentions have been shown to be

associated

with

such

emotional

states

as

confidence,

stress,

and

interest

(

Druckman et al. 1982

). Each of these states has been found to be indicated by particular

facial (and other bodily) expressions. For example, deceivers indicate confidence in defend-
ing positions through increased head shaking, rocking movements, and crossed hands; an
attempt to evade an issue is accompanied by feelings of stress and indicated by frequent gazes
away from the other person; an intention to be honest is accompanied by feelings of interest
or involvement and indicated by frequent leg movements and increased speaking frequency.
These correlational findings point to a connection between emotional states and particu-
lar intentions. They also highlight the possibilities for diagnosis (decoding) and impression
management (encoding) in negotiation and related types of social exchange. Connections
between the emotional expression of both negative and positive emotions and opportunities
to deceive in negotiation are made in several recent studies (e.g.,

O’Connor and Carnevale

1997; Olekalns and Smith 2007; Steinel and De Dreu 2004

).

Expression games

The relation between decoding and encoding in social exchange is captured in

Goffman’s

(1969)

perspective on strategic interaction. Referred to as an expression game, he focuses on

interactive dynamics between the roles of subject (making an offer or demand) and observer
(receiving an offer or demand). This idea is a departure from the way research on negotia-
tion (and on emotions) has been done. These roles are separated in much of the research: the
focus of analysis is usually on the person receiving information from another or on the person
sending information to another as in buyer–seller concession making. Less attention is paid
to the interaction process where observer–subject interactions consist of alternating moves,
the one attempting to infer intent from the subject’s expressions, while the other attempts to
convey certain expressions. In this process, each person is in easy reach of both the observer
and subject roles. Reversed roles are a feature of the interaction that occurs as a result of
mutual attempts to influence the other; the participant’s sense of being more the subject or
more the observer depends on whether he or she is persuading or analyzing during a partic-

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Emotions in negotiation

5

ular episode in the process (see also

Argyle et al. 1968; Pruitt 1995

). Interchangeable roles

require that bargainers use both skills in the course of negotiation. And, both skills are essen-
tial for conveying and reading verbal and nonverbal emotional expressions in negotiation.
Whether improved sensitivity to the meaning of expressions increases tactical proficiency in
conveying intentions remains a research issue.

This approach assumes that the dyad or group is the unit of analysis. This assumption

departs from a good deal of the laboratory research where half the interaction is controlled
by the experimenter: messages are often sent from computers or confederates as is done in the
Pietroni et al., Carnevale, and Chen Yifeng et al. studies reported in this issue. An advantage
of the laboratory controls is that the direction of influence—from the computer/actor to the
subject—is clear. Causal inferences can be made with confidence. A disadvantage is that
interactive dynamics are ignored. The result is a loss in relevance to real-world negotiations.
This trade off, favoring internal over external validity, is a feature of much of the research
to date. A better balance between the two validities will materialize when researchers take
on the challenge of field research. The interaction dynamics described by field researchers
would complement the causal patterns inferred from the laboratory studies. Add to this the
challenges of studying a phenomenon that is fleeting—as in changing moods during the
course of an interaction—and vaguely defined—as when multiple meanings are inferred
from expressions—and there is little wonder that the research to date has progressed slowly.
Emotions are not easy to investigate. But, there is little doubt that it is important to study
them.

Missing also from many laboratory studies is the way that emotional expressions are

shaped by the contexts in which they are displayed. A contextualized view of emotions
would complement the process view preferred by most of the investigators in this issue. One
context of interest is the organization. Directions for research on emotions in organizations
is made by Fineman and his contributors. He asks: “In what ways do decisions unfold over
time as a function of the way people feel, and change their feelings—about themselves, their
projects and significant others? How, for example does anxiety, suspicion, love, and hate
take decision making through various paths towards particular outcomes?” (1993, p. 217).
These questions are also at the heart of research on negotiation. Stretching back to

Walton and

McKersie’s (1965)

intra-organizational model of labor negotiation, researchers have explored

the way that negotiation occurs within and between organizations—particularly with regard
to boundary roles (

Adams 1976; Burke and Biggert 1997

). The research has, however, been

more concerned with strategies than with emotional expressions. The article in this issue
by Chen Yifeng and her colleagues places emotional communications in an organizational
context. Further research along these lines would profit from asking about how emotions are
shaped by the organization and, in turn, how their display influences organizational life.

The articles in this issue

As we note above, progress has been made in the study of emotions in negotiation. Much
of the progress made to date, particularly on anger, is reviewed in the lead article by Van
Kleef and his colleagues. The papers that follow are empirical studies designed to address a
sampling of issues on the topic. Each article is summarized in turn. A concluding article by
Barry looks forward by asking about what we have learned to date and what remains to be
explored on the role of emotions in negotiation.

The article by Van Kleef and his colleagues reviews the research on anger in conflict.

A key finding is that angry feelings promote competition or aggression across conflict set-

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tings. However, the effects of those feelings on the other disputant varies from one setting to
another. The settings compared by the authors are laboratory tasks with different interdepen-
dence structures, outcome options, and number of parties. These tasks include negotiation,
ultimatum bargaining, prisoner’s dilemma, resource dilemmas, and coalition bargaining.
A particularly interesting question is when anger is reciprocated and when it encourages
concessions from the other. The negotiation studies suggest that there may be two processes
at work. One, reciprocated anger, may operate through an emotional route. The other, con-
cession-making, may operate through a strategic route. Which route is taken seems to depend
on a number of intervening variables. These include the relative power of the negotiators and
the justifiability of the anger: powerful opponents (including those with attractive alterna-
tives) were intransigent when their opponent expressed unjustifiable anger. Thus, anger can
backfire in certain circumstances.

In ultimatum bargaining tasks, anger can increase a bargainer’s outcomes if the angry

bargainer’s perceived limits are high. Anger also contributes to the perception of high limits
(or aspirations). However, communicating anger can backfire if the opponent can persuade
you that low offers are actually quite high. Successful deception can moderate the effects of
anger on outcomes. Another moderating variable is the consequences of rejecting an offer.
When the consequences are low, anger does not produce concessions. Thus, anger works in
ultimatum bargaining when the other’s limits are regarded as being low, the consequences for
rejecting offers are high, and deception is largely precluded. It is less likely to work in multi-
party situations. Several studies show that expressing anger prevents forming coalitions that
would maximize outcomes for its members. Two reasons are that relationships are important
for coalition members and bargainers have more choices to consider in multi-party than in
dyadic negotiations.

The authors conclude their article with a summary of the conditions that influence the

interpersonal effects of anger. Anger is beneficial in producing favorable outcomes when:
(a) it is directed at the task rather than the person, (b) it is viewed by the other as being
justified, (c) the relationship between bargainers is interdependent, (d) the expression has
informational value, (e) the bargainers take a strategic approach that encourages using the
expression as information that can aid coordination, and (f) the target of anger has few
opportunities to deceive. As noted above, strategic information may come from the other’s
verbal and non-verbal emotional expressions. Based on this summary of findings, the authors
address the question: When does it pay to be angry? The answer is: When the parties are
interdependent, when they use expressions strategically, and when the anger is seen as being
justified. A number of avenues for further research are then suggested, including studies on
other emotional expressions in negotiation.

Findings on anger suggest that the strategic bargainer may be a Bayesian. First, she ascer-

tains whether the anger (or other expressions) being conveyed has informational value. Then
she asks how often such outbursts have occurred in the past (a priori probabilities). The next
step consists of updating. She may ask about whether the expression is justified, whether it is
intended to communicate information about the other’s limits, whether it is intended to con-
vey information about the importance of the issue being discussed, or whether it indicates an
impatience with the process or with herself, the target of the outburst. Each of these questions
suggests a symptom that can be estimated in terms of probabilities. They are the contingent
probabilities that contribute to a decision about reciprocating the anger (escalation) or mol-
lifying the other (de-escalation): the former is a likely reaction to unjustified anger; the latter
to justified anger. The bargainer’s choice influences the chances that the talks will move in
the direction of an impasse or an agreement. Either of these trajectories is set in motion by

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the other’s reaction, which provides another twist in an ongoing expression game. The next
article introduces another factor or Bayesian symptom—the mode of expression.

The three experiments reported by Pietroni et al. address the interesting issue of whether

it makes a difference to receive numerical or verbal information from a bargaining opponent.
Their findings show that it does make a difference. In the first experiment, negotiators made
larger concessions and smaller demands to the tougher opponent only when that bargainer
gave verbal, affect-laden responses. In the second experiment, negotiators made larger con-
cessions and smaller demands to respectable than unrespectable opponents but only when
he/she responded with affect-laden verbal statements. And, in their third experiment, larger
concessions and smaller demands were made to partners with a nice (rather than untidy)
appearance. Again, this occurred only when opponents provided verbal, affective (rather
than numerical) responses. These results raise questions about the validity of many negoti-
ation experiments that—in contrast to non-laboratory negotiations—rely almost entirely on
numerical information. Typically, in real-world contexts, negotiators engage in verbal dis-
cussions where numerical information is occasionally used to support arguments and offers.

An explanation for these findings, offered by the authors, is that affective information

makes people more sensitive to social cues. This is consistent with results obtained in studies
on intuitive versus analytical information processing: intuitive processing increasing sensi-
tivity to one’s environment. However, a couple of caveats may be in order. One is that intense
emotions, such as those felt and expressed in high-stakes disputes, may have the opposite
effects. Similar to the effects of cognitive-overload, highly emotional disputants may be
largely unaware of their surroundings—an “emotional-overload” effect. Another is that non-
verbal communication of affect may have different effects on bargainers than verbal commu-
nication. This may be due, at least in part, to the ambiguity of interpretation of the nonverbal
displays: the same expression can be interpreted as sending either a tough or soft message.
At the heart of this matter is the way affective information—in either verbal or nonver-
bal modes—is used to attribute intentions to the other. Acting on the attributions, bargainers
may alter their own behavior which, in turn, influences the other’s strategic calculations. This
dual effect of attributions on own and other’s behavior is similar to our discussion above of
Goffman’s expression game. Each negotiator is in easy reach of both the interpretive (decod-
ing) and impression management (encoding) roles.

Based on their findings, the authors suggest issues for further research. One avenue con-

sists of altering the bargaining situation in several ways: Does affective information make
one more sensitive to social cues in face-to-face exchanges where the task allows for inte-
grative agreements? Another issue concerns the matching of emotional expressions in face-
to-face bargaining: Does synchronous expressions, resulting from social contagion, increase
coordination toward agreements? A third issue turns on the combination of numerical and
verbal, affect-laden information: How does sensitivity to social cues change when various
affective and numerical information are mixed?, Does a certain amount of numerical infor-
mation reduce sensitivity to the other’s strategy, their respectability, and their appearance?
The research done by these authors opens a window on the various ways that emotional
information can influence the course of strategic interactions.

The third paper brings with it a shift in emotional tone. In his contribution to this special

issue, Carnevale integrates models of decision-making with models of affect. He asks whether
negotiators’ emotional states influence the impact of decision frame. Specifically, he tests the
intriguing proposition that positive affect may shift negotiators’ reference points and reverse
the well-known framing effect. Drawing on evidence that positive affect increases optimism
and creates stronger expectations of success, he argues that for negotiators who experience
positive affect gains loom larger than losses. On this basis, he predicts that happy negotiators

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will make fewer concessions under a gain frame than under a loss frame. His subsequent
experiments demonstrate, first, that happy negotiators are more cooperative. They make more
concessions and more integrative offers to the other party. Importantly, he also demonstrates
that the framing effect can be reversed under positive affect: whereas affect-neutral negotia-
tors were more resistant to making concessions under a loss frame, positive-affect negotiators
were more resistant to making concessions under a gain frame.

Carnevale’s findings raise several interesting questions for future research. The first is the

link between affect, the activation of neural systems, and negotiators’ behavior. Although this
link between cooperative/competitive strategic choices and neural activity has been explored
in the context of Prisoner’s Dilemma Games, we are yet to understand how affective and neural
systems shape strategic choices in the more ambiguous and uncertain context of negotiation.
This finding also fits with an emerging theme in negotiation research, the context sensitive
nature of many well-established effects. Carnevale adds negotiator frames to a growing list
of variables—including negotiators’ goals and power—that do not influence behavior in a
uniform way. He identifies affect as one contextual factor that modifies the impact of situa-
tional and cognitive variables on negotiators’ behavior. He also highlights the importance of
emotion-as-information, the idea that negotiators use their own affective states to guide their
behavior. He concludes by posing the question of how best to establish a positive mood in
real-life negotiation … and which wine region would facilitate this goal.

Continuing the theme of context-sensitivity, Kopelman and Rosette ask whether there is

cultural variation in how negotiators respond to strategic displays. Unlike the other papers in
this issue, Kopelman and Rosette focus on strategic (intentional) displays of emotion rather
then experienced or genuine emotion. These authors ask whether the finding that negotiators
are more likely to accept ultimatum offers when they are accompanied by the expression of
positive emotions is culture-specific. They argue that, for emotional expression to be effec-
tive, it needs to be congruent with the cultural values of the other party in a negotiation. This
implies that expressing positive emotions will be effective when the other party values har-
mony whereas expressing negative emotions will be effective when the other party is focused
on haggling. In their first experiment, Kopelman and Rosette demonstrate that Asian negoti-
ators are more likely to accept offers that are made in the context of positive emotions than
those made in the context of negative emotions. In their second experiment, they contrast the
impact of strategic emotional displays in a culture that values harmony (Hong Kong) to one
that values directness and straight-talking (Israel). This experiment replicates the findings
from Experiment 1 (with Asians) but, contrary to these authors’ hypotheses, shows Israeli
negotiators to be indifferent to whether an offer is accompanied by expressions of positive
or negative emotions.

These findings add to our understanding of how emotion plays out in negotiation in several

ways. First, the results add culture to the list of variables that shape negotiators’ responses to
emotional displays. Second, by demonstrating that cultures vary in their sensitivity to emo-
tional displays, they highlight the need to better understand the mechanisms underlying the
culture-affect relationship. In particular, they open the possibility that cultures in which emo-
tional appeals are accepted as influence tactics may be more sensitive to emotional displays
then cultures in which rationality prevails. Third, they highlight the need to better understand
whether negotiators can differentiate between genuine and strategic emotional expression,
and whether this matters.

The article by Chen Yifeng and her colleagues extends the tradition of research on coop-

eration to workplace interactions in China. Earlier research by

Johnson (1971)

identified

the communication of warmth as an important influence on negotiation and related inter-
actions. This communication involves both verbal statements and nonverbal expressions.

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9

Both types of communication channels were used in this study: communicating an interest in
listening to the employees’ problems, facial expressions, eye contact, leaning toward, open
gestures, positive vocal tone. Opposite verbal and nonverbal communications were used
to convey indifference. As hypothesized, warm-hearted managers (compared to those who
were indifferent) facilitated the development of a cooperative relationship and helped them
to discuss issues in an integrative fashion. A twist taken by these investigators was to frame
the simulated interaction between a “foreign manager” and workers. Since this is a sensitive
issue, albeit a frequent occurrence, in modern China, these findings would seem to contribute
to discussions about how to improve workplace relationships. However, whether the verbal or
nonverbal components of these interactions are more important remains to be explored. How
these components contribute to attributions of a manager’s intentions also merit attention in
further research.

These authors also manipulated the way that rewards would be distributed. Following the

tradition of research set in motion by

Deutsch (1985)

, they compared mutual, independent,

and comparative distributions. As expected—and consistent with earlier findings—workers
in the mutual distribution condition made more integrated decisions, agreed more often, and
perceived the manager as being more effective than those in the other conditions. Although
the effects of this manipulation were not as strong as those obtained for warm-heatedness, the
pattern supports the value of reward structures that promote interdependence. And, the effects
are additive rather than interactive: warm-hearted communications (an affective variable) and
mutual reward structures (an information-processing variable) combine to strengthen the per-
ception of positive relationships. It remains to be learned whether these impression-manage-
ment tactics also improve negotiating effectiveness in the Chinese context. Of interest also is
the question whether these effects are particularly strong in cultures that value group rewards:
Do these approaches improve workplace interactions in more individualist societies?

Taken together, the articles in this collection offer an interesting set of issues for continuing

research on emotions in negotiation. First, we can look forward to studies that examine other
emotions such as surprise when expectations are disappointed, sadness when alternatives are
unattractive and dependency increases, shame when face is lost, and interest or involvement
when the stakes increase. Second, the interplay between emotions and cognitions presents an
interesting array of research challenges: for example, the way that bargainers use affective
information to develop or changes strategies. Third, process dynamics call for further inves-
tigation. In particular, interactive processes such as those described by the expression-game
paradigm need to be better understood. A related issue is the coordination of emotional expres-
sions: When does matching perpetuate impasses and when does it resolve them? Fourth, there
is much yet to be learned about the contexts for emotional expression. Included in these con-
texts are the number of parties, organizational norms, and cultures. A question of interest
is how these contexts shape the way emotions are expressed and read. The idea of cultural
display rules may be relevant also for organizations and negotiation structures. A number of
other themes ripe for exploration—particularly the interplay between emotions and cogni-
tions—are developed by Barry in his concluding article. He also discusses methodological
innovations contributed by researchers as well as some obstacles that face them in the study
of emotions. Clearly, there is hardly a limit on the variety of issues that remain to be explored
on this topic. We invite our readers to join us on the journey.

Acknowledgements

Hearty thanks are extended to Cameron Anderson, Jeanne Brett, William Donohue,

Neil Fassina, Ray Friedman, Andrea Griffin, Anne Lytle, and Cheryl Rivers for serving as reviewers of the
articles in this special issue.

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